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Abstract
In today’s global economy a flexible and responsive telecommunications infrastructure is 
essential to the maintenance and development of a country’s economy. Within a free 
market, such an infrastructure depends upon the use of common standards; either imposed 
as a consequence of regulation or evolved through the operation of the market. This thesis 
investigates the influence of regulation and standardisation on Intelligent Network 
telecommunications technology by addressing the hypothesis:
Tight architecture-based regulation is inappropriate for a rapidly changing 
telecommunications environment, since that environment is continually challenging 
and redefining the boundaries o f technological change.
The multi-method approach adopted is based upon triangulation to identify multiple 
viewpoints. A Stakeholder Analysis was employed to help categorise those with an interest 
in Intelligent Networks and provide a basis for data collection. The primary data was 
gathered using a combination of surveys and interviews.
The thesis illustrates a wide range of original research. A unique analysis framework was 
constructed to identify a number of factors, including technical and commercial influences 
and their impact on the choice of IN architecture and the implementation of regulations. 
This framework offers a new perspective with which to view IN architectures; leading to 
the development and implementation of alternative IN architecture models. A number of 
these architectures have been constructed, together with some novel services, to 
demonstrate what could be achieved by employing flexible, less detailed standards, or 
making use of proprietary protocols.
The research concludes that tight regulation is not appropriate for Intelligent Network 
technology. Instead, encouragement for implementation and interconnection is better 
shaped through the development and adoption of de-jure standards.
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1 Introduction
1 Introduction
1.1 Background
In 1993, the UK telecommunications industry was nearing the end of its first decade of 
private ownership; a decade of rapid change and major innovation. The previous seventy 
years had seen the introduction of direct dialling and international dialling but little else of 
obvious significance to the consumer. Behind the scenes the technology had changed, 
making the service more efficient, with the introduction of crossbar and electronic 
exchanges, digital links, and satellite communications. The years since UK 
telecommunications liberalisation (1984) had heralded a vast number of changes for 
consumers, including the private ownership of telephone apparatus, the introduction of 
exchange-based services, touch-tone dialling, better quality transmission, and most 
importantly competition for the monopoly operator British Telecommunications (BT).
As the UK’s monopoly supplier, British Telecommunication’s (BT) perspective was 
different. Policies and paradigms that had been followed over a long period had to be 
rethought at short notice and the workforce (still predominantly regarding itself part of the 
government workforce) re-educated. As the incumbent monopoly supplier, BT could only 
lose market share and hence there was a real danger that income would decrease if new 
products and services were not implemented quickly to counter this loss. Although the 
introduction of competition and lower prices were the key drivers, competitors who offered 
better customer service could tempt customers away firom BT, resulting in a more rapid 
loss of market share. This shifting climate required that all new services be justified on the 
basis of revenue generation, rather than the general benefit to UK consumers. The 
necessary changes were enabled by BT’s freedom to act independently of the Treasury, a 
consequence of privatisation. The Treasury was no longer able to claim a share of the 
profits above normal taxation (EIU 1995), limit re-investment, or dictate pricing policy.
The EU, observing the general success of the UK, US and Finnish privatisation 
programmes, was proposing to liberalise the European telecommunications market.
‘A liberalised market is also a flexible one. Telecommunications is a domain 
characterised by constant change and rapid technological progress’ (EU 1995).
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A liberalised telecommunications market would be aided by applying the Open Network 
Provision (ON?) directive to telecommunications networks. In particular, there was the 
potential to apply the ON? directive to specific technologies such as Intelligent Networks.
The Intelligent Network (IN) concept was conceived in the US. The essential idea is to 
provide a central store for network routing information, which is interrogated whenever a 
call is routed between two local exchanges. Although each routing request to the central 
location increases the call set-up time, it was found to be a cost effective way of 
implementing selective innovative services.
Whilst working for Concert (a British Telecommunications joint venture), I had direct 
experience of designing network architectures conforming to regulations and I was aware 
of the restrictions some regulation imposed on the level of service that could be offered to 
the customer. I also became aware that a comprehensive opening of IN interfaces, as was 
implied by the application of the ON? directive, could potentially reduce the level of 
service offered to customers using IN technology.
The research described in this thesis was prompted by two events; a survey undertaken by 
the EU (ETCO 1990), and a consultation paper published by the Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI 1992). The responses to these events formed part of the EU’s assessment of 
the application of the ONP directive to INs, by investigating the feasibility of opening the 
various interfaces of an Intelligent Network. Opening these interfaces would allow 
competing telephone companies greater control and access to information.
This thesis offers a study of the issues surrounding the possible introduction of regulations. 
It relates specifically to Intelligent Networks in the public switched telephone network, 
based upon research undertaken between 1994 and 2000.
1 ONP is a European Directive (EU 1990), which identifies that for certain areas (e.g. voice telephony 
services), Operators must be allowed to interconnect and inter-work. For this to be achievable, those 
telecommunications interfaces must be open and declared. This allows Suppliers to develop equipment 
enabling interconnection and ultimately brings consumer choice to that market segment.
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1.2 Hypothesis
Regulations and rulings in the EU have traditionally been preceded by information- 
gathering activities and research studies. It was therefore likely that when the EU, and then 
the DTI, undertook exercises on opening up the Intelligent Network architecture, 
regulation in support of legislation was likely to be applied to Operators deploying INs.
The European Technical Standards Institute (ETSI) had been working to develop 
acceptable IN standards in Europe. In the UK, licensing conditions imposed an obligation 
on Operators to adopt standard interfaces for the technologies they used. The Network 
Interfaces Co-ordination Committee of OFTEL had said:
‘.. .public systems must inter-work coherently to provide network services.. .inter­
working and interaction require the use of well defined interfaces. ..such interfaces 
cannot be defined by any one party in isolation fi*om others’ (OFTEL 1993 pi).
Within the EU, Memorandums of Commitment were used to encourage the 
implementation of inter-network interfaces to an agreed timescale, thus allowing ease of 
interconnection and the widest geographical coverage of services. Within the UK a licence 
condition required Operators to allow interconnection to certain interface types so as to 
encourage the introduction and spread of new services.
There was a good chance that INs would have had such conditions applied to them. This 
could have disadvantaged Operators implementing a proprietary IN solution, since they 
might have been forced to update their technology to conform to new standards. 
Alternatively, if upgrading was not mandatory, an Operator might resist relinquishing their 
proprietary solution, concerned by the potential loss of business as a result of other 
Operators utilising their standardised interfaces. Either way. Operators might choose to 
delay the implementation of INs.
The converse strategy would be to allow the market to shape both the technology and the 
associated standards:
‘Technical innovation would be driven by the demands of service providers and 
consumers as well as by the threat of competition from alternative technologies 
such as wireless and satellite’ (EIU 1995 Summary).
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The view held at the time was that if a technology were successful, the market would 
quickly demand standardisation and the opening of appropriate points of interconnection, 
so as to facilitate the development of service offerings. However, left to market forces. 
Operators will naturally optimise such developments to best suit their own business 
strategy.
There appeared to be very little published material addressing the issues associated with 
the interconnection of Intelligent Networks by competitors, at anything other than the basic 
network transport level. The lack of analysis in such a significant area was one of the 
reasons the research was undertaken.
These observations, in the context of the emergence of INs, led to the development of the 
following hypothesis:
Tight architecture-based regulation is inappropriate for a rapidly changing^ 
telecommunications environment, since that environment is continually challenging 
and redefining the boundaries o f technological change.
History has shown that regulations formulated for one situation often have to expand to 
embrace other situations not envisaged at the time the regulations were conceived, with the 
result that the regulations could be far firom ideal for these new situations. It was therefore 
arguable that if the regulation of INs was not carefully articulated, it would effectively 
restrict the type and flexibility of the services offered to customers.
 ^ ‘Rapidly changing’ in this context indicates the continuous demand for new innovative telecommunication 
services overlaid with the frequent arrival o f new technology. A  compromise is always being sought for the 
benefits it brings and its potential longevity, versus developing what exists to meet market needs.
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Consideration of the hypothesis and the paucity of literature led to the development of five 
key research questions:
• Are INs a service in themselves or simply a means to deliver services?
• Does regulation or detailed standardisation constrain technical innovation, 
service delivery, or both?
• Is legislative regulation the appropriate means to shape a technology in rapid 
change?
• How can it be ensured that robust technical and architectural models exist 
before standards are ratified?
• Do the members of the standardisation bodies (often the employees of the 
incumbent monopolies) subvert the goals of the regulators?
The goal of this thesis is to address these questions and contribute to the debate that 
surrounds them. To this end a series of interviews, together with two surveys, have been 
undertaken with key players and stakeholders associated with the development of INs.
The outcome of the research is a series of recommendations. These address both the micro 
level, such as the architecture of Intelligent Networks (INs) and the focus of 
standardisation organisations, as well as the macro level, such as the standardisation 
fi*amework.
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1.3 Themes
In analysing the hypothesis a number of themes emerge as key to the research.
Intelligent Network Architecture
There are differences in the IN standards implemented in the US and Europe and hence 
subtle variations in the operation of the architecture. These operational differences are 
being continually challenged and slowly evolved, as evidenced by conference papers, 
standardisation bodies’ submissions and the resulting standards. Both US and European 
architectures conform to the ITU-T standard, which is based upon a specific architectural 
model. However, this model does not appear to have been rigorously tested before it was 
used to evolve standards.
Some of the evolving standards for INs facilitate inter-working with other technologies. In 
this respect, the Intelligent Network appears to be an ‘enabling technology’, in that other 
technologies are required to work with it in order to gain acceptance and stand a chance of 
being implemented by Operators in their telecommunications networks. The 
standardisation of INs thus far, is premised on the assumption that the existing IN 
architecture is the most appropriate. This thesis questions such an assumption and explores 
the implications of alternative architectures and their associated regulatory implications.
Industry Dynamics
There has been little work specifically centred on INs and their impact/influence upon the 
telecommunications industry. Robin Mansell is one of a few writers to address the 
‘.. .implications of the strategies and tactics of the telecommunications supplier, user and 
policy community’, using Intelligent Networks as a common technology for comparison 
purposes (Mansell 1993). The interaction between the different players in the 
telecommunications industry impacts upon the equipment produced, how it works and the 
services offered. It is therefore usefiil to understand who the dominant players are (if any) 
and their level of interaction/influence over the others.
Standardisation
There is a very large number of interest and sub-interest groups contributing directly, or 
indirectly, to the standardisation organisations. These groups document roles and
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responsibilities, interactions and information flows within their organisations, but the inter­
relationships between standardisation bodies (e.g. ITU-T and IETF), and between the 
bodies and industry is less well identified. The members of these groups, their sponsors, 
and how they interact in the context of standards setting, are important factors from a 
regulatory perspective. The thesis identifies these relationships and assesses their impact 
upon the process of regulation.
Regulatory Environment
The thesis does not attempt to argue the case for competition; a number of people (Beesley 
1981, Baldwin et al. 1984) have already done so. Legislation originating at either the EU or 
national level creates a framework that is applied by means of regulation. In the UK, 
regulation is often applied by conditions embodied within an Operator's licence and has a 
major impact on the way Operators interact in the competitive environment. This thesis 
accepts the EU strategy for promoting competition, but tries to align the way the strategy is 
implemented with the many other drivers of technical innovation. The thesis does this by 
concentrating on those aspects of the regulatory environment specific to INs.
1.4 Research Boundaries
As with any research, boundaries need to be defined so as to constrain and focus the scope 
of the activities undertaken. The key boundaries established for this research are those of 
geography and technology.
The geographical area to be studied was identified according to the following criteria:
• standards bodies within a region were taking a particular interest in Intelligent 
Network standards;
• a number of telecommunications service providers within the region were 
using/implementing Intelligent Network technology; and
• the ease of data collection.
The areas initially chosen were North America, Europe and the Pacific Rim (Figure 1.1).
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Figure 1.1 Areas of Interest
Although the first IN standards were developed and implemented in North America, by the 
start of this research the technology deployed in North America was only marginally more 
advanced than that being deployed by European Operators and hence the North American 
influence on standards-setting was on a par with Europe. The influence of the Pacific Rim 
countries in the development of the IN standards was not significant at that time.
Partially for this reason, but owing more to the ease of collecting information and data, the 
main geographical focus areas for this research is Europe, and hence European regulations. 
However evidence and information is drawn from North America and the Pacific Rim 
regions where appropriate.
Within the areas of IN implementation, there have been two different realisations of IN, 
each with their own standards. These are the fixed network and the mobile network. The 
fixed network is the telecommunications system providing connectivity to telephones 
linked by a wire traceable back to a local telephone exchange. The mobile network is the
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telecommunications system providing connectivity to mobile telephones, that allow people 
to make and receive telephone calls whilst on the move away from their home or office.
The most widely implemented standardised IN mobile technology is termed Global System 
for Mobile (GSM). At the commencement of this research, GSM was an emerging mobile 
technology, with a significant level of preliminary standardisation work already undertaken 
in Europe, discussing and defining appropriate architectures and methods of 
interconnection.
This research has focussed on the implementation of fixed network INs, since it was the 
regulation of fixed network INs that the EU and DTI were considering in their studies, the 
lessons being learned from GSM^ indicating that a co-ordinated EU approach would aid 
interworking, flexibility and competition.
While fixed networks have evolved to employ different technologies (e.g. Voice Over 
Internet Protocol), mobile network evolution has essentially retained the same 
technological architecture model. The continued evolution of INs in the mobile network 
and a large legacy base of IN in the fixed network, ensure that the findings of this research 
are valid in the current telecommunications environment.
When this study commenced, a primary goal of Operators was to offer data and voice 
services via common links (EIU 1996), thereby providing customers with integrated access 
and a single bill. Intelligent Networks could have been used to facilitate such a migration. 
However the thesis does not discuss the use of the IN concept to aid the integration of 
voice services with those of data, since any initial regulation of IN interfaces was unlikely 
to impact this area.
 ^GSM technology was regulatory driven, following the findings o f an EU (1987) study which identified that 
with no action. Member States would use a variety o f systems. A variety o f  systems would result in reduced 
inter-working, flexibility, and competition. Consequentially, EU sponsored discussions took place, and the 
resulting standards became Memorandum o f Understandings (MOUs) and then European Technical 
Standards Institute (ETSI) standards. The majority o f the regulatory issues surrounding the GSM technology 
had therefore been addressed from the outset and effectively resolved before the technology was 
implemented.
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1.5 Thesis Structure
The Intelligent Network Development and Research Methods review (Chapter 2) was 
undertaken to develop knowledge of Intelligent Networks and IN Standards. This 
identified the operation and issues associated with INs (conceptualising the problem), 
achieved a level of understanding to aid discussion with the experts, and allowed 
meaningful questionnaires to be formulated. Sources of information were interviews with 
experts, practitioners and those interested in the area, the reading of primary source 
material such as technical specifications, and secondary source material such as conference 
papers and books. The technology and standardisation research areas also benefited firom 
some grey literature (not fully available in the public domain), such as internal BT 
documents and EU/ETSI working party papers.
Little information was found relating to the research methods employed to gather the data 
used in the literature. As a consequence, the literature review was expanded to include 
research methods that might be applicable, or adaptable, to IN technology and 
standardisation. Sources were informal interviews with practitioners, secondary sources 
such as books and to a certain extent, my own expertise gained firom undergraduate, post 
graduate and work-related research.
The Research Design chapter (Chapter 3) identifies the structure and planning of the 
research, the research methods adopted or adapted to meet the needs of the research, and 
justification for the courses of action taken. It allowed the production of a plan detailing 
what work needed to be undertaken for the research and the systematic way it should be 
undertaken.
The material for this chapter derived from the research methods material identified in the 
previous chapter, suitably selected as being directly applicable, or able to be developed 
into a useful capability.
The Evolution of Intelligent Network Technologv chapter (Chapter 4) discusses Intelligent 
Network technology in detail. It provides an understanding of how it is currently used in a 
public telecommunications network and the types of service it allows to be offered, 
together with its advantages and disadvantages over a traditional telecommunications
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network architecture. This allows the thesis to investigate the development and exploration 
of alternative services and architectures. It sets the scene to better understand the findings 
fi*om the surveys detailed in a later chapter.
Research for this chapter was based on primary sources in the form of ETSI technical 
specifications, together with interviews of ETSI working group attendees. Later stages of 
the research benefited from my own experience/expertise, discussion with colleagues and 
analysis of data derived fi'om BT’s network. The outcome of this was the development of a 
series of new architecture models used as the basis of Survey 1. Additionally a framework 
was evolved for the consideration of the choice of IN architecture. Secondary data included 
technical articles, books, conference papers and BT documentation on Intelligent Network 
architectures and operation.
Chapter 5 on The Evolution of Regulation and Standardisation Policies in Regulation. 
examines the history of regulation in the UK and identifies parallels and lessons that can be 
learnt from history. It examines the current regulatory environment and identifies the 
structure of regulation within the EU, particularly in the UK. Where appropriate, it draws 
upon contrasting examples from North America and the Pacific Rim. The work for this 
chapter developed an understanding of how regulation was evolving and applied in the UK 
and EU and how the ETSI standards institution operated. This resulted in the development 
of information flow diagrams and an understanding of the major influencers at different 
stages in the processes.
The research for this chapter was based on primary material firom OFTEL, interviews with 
staff at the DTI, OFTEL, Norwegian Regulatory Authority, ETSI policy working group 
leaders and attendees, European Commission representatives, together with my analysis of 
the UK Operator licences and the UK telecommunication acts. Secondary sources were 
books relating to the function of the EU and the history of UK telecommunications.
Chapter 6 addresses Stakeholder Attitudes and Concerns. It summarises the analysis of the 
two surveys undertaken for this research (in 1996 & 1998) in order to address a number of 
the questions arising from the research hypothesis. The first survey addressed three core 
areas:
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• Stakeholder reaction to some alternative IN architectures developed as part of the 
research;
• an assessment of the initial research findings regarding the issues associated with 
the implementation and interconnection of Intelligent Networks; and
• collected the opinions of interested parties.
The second survey, undertaken a few years later, introduced topics more relevant to 1998 
than 1996 (e.g. interconnection to the Internet) and aimed to determine how stakeholder 
perception of the key areas of concern had changed. (Copies of the questionnaires are 
given in Appendices A and B).
The Implications and Issues for the Regulation and Standardisation of Different Intelligent 
Network Models (Chapter 7), assimilates the findings from the individual chapters relating 
to the hypothesis questions and draws out the lessons to be learnt. It discusses this in 
relation to the appropriateness of the European Union’s (EU) and OFTEL's actions, 
formulating the issues that need to be addressed, together with recommendations for their 
future focus. The chapter reviews the appropriateness, or otherwise, of the hypothesis and 
suggests areas in which further study could be undertaken to progress the research.
The Appendices contain reference material related to the questionnaires (A & B), 
supplementary material detailing the types and classes of telecommunications licence 
available in the UK (C), a summary of the operating structure of the EU (D), an example of 
the documentation produced in the development of EU legislation (E), and a list of people 
interviewed for this research (F).
Information gained fi'om interviews is not contained within a particular section but is 
referenced from the various sections as appropriate.
A Glossary of acronyms is provided and where appropriate, an explanation of their 
context.
References given in the text are listed at the end of each chapter.
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The thesis draws on more than 20 years of the author’s professional experience in the 
telecommunications industry, which has played a key part in identifying the issues 
associated with the practical implementation of ‘regulation’. Early work showed a 
deficiency in the research literature regarding the policy issues associated with Intelligent 
Networks. The thesis therefore focused on Intelligent Network Technology and details the 
pressures and issues associated with the regulation of this technology.
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2 Intelligent Network Development and Research 
Methods
2.1 Introduction
Intelligent Networks (INs) provide a specific solution to the problem of providing voice 
telephony services. INs per se, are unique to large networks, interconnecting with several 
Operators, requiring specific standardisation and regulatory frameworks. At the same time, 
INs are just another form of telecommunications infrastructure and as such, are amenable 
to many of the research strategies and methods previously employed by researchers.
This chapter offers a study of the literature pertaining to Intelligent Networks. Researching 
this literature allowed a review of existing knowledge as well as giving insights into how 
that knowledge was obtained, i.e. the research methods used. This review divides 
conveniently into two parts, one associated with technological development (which focuses 
on IN architecture, standardisation and regulatory frameworks), and the other for the 
research methods.
The former part identifies the literature applicable to the operation and architecture of 
Intelligent Networks. It highlights the bodies and individuals associated with the evolution 
of the IN architecture, the standardisation process, the regulatory environment and the 
telecommunications industry. As such, it is key to understanding the various issues raised 
by the development and implementation of INs. Knowledge from interviews undertaken 
for this research are reported here in order to assist understanding the knowledge context of 
the research.
As will be seen however, the technical literature review identifies little relevant published 
material, with the result that this research places greater emphasis upon primary material. 
This led to the need to consider basic data-gathering research techniques, the subject of the 
latter part of this chapter, which identifies the strategies and techniques that have been 
employed by researchers gathering knowledge for other studies. It introduces the 
components of the research and presents the terminology used in the data-gathering 
process. It also offers support for the course of action adopted, based upon the specific 
research activity, (although how this process may have been adapted/developed for the
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particular needs of this thesis is explored in Chapter 3). Broader requirements, which help 
avoid mistakes or errors (e.g. validity-seeking research), are also defined.
2.2 Knowledge Review
I work for British Telecommunications (BT) as a ‘Systems Design Authority’, leading the 
design of new technology and its introduction into BT’s telecommunications network.
Prior to commencing this research, I had an extremely limited knowledge of Intelligent 
Networks, but had responsibility for developing international conferencing services for 
Concert (one of BT's subsidiary companies at the time).
Since the start of the research, I have replaced BT’s proprietary IN network elements, have 
worked on the design of mm02’s third generation mobile network, itself an IN-type 
architecture^ and am currently undertaking a design study into the viability of introducing 
an Intelligence Platform into the BT broadband network.
I have therefore applied to this research, my experience of the types of issues affecting the 
introduction of new technology, the interconnection of networks and network elements and 
the implementation of services.
Intelligent Network Architecture^
The concept of Intelligent Networks was introduced by Bellcore (the United States 
telecommunications research body (since renamed Telcordia'), which was jointly funded 
by the seven Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs) in the USA in 1984, when 
AT&T’s monopoly was broken and the telecommunications industry became deregulated 
(Ungerer 1990). The Intelligent Network comprised of a central computer, which held 
customer related information and routeing data. When a call was placed to a destination, a 
query was transmitted firom the local exchange to the central computer requesting routing 
information for that destination. The routeing information was returned to the querying 
Exchange permitting completion of the call set-up (Figure 2.1). The major benefit was that 
routeing data was held at a single location in the network and could be updated quickly and 
cheaply, rather than requiring updates to be carried out at all exchanges. The net result was
* See Chapter 1 for a description o f the differences between mobile and fixed Intelligent Networks.
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that call routeing became dynamic and new services, or previously uneconomic services 
(e.g. non geographic routeing), became viable.
What do 
I do with ^  
this call? y Computer
Information
Dialled
ExchangeNumber
/  . Connect to 
Destination
Caller
Connecting Call
Call
Connected
Exchange
Destination
Figure 2.1 Basic Intelligent Network Architecture
The progressive adoption of INs in the late 1980s and early 1990s, led to the 
standardisation of the basic architecture and interfaces in 1993 (ITU-T 1993c). Both the 
ANSI organisation in the USA and ETSI in the EU produced their own regional variants of 
these standards, termed the Advanced Intelligent Network (AIN) and the IN Capability Set 
(CS)^ respectively. ETSI appeared to follow the ITU-T standards more closely than ANSI, 
possibly due to the legacy of (Bellcore) Intelligent Network systems influence in the USA 
on the US regional standard; this was not the case in Europe. This led to essentially two 
key standardised Call State Models'  ^being implemented world-wide, thus limiting the 
potential for interworking of services between networks utilising the differing standards. 
The assumption that the IN architecture adopted by the standardisation bodies is actually 
the most appropriate, is one that this research has challenged. A number of alternative 
architectures were developed and used as the basis of the first survey to test their 
appropriateness to different groups of stakeholders. These models and related aspects of
The research considers the term ‘Architecture’ in the context o f an Intelligent Network, as the ITU-T 
theoretical conceptual operation o f an IN; i.e. that Service Control and Call Control are separated. The term 
‘model’ describes the differing physical implementations o f that concept.
 ^Sometimes the ETSI variant was termed the IN Application Part (i.e. ETSI INAP), but the ETSI INAP 
standards were re-submitted to the ITU-T for formal recognition, forming an ITU-T Capability Set (CS) 
release. Thus ETSI closely followed the ITU-T IN standard because frequently it was the same (due to this 
re-submission) and hence ETSI tended to use the same terminology as the ITU-T i.e. ‘Capability Set’.
^ The Call State Model is the part o f the IN standard specification which indicates at what point in a 
telephone call queries can be made to the centralised intelligence.
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the survey findings have been presented and published in conference proceedings 
(Shepherd 1997 a, b, c) and are presented and discussed in Chapter 4.
The primary material for the review of IN technology took the form of experts involved in 
the development of standards, standardisation body Working Group discussion notes (e.g. 
ITU-T 1995) and the standards themselves. Secondary material existed in the form of 
telecommunication journal articles, conference papers, published papers, etc. Such papers 
were either factual, or proposals based upon the author’s thoughts with little or no 
supportive evidence (e.g. Chang et al. 1997, El-Gendy et al. 1995, ICIN 1996).
The CSl Intelligent Network Conceptual Model consists of four levels. These are the 
Service Plane, Global Functional Plane, Distributed Functional Plane and Physical Plane 
(ITU-T 1993a). The Service Plane presents a high level view of the service as seen by the 
service user. The Global Functional Plane provides visibility of the different functions^ of 
the Intelligent Network. The Global Functional Plane additionally contains the call model, 
which essentially determines the points in the call from which actions can be instigated. It 
is the operation within this plane that is fundamentally different in the ANSI IN and ETSI 
CS implementations. The Distributed Functional Plane provides visibility of the distributed 
functions of the Intelligent Network, which are defined as Functional Entity Actions 
(FEAs) (e.g. call processing). The Physical Plane models the physical parts of the 
Intelligent Network, these being known as Physical Entities (e.g. an exchange) and the 
protocols they use to communicate.
The two planes key to this research and hence addressed in this thesis, are the Distributed 
Functional Plane and the Physical Plane.
The contents of the Distributed Functional Plane are shown in Figure 2.2 and are explained 
in detail in Chapter 4.
 ^The different functions take the form o f Service Independent building Blocks (SIBs), A  service is provided 
by a combination o f one or more SIBs.
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SCnF Service Creation Function
SMF Service Management Function
SCF Service Control Function
SDF Service Data Function
SSF Service Switching Function
CCF Call Control Function
CCAF Call Control Access Function
SCnF
Figure 2.2 ITU-T Intelligent Architecture Functional Model (CSl)
Thanyneberge et al. (1997) discussed the ITU-T model with reference to AIN standards 
and in particular the development of the AT&T IN standards. Magedanz et al. (1996) 
offered coverage with an American emphasis, but additionally introduced the concept of 
Intelligent Agents (moving software entities from one place to another to find 
information). Exchange Suppliers were a further source of information, several of which 
produced summaries of IN technology for prospective customers. These emphasised the 
benefits of their products (which may or may not have aligned with standards) and often 
replaced the standardised terms of key elements with company specific product names (e.g. 
Northern Telecom 1993). The texts suggested ways of mapping distributed functions onto 
functional entities. The most common is reflected in Figure 2.3, the others being minor 
variations of this.
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Figure 2.3 A Typical Mapping of the Functions to Physical Entities
The mapping of functions to Physical Entities shown in Figure 2.3, essentially reflects the 
physical model of the ITU-T CSl standard architecture. For instance, only the interfaces 
between the physical elements such as the Service Switching Point (SSP) to Service 
Control Point (SCP) interface were defined, whilst those within an element, (CCF to SSF 
in this example), were left undefined because most Suppliers had already implemented 
such interfaces in a proprietary manner.
The research was also interested in the ways different Telecommunications Operators had 
implemented Intelligent Networks within their networks. Jabbari’s work not only 
duplicated the discussions of other authors on the generic structure of INs (e.g. Jabbari 
1993b), but additionally provided an insight into the structure of Operators’ INs (e.g. 
Jabbari 1993a). Dufour (1998), Li et al. (1993) and Mansell (1993), similarly offer insights 
into Operators’ IN implementations. However, specific implementation details, although 
freely available in the early 1990s, had proved difficult to obtain by about 1996. This was
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probably due to the increased level of competition resulting from the proposed liberalised 
EU telecommunications market in 1998 (interview Ward 1993). Information relating to 
Operators’ implementations of Intelligent Networks during this later period, could only be 
gleaned by piecing together information in articles, press releases and interviews (e.g. 
interview Cullen 1996), with Dufour’s (1998) book, being an exception.
Early technological literature therefore covered the fundamentals of the Intelligent 
Network architecture, but most restricted their coverage to one implementation style, either 
Bellcore or the subsequent Advanced Intelligent Network (AIN) standard and 
implementation, or the International Telecommunication Union - Telecommunications 
(ITU-T) Capability Set (CS) standards and implementation.
More recent literature has focused on developing the basic IN concept as a means to satisfy 
the demand for greater bandwidth (Venieris et al. 1998) and mobility (Christensen et al. 
2000). Unfortunately the American/European divide continues to be apparent. For instance 
Christensen et al.’s (2000) book ‘Wireless Intelligent Networking’, concentrates upon the 
American National Standards Institute (ANSI) equivalent of the European Technical 
Standards Institute’s (ETSI’s) Customised Application for Mobile Enhanced Logic 
(CAMEL) architecture^.
There appeared to be very little published material regarding the issues surrounding 
interconnection by competitors at anything other than the basic network transport level.
The exceptions were the studies undertaken by the European Telecommunications 
Consultancy Organisation (ETCO) on behalf of the European Union (EU) (ETCO 1990), 
KPMG’s report (KPMG 1993) and the collated responses to the Department of Trade and 
Industry consultative document (DTI 1992). Other elements of information in this area 
were gained from interviews (e.g. interview Leeson 1995). These activities identified that 
interconnect at levels other than the IN transport level were being trialled in the United 
States of America. The capability was termed the Mediated Access Function (MAF) and 
allowed Service Control Point (SCP) access to third parties. Bell South implemented this 
capability on the SCP and allowed access via a system called SKY (interview Thomas
 ^Camel is an IN architecture, the nomenclature being based upon fixed network INs, but being used in the 
mobile environment to allow (typically) pre-pay mobile telephony.
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1994b), whereas BellCanada integrated the MAF as part of the Signalling Transfer Point 
(ST?) (interview Cullen 1996) (Figure 2.4).
SCP SCP
STP
Bell South Bell Canada
Figure 2.4 North American implementation of the Mediated Access Function
As time has progressed, other technologies have evolved to challenge INs (e.g. the Internet 
Protocol). David Isenberg was one of the first to confront what was considered the 
paradigm^ of Intelligent Networks as an ongoing network architecture, (with others 
following in the same vein e.g. Waesche 1999). Isenberg's (1998a) article summarised a 
paper entitled ‘The Rise of the Stupid Network’ that he had circulated on the Internet. This 
was written while he worked for a major US telecommunications provider and effectively 
challenged the thinking of his company (and arguably every other major 
telecommunications provider) at the time. In it he challenged the assumption that 
Operators should control networks by building in centrally managed intelligence. He 
argued that
‘The cost of infrastructure has been falling at a much faster rate than carriers have 
been able to depreciate and replace their legacy networks. As a result, new entrants 
are technologically better placed to succeed in the liberalised telecoms 
environment. This is especially true in Europe, where for years the incumbent
The Intelligent Network Paradigm was that ‘Intelligent Networks was the telecommunications technology 
to use for voice services’. No one had considered/challenged that paradigm to discuss what technology would 
replace Intelligent Networks, or when that was likely to be.
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national carriers have built up centralised, proprietary, intelligent networks.’ (ibid
1998a)
This, he said, put the incumbent carriers at a disadvantage. To counter this disadvantage he 
introduced the idea of a ‘Stupid Network’, which encouraged intelligence at the end 
terminals.
The challenge provoked a response by Ericsson’s vice President, Per Jomer (Jomer 1998), 
in which Jomer undertook to counter Isenberg’s argument but conceded that ‘intelligence 
was moving from the connectivity network out to the terminals’.
Isenberg countered with another article, (Isenberg 1998b) in which he criticised Jomer for 
failing to acknowledge that the separation of the network layer from the service layer 
would increase the rate of innovation and ‘tends to put distance between the source of 
innovation and established telecoms equipment and service providers’. That is to say the 
very act of separating the services from the network, as in an IN, would allow the 
introduction of third party service developers and providers. This would create a situation 
where services no longer need to be centralised, pushing the services out to the edge of the 
network. The act of introducing one architecture, the IN, would create a situation where 
another architecture evolves, or is more appropriate. Taken to its extreme, the services no 
longer need to reside in the Operator’s network, but could be migrated to the customer’s 
premises within the Customer Premise Equipment - hence the term ‘Stupid Networks’ .^
From a research perspective, Isenberg’s summary of the need for intelligence to devolve 
towards the terminals could be addressed by an alternative IN model, thus challenging the 
idea of the traditional IN architecture being sacrosanct. This concept of intelligence on the 
customer premises, is one that I described at an IN conference (Shepherd 1997a), by 
developing a ‘Distributed Service Control Functions (SCFs) & Service Data Functions 
(SDFs)’ model and indicating that the SCFs & SDFs could be pushed out of the network 
into the Customer Premise Equipment (CPE). The CPE querying the SCP for network
* The radicalism o f Isenberg’s article can perhaps be deduced from the actions o f his employer. It was 
reported that Isenberg was initially dismissed by his company and then, following the level o f public interest 
and discussion o f his thoughts, he was subsequently re-instated. It was as though his company themselves 
had begun to recognise the importance o f what he was saying and that they should begin considering 
technologies beyond Intelligent Networks (Cukier 1998).
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routing instructions or even determining if the destination were free, before initiating a call 
into the Operator’s network. The network model therefore progresses from a ‘service 
model’ to a more ‘product-oriented model’ encouraging third party and user-controlled 
services.
With time and reflection upon how technology in general has progressed, I feel that 
Isenberg (1998a, 1998b) was actually sounding the start of the end for Intelligent 
Networks, by indicating how market & technology requirements could not be addressed 
effectively by Intelligent Networks and that other technologies need to be explored. For 
example, it could also be argued that Isenberg’s model resembled that of an Internet 
Protocol network, where much of the intelligence resides in the User’s Personal Computer.
Standardisation
A review of the literature relating to standardisation falls naturally into two parts. The first 
identifies the international bodies that have been key in producing Intelligent Network 
standards and outlines what standards are available. (This is discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter 4). The second part examines the process of creating standards and is key to the 
discussion in Chapter 5.
Intelligent Network Standards
The primary technical literature is associated with those organisations responsible for 
developing and implementing the standards. Bellcore’s literature detailed the early IN 
standards (e.g. Bellcore 1986, Bellcore 1992) and its implementation (Ameritech 1989,
Bell Atlantic 1992, Gerads 1995). As the technology developed and became internationally 
standardised, the ITU-T and ETSI produced their own global (e.g. ITU-T 1993b) and 
European (e.g. ETSI 1993) standards respectively.
Other primary sources include discussion documents produced by experts involved in the 
development of standards and published at conferences (e.g. Sridar 1997) and papers 
produced for ETSI and the ITU-T working groups discussions (e.g. ETSI 1996, ITU-T 
1995, ITU-T 1996).
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Secondary sources exist in the form of conference papers, published papers, journal articles 
etc. The journal articles were frequently more interesting, offering a broader perspective on 
technological development (e.g. Oliver 1991, Aiken 1997).
At the start of the research, INs were still evolving and, with my professional judgement 
and experience, I could see that despite the theory behind their open architecture, there 
were fundamental problems, particularly with the interconnection of third parties at the 
higher levels. This was particularly evident with the early implementations of INs, based 
on Supplier’s proprietary protocols (making evolution difficult). This incompatibility was 
carried forward into the standards arena by the drive from both sides of the Atlantic 
resulting in two different sets of standards (AIN & CS), with associated interconnect and 
interworking problems. There was however, a drive within the ITU to align the ANSI AIN 
and ITU-T CS standards by the time CS4+ was achieved. (ETSI standards being a sub-set 
of the ITU-T standards were already closely aligned^ (interview Guram 1995, interview 
Anderson 1999)).
The Standardisation Process
Examination of almost any currently implementable telecommunications standard, (i.e. not 
one implemented solely to interface with obsolete technology), shows it to be dynamic, 
with ongoing development and refinement in the standardisation forum (e.g. CCITT No.
7). Hawkins (1995a citing Tassey 1991 and Hawkins 1995c) suggested that this was 
‘...not to define discrete conditions as fixed in time, b u t... to determine on a 
dynamic basis the benchmark below which the parallel development of technology 
is perceived to be inefficient and/or technology-based competition is perceived to 
be redundant’.
The truth is most probably a mixture of the two, in as much as subsequent releases of a 
standard specify an increasing capability, thus maintaining a technology’s usefulness by 
combating competition from other emerging technologies. From an Operator’s perspective, 
it is of course extending the life of existing fixed investments, maximising Return on 
Investment (ROI). Thus it is appropriate
 ^Both the ANSI AIN and ETSFs CS standards follow the ITU-T standards. However BTSFs standards align 
more closely. For instance ETSFs version o f CSl was called ‘Core INAP’ and was adopted by the ITU-T as 
CSIrefined (CSlr).
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‘...to perceive standards as ‘living documents’ and standardisation as an ongoing 
and dynamic process of information exchange between competing firms’ (Hawkins 
1995a citing the OECD 1995).
Hawkins (1995a) determined that during the 1980s the ITU recognised the establishment 
of three key standardisation organisations covering differing regions of the world. These 
were the American National Standards Institute (ANSI), covering North America, the 
Telecommunications Technology Committee (TTC) covering the Pacific Rim and the 
European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI)^ ®. The role of these bodies is to 
co-ordinate the regional standardisation activities and feed into the global ITU process, 
making the latter more efficient and more responsive. Support for this regional-global 
regime was reported to be strongest among the telecommunication equipment Suppliers. 
Hawkins (1995a) indicates,
‘High and costly R&D intensities, related both to existing and new product lines, 
are increasing the pressures to open up new international markets’ (ibid. 1995a).
Designing products to internationally formulated standards is a major step toward 
achieving this.
Hawkins (1995a citing Barry 1990) noted that the European Union (EU) has always had a 
focussed approach to standardisation policy in the communication technology sector. 
Furthermore, ‘.. .the EU has imposed virtual production quotas on the European standards 
development mechanism’, which had resulted in a multiplication of standards. As a 
consequence some standards had been produced ahead of an identified need and hence 
they failed to meet the strategic requirements of European firms, leading to their non­
adoption.
The potential for the development of inappropriate standards was also raised by the OECD 
(1995), concerned by the reluctance on the part of some companies to support voluntary 
standards initiatives. Generally speaking, the voluntary uptake of standards give less cause 
for concern, since they are unlikely to be widely implemented. Concern is greatest where
ETSI was created and initially sponsored and directed by the EU, with a view to co-ordinating the 
development and adaptation o f telecommunications standards in the EU. This is discussed in detail in 
Chapter 5.
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standards have to be implemented, perhaps following the implementation of some 
legislation, as is possible with EU produced standards. One of the OECD’s key issues 
relates to the domination of the standardisation process by the incumbent contributors 
(OECD 1995).
The advent of the liberalised European telecommunications market in 1998 highlighted 
further concerns regarding the responsiveness of the standardisation organisations (OECD 
1995) and that
‘...“the market” might not yield the appropriate standards in a timely enough way to 
support the new regulatory objectives focused on encouraging liberalised 
conditions for entry into telecommunication markets’ (Hawkins 1995a).
Whilst acknowledging the role of standards in the liberalised market, Thomas (interview 
1994b) expressed a similar warning that it is important that standards do not obstruct the 
development of new markets/market segments.
Hawkins proposed that using consortia and restricting their scope to a focused range of 
technologies, could increase the speed of standardisation. However he warned that 
‘...evidence is accumulating that consortia are in many cases no more or less 
efficient than committees in the already established standards development 
organisations’ (Hawkins 1995a).
The appropriateness and timeliness of IN related standards is one strand of the current 
research.
Agreement for the liberalisation of the EU telecommunications services in 1998, saw a 
shift in the foci of the Member State’s policy from preserving monopoly structures to 
discouraging them and public policy-makers actively began to promote the elimination of 
technical idiosyncrasies in national public networks (Hawkins 1995a). The national public 
Network Operators faced the dilemma that:
‘On the one hand they have a considerable interest in promoting standards that 
continue to protect their established sources of revenue, or that gave them 
advantages over new entrants in expanding the service base. On the other hand.
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increasing opportunities to become involved in international market ventures
provide incentives to opt for more ‘open’ network structures’ (Hawkins 1995a).
Although Hawkins did not recommend one course as being more appropriate than the 
other, there is ample evidence from company strategies at the time that the predominant 
course of action by the major EU telecommunications Operators, was that of predator; 
encouraging the opening of network structures to allow them to enter other Member State’s 
markets (Cl 1996).
In the United Kingdom, telephony standardisation can be traced back to 1922, when under 
pressure from the Telephone Division of the British Post Office, Suppliers were made to 
pool their Strowger technology-related patents in order to allow the optimum definition of 
the standard switch (BT 1993). This set a precedent that continued for the next 60 or so 
years, until the Post Offices Telephone Division’s successor, British Telecom (BT), was 
made a public limited company in 1984. From this point on BT progressively lost control 
of telecommunications standardisation, until in 1991 the process was completed when the 
Office of Telecommunications (OFTEL) created the Network Interface Co-ordination 
Committee (NICC) to take on the role of formal ratification of network interfaces for the 
UK Telecommunications industry.
The way standardisation has developed in the UK has therefore resulted in the preservation 
of national idiosyncrasies in the technical configuration of the public network, despite it 
being based on international standards (Hawkins 1995a).
Hawkins (1995a citing Hawkins 1993) suggested that there was a lack of perspective 
concerning the nature of the institutional relationships between standardisation 
organisations and industry, standardisation organisations and government and between 
themselves. This situation was exacerbated by a proliferation of standardisation 
organisations at national, regional and international levels. The result was a major co­
ordination problem, accentuated by the globalisation of telecommunications and the shift 
to supra-national standardisation organisations. An example of the consequences of a lack 
of co-ordination within the telecommunications industry, is in the area of Computer 
Telephony Integration (CTI), where many standards have developed diluting ETSI’s and 
hence the EU’s influence in this area (Shepherd 1998, Shepherd 1999).
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The situation appears worse between industries. Whilst the boundaries between the 
telecommunication and computer industry sectors are blurring, Hawkins (1995a) has 
suggested that co-operation between the two areas in the definition of standards is 
impossible. He highlighted that many of the computer industry’s standards stemmed from 
a proprietary or informal standardisation process which caused relationship problems and 
that it was undesirable that this culture of working should be reflected into the 
telecommunications arena.
Not withstanding the problems between standardisation organisations, there is a similar 
lack of perspective demonstrated within the organisations. Whilst they define their own 
internal process for producing standards, they appear to fail to define the communications 
between the working groups for different technologies (ETSI 1995, ETSI 2002, ITU-T 
2002",Ungerer 1990).
In summary, standardisation is a dynamic process. Initially a national activity, then a 
nationally co-ordinated international activity, the development of regional bodies, such as 
ETSI, has shifted the emphasis to a regionally co-ordinated international activity, but with 
some national variants. Two specific concerns expressed arising from the review are: a) the 
lack of communication and mutual consideration between standardisation organisations 
and b) that standardisation is reliant on input from technology specialists who are 
employed by the very companies that have vested interests in the outcome of 
standardisation. Where standards are established in support of legislative processes, such 
as in the EU, these vested interests may work against the legislative interests.
Industry Dynamics
The standardisation of INs has had a significant impact on the traditional relationships 
between Operators and Suppliers; relationships built over many years and underpinned by 
the deployment of proprietary equipment. Few authors seem to have addressed the issues 
arising fi*om the breakdown of these relationships and what little there is provides an 
important foundation for this research.
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Mansell is one of the few authors to have addressed the influence that Intelligent Network 
technology can have. In her 1990 article she discusses the impact of INs upon company 
structure. She identifies that the standardisation bodies act as:
‘...active contributors to the resolution...o/ th e  disagreement...hetween technology 
and institutions’ (Mansell 1990).
In essence, the value of telecommunications technology as a tool for a company increases 
when it is standardised. Mansell suggested that to maximise its benefit, the technology 
should be integrated into the way the company does things, such as the company 
(administrative and financial) restructuring to reflect the telecommunications technology 
used. Others see similar benefits with Intelligent Networks, e.g. ‘...intelligence in the 
network is a weapon’ (PN 1996).
One of the points Mansell identified was that (at the time of writing) the US emphasis was 
on regulation not technology; possibly a reference to the cost model applicable to the 
telecommunications environment in the US at the time. This took the form of a penalty tax 
applied to Operators who were making excess profits, with a view to encouraging lower 
customer charges (Bishop et al. 1995). The policy may have achieved this to a limited 
extent, but also encouraged internal inefficiencies with the result that the US eventually 
altered its regulatory cost model to one that more closely aligned with those appearing in 
Europe. However the policy also encouraged investment in the areas of technological 
development, such as INs.
From an end-user company perspective, IN technology has never really captured their 
imagination (interview Russell 1995). Results from a study undertaken by the Economist 
Intelligence Unit showed that companies did not feel IN was a very important technology 
impacting upon their telecommunication requirements, placing it after ATM, ISDN, 
wireless and Computer Telephony Integration (CTI) (EIU 1996). The architecture of CTI 
however, although using totally different (mainly proprietary) standards, looks extremely 
similar to INs, having centralised intelligence and databases (Shepherd 1998, Shepherd 
1999). Melody (1995) felt that INs, together with Microsoft’s drive in the personal 
computer applications market, could be the incentive needed to merge the two technologies
The 2002 references for ETSI and the ITU-T, present the latest organisational structure o f  these
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and bring greater control to the user. In practice Microsoft’s Telephony Applications 
Programming Interface (TAPI) interface has never made real in-roads into the CTI market, 
let alone the IN applications market and has been developed by Microsoft to offer their 
own Internet based telephony service.
In a subsequent study, Mansell proposed two models with which to analyse the alternative 
views of the trends in telecommunications (Mansell 1993). These were the:
• Idealist Model - a demand-led industry, stimulating collaboration and free 
market;
• Strategic Model - where technology is not sufficient to drive a competitive 
market and regulation is introduced.
The work included a review of the implementation of the INs being developed in key 
European countries and discussed the various Operator viewpoints and where their 
strategies appeared to be taking them. This study was of benefit in that it acted as a 
historical reference source for the deployment of INs, indicating the importance of 
considering the impact of proprietary legacy networks in the new standards-driven 
environment.
It was decided for this research, to develop elements of Mansell’s book to another level, 
i.e. that regulation via a standardised model was not the ideal basis of analysis, since it 
assumes as a baseline that the model will be adopted by all. If other models were preferred 
and implemented two key points would arise; either companies would be made to force-fit 
the model, i.e. they would be made to apply an IN model inappropriate to their company 
strategy, or the model they had already adopted might not fit the regulation and they could 
find themselves force-fitting the legislation, i.e. they would be developing interfaces solely 
to meet the needs of legislation.
Regulatory Environment
Much has been published regarding regulatory environments, for example Baldwin 1938, 
Robertson 1947, Beesley et al. 1989, Davies et al. 1990, TMA 1989, all providing valuable 
insights into the UK regulatory framework. Of special importance is OFTEL’s annual
organisations.
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management plan (e.g. OFTEL 2001 ) that summarised the previous year’s work and 
identified the areas under study in the coming year. For a number of years (1994 -1996) 
the management plan identified INs as an important area of study, but ultimately nothing 
strategic was achieved (interview Newman 1997).
Information pertaining to open interfaces and interconnection was contained within the UK 
Operator licences of which (until 1998) there were three major variants: the BT licence 
(DTI 1991a); the Mercury licence (now Cable & Wireless) (DTI 1991b); and the Cable TV 
company licences (e.g. DTI 1993). Long (1988) has analysed the BT and Mercury licences 
in detail, however the 1998 Competition Act has made many sections superfluous and 
these have been omitted from the later amended licences.
As far as this study was concerned, the key sections of the licences were B3 and B5. 
Section B3 gave the Director General of Telecommunications (DGT) the power to specify 
the interconnection interfaces between telecommunication networks that Ofrel considered 
to be essential for interoperability. The interfaces had to be to an international, European or 
other (DGT specified) standard and had to ensure that network security was not 
compromised, services not degraded and any intellectual property rights protected.
However, Section B5 stated that the Licensee was not obliged to conform, if it would 
necessitate the Licensee purchasing equipment incompatible with their existing network 
elements. However, the Licensee should incorporate the introduction of the interface into 
its development plans provided the cost is not excessive compared to the accompanying 
benefits.
The implications of these conditions were that OFTEL could have denoted IN interfaces as 
a suitable point of interconnection and compelled Operators to open them. However 
Operators with proprietary IN designs and not wanting to upgrade, could have used generic 
arguments, such as compromising their network security, to resist such an action^^.
The EU holds a large amount of reference material, both in its resolutions and the minutes 
of numerous meetings, which gave an idea of what was being considered and discussed.
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For instance EU (1993b) summarised the position of the Council of Ministers on the 
proposal to mutually recognise telecommunications licences operated by other countries as 
something to work towards, but not being immediately achievable.
Without mutual licence recognition the process of expanding a telecommunications 
network operation into another country would be slow. More importantly, the inequalities 
in licence conditions between the EU Member States could have given an unfair advantage 
to some Operators. For example, BT in the UK was not allowed to offer TV services over 
its local loop (with a few exceptions), whereas Deutsche Bundespost Telekom (DBT) in 
Germany was. Thus if DBT attempted to enter the UK Cable TV market in the UK they 
would not have been in competition with the dominant legacy telecommunications 
Operator. However, if BT entered the German cable TV market, it would be in direct 
competition with DBT, the dominant legacy Operator in Germany^^.
In 1990 the EU commissioned a study with a view to determining the case for a pan 
European IN (ETCO 1990). The study sought Operators and Suppliers views regarding the 
importance of INs and the feasibility of opening interfaces in line with the EU Open 
Network Provision (ON?) directive (EU 1990) ^ "^ .The study recommended opening the 
Service Control Point to Service Data Point, Service Management System to Service 
Control Point and Intelligent Peripheral to Service Switching Point interfaces (reference 
Figure 2.2). Another recommendation was that ETSI should concentrate on standardising 
the operation of three basic services with a common EU wide access code to these services. 
The study also identified that a standardised IN would not be available until about 1996, by 
which time there would have been substantial investment in proprietary INs and thus a 
reluctance by the Operators to migrate towards a standard IN, despite its advantages. These 
proprietary INs would be mutually incompatible (ETCO 1990). The study went on to say: 
‘Even at that time no regulation could take place, because of the huge investment 
that will have been already made. Therefore ONP cannot be applied to network 
architectures or interfaces for an intelligent network’ (ETCO 1990 p68).
Some Operator did use this argument, although not on an individual basis, but in response to the DTI 
(1991) survey.
In practice DBT was made to separate its cable TV business from its telephony business by the late 1990s.
The Open Network Provision directive was developed as an evolution o f Article 100 o f  the Treaty o f  
Rome. It comprised a programme o f regulation to allow access (i.e. interconnection) to public 
telecommunications networks. The directive prompted a review o f the telecommunications sector and 
ultimately resulted in a Resolution to liberalise EU voice services by T‘ January 1998 (EU 1993).
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and finally,
‘Opening one interface is a political matter, which has to be thought of 
independently of the completion of (the) standard’ (ETCO 1990 p69).
Looking at the recommendations made and how the working-group structure and standards 
progressed within ETSI, it appeared that those recommendations made by the ETCO 
(1990) survey, for concentrating on standardising selected interfaces and services, was 
followed.
In 1992, in preparation for EU discussions on the topic, the DTI sought stakeholder views 
concerning IN interfaces to be opened and why (DTI 1992). The general findings of the 
report were that:
• Service Providers saw no problem in opening the higher level interfaces;
• BT (the incumbent Operator) did not want to open such interfaces if resilience 
issues were not addressed;
• Other Operators and Suppliers took a position between these two.
Three areas (both explicit and implicit) of the report gave cause for concern. Firstly, the 
survey adopted the ITU-T standard IN architecture model as the basis of discussion, 
ignoring other variations that Operators might wish to implement. Secondly, some 
Suppliers’ IN architectures (e.g. AT&T Technologies, now Lucent) incorporated 
proprietary interfaces even though they conformed to the standardised model. Hence 
regulations to compel an Operator to open a particular interface m i^ t be impossible if the 
Supplier did not want to make it open. Opening any proprietary interface for inter­
connection or inter-networking would have required substantial investment^^. A third area 
of concern was that if an Operator did implement a standards-based IN, then opening 
interfaces could have created security and resilience issues. Inappropriate messages passed
A licence condition effectively states that Operators should not be made to open interfaces that infringe 
IPRs. However, as will be explained in Chapter 5, new services categorised as Supplementary Services 
Business (SSB) by OFTEL, had to have an open interface to allow other Operators to similarly offer the 
service. If the product implementation was via a proprietary IN, then assuming the supplier would have 
allowed the interface to be opened, interworking would have been difficult owing to its proprietary nature. 
This would have negated the purpose o f opening it. If the interface did not provide an open interface, the new 
product was likely to be blocked by OFTEL.
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over that interface, such as the improper arming of SSP triggers, could have caused an 
Operator’s network to fail (interview Spindley 2003).
Alwyn Thomas (a leading member of the team that wrote and evaluated the responses to 
the 1992 DTI document), stated during an interview (1994b):
‘What we (the government) want is open access and for the customer to be able to 
buy from a range of providers. We want ETSI to develop standards on points of 
interconnect; it is not the government’s role to open the SCP, we want the facility 
to do this’.
At another point in the interview he said that
‘...the EU (DG12) have given a mandate to ETSI on ONP to study and develop 
suitable interfaces, which includes IN....the government enable standards to allow 
interconnect to happen’
This view of the EU mandating ETSI was confirmed by Banfield (interview Banfield 
1994).
IN 1993, KPMG were commissioned by the EU to continue the 1990 ETCO work (ETCO 
1990) and to provide:
‘A clear architectural model of the INs in Europe.. .based on the current state of 
technological development and standardisation work’ (KPMG 1993).
The report made a number of recommendations covering standardised open interfaces, 
target dates for the implementation of common services and the application of full open 
standards by 2002. However, the most radical element of the report was the regulatory IN 
model proposed, which defined a relationship between the different stakeholders and the 
different types of services offered (KPMG 1993). The inference was that categories in the 
regulatory model could be mapped to areas in the architecture model.
It has been difficult to determine how the KPMG report was received, even though the DTI 
convened a special meeting to consider it. John Leeson (BT) (interview 1995) suggested 
that the report was fundamentally flawed. He felt that the rigid definition of which 
interfaces should act in support of Regulation, was inappropriate for a variable operating
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model. For example, stakeholders would not fall neatly into the categories defined in the 
report. Their categorisation would vary according to their products and as their strategy 
changed.
In the years following these studies, regulatory work into the opening of IN interfaces 
decreased. For this reason I interviewed representatives of both OFTEL and the EU 
telecommunications directorate to determine their latest thinking.
Dr. David Newman (interview 1997), Oftel’s Deputy Technical Director, stated that
‘...it is not usually the case that the internal network configurations of regulated 
entities are a subject of regulatory intervention, only the end product’,
and
‘Any requirements to provide interconnection of such services could be argued to 
reduce the incentive to innovate, since the benefits of a company’s innovation are 
distributed across other network Operators’.
However he went on to say that this only applied to non Co-operative Network Services^^ 
(such as ‘Call Waiting’). Co-operative Services (such as ‘Ring Back when Free’) required 
a co-operative capability between the call’s originating and terminating networks, 
including at the point of interconnect. ‘OFTEL believes that this category of service should 
be subject to continued interconnect regulation’ (interview Newman 1997). Given that the 
Economist Intelligence Unit felt that ‘As network intelligence advances, the distinction 
between “network” and “services” is becoming increasingly blurred’ (EIU 1996 p75), this 
course of action might not remain appropriate in the long term, but it does indicate that by 
1997 OFTEL did not think it appropriate to open ‘internal’ IN interfaces except to ensure 
specific service interworking.
It was also within OFTEL’s remit to ensure an Operator’s network integrity was not 
compromised from either internal failure or external attack. In Europe this was known as 
an ‘essential requirement’ (Walker 2001). Knowledge in this area was mainly subjective. 
Should an Operator have used this argument for not wanting to open an IN interface, the
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outcome would probably depend on how much OFTEL wished to believe them. OFTEL 
therefore needed to achieve a balance between encouraging competition and protecting 
network integrity. The problem of opening interfaces yet ensuring reliable network 
operation, was one the research sought to investigate.
In practice, OFTEL did not retrospectively force the opening of IN interfaces to existing 
services. However new service offerings that were judged to fall within the Co-operative 
Network Service, or Value Added Service categories, were required to have an open 
declared interface approved by the Network Interface Co-ordination Committee (NICCŸ\ 
so as to allow for interconnection by other Operators. Over time, it has been found that this 
mechanism has encouraged Operators to voluntarily open IN interfaces. Network integrity 
is ensured by restricting messages to just those required to implement the service.
Given a large number of services, each with a corresponding set of permitted messages, 
there is no way to guarantee network integrity. Messages permitted for one service could 
be applied and hence permitted for another service which may not require it. For instance, 
a message retrieval service requires digit capture in order to communicate with the 
messaging service. If the request for digit capture is applied to a Teast cost connect’ call, 
then there is a potential security problem should that customer be using the call to access 
an automated banking service. A Service Provider offering both services could apply a 
capability from one service inappropriately to a second service, whether by accident or for 
fraudulent reasons. Stakeholder views on the question of network integrity formed part of 
this research and are addressed in subsequent chapters.
The liberalisation of the European telecommunications market in 1998 caused other 
Member State Operators (such as France Telecom) to enter the UK market. The NICC 
allowed their contribution to UK technical discussions in the same way as any other UK 
network Operator. It is unclear however, how the NICC would have reacted to a potential 
contribution of an Operator or Regulator from a Member State, who did not have an
Non co-operative network services were those where although a telephone call may span more than one 
Operator’s network, information was not required from the second network to allow it to work.
The NICC was set up by Ofrel to agree national standards and national variants o f  European standards 
(which themselves were typically European variants o f International (e.g. ITU-T) standards). By this means, 
the NICC was part o f the European Regulatory process. Chapter 5 discusses the role o f the NICC in more 
detail.
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interest in directly interconnecting to a UK Operator, but who would be seeking to 
harmonise the standards in the two countries.
The EU stance appears more liberal than OfteTs. Dr Peter Scott, Director of the 
Telecommunications Regulatory unit in Brussels, indicated that the regulatory framework 
to be put in place for the 1998 liberalisation of the telecommunications sector in Europe, 
was basically neutral with regard to the underlying technologies used. The EU legislation 
made no specific mention of Intelligent Networks (interview Scott 1997).
Hawkins (1995a) identified that for standards to be used to support liberalisation, they 
should be guided and imposed. Although voluntary standardisation could achieve the same 
end, they increased the ‘measures of uncertainty as to the possible outcomes’ (Hawkins 
1995a citing Breyer 1982 & Reddy 1990). The reason for this was that voluntary 
standardisation was
‘...frequently subject to a range of internal and external pressures that are beyond 
the direct control of governments and publicly accountable regulatory agencies’ 
(Hawkins 1995b).
Those applying the regulation may find that a less than ideal outcome produced via 
voluntary standardisation would not be correctable (Baggott 1986). A strong case can 
therefore be made for de jure standardisation in support of regulation.
With the liberalisation of telecommunications, regulation of the telecommunications sector 
within the European Union has shifted focus from administrative and operational matters 
to commercial practices and market structures.
Hawkins (1995a) described the EU Telecommunications liberalisation situation as
‘...a set of regulatory institutions...now being constructed in order to ‘regulate’ for 
the first time a set of new or evolving commercial and industrial relationships.’
This statement led to the question of whether the regulatory institutions (the EU Member 
State telecommunications Regulators), operated in harmony with the EU’s best interests, or 
acted for their own individual Member State interests.
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The EU Commission however, began to take-on this role from a Supra-national level. 
European trans-border alliances between dominant Operators were used by the EU to force 
the removal of a particular country’s dispensation^^ (where one existed) to delay 
liberalising of their networks beyond 1998 (interview Corkerry 1997). This is of interest 
since the Member States who applied for and were granted, the dispensation by the EU 
were effectively in conflict with (typically) their dominant provider who wanted the 
dispensation dropped and liberalisation applied on time, in order that the EU would 
approve their joint venture. Similarly, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in 
the US forced the EU’s hand by demanding open interfaces for US companies in Europe, 
before EU companies (e.g. Concert) were allowed access to the US Telecommunications 
market (interview Guram 1995). These ‘tit for tat’ negotiations were eventually superseded 
by the World Trade Organisation’s telecommunications sector agreement, the arrival of the 
liberalised market in 1998 and a downturn in the ‘bull-market’ prevalent at the time, 
making joint ventures less attractive.
Summary
The public literature provides extensive coverage of the basic operation of EMs, whereas 
details of the discussions leading to the key decisions can only be found within the ‘grey’ 
literature. All this literature however, is premised on the ITU-T standardised IN model. 
Unsurprisingly, the ITU has based all the development of its standards upon it. The 
research investigates the assumption that the ITU-T IN model is the most appropriate.
The literature additionally discusses the operation of the model’s standardised interfaces 
and their capabilities, but lacks discussion on the operation of these interfaces in a ‘hostile’ 
environment. That is, one where a third party, not directly suffering the consequences of its 
action, might be careless in the messages passed across that interface, or how they use that 
interface.
Material relating to the standardisation process and the use of standardisation in supporting 
regulation was weak. With the increasing influence of the EU, the standardisation process 
essentially moved from a National to Supra-National level, with Europe developing its
Dispensation granted by the EU Commission, allowed a number o f Member States to delay 
implementation o f the 1998 telecommunications service industry liberalisation process until beyond the year 
2000 .
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variants of international standards. Ironically, this did not negate the need of Member 
States to produce their own variant as before, so the process has effectively inserted 
another level of bureaucracy rather than replacing an existing level.
Working documents pertaining to the interest groups of the standardisation bodies (e.g. 
ESTI, ITU-T) show that these groups are dependent upon the technology specialists 
released by the telecommunications companies. This raises the question as to whether 
these specialists are able to act independently of the vested interests of their employers and 
therefore whether the resulting standards might frustrate the goals of the regulators.
Little of the public literature directly addresses the key questions relating to regulatory 
policy issues associated with Intelligent Networks. As a consequence more basic data 
collection techniques have been employed, or adapted, to gather evidence in support of this 
research. The research literature and methods are discussed in the following section.
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2.3 Research Methods
The literature covering research methods is extensive, hence the approach adopted is to 
provide an overview of the strategies and categorisations that might be applied to this 
research and to review the most promising material in greater depth.
Postal surveys and interviews emerge as the most suitable methods of data collection. This 
raises the related questions of identifying appropriate candidates for interviews and surveys 
such as to ensure a representative cross-section of interest groups and ensuring data 
validity.
Overall Strategy
An important outcome of the literature review was the clear mismatch between the views 
of the regulators and practitioners as regards the ease of interconnection of Intelligent 
Networks. Thus the goal was to identify and understand techniques that would allow the 
diagnosis and exploration of the issues associated with interconnection, determine how 
they were manifest and how they were addressed within the regulatory decision-making 
process. This would lead to identifying the consequences of inappropriate 
implementations.
In reviewing the research methods literature, it was found that a number of standard 
research texts contained extensive treatment of relevant methodologies. As such these form 
the basis of the discussion presented here, supplemented by the findings from other authors 
where appropriate. Given the vast range of techniques available, only those that might be 
relevant to the research area are discussed in this section.
One of the standard research texts identified is that by Bailey et al. (1995). They use the 
terms ‘pure’ and ‘applied’ to distinguish between research that ‘finds things out’ and 
research that makes a ‘recommendation for action’. Whilst this research may well ‘find 
things out’, that is not its primary goal, as established by the hypothesis set out in the 
introduction. Rather this is ‘applied’ research that will define a set of ‘recommendations 
for action’, even though it lacks a specific customer to implement such actions.
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The idea of the consideration of variables is explored by Bailey et al. (1995). These 
include:
• The Independent variables - assumed to be part of the cause of a dependant 
variable;
• Intervening variables - acting between the independent and dependent variables.
Identifying the variables of the research helps to identify the areas which need to be 
investigated. For instance, the Independent variables could be identified as being the Value 
Chain elements, telecommunications market sectors etc. (i.e. equipment Suppliers through 
to product user); Intervening Variables would include the standardisation and regulations 
bodies.
Yin (1988) considered a number of definitions of research designs. He summarised this 
simply as ‘.. .what questions to study, what data are relevant, what data to collect and how 
to analyse the results’ (ibid p29). By way of example, he identified that studying an 
organisation necessitates expanding the boundaries of the research to other organisations to 
gather meaningful data and by comparison with the actions of the other organisations, 
decide if the actions of the organisation being studied are appropriate.
A parallel can be drawn with the Intelligent Network technology that forms the basis of 
this research. It has two key Call Models developing world-wide, the ITU Capability Set 
(CS) and ANSI’s Advanced Intelligent Network (AIN). Doing what Yin suggests and 
examining the forces influencing both models, would double the quantity of work and 
increase the scope of the research. It is therefore better to draw appropriate comparisons 
with the US AIN model, rather than replicate the whole study.
Howard et al. (1989) introduced the terms Primary and Secondary Data to distinguish 
between that collected by the researcher directly from the source (Primary Data) and that 
published or collected for another reason, such as for previous research (Secondary Data). 
In relation to the thesis, the literary review (Secondary Data) was used to develop an 
Hypothesis and Primary data used to contribute to the debate surrounding that hypothesis.
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Bell (1989) identified a number of styles of research, including Experimental Style. 
Typically this is where a model is developed and tested to determine if it meets specified 
criteria. She suggested that such research can determine cause and effect, but has to be 
treated with caution. Elements of this style are relevant here, in that this research set out to 
test alternatives to the standardised Evf model, using a questionnaire survey. The aim was to 
determine stakeholder acceptance of the model, not causal factors, so Bell’s caution is not 
apposite.
Case Studies are another technique Bell (1989) discusses, typically for researching a 
situation that has occurred and hence able to be well defined. They are used to determine 
the interaction of factors which caused the situation to occur and hence are a means of 
identifying key issues. Yin (1988) splits Case Studies into three categorises. He describes 
these as:
• Descriptive - describing the sequence of events over time;
• Explanatory - investigating a situation identifying the causal relationships;
• Exploratory - investigating a situation to develop ideas for further study.
Thus the literary review - gathering background material, is essentially Exploratory 
research, used to develop a hypothesis.
Yin (1988) followed the three purposes for Case Studies with six composition structures 
appropriate to one or more of the three purposes. Two of the composition structures 
proposed were:
• Linear Analytic - the standard method of stating the problem being studied, the 
methodology, the data collected and the conclusions etc. He explains that in the 
case of an Exploratory purpose, it would cover ‘.. .the issue of the problem 
being explored, the method of exploration, the findings fi*om the exploration 
and the conclusions’ (ibid p i38);
• Theory Building Structures - where each section contributes a part to the 
theoretical argument.
The traditional structure of a thesis follows the Linear Analytic composition structure, this 
being identified as appropriate for an Exploratory approach. However within this a ‘Theory
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Building’ Structure was used, in which each chapter addresses a new part of the theoretical 
argument being made.
Survey Questionnaires
Bell (1989) identified Surveys as a valid research tool to gather primary data, through the 
answering of questions. The data can be gathered in a structured manner, allowing 
quantitative analysis to be undertaken, trends identified and comparisons made. She 
indicated the importance that:
‘...all respondents will be asked the same questions in, as far as possible, the same 
circumstances.. .careful piloting is necessary to ensure that all questions mean 
the same to all respondents’ (ibid p8).
She adds a caution that the technique often fails to identify causal relationships.
Bailey et al. (1995) similarly discussed data gathering through the use of questionnaires 
and their value in addressing a large sample. They introduce and discuss the difference 
between open and closed questions, with closed questions having a scalable response, 
allowing subsequent quantitative analysis. Check questions are mentioned, enabling a 
check on representativeness and also the need to pilot the questionnaire to check that the 
questions are easily understood and are likely to achieve their aim. They identified that 
postal questionnaires
‘ ...result in low rates of return, ofl;en below 10 per cent. What’s worse is that the 
people who do complete and return the questionnaires are usually unrepresentative 
of the sample fi*om whom you wanted to collect information. The only time you 
should use postal questionnaires is where you have already gained a firm 
commitment from the respondents to complete them’ (ibid. p21).
Unfortunately telecommunication exchange Suppliers are global companies with their 
areas of expertise spread around the world. It would not be practical to physically visit 
them and there would be language barriers to overcome. Despite Bailey et al.’s 
recommendation against using postal questionnaires, it was considered appropriate to use 
them as a primary source of information gathering, owing to the ease with which many 
suitable people in different countries, speaking different languages, can be contacted.
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This Survey Questionnaires section therefore examines the various aspects of using 
questionnaire based postal surveys as a means of data-gathering. It discusses means of 
identifying appropriate participants from the different interested parties, (this information 
also proving helpful in identifying suitable interviewees). The layout of questionnaires is 
discussed, as are various means of encouraging the return of questionnaires, together with 
the validity of the number of responses and subsequent data analysis.
Content & Layout
Bailey et al. (1995) provided a lot of useful information on the structure and use of 
questionnaires. A key message is that questions should be ‘.. designed to produce 
information on which future decisions can be based’ (ibid. p42). They discuss the use of 
open and closed questions, identifying that open questions allow freedom of response 
without imposition, but produce answers that are difficult to categorise; closed questions 
having the reverse effect. They also indicated that the number of options a question 
response should have, should be considered with the number of respondents in mind (i.e. 
the size of the sample). As an example they suggest that 30 ‘profession’ options in answer 
to the question ‘What is your job?’ is likely to be meaningless if the survey sample 
comprises 50 respondents.
Scott (1961) does not give much advice on the structure of questions, but cites an example 
to illustrate the potential gains of closed versus open question types.
‘When the question “Where did you go for your vacation this summer?” was 
replaced by “Did you visit New Hampshire this summer?”, response increased 
significantly from 17 per cent to 28 per cent’ (Scott 1961 citing Heath 1950).
The postal questionnaire survey was aiming to gather data relating to the importance of 
different architectures and IN interfaces and hence quantitative analysis derived from 
closed questions was determined as the most suitable approach. However the problem with 
closed questions, is that an important point may be missed, so respondents were also given 
the opportunity to add their own answer if there was not one close enough from the 
selection given. This was considered to be a good compromise between gathering data able 
to be easily analysed and yet not missing any of the key points.
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Similarly the number of options in answer to a question were considered and minimised or 
worded such that they could be grouped into higher level categories at the analysis stage.
Bailey et al. (1995), Bell (1989) and Raimond (1993) all suggested piloting questionnaires 
so as to identify problems arising from omissions, misinterpretations, confusion and length 
and to validate responses against expected outcomes.
Trialling was conducted in two stages. The first stage was to trial a draft questionnaire with 
a small number of people with knowledge of Intelligent Networks, but who would not 
form part of the final sample. This checked clarity, content and length of the questionnaire 
and allowed changes to be made without invalidating any responses from the sample. The 
second stage, or final check, was a pilot survey with a small selection drawn from the 
sample population. The idea was that if no changes were needed, their answers could be 
considered with the responses from the sample population as a whole.
Scott (1961) interestingly, identified no apparent benefit in varying the length of a 
questionnaire, but cited other experiments that indicated that questions capturing the 
respondent’s interest encouraged completion, allowing a longer questionnaire to be used 
(Clausen & Ford 1947).
Scott (1961) also discussed the format of the covering letter with the questionnaire. 
Although he did not note any effect from the font and type size, he concluded that a 
‘...two page questionnaire attracts a better response than a single page (94.8% 
compared to 93.6%), this improving again if the questionnaire was put on the 
reverse side of the covering letter (95.8%)’ (ibid. 1961).
He cited Seitz (1944) as also finding a two-page questionnaire more responsive than a 
single page.
It was therefore decided to keep the length of the questionnaire to two pages, as suggested 
by Scott and to space the questions fairly generously to encourage responses. Although 
Scott did not find a reduced response from longer questionnaires, more than two pages was 
thought to look daunting. A further thought was to use folded A3 paper for the
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questionnaire, this looking neater than stapled A4, but this was rejected owing to the 
inability to fax the responses.
Encouraging a Response
Scott (1961) identified the best way to encourage a response to a postal questionnaire was 
to ‘ . .convince the recipient that his response is really needed’ and then
‘The more interested, or concerned recipients will reply.. .earlier.. .but only if they 
have about the same amount of work to perform in responding as the uninterested’ 
(ibid. p i64).
However, he did reject the notion that it is essential to arouse the recipient’s interest in 
order to gain a high response, stating:
‘...this cannot be the whole story, because 90 per cent of those who receive our 
Poultry and Pigs enquiry, claim to have no such livestock and yet the group 
responds quite as well as those who have positive information to give’ (ibid. pl78)
Ehrenberg criticised this point.
... (Scott’s) argument was that in the poultry and pig enquiry 90 per cent of 
informants had no such livestock and therefore by implication no interest. It does 
not follow that these 90 per cent did not find the questionnaire “interesting”’ (ibid. 
pl96).
Rather than attempt to make the questionnaires for this research interesting to all possible 
recipients, it was felt more appropriate to select a sample that was likely to have an interest 
and awareness of Intelligent Networks. Although this initially appears to bias the 
responses, many of the options for the questions used technical terms that only people with 
a knowledge of Intelligent Networks could answer, therefore pre-selection was essential. 
This approach, by default, tended to fulfil the requirement of making the questionnaire 
interesting so as to achieve a high response rate.
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Bailey et al. (1995) identified the options for boosting response rates to (typically) a postal 
questionnaire as being to:
• telephone;
• send a polite reminder;
• send a second questionnaire; and
• waiting beyond the deadline for late returns.
They were concerned that sending the questionnaire to a second sample ‘.. .may threaten 
the representativeness of ...the., .sample, since the replacements may not match the 
originals’ (ibid. p i93). Despite this, Bailey et al. also suggested increasing the number of 
responses by collecting additional data through personal interviews, designed to collect the 
same data as the postal questionnaire. I was personally concerned with the combination of 
data collected by these two methods, since personal interviews may have injected a bias 
not existing with postal questionnaires.
Scott (1961) himself generally used two follow-ups,
‘The first consisting simply of a very short letter, the second another short letter or 
slip together with the original letter, a second (serially numbered) copy of the 
questionnaire and another return envelope’ (ibid. p i64).
He said that
‘.. .the follow-up is the only technique which has been consistently found to raise 
response by a substantial amount - say over 20 per cent’ (ibid. p i78),
and indicated that the time to send the reminder is when the ‘.. .returns have almost 
stopped’ (ibid. p i66).
When this should be was indicated by Figure 1 (ibid. pi 59) in his paper. This showed that 
following reminders, the vast majority of replies (approx. 95%) were returned within two 
weeks, with the remainder being returned by week 3. He identified that his findings did not 
agree with a formula proposed by Mansfield (1948) in which Mansfield identified 90% of 
returns within 2 weeks.
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Another method of reminding respondents is to use a telephone call. Scott cites Waisanen 
(1954) who
‘...used a telephone call with marked success. ..and the ultimate response rate was 
raised from 62 per cent to approximately 70 per cent’ (Scott 1961 p i66).
Scott (1961) also identified Official Sponsorship as potentially being a means of improving 
the response rate. Although he summarised his findings, he did not come to any conclusion 
and hence did not offer any direct advice as to whether to distribute postal questionnaires 
privately or with a sponsor’s support. He did however cite the National Education 
Association (1930) as indicating that educational sponsorship was more successful than 
private.
In selecting a sponsor to support the research survey questionnaire, there were three 
options. It could have been sent personally, have the Open University (OU) support it, or 
have my company support it. Based upon the National Education Association (1930) 
findings, the OU was chosen as sponsor, adding greater authenticity than if it were sent 
under my own name. Sending it out under my employer’s (BT) name could have seriously 
restricted the quality and quantity of replies as discussed in the Ethical Considerations 
section later.
It was felt appropriate to boost response to the research questionnaire, by providing two 
reminders to recipients, the first being a telephone call after 2 weeks and then a repeat 
questionnaire after 3 weeks, allowing a minimum of four weeks before analysis. Those not 
responding were identified by marking the questionnaire.
Scott (1961) felt that putting a stamp on the return envelope, (which he argued conveyed a 
feeling of a waste of money if it were not used) would also improve the chance of a postal 
questionnaire being returned. He additionally justified this by citing Ferriss (1951) who 
indicated a tremendous difference in responses, 66% for stamped envelopes versus 12% 
for unstamped. It was felt that since letters would be sent to individuals in companies, 
individually stamped letters, compared to franked letters, would make no difference, so 
replied paid envelopes were enclosed with the postal survey (apart from those sent abroad 
where faxed returns were encouraged).
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Other suggestions by Scott, such as hand-written notes to convey a personal element, or 
special delivery to convey a sense of urgency, were considered, but not implemented. My 
experience with receiving a large amount of unsolicited material is that both these methods 
are widely practised and have lost any impact they might have. Admittedly the hand 
writing is not individually written, but actually printed in a different type and colour and 
the correspondence is made to appear as though special delivery is used whereas this is not 
the case.
Although the idea of a reward to encourage questionnaire returns was an attractive one, a 
monetary award as suggested by Scott (1961) was not thought appropriate. A more 
appropriate one for those returning the postal questionnaire, was to offer a copy of the 
analysis to those who were interested. Later in the research, I circulated a second 
questionnaire at a conference. In this case an entry to a draw for a ‘bottle’ was offered to 
participants who completed the questionnaire.
However, having suggested many ideas for improving the number of postal questionnaires 
returned, Scott (1961) gives the warning that ‘.. .experience shows conclusions which hold 
in one may fail with another’ (ibid p i44), thus indicating that there is no guarantee that 
applying the methods he proposes will gain the same degree of success.
Ethical Considerations
Bailey et al. (1995) discussed the importance of research ethics and in particular the 
‘.. .responsibility of the researcher to make sure that the participants are not harmed by the 
research’ (ibid. p4). They identified that in order to maintain ethical standards in research 
many bodies have developed professional codes of ethics and suggested the typical 
contents of a personal code of ethics to help researchers develop a code appropriate to their 
particular research. The code proposed that researchers seek permission firom the 
participants and let ‘.. .the participants know how they will be protected if they agree to 
take part in the project’ (ibid. p5), including their right to privacy, confidentiality and 
anonymity. It identified how to avoid causing harm to the researcher, colleagues, the 
college, companies and people, involved in the research and identified that the ‘. . .risk to 
those researched must be balanced against the benefits to be gained from the results of any 
research’ (ibid. p20).
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Although Scott (1961) emphasised confidentiality and the need to draw it to the 
respondents’ attention in the covering letter, he did not reach a conclusion as to whether 
anonymity should be visibly demonstrated or not. He cited several references where 
experiments visibly preserved anonymity whilst returning the knowledge of who had 
responded. Rollins (1940) used different room numbers on the return envelope to identify 
the respondent, whilst Hill (1951), Bradt (1955), Cahalan (1958) and Larson et al. (1959) 
all used a separate letter or postcard returned by the recipient to indicate that it had been 
retumed^^. Finney (cited by Scott 1961) criticised the use of methods such as invisible ink 
to track which surveys had been returned. Scott replied that
‘ The deception here is a deception designed to get people to accept the truth - 
namely that the response will not be passed on’ (Scott 1961 p205).
The right to privacy was considered an essential requirement of this research and was 
easily implemented for a postal survey. The confidentiality of the information provided 
and anonymity of the respondent and their company in the analysis of the questionnaires, 
was promised in an accompanying letter. The letter also provided the means for 
questionnaires to be coded by respondent and hence a method of following-up unretumed 
questionnaires. This coding allowed the option of responses from a particular company to 
be compared with those resulting firom other sources such as the ETCO (1990) and DTI 
(1992) trawls for information. Care had to be taken with such comparisons, since there was 
a small chance that a company could be identified by comparing survey responses with 
other published information. Obviously, this would break the promise that the respondents 
would not be identifiable in the survey analysis.
A second ethical consideration was to ensure that the participants had control over what 
information they provided. This was considered implicit in the actions they took. For 
instance, if participants did not want to provide information about their work area, they 
could simply declined to answer the questionnaire, or certain questions on the 
questionnaire. Interviewees could act in a similar manner in interviews. Thus no specific 
actions were considered necessary.
Interestingly in Rollins’s (1940) method, the link between completed questionnaire and respondent had 
been retained, in contrast to the other methods, but this was not drawn to the readers’ attention by Scott.
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The Data Protection Act, cited by Bailey et al. (1995), addresses issues associated with the 
storage, processing and security of data relating to individuals. It was decided that 
individuals' data could be made secure by storing survey data separately from data relating 
to named individuals, with the records of the two data sets linked by a single numeric code. 
The two files were password protected, as was the computer system. With these measures 
in place it was not necessary to register the data.
Participant Analysis
Several of the references indicated that if research is to produce useful information that can 
be acted upon, then participant involvement is essential. With Mansell (1993) this took the 
form of interviews with participants having a common interest (i.e. Public Telephone 
Operators). The Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA 1995) suggested a 
wider participatory set taking
‘...the form of an open consultation with and between what it calls the principals 
(the owners and the sponsors) ..., its beneficiaries .. .and its opponents and 
supporters’ (TU870 1997 p40 citing SIDA 1995).
Similarly, TU870 indicates
‘.. .tight and neat designs constructed with little or no contact with, or serious 
support from, the groups targeted by the intervention...make the whole initiative 
untenable’ (TU870 1997 p39).
SIDA (1995), TU870 (1997) and B882 (1991) all suggest that identification of participant 
involvement can be achieved by using Stakeholder Analysis; stakeholders being groups of 
people who are linked by a common interest.
TU870 (1997) suggested that if a stakeholder approach is adopted, ‘. . .decision-makers can 
make practical trade-offs with a clear understanding of their likely consequences’ (ibid. 
pl5). It
‘...addresses this problem throu^ disaggregation of the costs, benefits and risks of 
different policies and strategies, as well as projects’ (ibid. p45).
The examples cited indicated that Stakeholder Analysis helped achieve the resolution of a 
problem by identifying all those who were involved in the situation associated with the
52
2 Intelligent Network Development and Research Methods
problem. However, Montgomery (1995a) warned against categorising participants into a 
particular stakeholder group and assuming that they all conform to the thinking in that 
category,
... within any of these, there are sub-categories of stakeholders with differing 
interests which may or may not be prepared to subsume in the general collective 
interest’ (ibid. p2).
This warning was reinforced by TU870 (1997)
‘Where externalities exist and where hidden agendas differ from written ones as in 
the case of institutions, differences between sets of stakeholder interest, or between 
stakeholders and society, may be considerable’ (ibid. p i5).
But TU870 maintained that Stakeholder Analysis is still appropriate ‘. . .in situations where 
there are considerable differences between different sets of stakeholders’ (ibid p44).
However, to perform a Stakeholder Analysis the drivers have first to be defined. The 
Futures Group (1994) proposed the use of a Relevance Tree, such that a broad topic is 
decomposed in an hierarchical fashion so as to present a clear description of the problem.
Montgomery (1995b) detailed a three-stage process for a comprehensive Stakeholder 
Analysis contributing to project design:
• ‘Stage 1: Understanding a project’s various stakeholders’;
• ‘Stage 2: Drawing out assumptions and identifying opportunities’;
• ‘Stage 3: Feeding the findings into the project design process’
(ibid. p8).
TU870 proposed the following Participation Analysis Matrix (Table 2.1) which could be 
used in Stage 2 of the above process (TU870 1997 p40). This categorises the stakeholders 
in order to determine their interest and power.
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Active
Institution
Active
Interest Group
Non-Active
Institution
Non-Active 
Interest Group
Table 2.1 Participation Analysis Matrix
The differing methods of Participant/Stakeholder Analysis are all ultimately directed at 
conflict resolution. As such they are not always appropriate to areas of research which 
seeks to gather data and identify conflict, rather than resolve it. However, as part of their 
problem-resolving process they employ a structured method of identifying participants, 
data gathering and analysis and it is this aspect of Stakeholder Analysis that appeared 
useful.
In adopting this approach, care must be exercised regarding the existence of sub-groups, 
perhaps with hidden agendas, within the larger group. Within this research for instance, 
members of the group Telecommunications Operators’ are in fact in competition with 
each other and therefore unlikely to subscribe to the same set of issues.
Grimble et al. (1994) suggested that such ‘Conflict^® situations could occur at both micro 
and macro levels and between levels’ (ibid. p9) and proposed a tabular technique to 
classify the trade-offs^^ and conflicts that exist (Table 2.2).
Matrix Stakeholder
1
Stakeholder
2
Stakeholder
3
Stakeholder 1 ±(1)
Stakeholder 2 -(2) -(2)
Stakeholder 3 +(3) +(3) -(4)
+ Complementary Aim 
- Conflicting Aim
Table 2.2 Inter-relationship Matrix
20 'Conflicts are situations o f competition and/or disagreement between two or more stakeholder groups 
'.(Grimble et al. 1994, p7)
'A trade-off is the process o f balancing conflicting objectives. A  trade-off therefore arises when a 
stakeholder or stakeholder group faces several objectives ... which cannot simultaneously be achieved.' 
(Grimble et al. 1994, p7)
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This inter-relationship matrix is a two dimensional matrix with the same stakeholders on 
each axis to plot the interrelationships. ‘A (-) is used to indicate a conflict and a (+) to 
indicate complementary aims (ibid. pps.12-3). The numbers in brackets related to 
accompanying notes explaining the complementary or conflicting aim. Such an approach is 
very similar to the Force Field analysis technique proposed by Lewin (1951) and Majaro 
(1988), in which the balance of a number of opposing forces creates the situation under 
examination. The priority for this research is the source of these forces, so as to ascertain 
whether they are conflicting or complementary and for this reason is probably best served 
by Grimble et al.’s (1994) approach.
The Relevance Tree approach was used for the initial identification of the stakeholders 
involved in this study. Further refinement of this framework utilised the participation 
analysis matrix proposed by TU870 (1997) and the Inter-relationship Matrix used by 
Grimble et al. (1994). Using these in conjunction with (an amended) Montgomery three- 
stage process created a lead-in to the research.
Selecting a Sample
Bailey et al. (1995) identified a number of techniques for progressively classifying a 
population and then selecting at different levels until the individual is identified. The first 
four types of sampling identify the population:
• Quota sampling: ‘representing different groups in the proportions in which they 
occur in the population’ (ibid. 1995 p89);
• Cluster Sampling: selecting a group within a population and sampling the 
group;
• Opportunity Sampling: limiting the sample to those who are accessible;
• Connoisseur Samples: asking others who the sample should be. (An example 
would be asking who are good managers and using the people identified as the 
sample.)
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The next stage covers three methods of sampling to identify individuals within the chosen 
population:
• Random Sampling - with every member having an equal chance of being 
chosen;
• Systematic Sampling - where every nth member is selected;
• Stratified Random Sampling - where the population is subdivided into smaller 
groups of interest and then a random selection is made from these groups 
(Bailey et al. 1995).
Stakeholder Analysis was used to identify the key groups to be sampled, the ‘Clusters’ 
defined by Bailey et al. (1995) and from within these groups individuals were selected. The 
method of selecting individuals within these groups reflected the potential number of 
candidates within a group. For example, since there are very few telecommunications 
exchange Suppliers world-wide, only one subject was selected from each Supplier. For the 
larger groups such as Operators, the technique of stratified random sampling was 
employed.
In the case of candidates for interviews, connoisseur samples were employed, investigating 
who were the key decision makers and seeking to employ them in the research.
Additionally there was a level of Opportunity sampling, taking advantage of those who 
were accessible at a certain point in time.
Analysis - Response Rate
Scott (1961) reported that response rates for his postal surveys were
‘...between 80 per cent and 90 per cent, up to 1956, however, every such successful 
survey reported had sampled a special population’ (ibid. p i44).
He also noted that lower response rates to postal questionnaires (apart from misaddressing/ 
misdelivery etc.) were obtained from those who had a ‘.. .lower mean educational 
average...or...lower status’ (ibid p i57) (defined by income and certain material 
possessions) and older women and younger military personnel.
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Bailey et al. (1995) indicated that even with chasing, postal questionnaires usually result in 
low rates of return, often less than 10% and recommend that the only time postal 
questionnaires should be used is when
‘.. .you have already gained a firm commitment firom the respondents to complete 
them...««<5^ ...where (usually), you are collecting information from a small number of 
people and don‘t have time to interview them’ (ibid. p63).
Despite the pessimism, the 10% figure quoted by Bailey et al. (1995) still seemed high 
compared to the 1 % rate of return achieved for many marketing campaigns quoted by 
Thompson (1990).
Scott’s (1961) reported response rates, I suspect, reflected the era in which he lived. The 
public indifference to questionnaires appears to have increased, as reflected in the lower 
response rates cited by Bailey et al. (1995) and Thompson (1990).
Drawing from these lessons, the approach adopted for this research was to ensure that the 
survey had some intrinsic interest to the respondent and to select respondents with an 
appropriate level of technical competence. Given that the goal of the surveys was to 
establish the position of organisations rather than individuals, non-respondents could be 
substituted by another candidate from within the organisation, thereby boosting the 
response rate.
Analysis - VaUdity
Consideration was given to the validity of data gained as the result of the questionnaire 
surveys, since it was important to assess that the data gathered was representative of the 
industry/industry sector views as a whole. Scott (1961) found that
‘...the mail survey is about as accurate as the interview for obtaining data on 
occupational class but the mail survey gets a substantially larger proportion of 
unclassifiable responses and these tend to be biased towards the less skilled 
occupations‘ (ibid. pi 83).
This was not felt to be a problem. By targeting the questionnaire at the technical 
community, the population did not by default, fall into the ‘less skilled‘ category.
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Scott additionally found that ‘.. .there is some slight evidence that socially less acceptable 
responses are more readily elicited by mail questionnaires ‘(ibid. pi 83). Although the 
questionnaires produced for this research did not have a social element, it might have been 
considered to have had a commercial aspect. The questionnaire therefore was probably 
more likely to elicit a response to such questions than an interview.
Bailey et al. (1995) said that non-response was a problem in that
‘...people or organisations do not....refuse to co-operate at random,...non response 
rates of more than 20% usually undermine any generalisations that can be drawn’ 
(ibid. p49).
I do not feel this is applicable here. If the recipient of the postal survey was uncooperative 
and did not return the survey, the problem was addressed by targeting someone else in the 
same organisation. However if an organisation has a policy of not answering 
questionnaires, then this method would not work, but such a situation was considered 
random within the population group of companies as a whole.
Raimond (1993) and Bailey et al. (1995) cautioned that those who respond to 
questionnaires are of a different mind-set and could therefore bias results. Whilst a valid 
concern, it was not felt applicable to this work, since there are numerous reasons for not 
responding. For example, a respondent may well have other priority work, might lack 
technical understanding, or simply lose interest, all of which are random events acting 
upon the population as a whole. Also conflicting with Raimond and Bailey et al.’s (1995) 
views is Fox’s (1990) assertion that provided there is a minimum of 25 in sample, then the 
results are a good approximation to the whole population.
Interviews
Interviews were felt to be an important means of gathering data, both in the early stages as 
a means of supplementing the literature in identifying the problems and issues to be 
researched, and in the latter stages to identify topics of interest to be explored in more 
detail. The literature offers clear guidelines regarding the types of interview that could be 
undertaken and the ethical aspects of interviewing.
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Bailey et al. (1995) categorised interviews as being Structured and Unstructured. 
Structured interviews are those for which a schedule is created and all interviewees treated 
in exactly the same way, with the goal of quantitative analysis to be performed later. 
Unstructured interviews allow the interview to develop as it progresses, to better meet the 
different types of respondents and thus ‘. . .allows the respondents to express themselves in 
their own unique way’, making ‘. . .more authentic responses ... likely’ (ibid. p66). The 
disadvantage with the Unstructured approach is that opportunities for quantitative analysis 
are limited due to the uniqueness of each interview. Bailey et al. (1995) gave by way of an 
example, a mix of ‘Structured’ and ‘Unstructured’ interviews used by a researcher 
investigating the knowledge of drugs among young people. A small number of long 
unstructured interviews allowed the researcher to gather the issues, gain knowledge of the 
language used and apply this to develop a questionnaire to be used in short structured 
interviews.
Interviews would therefore seem to offer a number of advantages during the formative 
stages of a research study such as this one. Furthermore, the method has a proven track 
record within the field of telecommunications policy, as evidence by noted researchers 
such as Mansell (1993). There is however, a need to establish clear ‘rules of engagement’. 
Bailey et al. (1995) suggested a Code of Practice for interviews, to ensure that the
‘...interviewees are fully aware of the reasons behind the research and the part they 
are going to play in it’ (ibid. p68),
in essence forming an informal contract with the interviewee. A Code of Practice should 
detail the reasons for the research, describe how the information is to be used, establish 
that anonymity will be guaranteed, set the times and location of the interview and define 
the interviewee’s rights regarding the information gathered. In addition Bailey et al. (1995) 
suggest that consideration also be given to other affected parties, such as the interviewees’ 
employers etc.
It was decided to adapt Bailey et al.’s (1995) code of practice to meet the ethical needs of 
this research environment and to apprise interviewees of the key points of this code at the 
commencement of the interview.
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In recording interviews, Bailey et al. (1995) identified three methods, with the latter two 
options being agreed with the interviewee prior to the interview:
• Taking verbatim notes: The disadvantages of this method are that it ‘.. .slows 
down the discussion’ leading to the temptation to ‘.. .omit parts of the 
conversation’ which w ill‘...lead to inaccuracies’(ibid. p70);
• Using a scribe: using a third person to record the conversation;
• Tape recording: the disadvantages being that interviewees may be worried 
about being recorded, there can be mechanical problems, leading to background 
noise, reliability etc. After the interview there may be problems with 
transcription owing to speech being structured differently to the written word.
For unstructured interviews, a tape recording was considered most appropriate, since the 
flow of the conversation could be maintained, costs were minimised (no third party) and 
the tape could be transcribed later.
Triangulation
The preceding discussion has identified two distinct methods of data collection, surveys 
and interviews. This raises the question as to how the collected data is drawn together.
Cohen et al. (1989) stated that ‘.. .the use of contrasting methods considerably reduces the 
chances that any consistent findings are attributable to similarities of method’ (ibid. p270). 
Bailey et al. (1995) suggest that research can use a variety of methods to collect data, 
similarly leading to greater confidence in the conclusion; they term the process 
‘triangulation’.
Denzin (1970) listed 6 types of triangulation:
• Time - Cross Sectional: Researching different groups at the same point in time;
- Longitudinal: Researching the same group at different points in time;
• Space: Researching groups in different cultures so as to negate any cultural bias 
in investigations;
• Combined levels: Analysing a situation from individual, group and 
organisational positions;
• Theoretical: Examining competing theories;
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• Investigator: Using more than one observer;
• Methodological - Within Methods: attempting to repeat results using the same 
methods on a different population;
- Between Methods: using different methods on the original
population.
Theoretical triangulation is explored by Yin (1988) in the form of ‘Validity Seeking 
Research’ (ibid. p7), in which one sets out to seek and negate rival hypotheses so as to 
avoid the danger of developing a blinkered attitude. This approach is also recommended by 
Smith (1975), ‘The investigator should be more active in designing his research so that 
competing theories can be tested’ (ibid. p274) and Cohen (1989)
‘Exclusive reliance on one method,... may bias or distort the researcher’s 
picture of the particular slice of reality he is investigating. He needs to be 
confident that the data generated are not simply artefacts of one specific 
method of collection’ (ibid. p269).
The Validity Seeking Research approach initially appeared useful to the research, since it 
indicated that if interested parties from different stakeholder groups come to the same 
conclusion, the subsequent focus can concentrate less on the group members and more on 
the group’s target. However, trying to juxtapose the elements of the hypothesis to produce 
a rival hypothesis produced nonsense statements, which implied for instance, ‘standardised 
customers’. Unless a direct opposite to the hypothesis was adopted, there was a danger of 
losing the research focus. Taking a direct opposite to the thesis however, would result in 
the same research being undertaken as was intended anyway. Thus contradictory evidence 
to the hypothesis was considered as being revealed as a matter of course during the 
research.
Triangulation in general is a good way of increasing the confidence of the results. The 
relevance of the different categories of triangulation was considered as follows:
• Time triangulation: Both types of time triangulation were employed. Cross 
sectional was used in gathering data from different groups, whilst Longitudinal 
was used in comparing the gathered data with published information, to indicate 
if stances had change with time;
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• Space triangulation was used to remove an element of cultural bias by focusing 
on stakeholders in Europe, not just the UK;
• Combined Level triangulation was not considered appropriate since the 
research was only interested at the organisational level;
• Theoretical triangulation was felt inappropriate, for the reasons discussed 
previously for not adopting rival hypothesis;
• The use of interviews to discuss findings, produced different observational 
viewpoints, allowing Investigator triangulation;
• Methodological triangulation was not appropriate owing to the overall small 
population to be sampled.
Yin (1988) offered yet another set of triangulation methods to ensure evidence is gathered 
firom multiple viewpoints, some of these methods overlapping with Denzin’s triangulation 
types. He suggested that evidence is built from 6 viewpoints. Documentation, Archived 
Records, Interviews, Direct & Participant Observation^^ and Physical Artefacts.
The first three of these (Documentation, Archived Records and Interviews) were 
considered appropriate, but the remaining viewpoints were not felt appropriate for the 
following reasons:
• Direct Observation was impracticable since I work for BT. Trying to gather 
data while a company is formulating a technical strategy would expose 
commercially sensitive information to the employee of a competitor. However, 
direct observation was attempted through attending the BT standardisation 
meetings to determine what was discussed and why the organisation arrived at 
the stance it did. This yielded minimal benefit, since most of the discussion was
23conducted by e-mail . Subsequently I found that conversations with the BT 
representatives on the standardisation bodies were less time consuming and as 
valuable. But the usefulness of this data was limited, since no comparison at 
this strategy setting level could be made with other organisations;
• Participant Observation was not appropriate since I was not in the part of my 
employer’s organisation which influenced such decisions. Should I have been
Bell (1989 p7) terms Participant Observation research, a s ‘Ethnographic Style’
^  It is interesting to note that much o f BT's Standards strategy was set by employees fairly low in the 
organisation with minimal guidance.
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able to adopted a Participant Observer role there would assuredly have been a 
potential reduction in trust, when I (as part of the research) sent a postal survey 
to attendees of some of the European Standards Setting Meetings. There could 
have been concerns that I was revealing commercially sensitive information to 
my employers. However, since I was invited to speak at a number of 
conferences, a certain amount of unplanned Participant Observation did actually 
occur;
• The use of Physical Artefacts had no place in this context. Nothing could be 
gained from looking at the equipment; the connections and signalling could 
only be gathered effectively from an architectural view.
Interestingly the idea of a survey was not detailed by Yin, although it could be argued to 
fall within Yin’s documentation category (i.e. the collection and examination of current 
information), or could be considered the equivalent to a structured interview. Yin’s 
viewpoints however, did not draw out and hence give consideration to, the sub-categories 
within them, to ensure a comprehensive coverage of items. This was addressed by the other 
aspects of Triangulation which encompass and extends Yin’s viewpoints.
Cohen et al. (1989) warns that
‘...where triangulation is used in interpretative research to investigate different 
actors’ viewpoints, the same method.. will naturally produce different sets of data.’ 
(ibidp270)
but that the benefit is that ‘...the more the methods contrast with each other the greater the 
researcher’s confidence’ (ibid. p270). It was therefore decided that Triangulation would be 
of benefit to the research and that generally the approach, scope and period of the research 
would involve a number of Triangulation options.
Validity of Research
Bailey et al. (1995) detailed criteria forjudging the validity or the ‘correctness’ of the 
conclusions and hence why they might be invalid. These are:
• Content Validity, where the response from certain parties is at variance owing 
to differing levels of openness. This could be due to inappropriate questions or
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a variance in the trust shown to the researcher, leading to differing levels of 
openness;
• Unreliability, where the questions are unconsciously framed to impact a subset 
of the population to a greater extent than the others, resulting in a bias from that 
subset;
• Representativeness, where the researched population is chosen such that they 
have a greater vested interest in the research.
The validity of the data was an appropriate issue to consider for this study. It was 
approached by thinking how the conclusions could be invalidated and trying to avoid these 
situations. An example would be a respondent answering the questionnaire in a biased 
manner knowing I work for BT (and considering BT as a competitor or potential customer 
etc.) (Content Validity). Such bias was avoided by not volunteering the information that I 
work for BT, whilst obviously assuring and maintaining the confidentiality of their 
responses.
Unreliability and Representativeness were also valid issues, since the postal survey 
questions were worded and the survey targeted, at those with a technical knowledge of 
Intelligent Networks. However there was no way to avoid this, since this was the only 
group of people likely to be aware of the issues associated with this technology.
Gosling et al. (1995) identify a further concern,
‘...the work itself may be bringing about change in the environment around it. Any 
change will have an effect on the work’ (ibid. pi 1).
Nelson (1990) terms a researcher who changes or influences a situation by their data 
collection and analysis an Action Researcher. Thus the very act of collecting information 
may directly, or indirectly, change the situation and invalidate the data. This is another 
legitimate concern, but not one which was felt likely to cause a problem, owing to the 
number, variety and magnitude of the different forces acting upon the area being 
researched, negating any influence introduced by the researcher.
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2.4 Summary of Research Methods
Reviewing the literature on research methods and techniques identified the need for a 
research focus, an understanding of the various methods of data gathering and the actions 
needed to increase the confidence of the data gathered and subsequent conclusions.
For the research to be of practical use it was decided to treat it as ‘Applied’ research, 
resulting in a series of recommendations. Primary data gathering was firom practitioners 
and stakeholders related to Intelligent Networks. Their geographical diversity made 
interviews impractical, thus questionnaire surveys were adopted and applied with ideas 
gathered firom the Methods Research to encourage a response. Interviews were initially 
used to gather broad ideas and focus the research, and latterly to explore selected issues in 
detail. Overall the validity of the research was raised by means of triangulation techniques, 
a number of which occurred by default from the nature of the situation and the duration of 
the research.
For instance. Space triangulation was valid since many of the practitioners I needed to 
gather data firom, were in many different European countries; and Time triangulation 
occurred as the result of the period of time needed to undertake this research part-time.
These areas of choice, why they were adopted and how they were adapted for the research, 
are discussed in Chapter 3.
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3.1 Introduction
The literature discussed in the previous chapter defines a broad set of research methods and 
tools that have been applied to policy research and more specifically to identifying 
stakeholders and establishing their attitudes to the potential regulation of INs. Which 
methods and how they were applied, form a key part of the research design. This chapter 
details the methods which were chosen and how they were adapted and combined to create 
the research programme.
Developing a research programme of this type is by its very nature an iterative process, 
whereby early tentative decisions are reviewed and refined as the work proceeds. This 
narrative however, is inevitably sequential and therefore the rationale for some decisions 
appears after the initial discussion. For instance, the boundary of information gathering 
(seemingly set early in the research), was set following discussions with end users (i.e. 
telecommunications service customers), arising as part of the questionnaire trial discussed 
later in the chapter.
During the research, the investigation fi-equently checked back to the ultimate aim of the 
thesis, which was to produce conclusions concerning the research hypothesis:
Tight architecture-based regulation is inappropriate fo r  a rapidly changing 
telecommunications environment, since that environment is continually challenging 
and redefining the boundaries o f  technological change.
To this end questions were ‘.. .designed to produce information on which future decisions 
can be based’ (Bailey et al. 1995 p42). The responses to surveys and interviews for 
example, allowed the consequences of the standardised IN architecture model^ and hence 
potential standardisation changes to be assessed. The thesis therefore has a function 
regardless of its response to the hypothesis questions, with its findings being applicable 
beyond IN technology.
The research did not adopt any one ‘approach’, with several being found appropriate 
depending upon the situation and data gathering process. By examining the standardisation
The standardised IN model was introduced in Chapter 2 and discussed and is developed in Chapter 4.
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and regulatory processes and in particular the way the Operators, Suppliers,
Standardisation Bodies and Regulators interacted and did business, the research adopted a 
Case Study approach (Section 2.3, Overall Strategy). However, presenting the research 
findings at Intelligent Network conferences shaped a Participant Observer role for the 
researcher (Chapter 2.3, Triangulation). The findings presented might have influenced the 
course of IN technological development and hence subsequently gathered evidence. This is 
particularly relevant over the longer timescales taken to pursue a part-time research degree. 
Two examples of the influence the research might have had, are an interviewee (interview 
Alvestad 1997) and a survey respondent (cbal401), which indicated that material I had 
presented and questions asked had given them information and made them think of issues, 
of which they were not previously aware. Overall however, it seems unlikely that the 
research has impacted the future of INs, since it was heavily influenced by key 
stakeholders with a commercial interest.
A Participant Observer role was similarly played by the researcher in gathering data by 
participating in BT standardisation meetings, to discuss BT’s stance on issues arising from 
the standardisation working groups. The danger in this case was that researcher judgement 
may have been impaired, judging observations as typical of the stakeholder group as a 
whole (Bell 1989). Adopting a BT bias was a danger of which I, as an employee of BT, 
was constantly aware, since it was the one to which I would be most likely to succumb.
A key influence of this research is the adoption of Triangulation, discussed in the next 
section (Section 3.2). Within this, the different technologies considered as the basis for the 
research are explored and how a Stakeholder Analyses was employed, to categorise those 
with an interest in Intelligent Networks.
The remainder of the chapter discusses the survey strategy (Section 3.3) addressing the 
layout of the questionnaires, how the recipients were selected and how data were collected 
and analysed. Finally Section 3.4 discusses the interviewing technique employed and how 
the early interviews acted as a trial to develop the strategy adopted for the majority of the 
interviews.
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3.2 Triangulation
The researeh employed Triangulation in order to examine the data from several angles and 
determine if there was a consistent message/result. This created a broad overall perspective 
maximising the value of the research. The Triangulation categories considered for the 
research (using Cohen et al.’s (1989) categorisation for each, as detailed in Chapter 2.3) 
were:
• Longitudinal Time - the programme of research exhibits Longitudinal Time 
Triangulation, with data gathered over an interval of time allowing an 
assessment of the stance of stakeholders over that period;
• Cross Sectional Time (1) - an analysis of technologies employing centralised 
intelligence was made in order to determine if it was feasible to gather data 
relating to more than one technology. Consideration was similarly given to the 
developing Intelligent Network standards to assess the possibility of world­
wide gathering data.
• Cross Sectional Time (2) - more than one view-point was employed, involving 
not only Value Chain members but other stakeholders, for example regulators 
and standardisation bodies, to gather data and identify concerns and issues;
• Space - the research involved multiple companies from across the European 
Union, but drew-in evidence from other regions of the world where appropriate, 
such as the Pacific Rim and North America, to support, to argue against or to 
illustrate the probable result from certain courses of action etc.;
• Investigator - the results and the conclusions reached from the analysis of data 
were examined and discussed with others, to ensure correct interpretation;
These categories were developed and incorporated (via an iterative process), into the 
research programme depicted in Figure 3.1.
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Figure 3.1 A Representation of the Research Process
Gathering and analysing the background material formed the initial step into the research, 
taking the form of a literary review to help establish the parameters of the research, and 
define and refine the hypothesis and background interviews to achieve a better 
understanding of the issues. This led to the development of alternative Intelligent Network 
architecture models based upon the perceived weaknesses of the standardised architecture. 
These architectures were tested in Survey 1, to gather data to analyse the implications of 
implementation and prove their attractiveness and viability. A postal survey was chosen as
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the main source of primary information-gathering, owing to the number and geographic 
spread of companies needing to be targeted, in order to get as accurate a view as possible. 
The survey was supplemented by interviews, undertaken to understand and explore the 
reasoning behind the issues identified in the responses. The first survey was followed by a 
second information-gathering process in the form of a second questionnaire survey, to 
verify, update and develop the information gathered.
This strategy provided a suitable scope and depth of data gathering, without resorting to 
the process of extensive interviewing. Following the questionnaire survey by interviews, 
also countered any unconscious tendency for the interviewer to place emphasis on strong 
views arising firom early interviews.
Although the research programme can be considered as a way of applying Longitudinal 
Time Triangulation, the scope of the technology under study could similarly potentially be 
developed, to achieve another triangulation, that of Cross Sectional Time.
Technology (Cross Sectional Time)
INs was but one of a number of ‘centralised intelligence’ technologies under development 
during the period of this research and therefore the technique of Cross Sectional Time 
Triangulation as described in Chapter 2.3, Triangulation, might provide a means of 
highlighting common issues.
To this end, a structured analysis was employed at the commencement of the research 
(Figure 3.2) to initially identify and subsequently establish the state of other technologies 
that employed central intelligence. This was to determine if they could provide an analysis 
comparable with that of INs.
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Figure 3.2 Technologies Employing Centralised Intelligence
These alternative central intelligence technologies are represented on a three dimensional 
map, using the parameters of Network Type (Packet or Circuit Switched), the Telephony 
Market (Fixed or Mobile) and the Position of the Technology in the (end-to-end) Network 
architecture; Core (in the Operator’s network) or Periphery (in the customer’s network).
The technologies identified at the time were Voice Over Internet Protocol (VOIP) 
Telephony, Internet Protocol (IP) Telephony, Computer Telephony Integration (CTI), 
Intelligent Networks (INs), Global System for Mobile (GSM) and Radio Telephony. The 
technology map indicated that there was a ‘technology void’ for a ‘Core, Mobile, Data 
Network’, which has since been filled by Mobile Internet Protocol. Mobile Computing was 
another ‘technology void’, which does not yet appear to have been filled by a Centralised 
Intelligence technology. (These technologies are explained below.) The prerequisite for a 
Cross Sectional Time Triangulation based upon INs, was a technology that employed 
centralised intelligence (closely mirroring that of INs), employing non proprietary 
standards and not subject to regulation (at the time).
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VOIP Telephony employs a single telephony server to process calls. Its benefit is that a 
company could use its existing data infirastructure (Local Area Network), to not only 
connect computers, but telephones too. Its key disadvantage, was that at the start of the 
research the telephony capability was almost wholly proprietary and was limited to private 
company (not public use).
The term Digital Telephony embraces a number of mechanisms for carrying telephony 
traffic on a data network. This includes Voice over ATM and VOIP which can also be 
carried on ATM. Its disadvantage from a research perspective was that it was an immature 
technology at the commencement of the research.
CTI employs a centralised database to (typically) allow calls arriving at a company’s 
premises to be more efficiently handled. For instance, the ‘Calling Line Identity’ 
(originating telephone number) associated with an incoming call, could be used prior to the 
call being answered, to identify the person who dealt with that caller’s account and 
automatically route the call to their telephone. The disadvantage of this technology, was 
that again it was highly proprietary (although standardisation was emerging, (Shepherd 
1998)) and not appropriate to public Operator use owing to its lack of scalability, (i.e. it 
was targeted at corporate rather than network Operator markets.)
At the start of the research. Radio Telephony offered a private localised mobile radio 
service. It generally employed proprietary standards (five-tone, N-tone etc.), although 
ETSI were in the process of agreeing the ‘Binary Interchange of Information and 
Signalling’ (BUS) standard (Durvaux 1993). The technology serviced a limited niche 
market and was unlikely to be adopted or develop particularly quickly, thus being 
considered inappropriate for more detailed study.
Mobile Internet Protocol (IP) was essentially a non-existent technology at the 
commencement of the research, but one the analysis demonstrated could exist. Initial 
discussions started in the standards bodies about 1995 and the first service (GSM Packet 
Radio System (GPRS), launched in the UK in about 1999. The technology was not 
considered for study, because it was non-existent at the commencement of the research.
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The relative merits of INs and GSM have already been discussed in Chapter 1.
Mobile Computing was a similarly non-existent technology at the start of the research and 
still is, since there is nothing available which meets the criterion of employing centralised 
intelligence. A combination of Wireless LAN technology (Wireless Fidelity 802.1 lb) and 
Internet Protocol version 6’s capability to ‘roam’ however, comes close to meeting this 
functionality criterion.
It was concluded that undertaking Cross Sectional Triangulation of these other 
technologies with INs was impractical, owing to their general immaturity and/or lack of 
recognised open standards. Identifying them however, allowed the research to consider the 
implications of INs upon other networks such as GSM and CTI (discussed in Chapters 4 
and 6) and provided recognition of the value of the research in being applicable to these 
other technologies.
Although suitable alternative centralised intelligence technologies to IN could not be found 
in order to apply Cross Sectional Time Triangulation, another area which was assessed for 
Cross Sectional Time Triangulation, consisted of the standards employed by Intelligent 
Networks.
Intelligent Network Standards (Cross Sectional Time)
The ITU-T Intelligent Network standards are generally recognised as the international 
standards applicable to this technology. The initial IN standards ratified by the ITU-T, 
termed Capability Set 1 (CSl), despite being a collaboration by all parties, proved to be 
insufficiently detailed to be implementable. The CS1 standards were subsequently 
influenced by ETSI refining and defining a practical implementation of it. This was termed 
‘CSl Refined’. In parallel to the CSl development. North America (NA) continued to 
develop their Advanced Intelligent Network (AIN) standard. There were therefore, two 
regional standards for the use of IN systems developing world-wide, both being associated 
with the ITU-T standard. These two evolving regionalised standards had potential for 
achieving Yin’s (1988) proposal of expanding the boundaries to gather comparative data, 
or being used in Cross Sectional Time Triangulation, in this case comparing the situation 
in North America with Europe. However owing to the difficulty of gathering data fi*om
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America, a decision was made to focus on the European specification and standardisation 
process, drawing comparisons where appropriate with the North America model.
A third area considered as to its suitability to meet the requirements of Cross Sectional 
Time Triangulation was the gathering of data from different groups.
Stakeholder Analyses (Space/Cross Sectional Time)
Ensuring data was gathered firom more than one viewpoint required Cross Sectional Time 
Triangulation. The viewpoints sought were fi*om employees of Telecommunications 
Service Value Chain companies or bodies closely related with telecommunications, such as 
regulators and standardisation organisations. These companies and organisations are 
termed Stakeholders. The research involved gathering data fi’om stakeholders located 
across the European Union and addressed the requirements of Space Triangulation by 
drawing in evidence firom the Pacific Rim and North America where appropriate.
The different categories of stakeholder involved with Intelligent Networks, were identified 
by employing a Stakeholder Analysis as discussed in Chapter 2.3, ‘Selecting a Sample’. 
This was a precursor to identifying companies and key individuals within them, who had 
knowledge, opinions and an interest in Intelligent Networks and who might be receptive to 
participating in the research by way of a survey or an interview.
The initial Stakeholder Analysis followed Grimble et al’s (1994) format. It gave 
consideration to the fact that sub-groups often have differing agendas. For instance, 
different members of the stakeholder group (Telecommunications) Operators, were in 
competition with each other and therefore did not form a homogenous group.
Using the interrelationship matrix outlined in Chapter 2.3, Table 3.1 was developed to 
identify those stakeholders with an interest in INs. Their relative importance was assessed 
using Grimble et al.’s (1994) categorisation of Active or Non-Active. Active in this context 
refers to whether they were taking an active part in the development of IN standards, 
operation or their regulation etc. The Telecommunications Managers Association (TMA) is 
identified as Non-Active, since although they are active in the field of telecommunications 
products, charges and services etc., their activities are for the most part, independent of any 
particular technology such as INs.
82
3 Research Design
INSTITUTIONS INTEREST GROUPS
Active Exchange Suppliers, 
Computer 
Manufacturers, 
(Network) Operators, 
Service Providers
European Union (Commission)
(Member State) Government
(e.g. UK Department of Trade & Industry
(DTI)),
Regulators
(e.g. UK Office of Telecommunications 
(OFTEL)),
Standards Bodies
(e.g. International Telecommunication Union 
- Telecommunications (ITU-T), European 
Telecommunications Standards Institute 
(ETSI)),
Consultants
Non-
Active
Lobby Groups 
e.g. Telecommunications 
Managers Association 
(TMA), Telephone Users 
Association (TUA) 
etc.
End User
Table 3.1 Intelligent Network Stakeholder Interrelationship Matrix
The stakeholders identified in Table 3.1, provided the categories used in a ‘Participation 
Analysis Matrix’ (Chapter 2.3, Participant Analysis), which allowed an initial exploration 
of the relationships between the stakeholder groups, regarding the introduction of 
Intelligent Networks and the opening of their interfaces. This analysis proved useful when 
attempting to explain some of the variations in survey responses by members of the same 
Stakeholder group.
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Matrix EU Gvt.
Reg,
Exchange
Suppliers
Computer
Manu.
Operator Service
Providers
Standards
Bodies
Consultant Lobby Gp. 
/User
Gvt./Reg. ±(1)
Exchange
Suppliers
-(2) -(2)
Computer
Manu.
++(3) ++(3) -(4)
Operator ±(5) ±(5) -(2) ++(3) ■(5)
Service
Providers
+(7) +(7) -(2) +(3)
Standards
Bodies
Consultant
Lobby Gp. 
/User
++ (6) ++(6) +(6) +(6)
+ Complementary Aim 
++ Strong Complementary Aim 
Conflicting Aim 
±  Complementary and Conflicting Aim
Table 3.2 Participant Analysis Matrix
The Participant Analysis Matrix (Table 3.2) summarises the key relationships between the 
stakeholders, the information being found from preliminary background reading, 
interviews and my previous experience. A number of cells are grey-filled since they 
replicate a relationship considered elsewhere in the table. The symbols + & - indicate if the 
Stakeholders had complementary or conflicting interests and the assessed strength of the 
relationship. The number in brackets relates to the specific interests as is explained in 
Table 3.3.
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COMMONALITY OF INTEREST (+) CONFLICTS OF INTEREST (-)
The EU Commission and Member States 
promotes a competitive 
telecommunications environment
Moving to open interfaces allows entry to 
the telecommunications market
Welcomes open interfaces since it allows 
equipment to be purchased from a range 
of Suppliers, knowing it will interwork.
Welcomes the greater range of services 
introduced by Intelligent Networks 
Welcomes open interfaces since 
interconnection to other Operators is 
made easier_____________________
1 The Member States need to uphold their 
country’s interests in Europe
2 Moving to open interfaces avoids 
Operator tie-in to one Supplier.
3
4 The move to open interfaces allow 
elements of INs to be provided by 
different Suppliers.
5 Does not welcome opening interfaces to 
competing Operators, since this improves 
the functionality of the services they are 
able to offer.
Table 3.3 Notes Relating to the Participant Analysis Matrix
In the UK for instance, both the DTI/OFTEL and the computer manufacturers had an 
interest in opening IN interfaces; the DTI/OFTEL to encourage competition within the 
telecommunications sector; the computer manufacturers to gain access to the 
telecommunications market.
The Exchange Suppliers were assessed as (generally) not wanting open interfaces since 
being able to ‘mix and match’ Suppliers’ equipment would break their close Network 
Operator relationship of old.
Network Operators liked open interfaces because it increased their range of Suppliers and 
hence strengthened their negotiating position. However within this group, the 
legacy/market dominant Operators disliked standardised interfaces, as they provided a 
possible point of interconnect to their network for Service Providers and new market 
entrant Operators. The legacy/market dominant Operators therefore had conflicting drivers.
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Users (including ‘lobbying’ trade associations such as the Telecommunications Managers 
Association (TMA) and Telephone Users Association (TUA) in the UK), were not so 
concerned with the technology, rather than the benefits technology might bring them. Thus 
INs were supported by users in that they encouraged new services, greater flexibility and 
reduced prices (due to those services being offered in a more efficient way).
Standardisation Bodies and Consultants are shown as having no complementary or 
conflicting aims in Table 3.3, since they were neutral. In practice however, they were 
likely to adopt the stance of their partieipants and sponsors.
The interrelation matrix and the Stakeholder Analysis were used to perform a Variables 
Analysis, leading to the identification of the stakeholder paths of influence. This is 
represented by the ‘branches’ on the Relevance Tree in Figure 3.3.
Strategy Strategy 
Policy Policy
Computer -  -  Telecom c p e  
Equipment
Strategy
Policy
Strategy Benefits 
Policy Need
Benefits
Need
Service Companies Infiasmtcture PSTN VPN Pnvate Cellular N a f i ^ —  In terzo n a l
Providers andService Co Co Co
Suppliers* NetworksOperators
Technology
(Consultants Regulators Standards Propnetary
Supplier
Tel. Co.
International Trade
ConsortiumsAgreement
Collective ITU-T
EU (ETSI)
International NA (ANSI)
European
American/FCC
Pacific Rim
GATT
R eg n / Suppliers \  Users 
Independent Op National
/
Strategy 
Policy
Strategy
Policy
K ey
Formal Relationship 
Informal Relationship 
Strong Relationship 
Potentially Evolving Influence
Figure 3.3 The Variables Associated with and Impacting upon, Intelligent Networks
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Identifying the variables in the research was key, since they helped define the study areas 
and acted as a focus for deciding the best method of investigation. For instance, the 
Independent Variables discussed in Chapter 2.3, could be summarised as the 
telecommunications services market’s main Value Chain elements (marked A-C in Figure 
3.3). (i.e. equipment supplier through to product user). Intervening variables included the 
standardisation and regulatory bodies. The Independent Variables were investigated via 
questionnaires and interviews and the Intervening Variables by paper research and 
interviews, i.e. the study involved non-equivalent dependent variables (Bailey et al. 1995).
Figure 3.3 also attempts to identify the relationship between the stakeholders with respect 
to IN technology. The Participant Analysis Matrix (Tables 3.2 & 3.3) helps catalogue the 
aim of each Stakeholder, whereas Figure 3.3 differs in attempting to convey their relative 
influences. The National Regulator is therefore identified as a ‘Potentially Evolving 
Influence’, since OFTEL at the start of the research, was considering regulating IN 
interfaces.
The figure additionally helped identify stakeholder sub-groups and was used to categorise 
an address list of contacts for the research. These included members of the European 
Commission and Regulatory Organisations, Suppliers, Telecommunications Network 
Operators, representatives on Standardisation Bodies and Consultants associated with 
Intelligent Networks. (A list of the stakeholder categories used, is given in Appendix A.2). 
The individuals within these groups were compiled firom a number of sources ranging firom 
attendees of appropriate ITU, ETSI working groups, respondents to EU, DTI IN 
consultations, authors of IN articles and IN books, and presenters at IN conferences etc.
The Stakeholder Analysis groupings of interested parties e.g. Supplier, Operator etc, 
matched Bailey et al.’s (1985) classification of Cluster Sampling. Within a group (cluster), 
the choice of population was made depending upon the structure and size of the group. For 
instance the group of telecommunication exchange manufacturers was relatively few in 
number and it appeared appropriate to seek a response fi*om no more than one 
representative fi*om each country (in which they had a development presence^). For other
 ^The research questionnaire contained technical terminology and architectures, which tended to be best 
understood by those developing Intelligent Network systems.
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groups such as Operators, a Stratified Random Sampling was employed, sub-dividing the 
group and randomly selecting from these divisions.
For interviews. Connoisseur Samples were employed, establishing who were the key 
decision makers and seeking to employ them in the research. Additionally, there was a 
level of Opportunity Sampling, taking advantage of those who were accessible at a certain 
point in time, such as at conferences.
Data Gathering (Investigator)
A final triangulation type (Investigator) was employed by examining and discussing the 
research results and the conclusions reached with others. This ensured the data had been 
correctly interpreted and a balanced search made for both supportive and disconfirmatory 
hypothesis evidence.
In summary. Stakeholder Analysis and Variable Analysis identified the stakeholders and 
sub-categories thereof. Categorising these influences as Independent and Intervening 
Variables, grouped the stakeholder groups into sub-categories, which were able to be 
treated similarly in the way data could be gathered fi*om them. Finally, the Participant 
Analysis matrix and relationship assessment of the Variables Analysis, identified tentative 
links and associations, which were used to help explain trends emerging fi*om the analysis 
of the surveys.
With the identification of the structure of the information required and the key actors, the 
research progressed via a combination of a number of ‘standard’ techniques associated 
with data gathering and analysis, including interviews and surveys. The next sections 
review the strategy adopted for these techniques.
3.3 Surveys
Focussing upon the ETSI IN and in particular its CSl implementation, identified an ITU-T 
architecture model which was used as the basis of standards development. In 1992, the DTI 
in the UK issued a consultation document (DTI 1992), seeking further information on the 
opening of the interfaces of the standardised ITU-T architecture; implying that they were 
considering regulation in this area. If this was to happen, it was important that the
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architecture they used as the basis of regulation was appropriate. This was a key research 
area. To check the appropriateness of the architecture model, the CSl architecture was 
analysed from a number of perspectives (such as technical features, ability to regulate, 
products offered, harmonisation with company strategies, advantages/disadvantages etc.^), 
and various ways were identified by which it could be altered to better meet differing 
needs. As a result, two alternative architectures were developed by the researcher" ,^ which 
formed the basis of Survey 1 and sought information regarding the appropriateness of 
opening the interfaces of the standardised and alternative IN architectures from a range of 
stakeholders perspectives. Thus the research tried to investigate the appropriateness of the 
standard architecture and the extent to which the DTI should demand the opening of its 
interfaces.
The danger with prescribing a particular architecture is that as marketing demands change, 
or the technology moves into parts of the world with different cultural and hence 
potentially different market requirements, its appropriateness and ability to accommodate 
different Operators’ needs may reduce. Thus it could either restrict development of the 
architecture (and hence services), or be of limited use in promoting competition; i.e. 
regulation may not have the desired effect.
The Stakeholder Analysis identified over 250 candidates for inclusion in the data gathering 
exercise; a combination of individuals, commercial organisations and regulatory 
authorities. However their geographical spread and variety of languages, precluded 
interviews as the primary method of data collection and so recourse was made to a 
combination of surveys. The first of these surveys was undertaken by post, the second was 
conducted amongst participants at a Europe conference on INs.
The first survey (Survey 1) was designed to test the validity of the ‘standard’ (centralised 
processing) and ‘alternative’ IN architecture models and gathered information relating to
Discussed in the Chapter 4.
One of the models borrowed the idea of distributed processing from the computing environment and applied 
it to the telecommunications domain and is now an established way o f  working with Intelligent Networks 
requiring centralised intelligence capable o f high processing. The other was wholly my own development and 
introduced the concept o f local and central SCPs. BT is currently evaluating an architecture similar to this, 
although its operation is slightly different to that originally envisaged. (Both o f these models were presented 
at conferences in London, Belgium and Rome (Shepherd 1997a, 1997b, 1997c) and are discussed in detail in 
Chapter 4.
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Opening IN interfaces. A postal survey was chosen as an economical method of reaching a 
large number of relevant people in different countries and speaking different languages. 
Being a paper survey, questions were presented on a consistent basis, leading to easier 
response evaluation and negating potential bias introduced by verbal questioning.
An opportunity arose two and a half years later, to undertaken a second survey (Survey 2), 
in conjunction with the organiser of an Intelligent Networks conference. The survey being 
targeted at the attendees of the conference, provided a different sample group to Survey 1. 
It aimed to determine if industry concerns and focus had changed since Survey 1 and 
provided the opportunity to explore the relationship of INs with new technological 
developments.
This section discusses the strategy adopted for the survey questionnaires. It addresses their 
layout, the means used to encourage a response and discusses how the validity of the 
responses was assessed and the subsequent data analysis.
Postal Survey Strategy
The literary review identified that the EU and DTI had already gathered information 
regarding the application of Open Network Architecture to Intelligent Networks. The EU 
obtained this data via a questionnaire (ETCO 1990) and the DTI through an open 
consultation exercise (DTI 1992). In both these studies there was an implicit assumption 
that the ITU-T standardised IN architecture was the only option open for discussion. In 
collecting issues associated with opening the model’s points of interconnect, they failed to 
allow any weighting of the issues.
This research augmented these sources of information. The postal survey offered 
alternative models and allowed the identification of which of the issues was perceived to 
be the most important. This allowed an assessment of whether opening any interfaces was 
dis-proportionally likely to increase regulation. The surveys also provided an in-depth 
knowledge of how the different Stakeholders viewpoints varied and hence their 
collaborative or competitive nature. The responses were used to assess the relevance and 
potential effectiveness of IN regulation, were it to be implemented in the UK and EU, an 
example of Phillips et al. (1987)‘theory of factors’.
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Postal Survey Content & Layout
One of the goals of this research was to scrutinise the ‘official’ conclusions regarding IN 
technology. The survey questions were therefore designed to gather data on the 
appropriateness of opening Intelligent Network interfaces and hence produce information 
on which future decisions could be based; a conscious check being made as to how the 
answer to each question would aid the aims of the research (Bailey et al. 1995).
It was felt more important to have a good survey response rate to a number of basic 
questions, than a small response to a large commercially sensitive survey. The 
questionnaire was therefore simplified after an initial trial, to avoid asking for detailed or 
strategic information. This approach addressed Bailey et al.’s (1995) issue of ‘Content 
Validity’, where the respondent is wary of providing strategic information by answering 
the questions in full.
The postal survey gauged stakeholder attitudes to the relative importance of specific IN 
architectural features, a task best achieved by undertaking a quantitative analysis and hence 
the use of closed questions. The danger of such a format is that crucial concerns could have 
been missed. The survey format consequently provided respondents with the opportunity to 
add their own comments if they felt it was necessary. However such ‘free form’ answers 
are not generally amenable to quantitative analysis, therefore the questions were designed 
so as to lead the respondent to use keywords or technical terms. In this way individual 
comments using the same keywords could be grouped within a single classification.
In order to improve overseas responses, the questionnaire and covering letter was 
translated into French, German, Spanish and Finnish, with overseas recipients being sent a 
questionnaire in both English and the language of their country of residence. Only two of 
the overseas recipients chose to use the foreign language version.
An English language version of the questionnaire used for Survey 1 is provided in 
Appendix Al.
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Postal Survey Recipients
The list of contacts compiled from the Stakeholder and subsequent analyses formed the 
survey contact list.
Early interviews and trials of the questionnaire found that there was unlikely to be a 
response from the UK Govemment/OFTEL^, or End Users. For the latter group it was 
established that End Users were unlikely to have sufficient knowledge at the level required. 
It was therefore felt appropriate to gather information from governmental and regulatory 
sources via interviews and only contact End Users should a broader based perspective be 
required.
The next consideration was to identify who within the remaining groups (Consultants, 
Operators and Computer & Telecommunications Equipment Suppliers etc.) should receive 
the questionnaire survey. One concern was that sending multiple questionnaires to a large 
company could result in multiple returns that would bias the analysis in favour of that 
company’s views, compared to a smaller company returning a much smaller number of 
questionnaires. Another concern, (which I have experienced first hand in BT with 
questionnaires arriving from outside the company), is that multiple questionnaires can 
trigger a company-wide ban in responding to that questionnaire. For these two reasons, the 
survey was restricted to one representative in each company in each country (keeping the 
EU as the survey data gathering boundary). Where there was more than one contact in a 
company in a country. Stratified Random Sampling (Chapter 2.3) was employed, which 
involved sub-dividing the groups and making a random selection from these.
In summary, the research strategy selected different individuals from within the 
stakeholder groups by different means and employed the most effective way of gathering 
information from them. A number of the individuals were sent the questionnaire survey to 
test the preliminary research and the complementary and conflicting views indicated by the 
Stakeholder Analysis. These included support for the apparent EU/DTI proposal to open 
IN interfaces and to test the appropriateness of the alternative architectures developed. The 
survey attempted to verify these conflicts at a more detailed level.
 ^The DTI and OFTEL, although willing to talk appeared reluctant to do anything which created a traceable 
record o f their responses to research questions, such as answering a questionnaire or allowing an interview to 
be taped.
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It was felt important that individuals receiving the survey were not only fully aware of the 
reasons behind the research and the part their information would contribute to it, but that 
they were assured of their anonymity.
Survey Confidentiality
To address research confidentiality, a check-list (as proposed by Bailey et al. (1995)), was 
identified and implemented for analysing the questionnaire. Two points from the check­
list, the ‘Right to Privacy’ and ‘Control over the Information Provided’, are discussed in 
more detail here.
The confidentiality of the information provided and anonymity of the respondent and their 
company in all publications arising from this research was explicitly guaranteed in the 
Survey 1 covering letter. Furthermore, a point of contact was included for any queries that 
respondents might have. However, in order to provide a follow-up for non-retumed 
questionnaires and to facilitate the comparison of responses with previous published 
positions (e.g. the DTI or EU survey responses), the questionnaires had to incorporate 
some form of respondent identification. The method applied was to hide the identifier 
within a computer filename carried in the footer of the page (Appendix A.2), an example 
of the strategic approach employed by Scott (1961). As a consequence, particular care has 
been exercised when comparing survey responses with published data so as to avoid a loss 
of anonymity. In addition, all company related data was stored in a separate file to that of 
respondent data; both computer files were password protected and the PC’s system 
password option implemented.
A further consideration was the level at which the respondent had control over what 
information they provided. Co-operation of the participant was needed at all information 
gathering stages. If participants did not want to provide information about their work area, 
they would decline to answer the questionnaire or certain questions on the questionnaire 
and act similarly for an interview. Control was therefore directly exercisable by the 
respondents.
In order to assess the validity and comprehension of the questions contained within the 
survey, a number of staged pilots were employed.
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Postal Survey Pilot
Survey 1 was piloted in three stages, with the questionnaire being assessed for revision 
after each stage. For the first stage, market research experts assessed the questionnaire 
structure and layout. This was done using three marketing research experts, two from the 
Open University and a third independent, and resulted in a revised questionnaire layout.
For the second stage, a draft questionnaire was piloted with two people within BT with 
knowledge of Intelligent Networks who would not form part of the final sample. It was 
also piloted with an End User, a telecommunications director from a pharmaceutical 
company (interview Russell 1995), who had no IN knowledge but an excellent knowledge 
of End User telecommunication systems. This second stage trial checked the clarity 
(questions suitably worded and understood), validity of content and length of the 
questionnaire, and allowed changes to be made without invalidating any responses from 
the eventual sample. It identified minor omissions, but more importantly, text confusion. 
The questionnaire was also felt to be too long, (the initial survey questionnaire being six 
pages in length). This resulted in revised wording for some questions and a reduction in the 
number of questions overall, in order to reduce the length of the questionnaire to two 
pages. The telecommunication director was totally unable to complete the technical part of 
the questionnaire since the Intelligent Network terminology meant nothing to him. This 
identified the need to move the sample boundary, excluding the End Users and focus on IN 
knowledgeable people only.
The final trial took the form of a pilot survey utilising a small sample of the entire survey 
population. The development of the questionnaire from the first two trials, created a survey 
that proved to be sufficiently robust that the pilot did not identify any other errors/problems 
and there was no need for further changes, thus allowing the answers from the pilot to be 
considered with the responses from the sample population as a whole.
Encouraging a Response
The Research of Methods (Chapter 2) identified a number of ways to encourage a response 
to a postal questionnaire. One way identified by Scott (1961) was to make the 
questionnaire interesting to the respondent. The early trial with the director of the 
telecommunications department of a pharmaceutical company, (interview Russell 1995)
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showed that respondents had to have a basic knowledge of INs otherwise they would be 
unable to answer all but the initial questions. Russell also highlighted that End User 
companies were more interested in their quality of service, price etc., than any particular 
method of realising that service. For these reasons the survey did not include End Users in 
its sample and selected a sample where the respondent was likely to have a knowledge of 
ESfs and hence an interest in the questionnaire. This aimed to increase the response rate.
It was thought appropriate to boost responses (as recommended by Scott (1961 )), by 
providing two reminders to questionnaire recipients; the first being a telephone call after 2 
weeks and then a repeat questionnaire after 3 weeks, allowing a minimum of four weeks 
before analysis. Marking the questionnaire identified individuals who had not replied, to be 
targeted with the follow-up. When a non response to the survey became obvious and 
another suitable contact (selected at random) in the same company was available, the 
second contact was sent a questionnaire to encourage at least one response firom that 
company, in that country.
It was felt that since the survey would be sent to individuals in companies, individually 
stamped (delivery and response) envelopes compared to franked envelopes, would make 
no difference to the response rate despite the findings discussed in Section 2.3. The 
argument for this approach, was that the recipients of the postal survey were employees of 
large companies and that they would not experience the same feelings as the general public 
who received Scotts’s (1961) questionnaires. Thus franked reply envelopes were used 
(apart firom abroad where faxed returns were encouraged).
Other suggestions such as hand-written notes or special delivery was not thought to convey 
any extra urgency. Personal experience with receiving a large amount of unsolicited 
material is that both these methods are widely practised and have lost any impact they 
might once have had.
The idea of offering a reward to improve the number of responses was an attractive one, 
although a monetary award was not thought appropriate. A more appropriate one was to 
offer a copy of the analysis to those who were interested.
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In practice, Survey 1 received a 9.2% response rate, close to the 10% predicted by Bailey 
et al. (1995). This 'was far less than the high response rates reported by Scott (1961), which 
probably reflected the era in which he lived, the public indifference to questionnaires 
appearing to have increased since then, resulting in reduced response rates. The 9.2% rate 
is however exceedingly good given the sub 1% results marketing companies receive using 
for example, demographic means to target the recipients (Thompson 1990).
Postal Survey Analysis and Validity
The analysis of the questionnaire responses employed both qualitative (stakeholder 
relationship analysis), as well as quantitative techniques (use of the stakeholder 
relationship table).
From 250 questionnaires, 23 were returned, a response rate of 9.2%. This relatively high 
response rate was probably due to the targeted technical audience. This was a 
representative response, since replies were received from all the major Telephone 
Operators in the UK and from all the major Suppliers having an interest in INs (and is 
therefore a good sample of telecommunications equipment Suppliers globally). Areas of 
weak responses were from consultants and specialist Operators (e.g. Service Providers), 
restricting the ability to analyse within these sectors.
Raimond (1993) and Bailey et al. (1995) identified a concern that those who reply are of a 
different mindset to those who don’t and are thus biasing the results, since ‘.. .people or 
organisations do not.. .refuse to co-operate at random’ (ibid 1995). Although individual 
non co-operation was experienced (through the questionnaire not being returned), targeting 
someone else in the same organisation with another copy of the questionnaire attempted to 
circumvent this. If an organisation had a policy of not answering questionnaires, this was 
difficult to overcome, but was random within the sample as a whole and hence was 
considered not to influence the results. (Only one company, a UK based Supplier, stated 
they had a policy of not answering questionnaires.)
Conference Survey (Survey 2)
Two and a half years after the first survey, a second survey was used to determine if 
industry concerns and focus had changed from the first survey and to explore the 
relationship of INs with new technological developments such as the Internet.
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Knowing that I was due to speak at an Intelligent Network Conference in Madrid in 1998,1 
contacted the organiser to determine whether I could extend elements of my research to a 
wider EU resident audience. The resulting second survey was therefore arranged to be a 
collaboration, where the data obtained was used both for the purposes of this research and 
by the conference organisation to help identify the suitability of topics for the next 
conference.
The Survey 2 questionnaire was unstructured, comprising of a question followed by a free 
entry field .^ This layout was adopted to encourage speed of response and hence encourage 
a greater number of returns. Since this type of questionnaire does not lead the respondent 
to answers by asking them to choose or prioritise from a list, there was a greater variety of 
responses. Given this freedom of responses, quantitative analysis was difficult, but was 
achieved by grouping similar comments into categories. Then since
‘.. .the standard deviation of a sample is a good approximation to the standard 
deviation of the population, providing the number of items in the sample is greater 
than about 25’ (Fox 1990 p24),
this was used to identify which items in the questionnaire were not significant (using the 
5% significance level (Fox 1990)). This was only useful across all the stakeholder groups, 
since within a group, the number within the sample dropped below 25 and became 
subjective.
With the second survey it was thought a good response rate would be achieved by offering 
a bottle of whisky as a prize, this being a visible inducement as they completed the form 
and an immediate reward.
The conference survey had 29 returns, achieving a 22% response rate, better than that 
achieved for the postal survey. Respondents were mainly from the Telecommunications 
Operator and Supplier sectors, with the remainder being from a range of other identified 
stakeholder groups.
 ^A  copy o f the second questionnaire is given in Appendix B
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The conference organiser originally agreed to provide copies of the responses, provided 
confidentiality v^as maintained. This was subsequently amended to copies of the responses 
with the respondent’s name, job title and company blanked, but the categories of the 
respondent’s job and respondent’s company identified. In order to differentiate the 
respondents of this survey firom those of the Survey I, they have been identified by the 
prefix IN and a number (e.g. INI 5).
A copy of the questionnaire used for Survey 2 is provided in Appendix B.
Using survey questionnaires was the principle research technique for gathering data firom a 
wide range of geographically diverse stakeholders. A second principle technique utilised 
by the research is that of interviewing.
3.4 Interviewing Strategy
The interviews performed fulfilled two purposes. The first set of interviews explored and 
iteratively focused the scope of the research, developing, assessing and refining the ideas 
which were eventually tested in Survey 1. The second set of interviews explored selected 
issues that arose from the survey research.
The first set of interviews questioned academics for their advice on research focus and 
methodology and also questioned key figures involved with INs for their advice. This 
provided background information allowing an understanding of IN technology to be 
developed, tested the understanding of the technology and current regulations, identified 
key points and issues, and pinpointed potential contacts. Since these interviews were 
primarily designed to collect qualitative data a semi-structured interviewing approach was 
adopted (Moore 1987).
The second set of interviews principally focussed on key people involved with particular 
aspects of INs (standards, operational deployment etc.). They were selected where a certain 
area needed to be explored in detail or extra information gathered and where the person 
was unlikely to reply to an (unsolicited) letter/e-mail. Interviews additionally imparted:
‘.. .discursive information - qualitative as opposed to quantitative ...which usually 
contains a high degree of opinion or the expression of attitudes’ (Moore 1987),
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which was also collected. Interviewees were selected by employing Connoisseur Samples 
(Bailey et al. 1995), i.e. asking who were the key knowledge holders/decision makers and 
seeking to interview them. Additionally there was a high degree of Opportunity Sampling, 
taking advantage of those who were accessible at a certain point in time.
Attempts were made to conduct additional structured interviews with some of the second 
interview set in order to increase the number of completed Survey 1 questionnaires. It was 
found that interviewees were unwilling to let me complete the questionnaire, with them 
verbally responding to the questions and didn’t return questionnaires left with them 
(despite reminders). The fact that no questionnaires were completed via structured 
interviews, avoided the concern that face-to-face methods could have influenced their 
answers and invalidated a merger of the data with that fi*om the postal questionnaires 
(Nelson 1990).
The second interview set therefore, made use of unstructured interviews, with a semi­
structured element, steering the topic of conversation to areas of interest. In total 40 
interviews were performed. A list of interviewees is provided in Appendix F.
Initially the tape recording of interviews was planned as a convenient method of noting 
information, with later transcription. This would have ensured complete information 
capture and the uninterrupted flow of the conversation. In practice, with a few exceptions 
(i.e. academics), interviewees did not want to have the conversation taped. The lack of 
success with taping the initial interviews, led to abandonment of the attempt to tape later 
interviews.
Finally, as with the surveys, a Code of Ethics was adopted so that the interviewee knew 
from the outset what the information was being used for and what action they could take if 
they had any concerns. Again, Bailey et al.’s (1995) code of ethics was adopted to meet the 
needs of the research environment and interviewees were appraised of the key points of 
this at the commencement of the interview.
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The adapted code was as follows:
• Interviewees have the right to terminate the interview at any time and/or choose 
not to answer some or all of the questions;
• During an interview the interviewee may ask for statements to be regarded as 
‘off the record’. These will not be quoted in the thesis;
• The findings will be included in a thesis submitted to the Open University;
• The identity of individuals and companies will not be disclosed. Analysis will 
be by stakeholder group.
3.5 Summary
This Methodology chapter has identified how various methods and techniques were 
chosen, which together have allowed evidence to be collected and analysed and its validity 
to be established, thus following a Theory Building approach to the research.
The research has adopted the technique of Triangulation to identify what and whom should 
be considered in the data gathering exercises. Longitudinal and Cross Sectional Time, 
Space and Investigator Triangulation were considered appropriate for the research.
The research uses Longitudinal triangulation in that it gathers information from the 
interested parties over a period of time. The data gathering process was iterative, allowing 
the adoption, adaptation, testing and refining of research techniques within a research 
block as well as between them, before moving on to the next step. The research structure 
(Figure 3.1) divides the research into two distinct phases, the first gathering background 
information to establish and refine the hypothesis, with the second phase gathering data to 
test the validity of the hypothesis.
The examination of centralised intelligence technologies analogous to Intelligent Networks 
(Cross Sectional Time Triangulation), confirmed that INs alone appeared to be the best 
focus for the research owing to its level of development, its adoption by the standards 
bodies and because preliminary research on opening interfaces had been undertaken by the 
EU and DTI.
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Stakeholder Analysis was undertaken in order to identify interested parties (and their 
perceived relationship) from whom to gather alternative viewpoints, fulfilling the 
requirements of Cross Sectional Time Triangulation. The stakeholder groups identified 
(Regulators, Operators, Suppliers, Standards Bodies, Consultants, Users etc.), were used to 
categorise the questionnaire recipients and the subsequent analysis of their responses.
Survey 1 was used as the initial primary data gathering tool, testing the validity of the 
standardised IN model and gathering information relating to the problems of opening IN 
interfaces. The construction and trial of this questionnaire are discussed together with the 
need to assure respondent confidentiality, yet be able to provide a follow-up. The findings 
from the trial were used to remove the stakeholder groups of Regulators and Users from 
the sample.
A second survey (Survey 2) was used to update the Stakeholder focussed concerns arising 
from the first survey and provided the opportunity to explore the relationship of INs with 
new technological developments.
Interviews were identified that could provide information supplementary to the surveys 
allowing the focussing upon particular topics. These were divided into two categories; 
initial background interviews to gather information and check the appropriate of the topic 
of research and subsequent information gathering interviews to expand and investigate 
specific findings in greater detail.
This chapter has outlined the reasons behind the research design and the strategy adopted. 
The following chapters detail the findings of the research, with the next two chapters 
setting the scene by examining the technological aspects of INs and the 
telecommunications regulatory environment within Europe.
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4 The Evolution of Intelligent Network Technology
4.1 introduction
Since the inception of Intelligent Networks, the variety of services made available via this 
technology has rapidly increased, particularly where a network Operator is willing to 
employ proprietary elements in an implementation. This chapter explains the technology of 
Intelligent Networks in greater detail, giving a brief explanation of the principle elements 
and their role in the overall architecture. The chapter also demonstrates how the network 
could operate in providing a number of services. It continues by describing a framework 
which I developed for the consideration of Intelligent Network (IN) architecture choice.
The purpose of the chapter therefore, is to provide a historical summary of Intelligent 
Networks, to define the state of their development prior to the first research survey and to 
introduce the IN architectural models used in that survey.
It also addresses two of the hypothesis questions posed in Chapter 1, section 1.2. These 
questions are:
•  ‘Does regulation or detailed standardisation constrain technical innovation, 
service delivery, or both?’; and
• ‘Are INs a service in themselves or simply a means to deliver services?’
The source of the material for this chapter is a combination of primary material such as the 
ITU, ETSI and ANSI standards that identify the current IN architecture and my own 
material arising from both the responses to the initial survey and derived from a synthesis 
of secondary material (including personal knowledge, interview material and general 
background reading such as detailed in Chapter 2). The architectures presented and 
described are appropriate up to the year 2000. Although ETSI IN standardisation work has 
continued beyond this, the introduction of new technology has refocused the IN 
standardisation bodies' efforts to that of interfacing with the new technologies, rather than 
further developing the functionality of INs (interview Stretch 2002) \  Much of the material
‘ The exception is China, where the amount o f innovative material (conference discussion papers etc.) is still 
being produced on a regular basis. Similarly the sale o f the IN technology manufactured in that country 
continues to grow and expand into outside markets, as the western markets decline. It is almost as thought 
there is a time lag in the progression o f technology in China compared to the West.
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has been presented at conferences (Shepherd 1997a,b,c 1978 & 1999c). The references for 
this chapter illustrate the wide range of original research conducted for this thesis.
The next section of this chapter gives a brief summary of the history of Intelligent 
Networks and shows that the services offered were once commonplace, although extremely 
localised and perhaps not consistent. The section continues by considering the evolution of 
INs and issues surrounding its development and applications.
Section 3 describes the difference between a traditional telecommunications network 
architecture and that of an Intelligent Network, giving an example of how a call is routed.
It provides a lead-in to Section 4, which gives an overview of the elements of an Intelligent 
Network, describing its role in the operation of the network.
Sections 5 and 6 of this chapter give worked examples of Intelligent Network Services. In 
particular. Section 5 shows how interfacing different Operators’ networks at different 
levels in the Intelligent Network architecture hierarchy, can bring operational benefits even 
though the customers are unable to discern any difference in the connection of their calls. 
Section 6 introduces services developed for this research to demonstrate what could be 
achieved by employing proprietary protocols.
Unique to this research is a framework, described in Section 7, which I constructed to 
identify the factors needing consideration by a Network Operator when implementing an 
Intelligent Network. The framework of considerations includes technical and commercial 
influences (such as traffic types and company strategy) and the impact they have upon the 
choice of IN architecture and the implementation of regulations. The danger to be avoided 
is that of gearing regulations to one architecture, since it is likely to prevent more 
appropriate ones developing and thus limit service growth and flexibility. This framework 
offers a new perspective in which to view IN architectures, leading to the development and 
implementation of alternative IN architecture models.
One IN service architecture not discussed in this chapter is that of the Pan European GSM 
cellular network. As discussed earlier in Chapter 1, GSM uses a different set of standards, 
the centralised application being core to service operation is ‘hard coded’, leaving little
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option for offering bespoke services. It therefore offers far less flexibility than the ITU-T 
standard IN.
4.2 The History of Intelligent Networks
Early Intelligent Networks - Human Switchboard Operators
Intelligence in telephone networks is not new. Public networks were highly intelligent in 
the very early days, when every subscriber had a local switchboard operator (Figure 4.1) 
who knew all her customers by name. Advanced services such as ‘calling name delivery’ 
(identifying the caller before connecting them), ‘call distribution’ (e.g. connecting to the 
doctor currently on duty), ‘diversion on no-reply’ (connecting to the person's home address 
when they are not answering at work), ‘call back when free’ etc. were all part of the 
normally expected service. Thus many of the services offered by Intelligent Network are 
not new, but a rediscovery of what existed in the past and recreated to accommodate 
modem telephony usage.
© British Telecommunications pic
Figure 4.1 Operators Answering and Connecting Calls
The days of switchboard operator control however were numbered when Strowger 
invented the first automatic telephony switch in the 1890s ,^ reducing the cost of telephone 
service operation and heralding the advent of automatic switched telephony. The first UK
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automatic local exchange opened in Epsom in 1912 and the technology was formally 
adopted to form the basis of the UK telephone network in 1922. Switchboard operators 
were no longer needed and hence ‘intelligence’ in the network, in terms of the variety and 
range of personal services available to customers, diminished over the next 30 years with 
the demise of switchboard operators.
The First (Non-Human) Intelligent Networks
An Intelligent Network is a telecommunications architecture that shifts some of the 
telephone call routeing capability held in every switch to a single location. Thus instead of 
having identical routing information held on every local or transit exchange, an exchange 
contacts that single location to query routeing parameters.
Such an architecture has a number of advantages over a traditional distributed 
telecommunications architecture (which will be explored in detail later in this chapter), but 
the key point is that by holding the telephony call routeing data in a single location, it can 
be changed far more efficiently than if it were held on individual exchanges. This allows 
innovative services, requiring the fi*equent changing of routeing data relating to a call, to be 
offered to customers.
The concept of Intelligent Networks was introduced by Bellcore in the USA in 1984, when 
AT&T’s monopoly was broken and the telecommunications industry became deregulated 
(Ungerer 1990). There was an understanding at the time that the Regional Bell Operating 
Companies (RBOCs) could offer similar 0800 Freephone services to those offered by 
AT&T as long as they did so using standardised interfaces (interview Anderson 1999). 
Intelligent Networks generally have centralised information and so present a convenient 
point for data access and hence a point at which to create a standardised interface between 
the call control in the Service Switching Point (SSP) and the Service Control Point (SCP). 
Bellcore therefore led the way with IN standards during the mid to late 1980s, driven by 
the operating companies’ enthusiasm to compete quickly with AT&T for number 
translation and associated IN services.
 ^It is generally accepted that Strowger was motivated by the actions o f a US local telephone company 
switchboard Operator, the wife o f the owner o f a rival business to his own. She was alleged to have 
connected telephone calls to her husband’s funeral parlour business instead o f to Strowgers.
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In the early days, the Intelligent Network eoncept had high aspirations. It was sometimes 
heralded as providing a network re-arrangement capable of providing any 
telecommunications service need a user could conceivably want. However, factors such as 
inter-working limitations, financial constraints and commercial priorities constrained the 
development of the (theoretically) full potential of INs. 1 discuss later how some of these 
aspirations proved to be impractical.
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Figure 4.2 The History of Intelligence in the UK Telephone Network
The history of ‘intelligence’ in the telephone network can be represented as shown in 
Figure 4.2. Switchboard operators provided the initial intelligence for routing services, but 
this declined gradually over a period of 30 years as local human-operated switchboards 
were replaced with automated local exchanges. This led to a decline in the range of 
services offered, reaching a minimum around the mid-1950s and it was not until the middle 
of the 1970s that technological developments enabled the re-introduetion of some of the 
services that had gradually been lost with the demise of the local switchboard operator. 
Services such as ‘call forwarding’ and ‘short code calling’ were re-introduced, now totally 
under the customer’s control. It has therefore taken 30 years or more to get back to the 
level of “intelligence” and “services” reached in the 1880s.
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Standards
The early Bellcore development of INs led to the formulation of the Advanced Intelligent 
Network (AIN) standards, with their emphasis on the North American telecommunications 
market needs and switching systems. By the early 1990s the International 
Telecommunication Union - Telecommunications (ITU-T) (formerly CCITT) had 
established a hierarchy of study groups on INs, leading to the series of ITU-T IN 
Capability Sets (CSs). CSl was planned to be the first of several subsequent standards 
supporting the introduction of INs into existing telephony networks.
The US delegates were generally vociferous in the formulation of the CSl 
recommendation. Some US representatives did not want CSl to include some of the more 
advanced ideas of independent Teg-controT^ (interview Anderson 1999). This resulted in 
CSl being a relatively modest set of IN capabilities for voice calls (ITU 1993a,b), since 
non-US switch Suppliers could not easily adapt to this sort of functionality. (It could be 
because of this debate, over the appropriateness of CSl, that ITU-T CSl was detailed only 
as a recommendation, while CS2 onwards are specified as standards.) Meanwhile in the 
US, Bellcore was standardising the AIN set of recommendations in parallel to the ITU 
activities. This resulted in two parallel standard IN specifications, originally targeted by the 
ITU-T to merge before the ratification of IN CS4 standards. Some authorities (e.g. 
interview Russo 1997) believed integration would occur. Others, for example Ziemba 
(interview 1997), disagreed, arguing that North America would not want to be restricted by 
what the rest of the world would want to do and that a new technology would replace INs 
before integration occurred. Similarly, Brown (interview 1997) argued that integration 
would not be achieved before a replacement technology was adopted, because of the time 
taken to define and implement the standards.
 ^A telephone conversation consists o f a ‘send’ path from the caller to the destination and a ‘receive’ path 
from the destination back to the caller. This allows people having a telephone conversation to speak 
simultaneously. The ‘send’ and ‘receive’ paths are called the legs o f a call. Typically, as in a normal 
telephone conversation, the origination and destination o f each o f these legs are the same. However, by 
allowing the network to create the legs o f a call independently from each other, thus having a different origin 
and destination, more flexible services can be created. For instance a receive leg could play an announcement 
such as a menu o f options to choose from, whilst the send leg could terminate on a voice recognition 
detector. This would allow the announcement to speak the numbers o f the menu options, without the detector 
incorrectly interpreting what is said in the announcement as a customer choice. Currently, many systems 
avoid this problem by not allowing the detector to operate until the announcement completes -  indicated to 
the caller by a beep. Hence the caller is not allowed to make a selection until the whole o f the menu has been 
played -  frustrating for a regular user.
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European Operators with INs have in the main implemented IN CSl or 081+"  ^(interview 
Anderson 1999). The technological drive towards connectionless Internet Protocol (IP) 
networks has reduced support within the standardisation bodies for the further 
development of INs and it is highly unlikely that Operators will upgrade their networks to 
CS2 and beyond^. Thus the ETSI CS4 standard ratified in early 2002, is envisaged to be 
the last major IN standards development, with any future work restricted to essential items. 
AIN/CS convergence has therefore been sidelined and is unlikely to be completed because 
the technology has been superseded, confirming the predictions of Ziemba and Brown.
In the EU, telecommunications liberalisation encouraged the European Technical 
Standards Institute (ETSI) to be proactive. Thus, although ETSI defined the same Service 
Independent Building Blocks (SIBs) as the ITU-T did for their implementation of the IN 
CSl standard, seven more were added for the ETSI CSl standard. Therefore the ETSI SIB 
set was a superset of the ITU-T CSl standard (Thomer 1994). However, within the ETSI 
CSl specification, the Intelligent Network Application Part (INAP) was a subset of the 
ITU-T CSl INAP specification (Fayenberg et al. 1997). These pragmatic rationalisations, 
which also occurred in later ETSI standard releases, helped to influence the ITU-T CS 
standards, since for instance, the ITU-T adopted the ETSI version and issued it as an 
update to CSl called CSl-R (for ‘Refined’) (interview Anderson 1999).
Currently (in 2003), the state of the ITU-T standards compared with the previous CS 
release, are:
• CS2 - additional services, new functions and peer interconnect;
• CS3 - better leg control of calls (already discussed);
• CS4 - defined management interfaces, including an Internet protocol (IP)
interface and API interface (using Parlay);
• CS5 - proposals agreed but work halted due to obsolescence of technology.
IN CS1+ is the IN CSl feature set with elements o f the IN CS2 standards which provide SCP-SCP and 
SCP-SDP interaction etc.
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In the US several AIN releases have developed and are now being progressed by the US 
ANSI standards organisation:
• AIN 0 - Ameritech proprietary IN specification;
• AIN 0.1/0.2-a  Bellcore sub-set of CS1& AIN 1;
• AIN 1 - an ANSI (predominantly) superset of CSl (including mid-call triggers).
One of the key problems in the US, resulting in the delay in implementation of their 
equivalent of ITU-T CSl, is that they had to alter their basic C7 signalling system (ANSI 
SS No. 7, TCAP & ISUP), since it was at too great a variance with the ITU-T C l standard 
for CSl to operate efficiently (Fayenberg et al. 1997).
Elsewhere in the world, the Japanese Telecommunications Technology Committee (TTC) 
has produced yet another variant of ITU-T CSl & CS2, JT-Q1218, based on the draft CS2 
standards.
The differences between the ITU-T CS Intelligent Network recommendations, ETSI’s 
standards implementation of the ITU-T CS standards, the ANSI AIN recommendations^ 
and the TTC JT standards, are generally too detailed to be appropriate for this thesis. Some 
differences may be referenced in passing, but this thesis uses the ETSI implementation of 
the ITU-T IN Capability Sets (such as CSl etc.) to explain the operation of Intelligent 
Networks. The operation and relationship of the ITU-T, ETSI and ANSI (the US 
standardisation body) is explored in Chapter 5.
Currently in Europe (2002), the majority of the installed base of Intelligent Networks 
conforms to ETSI CSl and part of CS2^. Standards, now ratified to CS4, have raced ahead
 ^There are always exceptions. IN SCPs contain expensive applications and capability. With the move to 
VOIP technology, network Operators will be looking to a means o f using this capability in a VOIP 
environment, rather than redeveloping all the services. CS4 provides an SCP/IP interface for soft switch 
capability. Thus there is a likelihood that existing Operators will implement the IP interface part o f  CS4 to 
allow this interworking to occur.
 ^For instance, the US AIN standards were less concerned about the SCP - SDP interface than Europe. This 
was probably because the US had fewer inter-working networks than Europe. Europe had many small 
network Operators, so there was greater interest in the SCP - SDP interface between networks (as GSM 
Camel has demonstrated).
 ^Along with many other capabilities (e.g. older signalling types), Suppliers used the need for ‘millennium 
compliance’ of their kit, to rationalise previous developments which they needed to continue to support. 
Several manufacturers took this opportunity to ‘upgrade’ or ‘force’ the replacement o f Operators’ Intelligent 
Network elements from their original proprietary offerings, to that which adhered to standards (Shepherd 
1999a,b)
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of implementation, to the extent that owing to the introduction of new technology (e.g. 
Internet Protocol networks), the later standards (CS3 and beyond) are unlikely to be 
implemented. The exception are those aspects of standards related to the interworking of 
other (especially newer) technologies, owing to the extensive installed base of INs with 
which they need to interwork.
Similarly, apart from allowing peer interconnect in CS2 and introducing an Internet 
Protocol interface in CS4, no developments beyond CSl fundamentally altered the basic 
architecture model upon which the standards were based. This permits the conclusion that 
CS releases beyond CSl are not significant to this thesis.
4.3 Call Routeing in Traditional and Intelligent Networks 
Traditional Routeing
When switchboard operators routed a call (prior to the introduction of Strowger 2-motion 
selectors), a call’s destination was determined by verbally passing the number between the 
switchboard operators at the different exchanges.
Caller
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3
operator
Speech Speech
Local
Exchange A
Transit
Exchange
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Exchange B
Figure 4.3 Switchboard Operator Connected Calls
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The sequence of operations illustrated in Figure 4.3, is:
1. The caller tells the Local Exchange A’s operator the number they want to 
connect to;
2. The operator, selecting an appropriate outgoing route, verbally passes the 
number required to the operator at the Transit Exchange and connects the caller 
to the Transit Exchange Operator by means of a plug and cord;
3. The Transit Exchange Operator would perform a similar function with the 
destination exchange operator (Local Exchange B), who would ring the 
destination;
4. Upon answer, the destination is connected to the caller by means of a plug and 
cord at Local Exchange B.
Strowger-based call routeing automation allowed the dialled number to pass from 
exchange to exchange in the form of a series of electrical pulses; the number of pulses 
determining the routeing and destination of the call. When the call reached its destination, 
the same path that was used to convey the dialled number was also used to convey the 
speech.
Switch
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Signalling & 
Speech
Switch
Transit
Exchange
Switch
Signalling &
Speech Local
Exchange B
Figure 4.4 Strowger Connected Calls
113
4 The Evolution o f  Intelligent Network Technology
The stages are illustrated in Figure 4.4 :
1. The number dialled by the Caller is used to select an outgoing route from Local 
Exchange A;
2. The number is similarly used by the transit exchange to select an outgoing route 
to the destination Local Exchange B;
3. The dialled number is also used to select the path through Local Exchange B to 
connect to the Destination, where the telephone is rung;
4. Upon answer. Local Exchange B connects the destination to the Caller using 
the same physical link that was used to carry the signalling (the dialled 
number).
A fiirther development in the UK during the 1970s was the introduction of Common 
Channel Signalling (CCS), in which the routeing signal (which informed the transit 
exchanges of the dialled number) was carried on a separate path from the speech signal. 
This allowed more efficient use of the speech circuits. It was this separation of signalling 
path and speech path that allowed the non-speech-path signalling necessary for 
communications between remote Intelligent Network elements and hence allowed 
Intelligent Networks to develop. Just prior to the introduction of Intelligent Networks 
therefore, most telephony networks employed Common Channel Signalling (typically C7  ^
which had separated speech and signalling) and digital exchanges able to operate with such 
a signalling system. The resulting network architecture is sometimes referred to as a 
‘Distributed Intelligence’ network, because every exchange has sufficient ‘intelligence’ 
contained within it to route a call. This is represented diagrammatically by Figure 4.5.
 ^CCITT Signalling System No, 7 (typically shortened to Cl), was a Common Channel Signalling system 
specified by the CCITT (now ITU-T) for improving the signalling efficiency o f telecommunication systems. 
This was done by carrying all the signalling information on common links freeing some links to carry speech 
traffic.
114
4 The Evolution o f Intelligent Network Technology
Signalling Signalling
Services & 
Information
Services & 
Information
Services & 
Information
Exchange A Exchange
Onginal
DestinationExchange B
Services & 
Information
,  ^ ^  Local
Number Exchange C 
Diverted
Figure 4.5 ‘Divert To’ on a ‘Distributed Intelligence’ Network
The ‘intelligence’ (i.e. information) held at each exchange is replicated on a number of 
exchanges and can be used to translate a dialled digit string into an address^ used for 
routeing the call through the network. Distributed intelligence implies a significant data- 
management overhead, in that if a piece of data (e.g. a telephone number destination) 
changes, then it needs to be changed on all the exchanges simultaneously.
Figure 4.5 shows the sequence of a call set-up for a diverted number using the traditional 
(Distributed Intelligence) telephony architecture:
1. A customer connects to their local exchange A and dials a number;
2. The call is routed to a transit exchange; and
3. onward to the destination local exchange B. The called customer however, has 
their number diverted to local exchange C; so
4. the call routes to the transit exchange;
5. then to the local exchange C;
6. and then onward to the destination. When the destination customer answers, the
speech path created goes from the originating local exchange A, through the
 ^An address is a digit string (often in the UK containing the dialled number), used to tell tandem exchanges 
how a call should route. This avoid the need o f every exchange to have to look at a dialled number and work 
out from basics how a call needs to route.
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transit to the ‘diverted’ local exchange B, back through the transit exchange to 
local exchange C.
The architecture is inefficient, since a ‘Divert To’ number stored in a customer’s local 
exchange (i.e. one to which they are directly connected), results in calls routeing to that 
exchange and then onward routeing to the new destination. The new destination may be 
close to the call origin, thus the call is routed further than necessary. A more direct 
routeing (as is possible with an Intelligent Network) would better utilise the network and 
improve performance.
Specifying, developing, testing and deploying new services on a ‘Distributed Intelligence’ 
network can take between 2 and 5 years (Shepherd 1999b), owing to the need to 
thoroughly test upgrades, since once deployed, the service is likely to form part of the 
Supplier’s product portfolio and is unlikely to be changed easily. The periodicity and scope 
of upgrades are limited by Network Operators to minimise disruption, since the network is 
more vulnerable to reduced performance and failures during the deployment phase. 
Conversely, a lengthy period between upgrades results in a reduced ability to react to 
market demand and competitors’ products and a consequence is that bespoke products (to 
accurately fit the customers’ requirements) can become almost non-existent. The 
introduction of any new service is time-consuming and costly.
intelligent Network Routeing
Intelligent Networks (INs) differ firom traditional telephony networks by tending toward 
centralised intelligence, allowing centralised routeing control. This centralised control is 
achieved by separating the services (service logic) and routeing information firom the 
exchange switching actions (call control) and placing the service logic in a single location. 
An exchange which is required to route a call will ask ('query’) the centralised intelligence, 
which will return the information needed by the exchange to route the call (Figure 4.6).
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Figure 4.6 ‘Divert To’ on an Intelligent Network
Figure 4.6 shows the sequence of a call set-up for a diverted number using an Intelligent 
Network and can be compared directly to Figure 4.5. With an IN architecture the ‘Divert 
To’ number is stored centrally. When the call is made, a customer:
1. Connects to their local exchange A and dials a number;
2. The local exchange queries the centralised intelligence (containing the services 
and information) for the routeing of the call;
3. The centralised intelligence has information which identifies that the called 
number is diverted to another number, so it provides the routeing of this ‘divert 
to’ number to the local exchange A;
4. Local exchange A routes the call accordingly, which in this case happens to be 
to a telephone connected to local exchange C and rings the telephone;
5. When the call is answered the speech path created through the network, is from 
the originating telephone to the destination telephone via local exchanges A & 
C.
Using an Intelligent Network architecture the call can route directly to the final destination; 
avoiding unnecessary routeing that is incurred by a similar call in a traditional architecture.
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This example indicates that the function of the Central Intelligence is to enhance an 
exchange’s number translation and routeing capabilities. Whilst numher-to-address 
translation is a normal switch function, it is an expensive and inefficient overhead to load 
the exchange’s real-time call-processing software with the functions and data needed for 
these extra translations (i.e. ‘Divert To’ numbers). Some businesses have a widely 
dispersed and dynamic profile of call reception points, such that during the working day 
they need immediate changes to their incoming routeing translations, in order to adapt their 
response to the changing patterns of call (Shepherd 1999c). It would be inefficient to 
distribute the translation information to hundreds of network exchanges, because of the 
excessive storage required and because information changes would be slow and processor­
intensive; routines would need to be run detracting from the exchange’s call carrying 
capacity. Thus putting the services and information in a central location, creates the need 
for just a single occurrence of a service and data in a telephony network, allowing quick 
and easy modifications. With Intelligent Networks therefore, new services and associated 
information only need be implemented at the central location, this being achievable with 
(theoretically) no network disruption.
Separating the service logic (from which services are created) from the transport logic, as 
in INs, created an ‘open’ architecture. Initially the interfaces of the IN architecture 
represented in Figure 4.6 were proprietary^^, but the success of Intelligent Networks 
encouraged .. .the desire for service and Supplier independence and gave an impetus to 
develop new international standards for IN5 ’ (Pandurangan 1993 pI29). This made the 
technology more attractive to Operators, who were able to choose different Suppliers for 
the different elements (exchange, central intelligence, etc.) achieving vendor-independence 
and gaining purchasing power. Standardisation was also attractive to smaller Suppliers, 
since ‘.. .there will be a bigger market for their products and a more stable environment for 
product development’ (Ellis 1992 pi), necessary to have made such developments 
economically viable. Larger Suppliers offering only proprietary INs were consequently 
forced to align their products to standards and hence similarly benefited from the 
potentially larger market. Computer manufacturers were ‘.. .interested in IN because it 
provided them with a means of extending their markets into the telecommunications arena’
Proprietary IN protocols generally refer to those messages passed between the exchange and the central 
intelligence. When these messages are proprietary, they are specific to the service, exchange and central 
intelligence.
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(Ellis 1992 pi). However Hawkins (1995) indicated this transition was not likely to be 
easy, since
‘Although the technology bases of the telecommunication and computer sectors 
have converged, it is uncertain that the commercial cultures of the two sectors have 
converged to the extent that co-operation between them in defining standards will 
be possible or productive’.
This was similarly recognised by Gilder (1996) who said that ‘...computers and telecoms 
are converging like the automobile converged with the horse’.
An Intelligent Network architecture therefore provides a quicker and more responsive 
mechanism for new service delivery that does not threaten the underlying stability of the 
network. However, with the service control and supporting information isolated at one 
location, it creates
‘...a situation where a company’s entire incoming communications is based upon a 
single number (such as a Freephone number) and places considerably greater 
requirements on the reliability of access to that number, since upon failure, all 
telephone calls to that company are lost.’ (Thomer 1994)
4.4 An Overview of intelligent Network Elements 
Intelligent Network Elements
This section uses an example of a geographic routeing service to describe the role of 
standardised Intelligent Network functions. The physical realisation of an Intelligent 
Network varies between network Operators; depending upon the services offered and the 
geographical location of the hardware. Thus although the key fiinctions of an Intelligent 
Network are discussed in relation to the physical element with which they are normally 
associated, this relationship may not always be the case. (The relationship of the fimctional 
elements to physical elements, is detailed in ITU specifications ITU 1992 and ITU 
1995a,b,c).
One example of the type of service provided using an IN would be that for a large 
windscreen repair company that offers its customers a single, national, Freephone contact 
number. Calls to this number are always connected to the geographically closest repair
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depot. Another example is a pizza delivery service, where a chain of pizza restaurants 
advertise a single Freephone number for a home-delivery pizza service and the call is 
routed to the restaurant nearest to the caller. Such services are referred to as ‘Geographical 
Routeing’ and the call set-up sequence for such a service is illustrated in Figure 4.7.
Routeing Table for 0800 111 1111
if originates from 020 area send to 020 1234 5678 
if originates from anywtiere eise send to 01234 222 222
Services & information 
(Centrai inteiiigence)
SMS
Management Syst
6 Routing 
020 1234 567 
(No Caiier Ctiarge)
3 Query
0800 111 1111
originates 020
S D F ) information
^  SCF I Services
. 2 Caii
7 /  ( S S F  0800 111 1111
/  originates 020 area
ccF  ........ ..... ...... —z z z :—
1 Caiier Dials 
0800 111 1111
SSP
Local/Transit Excftange Locai Exctiange
Caiier
(Tel No. 020 8111 2222)
IN Service controi 
Management reiationstiip
(Note: to aid clarity, not all 
tire links are strown)
Figure 4.7 The Geographical Routeing of a Freephone Call
The rectangles in Figure 4.7 represent the physical elements, whilst the ovals represent the 
functionality generally associated with that element.
The Local Exchange
In Figure 4.7, a caller having a telephone number 020 8111 2222,
1. calls a Freephone number 0800 111 1111.
2. The dialled number is recognised by the CCAF as requiring a central database 
look-up and the call is routed to the SSP.
Non Service Switching Point (SSP) local exchanges can contain ‘Call Control Agent 
Functionality’ (CCAF), which when a call originates on that exchange, detects that an 
Intelligent Network capability is required and routes the call to an SSP exchange which 
provides service access via the Call Control and Service Switching Functions.
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The ‘Call Control Function’ (CCF) of an SSP exchange can be viewed as containing a 
‘Call Model’ which identifies at which stages in a call a query to the central intelligence 
(Service Control Point) may be needed. These stages are called trigger points and can arise 
when a customer lifts the receiver of their telephone or completes the dialling of a number. 
Different services could utilise different trigger points.
The North American AIN standard utilises a different call model (and hence generates 
triggers from different points) from the ETSI CSl standard.
‘If the database in one country uses an AIN call model and if the
node in another country uses CS1, the international service cannot be properly
offered’ (Pandurangan 1993 p i30).
Thus the implementation of a common service across networks comprising the two 
standards is made difficult since the service may assume the use of a trigger point which 
does not exist on both networks.
The Service Switching Point (SSP)
The ‘Service Switching Point’ (SSP) typically hosts the ‘Call Control Function’ (CCF) and 
‘Service Switching Function’ (SSF). The Service Switching Function ensures that all the 
information appropriate to a trigger point is gathered into a message, such as step 3 in 
Figure 4.7:
3. The SSF constructs a query, such as ‘the caller has dialled number 0800 111 
1111 and is calling from location 020  ^^ ’ and sends this message to the 
centralised service application located at the Service Control Point (SCP).
6. The SSP translates the instruction ‘connect the call to destination 020 1234 
5678’ received back from the SCP into a set of switch actions to be performed 
by the Call Control Function (CCF), such as
The Caller’s telephone number (020 8111 222) is geographically based, i.e. numbers beginning 020 only 
occur in London. The caller’s telephone number when used in conjunction with a call they are making is 
called the Calling Line Identity (CLI). With an entirely digital network, the CLI will always be available, 
however i f  the CLI is not available, possibly because the call originated from an analogue exchange or other 
network where the CLI is ‘withheld’ by the Operator, an approximation o f the caller’s location can be used 
based on the incoming trunk. This is known as ‘partial CLI’, or ‘trunk identifier’ where the identity o f  the 
route into the first digital exchange in the network is provided. Similarly i f  only part o f the caller’s number is 
used (e.g. 020), this is also known as a partial CLI.
.2.
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7. ‘connect the call to outgoing route x from the exchange and disable caller 
charging’ - since a Freephone number is being dialled.
The Service Control Point (SCP)
The Service Control Point is a centralised computer (or a number of computers) that 
contains the ‘Service Control Function’ (SCF) that executes the IN services and the 
‘Service Data Function’ (SDF), which stores the data needed for a service.
For instance, the query (3) from the SSP in Figure 4.7, indicates that the caller is dialling 
the Freephone telephone number of a car windscreen repair company (0800 111 1111).
The SSF invokes the operation of the service applicable to that number which may be a 
‘connect to the closest branch’ service. The service uses additional information from the 
query received from the SSP (i.e. call originates from the 020 area), to identify the location 
of the customer in the country.
4. It will then ask the Service Data Function (SDF) for the destination telephone 
number of the closest branch.
5. The SDF responds with the telephone number of that branch (020 1234 5678). 
The SSF constructs this into a message to be sent to the SSP. This has already 
been discussed above for step 6 of the call flow.
In some cases (such as credit card validation for credit card calls), the information would 
not be under the Operator’s control and the SCF could use the SDF capability on a remote 
database to obtain the information.
The Service Management System (SMS)
The Service Management System (SMS) comprises the Service Management Function 
(SMF) which manages the provisioning, maintenance and operation of IN services (e.g. 
data updates), therefore acting as the IN system interface for customers (Thomer 1994). 
(The customer in the example of Figure 4.7 is the one owning the Freephone number and 
related service application i.e. the windscreen repair company). Needless to say security 
must be extremely high to prevent hackers from accessing the system and the ITU-T 
standards Q.1221 and Q.1224 have addressed this with respect to IN security (ITU 1996).
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Thus if the windscreen company wished to change the branch to which they routed calls 
originating from the 020 area, the SMF would convey the new number to the SDF which 
would then change the appropriate entry in the information table.
4.5 The Progressive Development of Intelligent Network Services
Intelligent Networks currently offer a very wide range of services. Because these services 
are essentially constructed from the same basic building blocks their functionality overlaps. 
For example, services could include a Freephone service, a Freephone service with 
geographical routeing, or Freephone service with geographical and time of day routeing, or 
call redirection service having geographical and time of day routeing etc. The frill 
functionality available and exactly how such services are implemented will vary between 
Network Operators.
This section takes the concept of a simple Freephone service introduced earlier and 
develops it to demonstrate how, using different standardised points of interconnect in the 
Intelligent Network architecture hierarchy, a progressively more advantageous 
International Freephone service could be offered between network Operators.
The Freephone Service
The simplest use of an Intelligent Network is to provide a number translation service, as 
described previously and was the first service offered on INs. The key advantage of the IN 
over the traditional telephony network, where intelligence is effectively distributed 
amongst the exchanges, is that the service logic information is held in one place and so it is 
easy to change.
The world-wide success of the Freephone service, which combines these number 
translations with the ability for a caller to make a ‘free’ call - at the recipient’s expense - is 
well-known. Freephone dialling codes (e.g. ‘1800’ in the US, ‘0800’ in the UK) bear no 
relation to the geographic location of the recipient. Countries which had the foresight to 
keep letters as well as numbers on their telephone instruments found this factor to be a 
catalyst in the growth of their Freephone servicesIngenuity encouraged the invention of
It is interesting to reflect that the near-instant success o f the Freephone service appears to have resulted 
from technology stimulation rather than carefully laid marketing plans (interview Anderson 1999).
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easy-to-remember ‘numbers’, such as 1800-AIRWAYS, or 1800-CARPETS^^, which 
aided the use of the service.
The Freephone service was initially implemented in North America and the UK using 
proprietary protocols between the Service Switching Point (SSP) and Service Control Point 
(SCP). Unless Telephony Network Operators were using exactly the same Supplier’s 
equipment, interaction was not possible and interconnect could only be achieved at the 
basic (transport) level, i.e. where one Operator presents a call and the number dialled to a 
second Operator for further processing. Once international standards had been established, 
then‘intelligent’ interconnection was possible.
The following examples demonstrate how different Network Operators’ standardised 
Intelligent Networks, could be made to operate by using different IN interfaces. In each 
case the example is an ‘International Freephone’ call where the destination of the 
Freephone number is in a different country from the originator. In each case the caller 
discerns no difference in the handling of their call by the networks. (In the figures the 
Freephone prefix has been omitted and the lengths of the number strings have been 
truncated to aid clarity).
When these examples were initially constructed (1996), interconnection was only possible 
at the transport level. Connection at SCP/SDP level was just being ratified in the standards, 
thus the later examples in this section illustrate what could be offered using these 
interfaces. There are now (in 2003) examples of networks interconnecting at the SCP/SDP 
level.
Unfortunately the relationship between letters and numbers on telephone dials vary between countries. The 
liberalisation o f telephone equipment in the UK in the early 1980s allowed telephone imports with a different 
letters to numbers relationship to the rotary dial telephones already existing in die UK. Although the 
number/letter relationship has now been standardised, there are still enough older telephones in use for this 
form o f Freephone number dialling not to have received official sanction in the UK.
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International Freephone (Connection at Transport Level)
This first example is still generally an illustration of what happens today, connection 
between Operators’ networks at the basic (C7) transport level.
SDPSDP
Services & 
Information
Services & 
InformationSCPSCP
800 1234
+41 800 1234
SSPSSP
800 1234
ExctiangeExchange
Customer BCustomer A
Figure 4.8 Inter-Operator Freephone Service (Interconnect at transport Level)
Referring to Figure 4.8:
1. A customer on Network A dials a Freephone number (800 1234).
2. SCP A receives the query from SSP A and identifies the call as being destined 
to a Freephone location in Network B. If necessary it translates the dialled 
number into a number recognised by network B and inserts a Country (or 
routeing) code (+41) and
3. instructs SSP A to route the call to Network B.
4. Network A routes the call based upon the country code to Network B 
(establishing a speech path in the process), where SSP B recognising the 
country code as its own, removes it and
5. queries its own SCP (SCP B) for the destination.
6. SCP B recognises the destination corresponding to the Freephone number 800 
1234 as being telephone number 611 1234 and instructs SSP B to route the call.
7. SSP B connects the call to the customer and when the call is answered a speech 
path is established to connect to that already set-up from network A.
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The call uses the SCPs in both the originating network (SCP A) to route the call through to 
Network B and then again in Network B (SCP B) to connect the call. A voice path is 
established in Network A as soon as the call is passed to Network B, thus Network A is 
using voice capacity on its network for a call which might ultimately fail (i.e. the 
destination number might be busy).
International Freephone (SCP-SDP Interconnect)
In this second example, there is connectivity between Network A’s SCP and Network B’s 
Service Data Point (SDP), thus SCP A is able to perform a remote database query of 
Networks B’s database.
SDP SDPInformation
Information
Services
Services
SCP SCP
+41 611 1234
SSP SSP
800 1234
Exctiange Exctiange1
Customer BCustomer A Networir B
Figure 4.9 Inter-Operator Freephone Service (SCP-SDP Interconnect)
Referring to Figure 4.9:
1. A customer on Network A dials a Freephone number (800 1234).
2. SCP A receives the query from SSP A and
3. recognising the dialled number as belonging to Network B, asks Network B’s 
database for a translation of the number.
4. Network B’s database recognises the destination corresponding to the 
Freephone number 800 1234 as being telephone number 611 1234 and returns 
this translation to SCP A.
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5. SCP A translates the dialled number into a number recognised by network B by 
inserting a Country (or routeing) code (+41) and instructs SSP A to route the 
call to Network B.
6. SSP A routes the call based upon the country code to Network B,
7. where SSP B recognising the country code as its own, removes it and connects 
the call to the customer (without the call requiring a further SCP query). When 
the call is answered a speech path is established to connect Customers A and B.
In this example, the call only uses SCP processing in Network A, but although SCP A has 
to do slightly more processing than in the first example, the call processing used overall is 
less, since SCP B is not used. Call connection time for customer A will be marginally 
improved (not noticeable to the caller, but helpful to the network owing to reduced 
reservation time of network resource "^*). A voice path is only established when the 
destination answers, avoiding the need to establish a path as in the previous example prior 
to this state being established.
When a call is made in a telephone network, the dialled number is carried on a separate link to the voice. 
This allows the destination to be checked to make sure it is free and available to take a call before the speech 
circuits are connected. However, before the destination is checked the network needs to identify that there is 
speech circuit capacity available to the destination. Once this is done, the network resource identified to 
construct that speech circuit is ‘reserved’ for that call should the destination be free. If the destination is not 
free, the reserved resource is freed to be used for other calls. This method o f working is quicker than 
establishing speech circuits for every call (successful or unsuccessful) and uses less network processing and 
requires fewer circuits.
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International Freephone (Interconnect at SCP Level)
In this third example, there is connectivity between Network A’s SCP and Network B’s 
SCP, thus SCP A is able to ask SCP B for instructions on how to handle the call.
: ___:
SDP SDP
800 1234
+41 611 1234
+41 611 1234
1234 free+41 611 1234
ExchangeExchange
Customer A Customer B
Tel. No. 611 1234
Figure 4.10 Inter-Operator Freephone Service (Interconnect at SCP level)
Referring to Figure 4.10:
1. A customer on Network A dials a Freephone number (800 1234).
2. SCP A receives the query from SSP A and
3. recognising the dialled number as belonging to Network B, asks Network B’s 
SCP for instructions on how to handle the call.
4. Network B’s SCP recognises the destination corresponding to the Freephone 
number 800 1234 as being telephone number 611 1234 (by querying the SDP) 
and can ask the SSP to check if the destination 611 1234 is free.
5. If the destination is available to receive a call,
6. SCP B returns the telephone number the call needs to route to, to SCP A 
prefixing the appropriate country codes at the front (+41 611 1234).
7. SCP A forwards the translated number to and instructs SSP A, to route the call 
to Network B.
8. SSP A routes the call based upon the country code to Network B,
1 2 8
4 The Evolution o f Intelligent Network Technology
9. where SSP B recognising the country code as its own, removes it and connects 
the call to the customer (without the call requiring a further SCP query). When 
the call is answered a speech path is established to connect Customers A and B.
In this example both SCP A and SCP B are involved in establishing the call, but the overall 
processing load is reduced. Network Operator B knows from the query to SCP B what 
telecommunications traffic is expected to enter its network, the traffic’s origin and its 
destination, fractionally in advance of it happening^ Call connection time for customer A 
is marginally improved (not noticeable to the caller, but helpful to the network owing to 
reduced reservation time of network resource^^). A voice path is only established when the 
destination answers, avoiding the need to establish a path prior to this state, as in the first 
example.
Interconnecting SCPs introduces a level of trust between the two parties since 
inappropriate messages could cause operating problems for the other Operator’s network.
‘. . .the protocols to connect between the different entities have not been designed to 
be secure (in the sense that wrong messages from one entity might upset the 
functioning of the network)’ (Yeoman 1993 p2).
This concern is echoed by Woollard, ‘Let INAP get into the wrong hands and you can take 
down the whole UK network’ (interview Woollard 2002). The ITU-T documentation 
covering IN CS-2 includes the provision of security-assisting fiinctions at the SCF-SDF 
and SDF-SDF interfaces; however these functions, of themselves, are not sufficient to 
assure the security of IN structured networks (interview Anderson 1999).
15 •Advanced information on network loading is important since it allows an Operator to be proactive in 
managing their network resources, particularly in overload conditions. In this particular case, i f  Operator B ’s 
network is in congestion (attempting to carry more traffic than it can handle), the SCP B can send a 
congestion message to Network A and have the call blocked in Operator A ’s network. Normally a call would 
route into Operator B ’s network through several transit exchanges before it was blocked, using both 
Operators’ switching resources for what will be a failed call attempt and preventing that resource from being 
used for other callers in the Operators’ networks who might other wise have made a successful call.
As footnote 10
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In practice,
‘Separate implementations by carriers have created a situation in which service 
applications cannot be provided across carrier networks, or at least not in their 
entirety’ (Langner 1993 p864);
thus even today connections between Operators in different countries do not occur at 
anything other than the basic transport level.
4.6 More Advanced Services
The following examples (similarly of my own construction) are services which could be 
implemented by Intelligent Networks, but would need non-standardised capabilities. These 
examples appeared quite radical when conceived and were constructed to illustrate the 
potential of open interfaces, with respect to integrating INs with Customer Premise 
Equipment (CPE). The aim was to explore Isenberg’s (1998) (and others’) thoughts of 
intelligence moving out to the edge of the network, in conjunction with INs.
‘The simple telephone will not be capable of maximising all the potential of 
intelligence in the network. New types of terminal equipment should represent an 
opportunity for service providers by making more complex and data-rich services 
practical’ (Jordon 1993 p4).
These examples employ capability being discussed and observed to exist at the time 
(1998), with elements of these designs now (2002) realised.
Computer Telephony Integration
Computer Telephony Integration (CTI) is the integration of computer (or server) 
technology with (voice) telephony. A typical application is that employed in ‘call centres’ 
where the callers telephone number (termed Calling Line Identity - CLI) is used to retrieve 
customer information from a database and present it on the attendant’s screen at the same 
time as the call is presented to them through their headset.
In the example below, a simple ‘Call Pick-up’ function (where any agent can answer a 
ringing line) is being employed.
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Figure 4.11 Call Pick-up
The terminals in Figure 4.11 represent the four users of a call pick-up group, each having a 
telephone and a computer terminal.
1. A call is routed through the network destined for telephone D.
2. The call is referred to an IN SCP for an address translation and the call 
connected to telephone D based upon the CLI. After a pre-set time, the timer in 
the SSP activates a trigger to the SCP. The subsequent query contains the 
dialled number, the CLI and a Service Key value indicating the reason for the 
query (i.e. that the call was not answered). From the dialled number, or the 
Service Key value, the SCP front-end invokes the SCP application logic that 
handles the call pick-up service. This identifies which other destinations could 
be offered the call.
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3. It then instructs the switch to send the CLI to the terminals belonging to users in 
the pick-up group (using perhaps the ISDN^^ data channel),
4. invoking a pop-up screen from which other members of the pick-up group 
could accept or reject the call, via their terminal.
5. Supposing user B accepts the call, the acceptance is passed back to the switch 
in the form of a (ISDN) CLI and
6. this is passed to the IN (via the SSP), which
7. subsequently instructs the switch to connect the call to the telephone of user B.
8. a. Information relating to the customer is displayed on user B’s terminal as,
8. b. the call is connected to their telephone
The key benefit of the IN in this case, is not so much the call pick-up capability, which 
many companies’ internal telephone systems already possess, but that the pick-up group 
members could be geographically remote from each other. A secondary benefit is the 
computer terminal integration, which could be enhanced by the inclusion of a server and 
corporate directory so that not just the telephone number of the caller is displayed on the 
user screen, but also the caller’s name and other relevant details.
At present there are no examples of CTI using a wholly network based SSP & SCP; instead 
such services utilise hardware performing the same functionality on the customer’s 
premises, for example a Private Switch (PBX) & CTI Server. As Jabbari et al. indicated in 
1992, most customers prefer this arrangement as it gives them greater control over the 
introduction of new applications.
Although it is not applicable in this example, it is worth emphasising that ISDN and IN did not (until more 
recently) function together. This is because once an ISDN call was established, the traffic was ‘enveloped’ 
through the telecommunications network (analogous to ‘tunnelling’ in an Internet Protocol network), 
preventing the network from identifying and acting upon relevant information sent by the caller. For instance, 
should a person make a Charge Card call (with an ISDN origin and destination), then once they had finished 
that call they would normally indicate to the network (by means o f a sequence o f  key presses), that the 
current call could be terminated and that they would like to make a ‘follow-on’ call. With an ISDN  
connection, the information would be ‘enveloped’, the network would be unable to see it and act upon it. The 
customer would have to clear their call (replace their handset) and then redial the Charge Card bureau and re- 
authenticate themselves, before continuing with the second call. Similarly, Call Models are unable to act 
upon end to end supplementary information messages carried over ISDN. This problem is not an issue in this 
example since the caller would be using a PSTN line and the ISDN functionality would only exist on the 
company’s premises. (Batten et al. 1991, interview Paterson 1994, Buck 1995, interview Guram 1995).
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More recently however, customers have taken the first step towards a fully integrated 
network solution, with dedicated interfaces on the CTI server providing information to the 
SCP on the local loading and average call holding time of their call centres, allowing the 
SCP to work out the appropriate call distribution.
This example of a ‘call pick-up’ service uses the customer’s home number (their CLI) to 
route the call to the appropriate user group. There are several types of CLI available in a 
telephony network, broadly falling into the categories of ‘Presentation’ and ‘Network’
CLI. ‘Presentation’ CLI is that which the user wants to be displayed to users, whilst the 
‘Network’ CLI is that used by the network to uniquely identify a location. ‘Presentation’ 
CLI can be ‘withheld’ by the customer if they don’t want others to know their telephone 
number. ‘Network’ CLI cannot be ‘withheld’. In the last example, the Call Pick-up service 
used ‘Presentation’ CLI and if the caller chose to withhold their CLI then the application 
would typically have used some kind of default routeing, perhaps connecting the caller to 
an attendant handling general enquires, rather than the group dealing with their account.
There are however, applications (such as Geographical Routeing) which need the CLI to 
ensure correct operation. In this latter case, the network uses the ‘Network’ CLI for 
routeing purposes even though the CLI may have been withheld by the customer. This 
ability of certain services to ‘see’ the ‘Network’ CLIs, potentially allows other services and 
their administrations (who may be independent from the underlying Network Operator) to 
discover the number and hence the identity of a caller - something the caller may not want 
known. This gaining of information from other services, as well as services detrimentally 
interacting is called 'Service Interaction'. If a customer wishes that their CLI remains 
hidden, the obligation is upon the Operator to ensure that this is done. This is supported in 
law in the USA and at present in licensing conditions in the UK.^^
Another aspect to Service Interaction is the interaction of call-processing features. This is 
particularly an issue with the development of third party applications running on an 
Operators platform. Since the Operator is given minimum visibility of their operation, 
there is the possibility of two applications interpreting the same information in different
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ways, leading to operational problems. For instance Cain (1992) indicates that for a large 
business customer, a flashing of the switchhooks (equivalent to quickly placing a telephone 
receiver on its rest and picking it up again) can mean any of the following:
• ‘Initiate the second leg of a three-party call;
• Bridge the second leg of a three-party call onto the call;
• Initiate call waiting, putting a current call on hold and answering a second 
incoming call;
• Toggle a pair of call-waiting calls, putting the current call on hold and 
retrieving the held call;
• Attendant take-back of a call originally transferred by the attendant;
• Initiate any of several other features such as call transfer. ’
(ibid p44)
Although these examples are not particularly pertinent to Intelligent Networks, they do 
give an indication of the multitude of features which may rely upon the same trigger to 
activate them. Products created by different parties and used by a single customer may find 
they have a common trigger for some functions. It is this aspect which needs to be 
addressed when allowing third party access to an Intelligent Network Service Creation 
environment or Service Logic Execution Environment.
The conclusion to draw from this detail is that for the introduction of a new service, it is 
not only the security of the operation of that service that needs to be examined, but also the 
security and operation of all the other services that may be required to work with it. The 
impact of service and feature interaction, both from security and network integrity 
perspectives is therefore perhaps the greatest ongoing challenge to be resolved. This 
significant conclusion was recognised by Thomer (1994),
‘Service interaction and the inherent risk of undesired effects when two or more 
services are used together become a major problem unless we develop tools to 
handle this problem very quickly’ (ibid p92).
Interestingly in the UK, this licence condition could be argued to be breached by mobile telephone 
Operators, both in their Short Messaging Service (SMS) (where CLI cannot be withheld) and in their 
Directory Enquiries Service (where telephone numbers can be SMS’d to the callers telephone even with their 
CLI withheld)
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Integrating CTI, IN and the Internet
This example of an advanced Intelligent Network service, takes a topic arising from 
Survey 2, that of integrating INs with the Internet and identifies how an IN can be used to 
offer a service in conjunction with a web page.
Internet
Server
Get Page
Numbers to
Web Page
Services & Centre Loading 6
Information SCP <-------------------------- 1
1__
Numbers to
SSP
Exchange
Web Page Info
Appn
□
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Figure 4.12 Internet ‘Call Me’ Instruction
In this scenario, the customer is browsing a page on the Internet and wishes to talk to a 
representative of the company to which the page belongs, perhaps to obtain further 
information. An icon on the page indicates a ‘call me’ capability.
1. & 2. When the user selects the icon, this is detected by the Internet Server
which
3. sends a request to the Access Server owned by the Internet Services Provider.
4. The Access Server provides the customer’s telephone number to the Internet 
Server. The Internet Service Provider (owning the Access Server) knows this 
from their own user account information and the logon identifier of the user.
5. (a) The Internet Server invokes a call-me instruction in the telecommunication 
network Operator’s SCP. The SCP application, having a geographical routeing 
capability, is able to identify the most appropriate company call centre to which 
the call is to be connected. (Geographical routeing is important given that the
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Internet Server conld be accessed from anywhere in the world), (b) Along with 
the call-me instruction, the Internet Server provides details of the Internet page 
the customer was looking at when they selected the ‘call-me’ icon.
6. The SCP can check the loading and call queuing capacities of this centre by 
means of a back-end link to Call Centre’s server and thus if necessary, select an 
alternative centre.
7. Having identified an appropriate Call Centre to handle the call, the SCP (a) 
sends details of the web page to the Call Centre and (b) instructs the SSP to
8. (a) generate a call to the customer while (b) the Call Centre application is 
retrieving a copy of the Internet page the customer was looking at.
9. (a) Upon the customer answering, the SSP can connect the call to the call centre 
(using call queue jumping^^) and the attendant answering the call will have (b) 
the appropriate Internet page displayed on the screen of their terminal. The call 
and Internet Page information could use the channels of an ISDN link, 
providing integrated access to the attendant’s position.
Although this service was developed for the purposes of the research and required new 
protocols, all the information and much of the capability already resided in telephony 
networks at the time of the design (1998). Despite this, such services have not been 
implemented, probably because the increased use of Voice Over IP from the p.c. would 
appear to make such a proposal redundant, although one Operator is currently (2002) 
considering it (Shepherd 2002).
4.7 Factors to Consider when Choosing an Architecture
In researching Intelligent Networks, it became apparent that there was little thought being 
given to the appropriateness of Intelligent Networks in meeting a telecommunication 
Operator’s needs. It appeared to be considered a ‘must have’ or ‘flavour of the month’, in 
much the same way as the Internet is currently. Intelligent Networks were developed and 
integrated with other technologies; global partnerships and joint ventures were established 
and new services were implemented as fast as possible. Operators were perpetually
Queue jumping can be achieved by a variety o f means. The most widely practised method o f  queue 
jumping used by Call Centres is to use the CLI o f the caller to identify if  they are an existing or valued 
customer, the Call Centre CTI application then moving them to the front o f the queue. In this particular 
example, queue jumping could be achieved by using a different telephone number to access the centre 
compared to other users, to establish priority.
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ensuring there was capacity in the right place at the right time, with little thought being 
given to where their evolving architecture was taking them.
This section sets out a framework, comprising a number of factors which should be 
analysed and assessed against an Operator’s existing network and proposed IN 
architectures. The goal is to determine whether the proposed development is the best 
course of action in helping the company achieve its strategic goals. The next stage 
identifies the role of INs in an Operator’s network. Drawing on the findings of this 
research, it has been possible to identify a common sequence in which Operators 
implement INs; an Operator reappraising the role and hence structure of their network as 
time progresses, thereby unconsciously moving INs through a number of discernible 
stages. This section also identifies different traffic types, these being discussed in 
association with a number of different implementations of IN architecture, with 
consideration being given as to how some IN architectures may be better suited to meeting 
an Operator’s company strategy compared to others. Finally, with the research taking a 
number of years, it has been possible to compare some promised aspects of IN technology 
with what has been realised, to perhaps temper the vision with reality. This is included 
again as a consideration point for an Operator implementing an IN.
The Impact of INs on Operators’ Legacy Networks
Assuming the decision to implement an Intelligent Network has already been made, that 
decision-making process should have considered the benefits, that an IN implementation of 
services offers over similar services implemented on an Operator’s legacy network 
(assuming there is one). The benefits of supporting services on an IN architecture have 
already been discussed, but many of those services can be offered (albeit less efficiently) 
on a traditional distributed processing network. The primary reason for using an IN arose 
when the Services were frequently modified, or if there was a high chum in customer 
information, such that the volume, or frequency, of updates caused the management and 
network systems problems in achieving acceptable update times and accuracy.
Having chosen to implement an IN, there were periods when Network Equipment 
Suppliers were introducing a standardised IN product into their portfolios (about 1994 
onwards), or developing ‘open management’ interfaces (about 1999), when there appeared 
to be a benefit to Network Operators to delay the introduction or upgrades of INs, in that 
they would get these new features. This would have aided the integration of the new
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equipment with the existing equipment and provided a level of future-proofing. Obviously 
such a delay would have been strategic and only really achievable if they could have 
maintained the revenue stream firom their existing network, without losing market share. 
However it is fair to say that by 1998, all large network Operators were looking either to 
implement their first IN (e.g. Cable & Wireless in the UK) or upgrade their existing IN 
(e.g. BT in the UK). Intelligent Networks had therefore established themselves as an 
essential part of any large Operator’s network.
The key problem with existing (non IN) switches were that they were not developed with 
the modular IN approach in mind and thus were not easily upgraded to IN working^^. 
Furthermore, those elements that were upgradeable would not conform to IN standards.
The option of an upgrade path depended largely on Suppliers developing existing products 
(rather than producing new products) to construct their IN product portfolio. As can be 
imagined. Suppliers typically followed the ‘distributed intelligence’ path, then developed a 
‘proprietary’ IN product, followed by an IN product adhering to international standards. 
Consequently, Operators that did not progressively upgrade (or update) their original 
switches found that they could not be upgraded to an IN model, since the upgrade firom a 
‘distributed intelligence exchange’ to an IN exchange required too many changes to be cost 
effective.
Upgrading older ‘distributed intelligence’ networks carried with it the requirement for a 
signalling protocol, such as C7, capable of handling non circuit-related messages. This was 
necessary in order that messages relating to SCP queries could be conveyed to an SCP 
located remotely firom the exchange^^ (Ellis 1992).
Operators with a substantial investment in an existing network adopted the strategy of 
‘overlaying’ the existing network with an IN, where only calls requiring IN services were 
routed to the overlay. This strategy also minimised the disturbance to the existing network, 
the operation of which would be compromised by upgrades.
Upgrading a non IN requires additional digit discrimination and triggering intelligence in the switch in 
order to query the central database. This is the ‘intelligence’ which upgrades a telephone exchange to SSP 
(Service Switching Point) status and represents a major network enhancement.
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In addition to the real-time network enhancements, large changes to the support systems 
for management and billing were essential for these new INs.
‘The greatest challenge to the introduction of the Intelligent Network is the 
administration of billing, call tracking and call identification information’ 
(Harrington 1993 p i3).
New elements obviously had their own management capabilities, but the real challenge 
was to converge these with the existing alarms, faults, network statistics and other network 
management and control systems already operating. IN services introduced major new 
revenue streams for network Operators and so appropriate billing arrangements were 
crucial to the success of the service. Whilst building a bespoke billing system just for a 
new IN might have appeared to be an attractive option, most customers purchased a range 
of services (offered on both IN and non IN equipment) and wanted a single bill addressing 
them all, not an individual bill for each service. Thus billing systems needed to be 
rationalised and converged in the same way as the other operational areas, to combat the 
onset of unmanageable complexity (Shepherd 1997c, Shepherd 1998).
Other exchanges in Operators’ networks may have been early IN implementations. These 
were proprietary, their applications hard-coded and the modules (SSP, SCP etc.) closely 
integrated with one another. The problem the Operator faced was the alternatives of being 
tied to one supplier until their network is upgraded to international standards or much of 
the network equipment having to be scrapped to upgrade to an architecture adhering to 
international standards (Shepherd 1999a,b).
As will be shown later in this chapter, the dilemmas discussed have resulted in Operators’ 
networks developing into hybrids, where elements of legacy network, proprietary IN and 
standardised IN operated in parallel with each other.
This section has alluded to proprietary and standardised implementations of INs and 
‘overlay’ implementations. The next section develops these points by discussing the
Within Cl, the (Open Systems Interconnect) application layer (layer 7) uses TCAP protocol to provide the 
signalling and allows INAP to be carried in the component layer, which is used for communication between 
the SSP and SCPs.
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reasons hindering the uptake of Intelligent Networks and reveals that the implementation 
of INs have followed well defined stages as the technology has matured.
The Development of Intelligent Networks
In implementing an Intelligent Network, the implications for existing exchanges of the new 
functions specified in the ITU-T IN Capability Sets, were major. The changes necessary to 
introduce the triggering functions were fundamental to the structure of the call control 
software in the exchanges. This was the reason for the initial slowness of the emerging 
ITU-T Intelligent Network standards. Equipment Suppliers had significant vested interests 
in the achievement of a standard which they could implement with least effort given their 
existing product range^ .^ Furthermore, the ‘knock-on’ effects, in terms of the impact on the 
extra processing needed for the triggering (of queries to the SCP), were considerable and 
led to performance degradation, loss of software structure and software maintenance 
problems, as well as the difficulty of inter-working the new IN service with existing 
switch-based features.
Because the emergence of a standardised IN was a slowly evolving process, the aim that it 
should become a platform for the fast launch of new service opportunities didn’t 
materialise. Customers required new services immediately, not when the standardisation 
organisations got round to it and those new services were provided in ways which 
continually under-mined the standardised IN cause^  ^and potential business-case 
arguments, adding to the difficulties of introducing the IN.
Therefore the implementation of ITU-T based INs was a slow and expensive process and 
was only achieved by established Operators in a piecemeal way. There was obviously a 
need for each stage of IN growth to justify its cost and so staged business cases were built, 
based on the expected revenues of the service functionality introduced. In this manner, a 
‘business-as-usual’ approach to INs gradually took root, with Operators ‘edging forward’ 
and adding functions within the ITU-T fi*amework, as each service was justified on its 
predicted revenue stream.
^  It has already been mentioned how North American Suppliers resisted ‘leg control’ in the ITU-T 
standardisation forum, since it did not align with the existing proprietary Bellcore IN specification and hence 
proprietary implementations o f INs in North America.
^  i.e. the services could have been provided on an Operator’s legacy non IN network, or on a proprietary IN - 
not easily ported to a standards based IN.
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Thus doubts were raised over the wisdom of the course of the development of IN 
specifications, with some Operators wondering if the unquestioning pursuit of the 
standards through CSl, CS2 .... CSn, was the most cost effective route (interview 
Anderson 1999). The fact that much of the installed base of INs has not progressed beyond 
CSl or C S l t e n d s  to confirm this.
The research has identified that Operators implementing an IN tended to develop through 
any number of four stages, illustrated by Figure 4.13.
Position in Network^ 
Hierarchy
19941981
Forni of Network
High
Integrated
Overlay
Proprietary Standardised
Standardisation
Figure 4.13 The Stages of Intelligent Network Development and Integration
The figure consists of three axes. The first indicates the position of the Intelligent Network 
in the routeing hierarchy of a telecommunications network. ‘High’ means only Tandem 
Exchanges had the ability to make SCP queries, while ‘Integrated’ means local exchanges 
had that ability. The second axis of ‘Standardisation’ has the options of ‘Proprietary’ and 
‘Standardised’. ‘Proprietary’ means that the Intelligent Network deployed was developed 
using a Supplier’s proprietary standards (making it difficult to connect to other INs at 
anything other than the transport level), whilst ‘Standardised’ means the Intelligent 
Network adhered to international open standards (allowing easier interconnection and a
24 CS1+ is CSl with parts o f the CS2 standards (such as SCP-SCP and SCP-SDP interaction)
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degree of vendor independence). The last axis ‘Form of Network’ indicates how the 
Intelligent Network was implemented in an Operator’s telecommunications network. 
‘Overlay’ indicates that special dedicated tandem exchanges were used, calls being routed 
specially to these exchanges for the functionality they offered. ‘Core’ indicates the 
Intelligent Network elements were integrated in the Operator’s main network and 
performed ordinary routeing as well as IN functions.
Many of the IN’s in Europe were implemented by monopoly Operators with an established 
distributed legacy network, which employed a high level of capital and was not easily 
upgradeable to an IN (Cl 1996). Owing to the hierarchical nature of these distributed 
networks, the tendency was to employ an overlay IN (point 1, Figure 4.13). An overlay IN 
employed a single specialist node, or sub-network of nodes, which were capable of 
triggering to an SCP. It was therefore small and self-contained, provided by one supplier, 
with access and egress of calls to a suitable point in the legacy network switch hierarchy. It 
was a means by which new services, made commercially viable by IN functionality, could 
be quickly made available to an existing customer base. It was however, a tactical rather 
than a strategic approach and had the tendency to lock the Operator into an expensive and 
proprietary upgrade route.
Prior to 1994 overlay networks were constructed from proprietary elements. After this date 
overlays, if proprietary, would have standardised elements and almost certainly include the 
facility to migrate to standards-based protocols and interfaces (point 2, Figure 4.13).
At some point, as demand for services grew, implementation in the core network became 
attractive and a combination of demand, cost and time, typically dictated that it reside high 
in the hierarchical structure (at tandem exchange level), rather than at the majority of local 
exchanges (point 3, Figure 4.13). Eventually demand and the need to upgrade local 
exchanges, has encouraged the IN architecture to migrate to local switch level, such that 
the local exchange is the SSP (point 4, Figure 4.13), this typically beginning to occur about 
1999.
Examining Operators’ networks revealed that they aligned to varying and indeed multiple, 
points on the above path (i.e. they had different INs in different parts of the network to 
provide different services). Thus when considering the implementation of an Intelligent
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Network, one of the primary considerations should be to identify how the new architecture 
will integrate with what exists in the telecommunications network; not how the existing 
architecture should change to accommodate it, as this would be expensive and not always 
technically feasible.
Types of Telephony Traffic
A consideration when implementing an Intelligent Network is the types of services to be 
offered and hence which telephony traffic it may be expected to carry and matching this to 
the network architecture. A step towards identifying what traffic types are expected, is to 
identify the market segments in which an Operator might function; be it resale^^, carrying 
basic telephony traffic, a televoting call-centre service provider, an Internet Service 
Provider, an International Service Provider with Card Access^^ or a network Operator 
handling a combination of all traffic types. Table 4.1 identifies the typical types of traffic 
that might have been found on an Operators network.
Traffic
Type
Busy
Period Duration
Number of 
iNAP 
Queries
SCP
Processing
Network
Impact
Basic
Teiephony
(POTS)
1000-1200 3 min 1 Min Low
Teievoting 1800-2100 15 sec 1 Min Very High
internet 0000-0300 1 Hour 1 Min High
Caiiing Card 1200 -1400 6 min 3 Med Low
Free Phone 1000 -1200 3 min 1 Min Med
Table 4.1 Traffic Types (Shepherd 1997c)
25 Resale is where an Operator acts as a carrier.
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Telecommunications networks have traditionally been dimensioned utilising the 
characteristics of basic telephony and this has continued to be the most significant traffic 
type for most Operators. It had a low SCP processing impact and typically a low data 
chum (i.e. the management systems did not have to accommodate a large number of data 
changes). A danger for Operators expanding their market by launching new IN services, 
was to continue dimensioning their networks based on figures derived fi*om this type of 
traffic. The following examples illustrate the potential impact of ‘new’ service options, 
with the next section discussing which IN architectures are best suited to the different 
traffic types.
Teievoting is one IN service application that requires special consideration. The 
characteristics of this service are a very high calling rate, but short call hold time. 
The traffic volumes generated have a tremendous impact on the whole of the 
network, potentially swamping all the other traffic types. With no management of 
the calls generated, 95% of the total calls of an hour long televote would occur 
within the first two minutes and with 98% within the first five minutes of the event 
(Shepherd 1997c). Although individual calls have little impact on SCP processing, 
collectively (at thousands of calls per second) they require an extremely large 
amount of processing in a very short period. Any architecture chosen to carry 
teievoting traffic should have the ability to process teievoting calls, while 
continuing to offer a suitable quality of service to other customers using IN 
services.
Internet calls on the other hand, have little processing impact upon the SCP, but 
they have an extremely long busy period, because they are generally long duration 
calls. Many Internet Service Providers (ISPs) minimise the number of modems at 
their network access points to maximise resource use. This can result in a high level 
of call connection failures when all the modems are busy, resulting in a similarly 
high level of repeat-call attempts to the local exchange providing the ISP access, 
impacting other traffic on the network and the local exchange.
Card Access allows secure authenticated voice access to the Service Provider’s network from the networks 
o f different Operators.
4 The Evolution o f  Intelligent Network Technology
Calling Card calls have a higher than average impact on SCP processing because 
the application has to remain active in the SCP; for example, maintaining the call 
count for follow-on calls thus avoiding the need to re-authenticate the customer. 
Some IN architectures have the potential for the SCP application to return the call 
context information with the initial routeing to the SSP for resubmission, should a 
follow-on call be initiated. This reduces the overall SCP processing requirements, 
but increases the SSP processing requirements.
Freephone calls have minimal impact on an IN for a basic number routeing, but 
the SCP processing required, incrementally increases if additional features such as 
Time Dependent or Geographical routeing are used.
The type of traffic carried heavily influences the architecture of a network. One possibility 
is to choose an architecture that is the best compromise between all the types of traffic 
carried based upon traffic volumes, or revenues, or the profit the different types of traffic 
attract.
An alternative approach is to implement several IN platforms to meet the different service 
needs, allowing the different types of traffic to be handled by the most efficient platform. 
Although this provides flexibility and purchasing power, the downside to this strategy is 
the increased costs of multiple installations, particularly those associated with operation 
and maintenance contracts.
Finally, the mix of call traffic on a network will change with time, possibly as the result of 
new market products, thus any IN architecture will need to be sufficiently flexible to 
accommodate future needs, including new regulations, such as re-numbering and number 
mobility. It is important to get the architecture right at the outset, since downstream change 
is not always easy and of course involves expense.
Intelligent Network Architecture
Having discussed some of the considerations which need to be applied in selecting and 
developing an IN, it is appropriate to determine what architectures could be used to meet 
those needs. This section therefore discusses a number of architectures.
1 4 5
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The first two architectures relate to a traditional (non IN) network and the ITU-T IN model 
and provide a baseline of features against which other IN architectures, such as those 
constructed as part of the research, can be compared. Each of the architectures is evaluated 
in terms of its ability to ‘provide a fast response’ to routeing queries, having a ‘high level 
of processing’, necessary to cope with high volumes of calls or complex services and its 
‘ease in modifying services and information’ to provide a measure of its ability to quickly 
and easily alter customer data.
Traditional Network Architecture (Distributed)
Management
System
Call Control
Information
Services
Switch
Call Control
Information
Services
Switch
Local/Transit E xchange Local Exchange
Figure 4.14 Traditional Network Architecture (Distributed Intelligence)
The traditional (pre-IN) exchange architecture, from which all voice telecommunications 
networks have developed, is illustrated in Figure 4.14. Its operation has already been 
discussed in detail in Section 4.3. The service applications and information are replicated 
in each of the switches. The importance of this traditional architecture lies in the fact that it 
needs to be considered when identifying how an IN is to be introduced and where the 
various services are to reside. The problem with traditional exchanges is that changes to 
applications, data, or architecture, affect all exchanges and thus it is difficult to implement 
changes quickly or easily, especially if there are more than a few exchanges (Table 4.3).
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Fast
Response
High Processing 
Available
Ease of modifying 
S erviees/Information
Traditional Good Good Poor
Table 4.2 Summary of Traditional Network Architecture’s Benefits
The traditional network arehitecture is ideal for basie telephony traffie where data does not 
often change and numbers are geographically based. Suppliers’ investment in IN 
technology to form the basis of their télécommunications equipment portfolio however, 
meant that future growth of a non-IN circuit-switched network was limited, as it was in the 
Supplier’s interest to sell an Operator an exchange capable of SSP functionality, whether 
that functionality was wanted or not. An advantage however, lay in an easier IN 
implementation in the future should it be needed.
The ITU-T, Capability Set 2 Intelligent Network Architecture
■ SMAF
SMF
Services & 
Information
SCPManagement System
Central
IN Service control
Management reiationstiip
(Note: to aid clarity, not ail
tfie links are stiown)
CUSF
SSF
Looal/Transit Exchange
Figure 4.15 IN-CS2 Architecture
The ITU-T IN physical arehitecture formed the basis of all the Suppliers’ IN offerings and 
hence the basis of Operators’ INs. Two new capabilities shown in Figure 4.15 not
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explained earlier are the operation of the management system and the Call Unrelated 
Service Function (CUSF).
The management element within an IN is termed the Service Management System (SMS) 
and provides three essential functions, the Service Management Access Function (SMAF), 
the Service Creation Environment Function (SCEF) and the Service Management Function 
(SMF).
The Service Management Access Function acts as an interface to customers wishing to 
update stored information (such as the telephone number to which they want their calls to 
be diverted).
The Service Creation Environment Function is the means by which services are 
constructed. In theory services could be created by the customer, but they are normally 
constructed by the Operator. The main reason for barring direct customer access, is the 
potential damage that could be done to the network from incorrectly constructed 
applications^^.
The Service Management Function acts as an interface to the network elements for the 
implementation of service applications and the changing of information (data). It 
essentially checks and ensures that all the equipment is at a common application/data build 
level.
The Call Unrelated Service Function (CUSF) is a capability in the SSP that allows 
information to be passed to the management system without an associated telephony call. 
For example, it would permit customers to update their data/information held in the SCP 
by using the data channel of an ISDN line.
The key point with the IN CS architecture is that the service applications and information 
are held centrally and any changes are made to this single copy. This architecture is
IN CS2 supports security through the provision o f a number o f security assisting functions, which are 
intended to permit secure service applications, both intra-network and inter-network, when one application 
communicates with another. Thus the security assisting functions support both internal network operations 
and interworking between two or more networks. However these security features do not guarantee network 
integrity, rather than help it, by allowing secured systems to be built.
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therefore ideal for traffic models requiring frequent data changes, such as Calling Card 
services (Table 4.3).
Fast
Response
High Processing 
Available
Ease of modifying 
Services/Information
Standardised (ITU-T) IN Average Average Good
Table 4.3 Summary of IN-CS2 Architecture’s Benefits
There are many variations on the classical CS2 IN architecture, such as using local SCPs 
(adjuncts), local caches, or operating in a distributed environment using IN protocols and 
distributed processing. Suppliers offer a small number of IN architecture variations and 
others have been constructed for the purposes of the research. The merits of these 
alternative architectures are considered in the following sections and seek to demonstrate 
how each is able to meet one or a combination of the demands made upon them (such as 
handling different traffic types).
Centralised & Distributed SCPs ( & Adjunct Processor)
ÇMAF
SŒ F Priority updi
SDF
Management System
'Priority flag Non 
priority updates
Centrai
SDFIN Service controi 
Management reiationstiip
Services & inbnnation
SCP
(Note: to aid darity, not aii 
the links are shown)
Local/Transit Exchange
Figure 4.16 Centralised & Distributed SCPs
149
4 The Evolution o f Intelligent Network Technology
The architectural model illustrated in Figure 4.16 is one that was developed in early 1996, 
as part of this research, using the basic principles of Intelligent Network operation. It also 
formed a key part of Survey 1.1 subsequently learned of work by Shelly (1996) relating to 
distributed architectures, although 1 have been unable to gauge the precise IN architecture 
to which his description refers and hence the similarity to those presented here.
‘When a large IN call capacity is required, the downsized IN systems are 
distributed over the network, while maintaining central control for service 
operations and the corresponding operations support systems.’ (ibid p21)
In this architecture, applications are held both in the Central SCP and Local SCPs. Not all 
central applications have to be replicated locally, but all applications held locally must be 
replicates of those held centrally. Local SCPs are often referred to as adjunct processors, 
however the key difference between the operation of adjuncts and the SCPs of this 
architecture is that adjuncts do not normally have copies of centralised applications, just 
those localised to their area of operation.
Local SCPs are not necessarily located at every exchange, since this would make the 
architecture almost indistinguishable ftrom the Traditional (non-lN) architecture. Rather a 
single SCP serves several exchanges in a particular area. An example would be in the 
Caribbean, where the telecommunication systems of some islands are connected by slow 
and not particularly reliable, Satellite links. In this case each Local SCP could serve all the 
exchanges on an island or closely grouped set of islands.
With this architecture, central applications are invoked from the SSP in the same manner 
as for the traditional ITU-T IN architecture (Section 4.3), thus what deviates from the 
standardised IN model are those applications replicated in both the Central and Local 
SCPs.
An application held locally allows a speedy response from the SSP to a query, but requires 
more time to update across all the Local SCPs. There would be an extended period during 
which some Local SCPs would be using out-of-date applications or information, whilst 
others are using newer versions. This is precisely the situation where a centralised 
application (as per the ITU-T architecture) is more advantageous, since it is relatively easy 
to update a single central copy of an application. However, a centralised response to each
150
4 The Evolution of Intelligent Network Technology
query is slower, significantly so at times of peak loading^ .^ In order to prevent ‘race’ 
conditions, a ‘validity’ flag is introduced to carry the current status of the application 
within a Local SCP. Should the SMF update an application centrally, an instruction would 
be sent to each of the Local SCPs setting the validity flag to the ‘invalid’ state.
A call originating at a Local SSP requiring IN service, will first query the local instance of 
the SCP and examine the validity flag associated with that particular application. The flag 
will indicate if the stored version of the application is still valid and if it is, it will be used 
to process the call. If the flag indicates that the application is invalid the query is forwarded 
to the Central SCP to process the call, returning instructions to the SSP.
This process is summarised in the following flowchart (Figure 4.17).
Line seized 
& digits diaiied
SSP  queries iocai SCP
appiication Locai SCP queries
Centrai appiication invoked 
& function performed
Local application invoked 
& function performed
to SSP
Figure 4.17 Query/Response Flowchart for Centralised & Distributed SCFs & SDFs
To complete the process, once a central application has changed and the local applications 
marked as invalid, the SMF will (as a low priority task) update each of the local 
applications and set the local flag back to the ‘valid’ state.
If the centralised SCP utilised a distributed processing environment with end-to-end application 
fragmentation the response would be slower still, when the SCP is heavily loaded.
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What this architecture achieves, is the retention of the key benefits of the centralised 
architecture, whilst introducing additional benefits as follows:
• The speed of a query/response is increased, since an application is normally 
processed locally;
• There are network integrity benefits since there is a reduced chance of 
congestion owing to fewer SSP - SCP (INAP^^) messages querying the central 
application and a subsequent transmission cost-benefit; and
• The potential for a major network failure will be reduced^®.
The Centralised and Distributed architecture is ideal where the SCP and SSPs are 
geographically remote, if there are a number of local oriented services which do not need 
to be replicated centrally, or there are heavily used services (such as for televotes requiring 
much processing) or infrequently changed services.
This assessment is summarised in Table 4.4.
Fast
Response
High Processing 
Available
Ease of modifying 
Services/Information
Centralised & Distributed SCPs Good Good Good
Table 4.4 Summary of Centralised & Distributed SCPs Architecture’s Benefits
There are of course disadvantages with this architecture. It employs a more complex, non­
standardised operation, both in call processing where flags are employed and for the 
management functions where the application version at different local SCPs have to be 
tracked. A second disadvantage is the cost of replicating services centrally and locally, 
necessitating additional local storage and processing. For some situations, such as if the 
SSP and SCP are separated by continents, a local SCP maybe the only means of 
guaranteeing an acceptable service. The concept of a local SCP is not so radical, since
^  Intelligent Network Application Part (INAP) messages are those passed between the SSP & SCP when 
asking and replying to instruction on how to route a call. The INAP messages are defined by the various IN 
CS releases.
A well designed network with a centralised architecture should be designed not to have any major failure 
points. Nevertheless, keeping the majority o f the processing and signalling local with the option to query the 
central SCP does increase operational reliability.
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some Suppliers’ exchanges were constructed with elements of an inherent SCP, such as 
Ericsson’s AXE 10 exchange, which was used for exchange housekeeping purposes and 
could have been developed into a full SCP.
Another disadvantage stems from the lack of management standards. Since there are no 
internationally recognised standards to which the Suppliers have developed their products, 
they will each employ their own implementation of a Service Creation Environment and 
Service Management Function. This makes mixing SCPs from different Suppliers 
extremely difficult, effectively tying the Operator to the one Supplier. Although this 
problem also exists with the standardised ITU-T IN architecture and would limit an 
Operator’s flexibility in upgrading, the Centralised & Distributed SCPs architecture 
exacerbates the problem since multiple SCPs are employed.
The description of the operation of the Centralised and Distributed SCFs & SDFs 
architecture above, has just referred to a service application being held both locally and 
centrally. Exactly the same method of working is applicable to the Data/Information held 
in the SCPs. In practice it is more often the data (announcement, destination, etc.) relating 
to a service that changes rather than the service application itself, thus use of a data flag 
and local storage of data is in some ways more useful. Similarly there are variations in the 
exact method of working. The example uses a Local SCP to Central SCP query, the 
inference being that that a Local SCP forward the query to the Central SCP. An alternative 
would be to hold the flag in the SSP and then generate a Global Title address in the INAP 
message, using a Signalling Point Relay to direct the query to the correct SCP^\
When this architecture was presented at a conference (Shepherd 1997a), an attendee 
mentioned that a distributed processing environment (discussed later) solved all the 
processing problems. He felt the use of one SCP to forward queries to a second SCP totally 
inappropriate. Interestingly, one large Operator is currently (2002) considering migrating 
their network to an architecture very similar to that proposed.
Thus the SSP determines (from an internal flag table) which SCP hold the valid application, constructs the 
query to the SCP, identifying by means o f the global title in the message the SCP the message is destined for. 
The message is then sent to a Signalling Point Relay (effectively a means o f connecting several SSPs to 
several SCPs) whereupon it determine the destination SCP from the global title and forwards the message 
accordingly.
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In discussing this architecture, reference has also been made to an IN architecture proposed 
by several Suppliers, which employs an adjunct processor. The physical architecture is 
identical to that shown in Figure 4.16, but the Local SCP (or adjunct as it is known), only 
employs services and information pertinent to its locality of operation. All the advantages 
of the Centralised & Distributed SCPs IN architecture remain, except that they only apply 
to localised applications. A significant proportion of calls will still need to query the 
Central SCP, hence its overall response has been graded as average. Its benefits can 
therefore be summarised in Table 4.5.
Fast
Response
High Processing 
Available
Ease of modifying 
Services/Information
Adjunct (Service Node) Average Good Good
Table 4.5 Summary of an Adjunct Processor’s Benefits 
Local Caching
A further important variation on the Centralised & Distributed SCPs architecture, is not to 
employ a Local SCP, but to use a local cache capability. A local cache provides the means 
of storing data/instructions provided in response to SCP queries, local to the SSP. This 
avoids the need for the SSP to query the SCP, when another call requiring the same call 
handling is detected.
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Figure 4.18 Local Caching
Local/Transit Excliange
In the local caching scenario shown in Figure 4.18, responses from the central SCP to 
queries generated by calls, are marked as being suitable for storing in a cache, as if they 
were a straightforward number translation. (Applications such as geographical routeing 
would obviously be unsuitable^^). Further calls at the local exchange to the same dialled 
number would query the cache and obtain the appropriate call routeing etc. (call action^^) 
from the stored data.
Cache entries would normally time-out based upon some default duration, or the SCP 
response might contain a ‘valid until’ flag (such as would be needed for Time of Day 
routeing applications) that would override the default duration. But therein lies the inherent 
disadvantage; information could change rapidly and there would be a time-lag during 
which calls would be incorrectly routed. Such a state would continue to exist until the 
cached data times-out and the SCP was re-queried.
With geographical routeing, the number translation depends upon the origin o f the caller. A local exchange 
may serve customers in two different geographical areas, thus the call routing for one may not be suitable for 
the other.
The cache would contain other relevant information such as used for call charging, thus strictly speaking 
the cache provides call action information - which includes the call routeing)
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A benefit of this arehiteeture is that by not querying the SCP for every eall, SCP load 
control^ "^  has oceurred. This is ideal for Teievoting applications, ensuring SCP processing 
is not overwhelmed and therefore available for processing other calls. The benefits of using 
local caching are presented in Table 4.6.
Fast
Response
High Processing 
Available
Ease of modifying 
Services/Information
Local Caching Good Good Average
Table 4.6 Summary of Local Caching Architecture’s Benefits
Distributed SCPs
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System
SMAF 7
SIVIF
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Figure 4.19 Distributed SCPs
The architecture in Figure 4.19 was developed following Survey 1 and aimed to 
demonstrate how applying legislation to open, standardised, IN interfaces could have the 
benefits circumvented by the choice of IN architecture. It comprises a number of SSPs and
Load Control is the selective blocking o f calls to certain numbers to ensure that the telephone network is 
able to continue to offer a suitable level o f service to other customers. For instance a Televote with no 
blocking would generate sufficient calls to use all the network’s processing resource, preventing for instance, 
the ability to make (999) emergency calls.
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co-located SCPs (containing a SCF and SDF) which may be geographically diverse from 
each other, each possibly serving a number of local exchanges. The SCPs communicate by 
a signalling ring labelled ‘service control’ and the network elements are linked back to the 
Service Management System (SMS) by a management ring. The architecture initially 
appears identical with that of a traditional (non IN) distributed processing 
telecommunications network, the main difference being that a local SCP would in practice 
service a number of local exchanges. Additionally, only services receiving high calling 
rates are replicated on every SCP, the remaining services being located on only one or two 
of them. Service operation using this architecture however, is totally different from that of 
a traditional (non IN) distributed processing network as follows.
If the customer’s service changes, then the SMF will update the service application on a 
particular SCP and mark it as the ‘master’. Messages are sent from the Management 
System to all of the other local SCPs marking their version of the service application as 
‘Invalid’ and, more importantly, identifying which SCP holds the master. If a call arrives at 
an SSP and querying the local SCP finds the local application marked as invalid, would use 
the additional information supplied by the SCP to forward the query (around the ring) to 
the local SCP flagged as containing the updated application. This would return the 
appropriate response to the originating SSP, which would then process the call.
Having updated one local SCP with the latest service application and marked the other 
applications as invalid, the SMF will (as a low priority task), update those service 
applications on each of the other SSPs and revalidate their flags for this application.
Although this example has only referred to service applications changing, the same method 
of working can be applied to the information held in the SCP, with the use of flags to 
indicate validity.
This architecture processes the majority of the calls close to their point of origin and is thus 
ideal for Televotes or those services (or applications), such as Calling Card, that require 
greater than normal processing (Table 4.7).
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Fast
Response
High Processing 
Available
Ease of modifying 
Services/Information
Distributed SCPs Average Good Average
Table 4.7 Summary of Distributed SCPs Architecture’s Benefits
The disadvantages are the same as for the Centralised & Distributed SCFs & SDFs 
architecture, in that there is duplication of resources due to the existence of multiple local 
SCPs.
Interestingly, this architecture would allow an Operator to adhere to ITU-T standards, but 
make it very difficult for other Operators to connect effectively to the network at anything 
other than basic transport level. For instance, connecting at a particular SSP/SCP interface 
would only allow access to that SCP’s applications which, following an update at another 
SCP, will be invalidated. The second Operator would be unable to gain access to that 
application until it had been updated on the SCP to which they were connected. Thus here 
is an example, where an Operator could abide by the potential ruling of a regulator to open 
appropriate standard IN interfaces to other Operator’s network, yet make it ineffective.
Centralised Distributed Processing
A centralised distributed processing architecture, such as that commonly employed in 
computing environments, offers an alternative way of increasing the central SCP 
processing capability. This section examines two Centralised Processing Architectures; one 
where the services are fully distributed and one where the common services are replicated 
on fi*ont end processors.
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i. Fully Distributed
(Note: to add clarity, not 
all ttie links are shown)
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Local Exchange
Figure 4.20 Centralised Distributed Processing - Fully Distributed
Figure 4.20 indicates one method of employing centralised distributed processing, with all 
the services and information fully distributed on servers around a Local Area Network 
(LAN). An SSP INAP message querying the SCP arrives at the interface^^ (I/F) gateway 
from where it is forwarded around the LAN to a free processor. The Service application’s 
response to this query is to pass back the routeing information via the same interface 
gateway.
The key advantage of this architecture is that single points of failure are reduced, although 
there is potential for LAN congestion (Table 4.8). The processors connected to the LAN 
can either operate in paired load-sharing mode or operate in parallel.
The Cl gateway acts as an interface between the signalling protocols uses in the telephony environment 
and those used on the LAN in the distributed processing computer environment.
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Fast
Response
High Processing 
Available
Ease of modifying 
Services/Information
Distributed Processing 
(Fully Distributed)
Average Good Good
Table 4.8 Summarjf of Centralised Distributed Processing - Fully Distributed 
Architecture’s Benefits
This architecture is ideal for all traffic types, although there is the potential that Televote 
traffic could cause LAN congestion, (i.e. Teievoting traffic queries should be restricted at 
the local exchange or such queries be restricted to a certain number of INAP messages in a 
defined period and the restriction deployed at the SCP interface.)
When this architecture was originally conceived (1996) and presented at a number of 
conferences (Shepherd 1997 a,b,c) there appeared to be no Intelligent Network SCPs 
operating in this fashion. Currently in 2002, it is quite common to have the SCPs using 
distributed processing in this manner (Perdikeas et al. 2001).
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ii. Replicated Front End Processing
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Figure 4.21 Centralised Distributed Processing - Replicated, Front-End Processor 
(with Back-End Application)
An alternative centralised distributed processing architecture developed for this research, 
which addresses some of the disadvantages of the standard ITU-T IN architecture 
comprises front-end application processors, holding their own applications and data. Call 
queries from the SSP arrive at the front-end processor. If the processor has the ability to 
process the query, it will do so. If the application does not reside on the processor, the 
query can be referred to a back-end processor. Thus the front-end processors can have 
replicated service applications and data for services which infrequently change or have 
high calling rates. The back-end processor would contain the service applications and data 
for services which changed frequently. This is summarised in Table 4.9.
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Fast
Response
High Processing 
Available
Ease of modifying 
Services/Information
Distributed Processing 
(Replicated Front-end)
Average Good Good
Table 4.9 Summary of Distributed Processing - Replicated, Front-End Processor 
(with Back-End Application) Architecture’s Benefits
This architecture again is ideal for all traffic types, although the front-end application 
processor would also be ideal for processing televote calls.
With such an architecture, care would need to be taken in balancing the load on the front- 
end processors. An exchange could have its load spread across a number of front-end 
processor ports or it could establish a primary front-end processor and have a secondary 
(back-up) front end processor, to handle emergency traffic under failure conditions. 
Alternatively, the load can be spread by processor loading which can be planned or real­
time. A further way is to spread processor load by application usage, this being a good way 
of limiting network congestion to a certain application (such as teievoting), whilst 
minimising the impact on other traffic being serviced.
The problem with distributed processing is the lack of a standardised architecture.
‘The computer sector does not have a particularly strong record of producing and 
implementing non-proprietary networking standards. Indeed, many of the 
interconnection and interoperation problems that for years have bedevilled the 
private computer networking environment may well migrate to the public network 
arena.’ (Hawkins 1995)
Proprietary SCP implementations make it difficult for an Operator to purchase additional 
SCP capacity from another Supplier.
This problem however, is likely to reduce, since as is frequently demonstrated with other 
technologies (e.g. mobile telephony), there will be a reduction in technical choices with 
time.
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Figure 4.22 The Impact of Time on the Deployment of Distributed Processing Options
Figure 4.22 suggests that during the same period of time that the range of technical 
distributed processing choices decreases, Processing capabilities will increase. (‘Moore’s 
Law...states that the processing power of computers will double approximately every 
18 months’ (Brown 1998)). Similarly technology will allow the distribution (geographic 
separation) of the servers to increase. These changing factors would improve the 
attractiveness of employing a distributed processing architecture.
Currently (2002) there are Operators using Distributed Processing architectures similar to 
both the models presented in this section. The implementation of that shown in Figure 4.21 
(Replicated Front-end Processor) is slightly different to that originally envisaged, where 
the front-end processors offer simple (e.g. number translation) services, whilst those on the 
back-end processor offer more complex and processor intensive applications.
Teievoting Architecture
A final Intelligent Network architecture is one appropriate for very high calling rates, such 
as Teievoting. A number of Suppliers have developed their own way of dealing with 
Televotes, typically in conjunction with the standardised ITU-T IN architecture.
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Figure 4.23 Teievoting Architecture
The implementation shown in figure 4.23 is a variation, developed for this research, of a 
Teievoting architecture offered by GPT. The first call to the teievoting number causes the 
SSP to generate a query to the SCP. The SCP’s response is to instruct the SSP to route this 
and subsequent calls to the same telephone number, a teievoting application on a switch 
integrated peripheral. The caller receives a courtesy announcement indicating, for example, 
that their vote has registered. Subsequent calls to the same number use a cache in the SSP 
to determine the routeing of calls, without further queries being made to the SCP.
The SSP maintains a count of the number of calls to a particular number, which can be 
forwarded to (or polled by) the SMF at regular intervals. A suitable management 
application can then be used to collate and manipulate the total votes cast.
In the commercial variant, the SSP generates an INAP message every 10 calls received, 
allowing a separate SCP based application to undertake the collation. I believe using the 
SMS to process the call is an improvement compared to the GPT offering, since it reduces 
the number of INAP messages and hence SCP processing, whilst using an existing 
infrastructure (the SMF to SSP link used for management) to convey information. The net
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effect is to reduce the load on both the signalling network and the SCP. The characteristics 
of this Teievoting architecture are summarised in Table 4.10.
Fast
Response
High Processing 
Available
Ease of modifying 
Services/Information
Teievoting Good Good Average
Table 4.10 Summary of Teievoting Architecture’s Benefits
This section has looked at a number of IN architectures for addressing the operational 
requirements (traffic types, geographical spread) of an Operator’s network. Another 
consideration when selecting the IN offerings available, or which could be developed, is 
the operational strategy of the Operator.
Operator Strategy
Table 4.11 identifies four offerings of Supplier’s IN equipment that may be possible and 
four considerations that may feature in an Operator’s strategy.
Company
strategy
Supplier
Equipment
Standardised
Services Best Services
Purchasing of
Interconnect
Adheres to 
Standards Yes No Yes Easier
Standard &  
Proprietary 
Elements
In Part No Weak Medium
Standard, 
Proprietary & 
Bespoke Elements
In Part Yes Very Weak Medium
Principally Bespoke 
Elements No Yes None Difficult
Table 4.11 Operational Strategy
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Considering the Supplier Equipment categories first, the ‘Adheres to Standards’ category 
includes those IN offerings that fully adhere to international IN standards with no superset 
of functionality. It is probably theoretically the least expensive of the four and is ideal for a 
company adopting a market-follower approach, where the basic features of a competitor’s 
popular service is replicated and undercut on price. Services offered on such a platform can 
be easily replicated, since they are constructed from capabilities which wholly conform to 
standards.
The ‘Standard and Proprietary Elements’ category, conforms to international IN standards, 
but is supplemented by the Suppliers own proprietary elements. Again, it is ideally suited 
to a market-follower strategy, since any Operator with the same Supplier’s equipment can 
replicate the services. The Operator however, risks being tied to a single Supplier’s 
product, since it will become increasingly difficult to replicate services that use the 
proprietary elements, should the Operator want to move to using another Supplier’s 
equipment.
The ‘Standard, Proprietary and Bespoke Elements’ offering, requires Operator use of an 
Application Programming Interface (API) allowing them to develop their own 
applications. This is ideally suited to a market leader strategy where the company wants to 
stimulate and capture initial market share. It is expensive and thus better suited to overlay 
networks, but with the drawback that the Operator is tied to one supplier. This is an area 
fraught with difficulty, since the Operator has to define the areas, level and scope of the 
API that is required in order to maintain future flexibility and service operation 
transparency with their other switches.
The ‘Principally Bespoke Elements’ offering is one that is heavily proprietary in nature, 
aiming not only to allow the development of services not easily replicated by competitors, 
but within a competitive environment, reduces the options for competitors to offer a 
seamless service across the two networks. Needless to say, adopting such a technical 
strategy is expensive owing to the bespoke development required. Currently (2002), the 
EU will not permit this, since regulation compels Operators to implement standardised 
equipment with a well-defined interface and operation. Even without the EU limitations. 
Suppliers would not now consider developing and maintaining bespoke developments for 
one Operator, although this was certainly possible up to about 1990.
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Looking at the second dimension of Table 4.11, the Operator’s strategy could be to offer 
only services developed from standardised capabilities or to be a market leader offering the 
‘Best Services’. They could additionally consider ‘Purchasing Power’ a priority with the 
ability to mix and match suppliers’ equipment. Finally, they might consider interconnect. If
36they are a carrier or a new Operator, they would perhaps consider ‘Ease of Interconnect’ 
a priority. Conversely if they are an established (legacy) monopoly Operator, they may 
wish to make interconnect at anything other than (the Cl)  transport level, difficult.
The pressure to conform to standards has, in practice, forced Suppliers to restrict their 
offerings to those based upon a standardised implementation. However, an element of 
proprietary functions remains essential to ensure that their product remains more attractive 
against the competition. Bespoke elements, if requested by an Operator and developed by 
the Supplier, are normally integrated into the Supplier’s existing proprietary elements and 
hence made available to other customers (Shepherd 1993). Operators need these 
proprietary elements to give their products some degree of ‘value added’ - which their 
competitors cannot easily replicate (unless they use the same Supplier). This was 
recognised by Pekka Peltola, president of Teligent, ‘It is not possible to invent something 
truly new...The INAP protocols are typically associated with pre-defined services’ (Shelly 
1996 p21) and has resulted in some Operators (e.g. BT) developing their own standards- 
based SCP.
The point at which a Supplier’s product is optimised for both standardisation and service 
differentiation is when the non-standard, proprietary elements employed are standardised 
in later versions of the relevant international standard by the standardisation body. The 
Supplier benefits since they have no retrospective engineering to do, as the product will 
now have no non-standard elements (Aiken 1997) and the Operator is happy because he 
has a future proofed (to friture standards) system from the outset. Clearly this vision is 
unrealistic. No one can predict the future with such clarity and accuracy, but it does 
explain why Suppliers and Operators lobby so hard in the standards forum for architectures 
and ways of working that map to their existing products rather than those produced by 
other Suppliers (interview Anderson 1999).
‘Ease o f Interconnect’ in this case being high in the in architecture hierarchy.
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Telecommunications Operators therefore face the dilemma of do they wait for 
standardisation before implementing services, or do they supplement the standard elements 
with proprietary ones to create a service. The former strategy will lose them market share, 
whilst the latter ties them to one Supplier and they risk the standardisation of these 
elements being implemented differently to their own in the future.
The Constraints Associated with an Intelligent Network
Rarely in discussions of the benefits of an IN architecture, is mention made of the 
constraints and limitations associated with the use of an Intelligent Network. This section 
therefore draws together observations gathered during the research concerning the 
deficiencies of Intelligent Networks as a topic of consideration by an Operator 
contemplating implementing an IN. It discusses the misconceptions associated with the 
cost of deployment of the initial network and of subsequent services, the problem of IN 
services being used to replace existing services and the ease with which IN services can be 
offered seamlessly across other Operators’ networks.
i. Cost of Deployment
Putting the services and information in one location, the SCP, is less expensive than 
putting it in a large number of exchanges as was traditionally the case. However some 
services still require exchange development such as the need to upgrade the Call Model. 
Thus the overall saving of using an IN, compared to a traditional distributed processing 
architecture, is significantly less than originally envisaged.
‘...if we could have performed our service offering without investing in IN, we 
would have done so...It is a very expensive way of delivering solutions for what are 
relatively small markets.’ (Hudson 1996)
Similarly, although the IN architecture may be standardised, the management system used 
for its control is proprietary. Thus if an Operator doesn’t want to develop its own 
management system and it is purchasing the SCP and SSP from different Suppliers, then it 
will also have to purchase each Suppliers’ management system. This results in greater 
purchasing and operational costs. The issue of being unable to integrate management 
systems has been recently addressed with the specification and application of Telephone 
Management Network (TMN) Q3 standards. If adopted by Suppliers, these standards will
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aid the ability to manage different Suppliers’ equipment from a common management 
system (interview Stretch 2002).
ii. Ability to Introduce New Services
An argument promoted in the early days of Intelligent Networks is that customers 
‘. . .demand customised services that suit their specific situation’ (Pandurangan 1993 p i28) 
and that they could ‘be offered what amounts to a constructor’s kit option to build their 
own services’ (Achar 1998), creating services from Service Independent building Blocks^^ 
(SIBs) in the management environment and downloading them to the SCP. This would 
have allowed products to be brought quickly to market, with the idea that quick to market 
means capturing the initial market share.
Experience has shown that the flexibility originally promoted did not materialise and that 
what little flexibility did exist, was limited by the Service Independent Building Blocks^^ 
(SIBs) available (Shepherd 1997b,c). Operators often found that the available SIBs did not 
permit the realisation of a newly envisaged product (Collet et al. 1992). The SIBs were 
decided upon by the Supplier based upon a number of considerations. These included their 
marketability; a Supplier not being willing to develop a SIB for which they could not make 
a profit; and switch limitations; a SIB not being able to be built for a function a switch is 
unable to perform. Time was therefore taken basing with the Supplier in the production of 
new SIBs and upgrading the network (Jefferies 1993, Swale 1997), increasing the overall 
time to market. The standards bodies also had an indirect influence in what SIBs were 
produced, by standardising basic services capabilities. This compelled the Suppliers to 
provide them in order to demonstrate their products were standardised and as has been 
indicated by Herian (interview 1996), these were not necessarily appropriate to the market 
needs. The restriction imposed by the limitation of SIBs encouraged ‘edge of the network’ 
services (such as CTI), which were not directly dependent upon network control.
SIBs are typically groups o f network actions bundled together. Examples o f SIBs are to ‘collect dialled 
digits’ or ‘connect to announcement’. SIBs are represented graphically on the screen o f  a Service Creation 
Environment. By stringing a series o f SIBs together on the screen an service is created which can then be 
downloaded to the SCP.
Services are developed and customised up by linking numbers o f Service Independent Building Blocks 
(SIBS) together. Each o f these performs a number o f different switch actions, such as ‘connect customer to 
dial tone’, ‘capture dialled number and interrogate database’, ‘route call’ etc. Together these constitute a 
service and by using different SIBs, customers can have services developed to better match their needs.
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iii. Network Exhaustion
Even the best-designed networks eventually reach a point of saturation, when it is not 
possible to add ‘more of the same’ to overcome a problem. This is typically due to a 
physical constraint such as designed capacity, or a consequential constraint such as 
processing speed, or obsolescence. The impact is that an affected IN is constrained in its 
development, preventing for instance, an overlay network from developing into a network 
based IN.
Such problems rarely result just from customer growth, but more generally as a result of 
adding new features and capabilities in order to offer new products to existing customers 
(interview Hall 2000). This creates a ‘Processing Cycle’ (Figure 4.24).
Increasing demand
Limiting capacity
New Network
Services   Upgrade
Enabiing capacity
New features
Figure 4.24 The ‘Processing Cycle’
New features necessitate new equipment and hence network upgrades. The new features 
are used to create new services, which aim to stimulate the market and become profitable. 
Success brings the need to increase network capacity. The subsequent network upgrades 
include new network resources, hence further new network features and so the cycle 
continues until the equipment/architecture limitations are reached (Figure 4.24).
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Consideration of the factors affecting design, such as consciously employing an 
architecture directly linked with an Operator’s strategic needs, will delay the network 
exhaustion point.
iv. Maintaining the Appearance of Services
When an Operator introduces an IN, they may wish to replace existing services and 
perhaps employ some of the basic range of services supplied with the product. The 
challenge they face is how best to match these services with their retained offerings whilst 
maintaining a consistent Took & feel’ of the set of products from a customer’s perspective. 
This difficulty is magnified where a service is classified as a ‘universal service’ obligation, 
owing to EU regulations limiting the extent of the changes possible.
V. Offering Services across Networks
The interworking of non-standard services between Operators could be a problem, 
especially if they use different Suppliers’ equipment, since each Supplier will implement a 
particular service in a slightly different way. Market forces will see Suppliers offering 
proprietary interfaces (Jordon 1993) and ‘Network (Operators) and service providers will 
continue to offer services using proprietary protocols ahead of standards’ (Pandurangan 
1993 pl30). Thus the ability to retain a common look and feel to a product (from a 
customer’s perspective) across networks is reduced.
vi. Speed of Response
A disadvantage of INs is the speed at which the SCP is able to respond to a switch query as 
a result of increasing demand on the SCPs processing capability. This should obviously not 
be a problem when the network is commissioned, but upgrades and new services that 
demand more SCP processing, affect the speed of response. An example of this are the IN 
CS2 interfaces that allow external database queries and SCP-SCP interaction. Overloading 
an SCP will affect the operation of the whole IN, whereas overloading a traditional 
network would produce localised processing problems.
Summary of Considerations
This section has addressed a number of the factors that influence the choice of an 
Intelligent Network architecture. It has also identified a range of questions which should be 
addressed in selecting and implementing an Intelligent Network architecture. These not
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only help ensure that an appropriate IN architecture is chosen, but also create an awareness 
of the practicalities of implementing and operating such a network. The questions can be 
summarised as follows:
• Strategy - how does the architecture match the operating company’s business 
strategy of where they want to be in the future?
• Geography - is the network of a cost-effective size, or is an excessive amount 
spent on hierarchical infrastructure compared with revenue generation?
• Size - is the network sufficiently large, or geographically dispersed, such that 
centralised processing or a single SCP could cause speed of response or 
reliability problems?
• Processing - does the architecture have a mechanism for handling SCP 
overloads?
• Response Time- is the size of the network so large that bandwidth or query 
response delay is significant?
• Migration - how would migration from an existing architecture to the new one 
be effected? What is the impact on the services offered and SCP applications 
and SCP (data); will it need replicating elsewhere? Can currently offered 
services and billing capabilities be replicated, matching their look and feel 
exactly? Can the same product name continue to be used? (Some product names 
are supplier copyright, allowing use of their names when the services are 
offered on their equipment.)
• Interworking - how conducive is the architecture to interfacing with other 
networks and offering a seamless service between them?
• Scalability - what are the limitations of the chosen design; to what extent can it 
grow and evolve; how scaleable is it?
• Upgrades - can upgrades be implemented in an acceptable time, without service 
interruption and an acceptable recovery time should something fail when the 
upgrade is taking place?
• Future - what possible interconnect regulations might affect the network in the 
future? Where will the ‘intelligence’ (applications and data) be located?
Options here include in the Operator’s network, in the network of other 
Operators or Service Providers, or on the customer’s premises (e.g. CTI, but 
perhaps also in the home of the residential customer). What interfaces would be
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used for this? Options here include the IN standard SCP-SCP interface, the CTI 
de facto or propriety standard, or some other.
Architecture - which architecture is most appropriate for the mix of traffic 
envisaged by the Operator?
Traffic Type I POTS Televoting Internet Calling Card FreephoneArchitecture
Traditional (distributed)
Standard N
Televoting
Adjunct (service node)
Distributed processing
Distributed SCPs
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Centralised and distributed 
SCPs
Key:
I = Average
Table 4.12 Architecture Comparisons for Different Traffic Types (Shepherd 1997c)
Table 4.12 rates the ability of the different architectures discussed in this chapter, to handle 
particular types of traffic. The traditional distributed architecture is less suited to a calling 
card service and Freephone. These are services where customer data is continually 
changing, with a customer’s credit limit decrementing for card services and Freephone 
Service Providers frequently altering their service routeing.
The standardised ITU-T IN architecture is not so good at Televoting, where the large 
number of calls can swamp the SCP
The other architectures developed for the purposes of this research vary in their efficiency 
in handling different types of traffic. The Televoting architecture is really an addition to 
whatever architecture it is applied, thus its appropriateness to other traffic types is marked 
as Not Applicable (N/A) in the table.
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As can be seen in the example of a Telecommunication Operator’s network in the next 
section, architectures can be mixed as the needs dictate.
A Typical Operator’s Architecture
The previous section has identified a range of different architectures and factors 
influencing the design of an Operator’s Intelligent Network. It is therefore interesting to 
observe the network of a large Operator, to determine how varying influences, demands 
and constraints have evolved their network.
Services & Information Services & information Services & Infbrmaticn
SCP SCPSCP
Services
Call Control
SSP Services
Call Control
Switch
SSFServices
Call Control
Switch
SSF
Local Exchange Transit Exchange A Transit Exchange B
Figure 4.25 An Operator’s Network Architecture (2000)
Figure 4.25 shows the structure of an Operator’s voice telecommunications network in 
2000^ .^ The Local Exchanges and Transit A Exchanges form the core network (carrying all 
types of traffic), while Transit B exchanges form an overlay, only carrying traffic requiring 
specialist SCP services.
It can be seen that all of the exchanges have some level of embedded services, but in 
addition there are three Intelligent Networks offering a variety of services, accessed from 
the different exchanges in the local/transit network hierarchy. These comprise a proprietary 
IN, a commercial standardised IN and an IN developed to BT’s specific requirements, but
Personal observations whilst working as a consultant.
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also adhering to standards. Thus maximum use is made of local legacy exchanges by 
continuing to use their inherent capability to offer basic services without recourse to the 
IN, but upgrading them to SSPs to enable access to SCP services. The exchange hierarchy, 
is used as a tool to reconcile the customer usage of a particular type of service with the IN 
location of the service and hence offer an optimum implementation of that service.
4.8 Summary
This chapter has provided an overview of the history of Intelligent Networks from the 
concept developed by Bellcore through the standardisation by ANSI, ETSI and the ITU-T.
It has argued that ‘intelligence’ in the network is not new and drew a parallel with the 
services originally provided by a human switchboard operator and those typically provided 
by an Intelligent Network.
The components of an Intelligent Network have been introduced, including the key IN 
functions of SSF, SCF and SDF, together with their typical implementation by the physical 
elements SSP (i.e. SSF) and SCP (i.e. SCF & SDF).
The research has found that Intelligent Network technology has a large established base, 
but almost all of it operates to the first ITU-T standards release of CSl or its derivatives. It 
is unclear whether conformity to later standards has been avoided due to the 
inappropriateness of the detailed regional variants of these standards (as this chapter has 
proposed), or whether the evolution of newer technologies, such as IP, has caused 
Operators to refocus away from IN’s. It is likely that the only potential for developments of 
Operator’s INs are those necessary to meet local needs. There is therefore unlikely to be 
further major developments to IN standards in the future.
A comparison has been drawn between a traditional distributed (non-IN) architecture, 
where the services and associated information are held at multiple exchanges and an IN 
architecture which has the services and information held in a single location. This showed 
that INs facilitate rapid updates to services and information, encouraging a range of new 
services where quick changes to the data are needed. Examples were constructed for an 
international Freephone service using existing standardised capability, indicating how
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Operators could gain increasing operational benefits by interconnecting at progressively 
higher levels in an Intelligent Network’s architectural hierarchy.
Further examples developed for this research showed how Intelligent Network 
functionality could be moved to the periphery of telephony networks. One example 
demonstrated how an SCP could be used to replicate and add value to CTI applications, 
removing the need for localised intelligence at the customer’s premises. A second example, 
indicating potential linkages between INs and the Internet, presented a method of using an 
IN to connect a customer by telephone to a Customer Service Centre, by means of a 
hyperlink on a web page.
Finally, the chapter developed a framework for assessing the value of implementing an 
Intelligent Network. The research has established that Operators have progressively 
implemented INs in a series of distinct stages, depending upon the maturity of the 
technology and the role the Operator wants an IN to perform in their telephony network.
A number of IN architecture models were original and specifically developed for this 
research and analysed to assess their appropriateness for helping to achieve an Operator’s 
telecommunications product strategy and their ability to carry different traffic types. Their 
characteristics are summarised in Table 4.13.
Fast
Response
High Processing 
Available
Ease of modifying 
Services/Information
Traditional Good Good Poor
Standardised (ITU-T) IN Average Average Good
Televoting Good Good Average
Local Caching Good Good Average
Adjunct (Service Node) Average Good Good
Distributed Processing Average Good Good
Centralised & Distributed SCPs Good Good Good
Distributed SCPs Average Good Average
Table 4.13 Summary of Different Intelligent Network Architecture’s Benefits
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The optimum choice of architecture for an Operator’s IN implementation depends upon a 
very large number of variables identified by the framework, which will differ fi*om 
Operator to Operator. It has been shown that an Operator’s network may comprise a 
number of INs at different stages of their life cycle, needed to achieve the company’s 
required product strategy. Thus there is no one ideal architecture for all Operators. This 
leads to two considerations:
1. The standardised IN architecture model is unlikely to be appropriate for all 
Operators, thus the ITU-T (and related) IN standards developed to this 
architecture may similarly be inappropriate and sub-optimal for alternative IN 
architecture models.
2. The application of regulations that force Operators to:
a) adopt an inappropriate IN architecture model;
b) open IN interfaces to allow access by other Operators, could be ineffective 
if the Operator has adopted an inappropriate IN architecture model.
The appropriateness of Intelligent Network architectures and opening IN interfaces to 
interconnect by other Operators, therefore framed the basis of Survey 1 of this research.
This chapter has also addressed two of the research questions arising from the hypothesis 
put forward in Chapter 1. It has shown that there are alternative IN architecture models 
which have sufficient, but differing benefits, that Operators may have been encouraged to 
adopt one of these in preference to the standardised ITU-T IN architecture model.
Applying standardised interfaces to one of these alternative architectures may not 
encourage optimum performance of the architecture and indeed may have proved 
impossible. As has been shown from the alternative architectures discussed. Suppliers did 
not move away much from the ITU-T IN architecture. Thus developing standards to one 
particular architecture tended to limit the potential benefits to be achieved by other IN 
architectures. Therefore in partial answer to the Chapter 1 (section 1.2) hypothesis question 
‘Does regulation or detailed standardisation constrain technical innovation, service 
delivery, or both?’
in the context of INs, the chapter suggests that detailed standardisation can indeed 
constrain technical innovation and service delivery.
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It has been shown that the introduction of INs has made it possible to offer services which 
were previously uneconomic, with some arguing that the technology created a new market. 
For instance, it can be argued that INs have introduced a flexibility which allowed the 
breaking of the paradigm of the caller always being charged for a call. The analysis of IN 
architectures has shown that some architectures are better at offering specific services than 
others. In addressing the Chapter 1 (Section 1.2) question
‘Are INs a service in themselves or simply a means to deliver services?’
this chapter has shown that INs are not a service but a means to deliver a service.
Chapter 2 identified that there are two key strands to this research; that associated with the 
technical aspects of IN technology and that associated with the standardisation and 
regulatory processes associated with IN technology. This chapter has addressed the 
technical aspect; the next chapter addresses the standardisation and regulatory processes. It 
will also consider the research questions:
• ‘How can it be ensured that robust technical and architectural models exist 
before standards are ratified?’ and
• ‘Does regulation or detailed standardisation constrain technical innovation, 
service delivery, or both?’
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5 The Evolution of Regulation and Standardisation 
Policies in Regulation
5.1 Introduction
The literature review, Chapter 2, established the two key strands to this research into INs; 
that associated with the technological aspects and that related to the regulatory and 
standardisation processes. The key technological issues have been addressed in Chapter 4, 
so the focus of this chapter turns to regulation and standardisation. The scene is set by 
reviewing some of the widely perceived conflicts arising from the liberalisation of the 
telecommunications sector, particularly that in the European Union (EU).
The regulatory sections provide a brief history of the regulation of UK telephony services, 
followed by an examination of the current regulatory mechanisms developed within the 
UK and subsequently within the EU. Where appropriate, comparisons are drawn with 
alternative structures, such as that of federal regulation within the USA.
The standardisation section examines the use of standardisation as a tool for supporting the 
implementation and application of regulation. A standardisation model for the EU is 
developed and discussed, based around the European Technical Standards Institute (ETSI), 
indicating how the regulatory needs for standards are realised.
Taken together, these sections contribute to the development of answers to two of the 
questions posed in Chapter 1 :
• ‘How can it be ensured that robust technical and architectural models exist before 
standards are ratified?’ and
• ‘Does regulation or detailed standardisation constrain technical innovation, service 
delivery, or both?’
In order to provide a backdrop to the regulatory and standardisation discussion, the next 
section identifies some of the key tensions arising from the liberalisation of the EU 
Telecommunications Services market.
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5.2 Industry Tensions
The 1998 European Telecommunications Open Market directive^ was the primary driver 
for the majority of the EU Member State liberalisation programmes and came at a time 
when most countries still had state-owned monopoly telecommunications Operators. The 
liberalisation of this sector can be traced back to studies undertaken by the EU in the 
1980s, which suggested that to develop and prosper economically, the EU needed a cost 
effective, well established, telecommunications infrastructure, supporting both internal and 
external services. To achieve this, Europe had to ensure it was part of the developing 
global telecommunications scene (Ungerer 1990). This forced the EU to consider the 
impact of a regulated telephony environment, both to achieve its aim of systematically 
removing the trade barriers between Member States, and to aid the economic growth of the 
EU with respect to the rest of the world. Further justification for change came in the form 
of the Uruguay Round of the World Trade Organisation talks (General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) at the time), that added telecommunication services to the 
agenda (PNE 1997a). The strength of evidence and global pressures pushed the EU to the 
conclusion that liberalisation was the way to proceed.
The state of play by 1980 was that each EU Member State had a basic, geographically 
diverse, telephony service, albeit nationally fragmented and employing a basic level of 
inter-working. Operators had often collaborated with in-country Suppliers; thereby gaining 
complete control over equipment specifications and proprietary standards and 
technologies, and making international interconnection complex .
The EU Commission recognised that a pan-European network required Operators to 
employ common standards. A review of the European standardisation organisations 
resulted in the creation of the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI). 
As standards were ratified. Member States undertook to implement them so as to ensure a 
universal service and commonality of services across Europe. The net effect of these pan- 
European standards was a break-up of the close Supplier/Operator relationships. Network
 ^The directive liberalised all Member State telecommunications services (including Voice Telephony), 
opening network infrastructure to competition.
 ^Hawkins (interview 1997) termed this traditional relationship a hierarchical type o f architecture. Each 
element in the architecture was tied to the commercial interests o f that particular Supplier and that the whole 
structure worked to sustain itself; the equipment Suppliers would do well i f  the network Operators did well 
and the close relationship effectively minimised competition and enhanced profits.
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elements could be purchased from different Suppliers, and in the case of Intelligent 
Networks, a Service Control Point (SCP) could be purchased from either a traditional 
telecommunications equipment Supplier, or a computer manufacturer. Suppliers could no 
longer rely upon an Operator for a sustained level of business. Thus consciously, or sub­
consciously, Operators developed a more flexible strategy that could cultivate or drop 
relationships as required.
Globally, other pressures were similarly forcing a path towards greater standardisation. In 
North America, telecommunications equipment Suppliers were faced with an increasingly 
competitive market and looked to growth opportunities in the rest of the world. To exploit 
this market their equipment had to work to standards that were more generic and less 
focused on the North American market. As a consequence, exchange Suppliers became 
another driver for global standardisation.
The target date set for liberalisation proved challenging for many EU Member States.
Some members were unwilling to pass the necessary legislation, whilst others required 
changes to a constitution that enshrined the rights and obligations of the monopoly service 
provider^. As a consequence, some state-owned Operators had little more than 2 years in 
which to prepare for the commercial environment. Their operating paradigm, developed 
over many years, was no longer appropriate and new relationships had to evolve. 
Liberalisation and competition meant reducing costs, often through the deployment of new 
technologies and staff redundancies. This frequently induced Trade Union action that 
further slowed implementation.
A consequence of liberalisation was a proliferation of joint ventures between the Operators 
of the EU Member States (e.g. Telenordia, Vebacom). The benefit of these joint ventures 
to Operators was the reduction of competition in their home markets and a stronger 
position from which to seek a presence in new markets.
 ^The French and German constitutions guaranteed the provision o f telecommunication services, hence 
constitutional amendments were required prior to the privatisation o f France Telecom and Deutsche Telecom  
(Reuters 1996, interview Hawkins 1997).
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The development of the UK cable-TV market, from primarily US investors, showed that 
predation could also come from outside the EU. A number of the joint ventures therefore, 
were with US companies (e.g. Concert, Global One, Unisource) (Cl 1996a).
The EU Commission used its power of approval of the joint ventures as a tool to promote 
liberalisation. For example, approvals involving the German and Spanish monopoly 
Operators were withheld until such time as their home markets were liberalised, which 
effectively meant liberalising well in advance of the 1998 deadline (Telecommunications 
1996). This resulted in the unusual situation of Operators bringing pressure upon their own 
governments to force the pace of change (Porter 1995).
In establishing the liberalisation programme, the EU provided Member States with few 
ground rules and what was provided typically identified desired outcomes, not an approved 
course of action. It was left to the individual Member States to implement the liberalisation 
process in the way they thought best, which Le Goueff (1998) felt left ‘. ..plenty of scope 
for abuse’. Consequently, different Member States imposed different conditions within the 
awarding and operation of Operator licences. In the Netherlands for instance. Operators did 
not require a licence. Some countries continued to favour their legacy national Operator, 
by imposing onerous licensing conditions and fees on the new Operators (PNE 1996f, 
Sandler 1996). Other countries positively discriminated against the legacy national 
Operator, for example by banning them from offering new services (EIU 1995). The 
mismatch of conditions by Member States gave some Operators an advantage in both their 
home market and the markets of other countries.
For an Operator building a pan-European network, the cumulative bureaucracy and varying 
licence conditions acted as a barrier to competition (PNE 1998b). The result of this has 
been new EU legislation, to be implemented by Member States by the second half o f2003 
(discussed later), that will provide consistence guidance to Member State Regulators.
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5.3 What is Regulation ?
Dictionaries generally interpret regulation as being a means to control or direct via rules or 
restrictions. The literature review in Chapter 2 has already reviewed some elements of the 
telecommunications regulatory environment including:
• the UK regulatory Framework;
• the role of licensing; and
• the evolving position of the EU Commission as a pan-European overseer.
These areas are developed further in this chapter, but for the present the focus is upon the 
role and implementation of regulation.
Whilst the UK telecommunication industry was nationalised (effectively 1913 -  1984), 
regulation comprised rules that were designed primarily to achieve the aims of the 
provision of a universal service and guaranteed communications for national security. 
There were also restrictions in the form of a budgetary allowance from the treasury and an 
indication that it should (in the main) be spent with UK industries. From the government’s 
perspective this achieved the aims of building the UK telecommunications infrastructure, 
making the country self-sufficient in the supply of telecommunications equipment, and 
promoted investment in the UK economy.
As time progressed the defence needs of a telecommunications system was perceived to 
have reduced and that (of a national) universal service sufficiently achieved to be replaced 
by the perceived economic benefits of an extensive modem network. It was decided this 
could best be achieved by investment from the private sector and the introduction of 
competition, leading to a need to privatise (Baumol 1995). In the current 
telecommunications environment, the mles and restrictions are therefore the result of 
legislation.
Such legislation could have been enacted in one of two ways. The first option would make 
use of a regulator, who applies regulation within the guidelines laid down within the 
legislation. The second option would be for the legislation to directly identify the 
framework and boundaries, within which a particular Telecommunications Operator could 
function.
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Hawkins (interview 1997) favours the first model for the telecommunications service 
sector. This is the one that has been adopted by the UK and by other EU Member States. In 
the UK the legislation was enacted by the 1984 Telecommunications Act. This Act 
provided a general set of guidelines and established a regulator, the Office of 
Telecommunications (OFTEL). Its Director was delegated suitable powers and allowed a 
degree of latitude in which to regulate the Industry according to the Act’s guidelines.
These powers included the right to allocate licences and the ability to impose specific 
conditions upon each licence holder.
With the 1984 legislation, regulation moved from being implicit in the actions of 
government, to being explicit in the multiplicity of actions of the country’s regulator; the 
focus ‘...shifting from administrative and operational matters to commercial practices and 
market structures’ (Reuters 1997).
The second legislative model is one in which legislation attempts to regulate directly. This 
would typically be achieved by incorporating the framework and boundaries within which 
a particular Operator etc. could operate, in law. However, such a model lacks flexibility. 
Whereas a regulator is able to adapt to changing circumstances, whilst still adhering to 
legislative guidelines, changes to a framework laid down in law would need to be argued 
directly within the legislative body (in the UK, the House of Commons Select Committee 
for Telecommunications). This would result in an interminable process for even minor 
amendments. It was this situation that arose in Germany, delaying their liberalisation 
process; their communication system being enshrined in the constitution, required a 
constitutional amendment to privatise Deutsche Telecom (interview Hawkins 1997,
Reuters 1996)).
This shows that effective regulation requires a broad legislative framework. The precise 
nature of regulation should not be enshrined within the legislation, since legislation cannot 
effectively regulate an evolving environment. The 1984 Telecommunications Act was 
therefore not a set of detailed regulations but a framework on which to base regulation 
(interview Hawkins1997).
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The UK 1991 White paper on Telecommunications (DTI 1991) recognised that for 
competition to be successful in a deregulated environment" ,^ standardisation was required to 
achieve interconnection and hence any-to-any services. OFTEL therefore took on the role 
of creating, developing and latterly facilitating, the Network Interfaces Consultative 
Committee (NICC), the body that evolves UK telecommunications standards. By 
sponsoring the creation of these standards and compelling their use via generic licensing 
conditions^, OFTEL was additionally regulating the behaviour of Operators via 
standardisation.
This need for standardisation to achieve interconnection has been recognised for many 
years. In the very early years (1900s) the standards used in telecommunications systems 
were proprietary, needing a bespoke interface for each interconnection between different 
Supplier’s equipment. As time progressed (1930s in the UK), Operators saw benefits in 
purchasing equipment utilising their own standards, thereby removing the Supplier’s 
proprietary interfaces and facilitating inter-working. Controlling the standards also allowed 
Operators to introduce competition amongst Suppliers. Some of these Operator standards 
(e.g. Digital Access Signalling System) became de-facto standards and were eventually 
adopted by standardisation organisations, such as the ITU-T.
The ITU-T was created to provide a worldwide reference for telecommunications 
standards and these were necessarily high level and lacked minutiae, in order to be 
adaptable by the different regions of the world; with such regional implementations being 
heavily influenced by their legacy systems. Hence when the US moved to Common 
Channel Signalling and 64k circuits to improve international inter-working, they continued 
to use their 24-channel PCM technology, rather than the more globally used standardised 
30-channel systems. Such régionalisation is decreasing, as Suppliers find it increasingly 
inefficient to develop regional variants within a global market.
Hawkins (1995a) pointed-out that as the telecommunications sector was liberalised and competition 
allowed, the use o f the term ‘de-regulation’ to describe the process was inaccurate. De-regulation, he said 
implied ‘that the role o f regulation is diminishing and that the quantity o f regulations is lessening - 
implications that are contrary to fact in most instances’.
 ^An Operator’s licence requires them to utilise standardised interfaces (where possible). For example, 
although a UK Operator is not compelled to use C7 ISUP, if  they do so, they have to use the NICC 
developed, OFTEL approved standard, termed ‘UK ISUP’. This is the UK variant o f ‘ETSI ISUP’ which is in 
turn the European variant o f th e ‘ITU-T ISUP’.
: 1 8 8
5 The Evolution o f Regulation and Standardisation Policies in Regulation
5.4 The History of Telecommunications Regulatory Development
The UK has a long history of telecommunications regulation and licensing policy and as 
one of the first Member States to undertake deregulation it has proved influential in the 
transformation of the EU telecommunications sector (Beesley et al. 1995, Ungerer 1990, 
interview Hawkins 1997). Understanding how current UK regulation policy is applied 
(through OFTEL and the DTI) provides invaluable insights into EU regulation and the 
formulation of global policies under the WTO.
The question Ts legislative regulation the appropriate means to shape a technology in rapid 
change?’, posed in Chapter 1, is addressed with respect to the UK and EU 
telecommunications regulation. Examples of other regulatory regimes are introduced as 
appropriate.
Telegraphy in the UK
The regulation of Telegraphy in the UK is summarised in Figure 5.1.
Licensing
No Licensing
1869
1870
1837
Nationalisation Independent
Figure 5.1 The Regulation of Telegraphy in the UK
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The first commercial telecommunication services in the UK evolved fi*om about 1837, with 
the start of short distance (60 km) telegraphy services (BT 1993a). As technologies 
developed, increasing both the distance and speed, signals could be carried, so the number 
of telegraphy companies grew. By 1870 there were a number of regional companies 
offering telegraphy services, most utilising different proprietary standardised equipment.
In 1868 the Postmaster-General gained responsibility for administrating the telegraph 
networks in the UK. He initially nationalised a number of telegraph companies to form a 
UK nation-wide network and licensed the remainder. This state was short lived as full 
nationalisation followed in 1870 (Telegraph Act 1868, Telegraph Act 1869).
Nationalisation^ allowed migration toward a common telegraphy equipment standard, 
gaining economies of scale. It also brought a potentially strong national tool of governance 
under governmental control (BT 2002a).
The telegraphy service was never denationalised, closing instead in 1962 (BT 1993a). 
Telephony in the UK
By 1880 the first telephony operating companies (Operators) had appeared. Their service 
was deemed to be telegraphic apparatus under the 1869 act and subject to a licence fi*om 
the Postmaster-General. (The common association between telegraphy and telephony 
continued until the 1951 Telephony Act.) The Postmaster-General licences were valid for a 
period of 31 years, restricted an Operator’s area of operation (and hence development), and 
placed a levy on the income (i.e. licence fee) from the company’s operation. The decision 
that Operators should be regulated by the 1869 act also meant that conditions of 
nationalisation within that act were applicable. This allowed the government the option to 
nationalise Operators after a set number of years, reducing the Operator’s incentive to 
invest and expand.
In 1882 the Postmaster-General (Henry Fawcett) decided that an area monopoly^ in the 
supply of telephone telecommunications was not in the public interest and adopted a policy
 ^The Post Office was a government department, thus bringing the telegraphy service under Post Office 
control was not strictly nationalisation. However, Nationalisation is used in this thesis to denote a monopoly 
under government control.
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of granting licences to all ‘responsible subjects’ applying for them. This competitive stance 
continued until 1884, when to encourage more of a universal service^, national licences 
were granted, allowing Operators to combine their local telephony networks to create 
national networks.
This position continued until 1892 when the Postmaster-General nationalised the largest 
Operator’s (National Telephone’s) trunk network and allocated new licences to the 
remaining Operators, restricting their operation once again to local geographical areas (as 
per the 1892 Telegraph Act). The justification for this change in strategy was the poor 
quality of service experienced by customers and the unsightly proliferation of overhead 
wires (BT 1993b). It is difficult to see how removing the trunk network from private 
control significantly reduced the number of overhead wires. A photograph from about 
1900 (Figure 5.2) shows that overhead wires continued to be an issue after trunk 
nationalisation. A more appropriate reason might have been the competition and loss of 
revenue they caused the Post Office’s own network, which was by then derived 
predominantly fi’om telephony (rather than telegraphy).
 ^Area monopolies were formed by Operators being licensed to operate in a particular area with no 
competition.
* ‘Universal service’ in this context, was the provision o f telecommunication services at a reasonable price, to 
all (including rural) communities within the British Isles. Providing service in rural communities was not 
favoured by telephone companies owing to the low number o f users, the need for long line lengths causing a 
high cost o f provision and a higher than average fault rate. Such installations therefore generated a low profit.
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4.
© British Telecommunications pic
Figure 5.2 Overhead Telephony Wires, Holborn Exchange, London, about 1900
Along with nationalisation of the trunk network came interconnection agreements allowing 
local telephone Operators to use the Post Office Trunk Network. This was essential to 
provide a Universal (any-to-any) Service.
Further operating licences were granted to local authorities in 1899, allowing them to 
develop and operate local telephone systems, to encourage competition with the National 
Telephone Company (Telegraph Act 1899). Of these local authority systems, that set up by 
Kingston upon Hull still exists today as the telecommunications Operator ‘Kingston 
Communications’.
In 1901 further interconnection^ agreements allowed the Post Office and the National 
Telephone Company to share line plant (cables) in London and achieve local 
interconnection (other than via a trunk network). In 1912 (upon expiry of the original
Interconnection is the action of connecting the networks o f two Operators in order to allow the customers of  
each to contact each other.
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licences and to a 1905 agreement) the Postmaster-General nationalised the National 
Telephone Company and (by 1913) additionally took over the control of almost all the 
local authority networks
The impact of licensing and nationalisation upon the number of UK telecommunications 
Operators is illustrated in Figure 5.3
1878 1881 1884 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1899 1911 1912 1913 1923
Date
* figure based on statements relating to mergers, acquisitions etc.
Figure 5.3 Impact of Regulation upon the number UK Telecommunication 
Companies
In 1929 the British government created ‘Cable and Wireless’ to operate all overseas 
telecommunications. This was prompted by the strategic consideration to keep all overseas 
cable service interests within British control. Cable and Wireless therefore took control of 
the private-sector cable services and the Post Office’s overseas cable and wireless
It is not clear why nationalisation was justified, but it is likely that arguments used for the justification of  
earlier licensing actions, (i.e. offering a universal service, defence of the realm and governing purposes) still 
held.
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service^ \  The unusual governmental backing of this company allowed it to gain 
international maritime rights unequalled by other international companies and still enjoyed 
today (interview Hawkins 1997).
The 1969 Post Office Act (promoted by the Postmaster-General, Anthony Wedgewood- 
Benn) established the General Post Office as a public monopoly corporation, removing its 
status as a government department and split the organisation into Posts and 
Telecommunications divisions. Although not envisaged at the time, this split aided the 
1977 Carter committee report, which recommended the creation of a separate corporation 
for the telecommunications part of the Post Office. Separation was implemented as part of 
the 1981 British Telecommunications Act, creating a new company, British 
Telecommunications pic (BT) (Beesley et al. 1995). The 1969 act also allowed the 
Secretary of State to issue licences to other companies (subsequently known as Service 
Providers) to operate in direct competition with BT in the area of Value Added Network 
Services (as per the 1981 Beesley report recommendations issued earlier in the year).
About this time, the Governor to the Bank of England stated that the UK was going to lose 
its markets (particularly financial) to the rest of the world, unless its telecommunications 
infirastructure was improved. However the money to achieve this was severely restricted by 
the treasury^^ (Baker 1997). The alternative was external investment and competition (to 
remove the opportunity to take advantage of a monopoly situation) (Beesley et al. 1995). In 
1982 the Conservative government proposed a bill to sell a majority stake in British 
Telecom (against DTI advice (Ellison 1997)) in order to provide the freedom fi*om 
ministerial control needed to make commercial decisions and grow in a developing market. 
The bill was finally passed as the 1984 Telecommunications Act and was followed by the 
government selling a majority stake in the company, effectively relinquishing their control. 
The removal of BT fi*om direct governmental control created a private company holding a 
monopoly position in the market. To prevent BT from exploiting this position competition 
was introduced (Gist 1990) and to regulate the telecommunications market more generally, 
the 1984 legislation also created the Office of Telecommunications (OFTEL) (as per the
“ In 1950 all Cable and Wireless services operating from the UK, were returned to Post Office control 
(which included those originally leased to Cable and Wireless by the Post Office), leaving the company 
controlling only an overseas network.
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1983 Littlechild report) and licences, which OFTEL granted on behalf of the Secretary of 
State. The effect of the Act therefore, was telecommunication service liberalisation and 
regulation through licensing and licence conditions.
It is interesting to speculate on the alternatives to liberalisation. If a Labour government 
had been in power, their traditional stance against denationalisation would probably have 
meant increased government investment in the telecommunications monopoly provider, 
BT. Such a policy would have speeded modernisation of the UK telecommunications 
network and would have been likely to have led to different outcomes. For example, 
greater investment could have seen full implementation of Prestel (the electronic 
information/mail service), or hastened the development of BT’s non-standard 80kbit/s 
ISDN service to introduce digital communications. BT’s close relationship^^ with the UK 
Suppliers (principally GEC and Plessey) would have remained for longer^ "^ . However, the 
long-term benefits are not clear. Prestel might have become a commercial success, as was 
France’s Mintel service, or could have failed because of incompatibilities with the 
evolving worldwide e-mail standards. Similarly, the 80kbit/s ISDN service might have led 
early developments of digital communications, but ultimately failed given the 
incompatibility with worldwide standards. In either case substantial upgrades would have 
been essential.
Overall however, it is fairly certain that the UK would have found itself in a position closer 
to the other EU Member States as the 1998 liberalisation deadline approached. Legislation 
would have been rushed through and BT would have been looking for significant joint- 
venture partners to develop a strong defensive (anti-poaching) stance. As it was, a 
deregulated BT was regarded as a significant predator at the time. If a Labour government 
had invested in a nationalised service, it is unlikely that any subsequent Conservative 
governments would have denationalised it. Although BT’s denationalisation turned out to 
be very successful, leading to the denationalisation of other industries, evidence indicates
The government found the telephone network developed a useful income, which the treasury considered 
part o f the UK treasury budget and thus tended to limit the finance available for development o f the 
telephone network.
Hawkins (interview 1997) termed this traditional relationship a hierarchical type o f architecture. Each 
element in the architecture was tied to the commercial interests o f that particular Supplier or service provider 
and that the whole structure worked to sustain itself; the equipment Suppliers would do well i f  the network 
Operators did well and the close relationship effectively minimised competition and enhanced profits.
The scenario maintains the existing Operator/Supplier relationships. In practice it was found that the 
introduction o f a third party significantly reduced purchasing costs (Shepherd 1987).
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that prior to BT denationalisation, the government was sceptical and support marginal 
(Blakeway 1997).
Licensed
No
License
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1984
1882
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Competition
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Figure 5.4 The Regulation of Telephony in the UK
When the history of UK telecommunications regulation^ ^  is presented diagrammatically 
(Figure 5.4), it can be seen that regulation prior to 1912 (almost all introduced by Liberal 
Governments under Gladstone) struggled to find a satisfactory formula; mixing monopoly 
licensing with competitive licensing, before partial nationalisation and then complete 
nationalisation of the network in 1912. By this date, the regulatory environment had 
already alternated between monopoly and competition twice (in 1882 and 1899). A third 
cycle was completed in 1984 when the telecommunications network was denationalised.
Telephony in the USA
By way of a comparison, it is useful to review the development of the regulatory 
fi*amework in the USA, since this was another regulatory regime examined by the 
European Commission when it considered options for the 1998 liberalisation. The USA 
was similarly driven by the desire for universal service, but it did not consider a national
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telephone network as important for defence purposes as did the UK, leading to the 
evolution of a different solution.
The American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T) was conceived in 1885 as a 
means to interconnect its regional parent Bell operating companies so as to offer inter­
regional services for its customers. In 1899 the companies were reorganised such that 
AT&T became the parent company. By the early 1900s AT&T was in competition with 
other Operators offering telecommunication services in the USA. As had occurred in the 
early days in the UK, these companies had set up unconnected networks in the same 
geographic areas, the customers of one Operator being unable to communicate with those 
of another Operator. AT&T refused to interconnect with other Operators’ networks, except 
in areas where AT&T did not have a presence and then only under the condition that the 
local Operator did not itself connect to any other network. This refusal to universally 
interconnect and the conditions imposed on those that did, encouraged criticism from the 
utility regulators. AT&T however, stemmed the argument against compulsory 
interconnection on the grounds that its approach actually encouraged universal service and 
as a trade-off unofficially accepted the regulatory commission control of 
telecommunication rates as an ‘. ..appropriate and acceptable substitute for the competitive 
marketplace’ (AT&T 1998, similarly Muller 1993).
The policy of monopoly interconnect resulted in anti-trust suits and the 1913 ‘Kingsbury 
Commitment’ which prevented AT&T companies from taking over competitors. The anti­
trust judgements (which found against AT&T) and the 1913 Commitment, were overturned 
by the Willis Graham Act of 1921. This Act argued that a universal telecommunications 
system was more important than a fragmented, competitive one (Mueller 1993). Thus 
AT&T began a period of consolidating its monopoly through take-overs.
As the Century progressed, AT&T was periodically accused of having abused its 
monopoly power in a number of areas, resulting in key anti-trust suits in 1949 and 1974. 
The 1949 anti-trust suit resulted in a formal declaration by AT&T of the scope of their 
business as being only ‘.. .the regulated business of the national telephone system and
Hawkins (interview 1997) argued that the European Telecommunications market has never been regulated. 
He does not see public ownership (i.e. control by a government) as regulation. ‘Such action has the effect o f
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government work’ (AT&T 1998). The 1974 anti trust suit resulted in the 1984 break up of 
AT&T into a long distance carrier and seven local Operators (termed ‘Baby Bells’). In 
return it was agreed that the statement made by AT&T in response to the 1949 anti-trust 
suit would be nullified, again potentially opening up the scope of their operations 
(Armstrong et al. 1995, AT&T 1998). The break-up allowed the introduction of 
competition into the long distance market and more recently the local market (Margasak 
1996, Times 1996).
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) was established as part of a 1934 
Communications Act, to ensure that AT&T did not abuse its monopoly position. The FCC 
regulates inter-state and international telephony communications via its Common Carrier 
Bureau (one of several bureaux that regulate all communications services, including 
television, radio, etc.) (Darlington 1981).
Intra-state communications are overseen by individual regulatory agencies. As is normal, 
some of the boundaries between the FCC areas of responsibility and an individual state’s 
regulatory authority are open to definition^sometimes leading to the curious position of a 
state’s regulatory agency joining with Operators to take the FCC to court^  ^over their 
actions, whilst they themselves are perhaps being taken to court by the same Operators, for 
the decisions they have made in a different area (CW I1996, Perrin 1998, PNE 1996). Such 
litigation tends to slow the pace of change.
The two-tier system found in the USA (i.e. having both national and regional (state) 
regulators) provides an interesting contrast to the relationship and operation of the EU 
Commission and the UK regulator OFTEL, examined in the next section.
regulating the market by preventing competitors and establishing a monopoly, but because there are no 
competitors, the market is not regulated’.
An example o f FCC/State Regulator conflict is where the FCC removed regulatory pricing controls on new  
services (to create incentives for the development o f new services) and also had to gain the right to override 
any state regulation which might reintroduce it, in order to ensure its effectiveness (Tele.com 1997).
Regulatory agency decisions can be appealed against in the state courts, while the FCC decisions can be 
appealed against to the US Circuit Court o f Appeals and then to the Supreme Court.
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5.5 How Telecommunication Service Reguiation is Applied in the 
UK ■ OFTEL
The Office of Telecommunications (OFTEL) was created by the 1984 
Telecommunications Act as an independent regulatory body for the telecommunications 
(but not broadcasting) industry. The role was originally intended to be undertaken by the 
Office of Fair Trading (OFT), but a decision was made that a dedicated regulatory agency 
was required and the concept of OFTEL developed. OFTEL was modelled on the Office of 
Fair Trading (OFT) and was designed to merge with the OFT at a later date (Beesley et al.
1995).
Prior to OFTEL’s creation the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) looked after the 
interests and needs of UK telecommunications, both within and outside the UK. After the 
creation of OFTEL the DTI focused more upon international telecommunication affairs, 
using OFTEL as an interface to the UK telecommunications industry.
OFTEL has sole responsibility for the granting, monitoring and enforcement of 
telecommunication licences. However the Department of Trade (DTI) (headed by the 
Secretary of State) remains politically responsible for telecommunications policy in the 
UK.
For OFTEL to be successful it needed to be independent of political control and Operator 
influence, a stance subsequently receiving formal recognition by the EU Commission and 
incorporated into their 1998 liberalisation guidelines. Without such impartiality the 
regulator’s decisions could be questioned and prospective new competitors could perceive 
an increased risk of entry to the UK market (EIU 1995).
David Edmonds is the current head of OFTEL and holds the title of ‘Director General of 
Telecommunications’. This post purports to be independent of government ministerial 
control. OFTEL’s expenditure is set and underwritten by Parliament (subject to annual 
Treasury approval), but the income is almost entirely derived from licence fees^  ^(OFTEL 
2001a). This method of funding makes OFTEL financially independent of government and
In the case o f the larger Operators, the licence fee is approximately related to the size o f the turnover o f  the 
business.
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arguably independent of political influence. However it is still a government department 
and at the end of each (calendar) year, the Director General has to compile a report to the 
Secretary of State, who presents the report to Parliament. This indicates that OFTEL has an
19indirect responsibility to the government and hence parliament (Walker 2001).
The role of OFTEL is described by Peter Walker, OFTEL’s director of technology, as 
being:
‘...to achieve those desirable and justified outcomes for consumers and the 
community as a whole that do not arise naturally from the market’ (Walker 2001 
p258).
To achieve this OFTEL has developed a number of objectives including:
• the protection of consumer interests;
• the promotion of competition;
• the issue, amendment and enforcement of licences;
• advising the UK government upon telecommunication related matters;
• overseeing telecommunication activities in the UK 
(OFTEL 1997).
OFTEL achieves these objectives by issuing and overseeing the operation of licences (i.e. 
ensuring the terms and conditions are met), using its statutory powers to collect and 
analyse appropriate information from licence holders.
From Mid 2003, the telecommunications regulatory framework will change when the five 
UK communication regulators (OFTEL, Independent Televisions Commission (ITC),
Radio Authority, Radio Communications Agency, and Broadcasting Standards 
Commission) are subsumed into a single Office of Communications^® (OFCOM) (OFCOM 
2001). A common Communications Regulator should better address such areas as ‘Pay as 
you View TV’, which has historically fallen within both OFTEL’s and the Independent 
Television Commission’s (ITC) remits.
OFTEL supports the stance that has been adopted, that National Regulatory Authorities should be 
independent o f government (OFTEL 1996d).
This will create a body with a similar scope to the US regulatory authority, the FCC (POEU 1981).
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Responsibilities
OFTEL is responsible for enforcing the Competition Act 1980 for the UK 
telecommunications industry, through the allocation, amendment and hence enforcement 
of licence conditions. Telecommunication licences are allocated by the Secretary of State 
following a recommendation from the Director General (OFTEL 2001b).
OFTEL also continuously monitors telecommunications activities in the UK and overseas, 
so as to advise government departments (the DTI and the Secretary of State) on, for 
example, what telecommunication issues should be discussed at the EU Commission level, 
problems with implementing EU directives, and so on.
In fulfilling its responsibilities, OFTEL endeavours to achieve a balance such that:
• all reasonable UK telecommunications service demands are met;
• Service Providers operate efficiently and their services are self financing (i.e. 
not subsidised);
• effective competition is maintained in the UK;
• the ability of the UK telecommunications industry to compete overseas is 
encouraged
(Long 1988).
Gillick (1991) recognised this last point in a written response to the government’s duopoly 
review (DTI 1991). He suggested that the government needed to improve the orientation of 
the UK telecommunications industry in the global market and to recognise the need for, 
and the regulation of, network interconnection arrangements (Gillick 1991). This would 
not only address terms and conditions, but the standards employed.
Licensing
The UK Telecommunications Act 1984 (DTI 1984) made it an offence to operate a 
telecommunications system without a licence granted by the Secretary of State; the Act 
together with a subsequent amendment (DTI 1991), detailing the categories of 
telecommunications licence available^\ The Secretary of State has devolved the
The telecommunication licences available are described in detail in Appendix C.
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responsibility of the granting of licences to the Chairman of OFTEL, the Director General 
of Telecommunications (DGT).
OFTEL uses licensing as a method of restricting access to a market segment as well as 
controlling the actions of Operators within that segment. For example, a number of 
restrictions become operative when a company is deemed (by OFTEL) to have 25% 
market share^ .^ In the case of fixed networks such restrictions appeared to apply mainly to 
the incumbent Operator (BT). BT has in turn expressed concern about the ‘significant 
market share’ clause being used to restrict its access to other market segments, such as 
Personal Communications Networks (now obsolete) and Broadcast Services.
A new EU directive to be implemented in July 2003, will abolish licences, replacing them 
with ‘authorisations’. The directive therefore firees Operators fi'om applying for licences, 
but imposes upon them the conditions in the directive and thereby creates a common set of 
regulatory requirements applicable to all European Operators (OFTEL 2002, Walker 
2001).
Powers
OFTEL and the Director General have no direct power derived fi^ om the 1984 
Telecommunications Act to determine the issuing or modification of a licence, or to 
enforce the adherence to licence conditions. This is done by the Secretary of State, but on 
the Director General’s recommendation.
OFTEL however, has considerable indirect power through conditions written into the 
licence, making the licence holder answerable to them for certain information and 
permitting OFTEL the power to revoke licences under certain circumstances. For example, 
breaches of licensing conditions could require the Director General to take remedial action 
by issuing a provisional order, followed by a final order. These can be enforced by civil 
action.
^  A ‘Framework Directive’ ratified in 2002 and due to be implemented in 2003, provides a new EU 
definition o f ‘Significant Market Power’, which OFTEL must use in considering the actions o f  UK Operators 
(OFTEL 2002).
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OFTEL’s decisions can be challenged in a variety of ways depending on the type of 
decision made. If the decision is related to price controls, this can be referred to the 
Competition Commission^^ (who principally take their advice from OFTEL). In 1996 one 
observer thought the number of referrals excessive and that OFTEL themselves should be 
investigated to determine the cause (Bennett 1996). If the decision relates to licence 
conditions this could be challenged by a judicial review based upon the decision’s 
relevance to the Competition Act. However,
‘BT argues that the system is unfair because it has no realistic means of appeal; it 
can ask for a judicial review, but that takes 18 months and the onus is on BT to 
prove that OFTEL’s action is ‘not reasonable’. In contrast, if an MMC 
recommendation goes against OFTEL, it is not obliged to act on it’ (EIU 1995 
p41).
Alternative approaches to resolving Operator disputes with a National Regulatory 
Authority have been proposed by the European Commission (for example in 1996), but 
these did not develop further, possibly owing to their perceived encroachment on National 
Sovereignty (Read 1996). They have however, simplified the basis of the right of appeal by 
Operators from those given above, to one based on ‘grounds of merit’^ "^ with the 
implementation of the Communications Bill in mid 2003 (interview Clark 2002).
The UK Telecommunications Business Model
When the UK telecommunications service industry was liberalised, OFTEL adopted a 
business/operational model on which its telecommunications regulation is based. The main 
constituent of the model is voice telephony although it also encompasses data. 
Telecommunication products and services are grouped into an ascending hierarchy, with 
Network Business providing the basic transport and forming the foundation upon which 
the other services are offered. The groups are categorised as shown in Figure 5.5.
^ Formerly the Monopolies and Mergers commission (MMC).
An example o f ‘Grounds o f Merit’ may be a decision which is likely to have a disproportionate impact 
compared to what it is trying to achieve.
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Figure 5.5 The UK Telecommunications Business Model
Public Telephone Operators purchase network capability at wholesale (or Network 
Operator) rates as per BT licence Condition 13 (Cl3), whilst Service Providers^^ have to 
buy such capability from Systems Business at retail rates (Figure 5.5). Operators however, 
typically offer a range of services falling within Systems Business (SB) and Supplementary 
Services Business (SSB) categories, but are not subject to the rules of the model unless 
they are deemed to have significant market share. For fixed network telephony, BT was the 
only Operator deemed to be within this category. The situation was further complicated by 
OFTEL having historically granted some Service Providers ‘Relevant Connectable 
System’ status (a particular class of UK telecommunications licence), which allowed 
network capability to be purchased at wholesale rates, whilst other Service Providers did 
not have this benefit (OFTEL 1995). What this means is that Operators (other than BT) and 
some Service Providers were able to offer Value Added Services with the underlying 
network capability being subject to wholesale rates, whilst most Service Providers and 
BT’s supplementary services division products were subject to retail rates (DTI 1993).
This anomaly was frequently drawn to OFTEL’s attention:
The concept o f Service Providers appears to have originated in the USA. The services they offered were 
termed Value Added Services, that is to say something in addition to the Network Operator’s service, such a 
‘Golden Numbers’. (Golden Numbers are typically those which are memorable such as ‘1-800 1111111’ or 
‘1-800 call now’.)
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‘...the Service Providers present were unhappy that they could only get retail prices 
from BT, but because Network Operators had access to C l3 prices they could, 
without adding any value, resell BT services at cheaper than BT retail tariff - an 
option not available to BT itself. For this reason Service Providers felt they had as 
much right to 013 tariffs as Network Operators’ (Sutton 1995).
Further potential anomalies have been blocked by OFTEL. This includes some large 
organisations operating private telecommunications networks that tried to follow the 
example of US companies by attempting to gain Network Operator licences (Savamejad
1996). This would have allowed them to purchase their telecommunication capability from 
Operators at wholesale rates and reduce their overall operating costs (Molony 1996b).
Of particular relevance to this research is the impact of the business model upon the 
opening of Intelligent Network interfaces to third parties. A situation could arise whereby a 
customer may use a service offered by the monopoly Operator that comprises a variety of 
capabilities provided by different organisations and subject to different regulatory 
constraints (Bicknell 1993). It would be very difficult to categorise the service as SB or 
SSB, since it may combine a third party capability (normally SSB) that can only operate in 
conjunction with a particular Suppliers equipment (normally SB).
Using a model as the basis to regulate a business highlighted the need for a clear, 
unambiguous, definition of the terms used by the model. The definition of ‘Supplementary 
Services Business’ or ‘Value Added Services’, ‘Systems Business’ or ‘Network Services’, 
varied between EU Member States. In the USA, the definition of ‘Value Added’ was 
forced to develop and change with time and new technology. Its interpretation has been 
challenged and reviewed in the law courts. Presumably to avoid such confusion, the EU 
1987 Green paper did not use terms such as ‘Value Added’, but rather ‘Reserved Services’ 
and ‘Competitive Services’ and concentrated on defining ‘Reserved Services’ only. What 
constitutes the remainder was left for the individual Member States to decide (Ungerer 
1990).
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The goal of creating a business modef^ was to split the products of the incumbent 
Operator (BT) into market segments, ‘virtually’ separating them as trading entities, thereby 
negating any advantage the entities might gain from operating collectively (such as cross­
subsidisation and knowledge transfer). The aim was to encourage market segment 
competition (Armstrong et al. 1995). Almost all of BT’s competitors supported the model 
and product split (OFTEL 1996a); hardly surprising since they were not subject to the 
same operating and accounting separation conditions, because they fell outside the rule of 
‘significant market share’ (DTI 1993). However such action potentially restricted BT’s 
economies of scale^  ^and arguably reduced its growth overseas^^.
There were however, other business models that could be considered. One approach 
seemingly missed in OFTEL’s discussions (OFTEL 1996b), was the option of Operators 
having to contract-out new services to Service Providers (Figure 5.6). Many of the issues 
associated with Network Operator pricing and open interfaces would have been avoided, 
since all new products could be offered only by Service Providers. Such a model would 
also promote market competition whilst avoiding the danger of Operators diluting market 
share beyond a critical limit and making it uneconomic.
The telecommunications business model is very similar to that proposed by KPMG (1993) in its report to 
the EU. This is discussed in Chapter 2.
Similar equipment owned by Supplementary Services Business and Network Business cannot be purchased 
under the same contract.
Concert’s Audio Conferencing Product comprised o f subcontracted MCI and BT Audio Conferencing 
services. BT’s service was higher priced than MCI, disadvantaging its use elsewhere in the world. This 
higher price was attributed to the need to purchase network capability from BT at retail rather than wholesale 
rates (Shepherd 1996).
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Figure 5.6 New Services Offered via Service Providers
Another approach proposed by some respondents to the OFTEL document (OFTEL 
1996b), is shown in Figure 5.7. This proposes a structure similar to that initially imposed 
upon the UK Mobile Network Operators, whereby they could only sell network capability 
to the Service Providers and the Service Providers sold the service to the public (OFTEL 
1996b, YG 1996). The approach indicated by this model is sometimes referred to as the 
maximalist view.
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Figure 5.7 The Physical Separation of Operators and Service Providers
The problem with a model separating Operators from Users is how to handle the existing 
Network Operator’s customers. This model is therefore perhaps best for totally new market 
segments, as indeed it was with the launch of UK mobile communications.
The groAvth of data services and the migration of traditional real-time (i.e. time-dependent) 
transmission products to non real-time products on a data network^^ (e.g. Facsimile, Voice 
Mail etc.) indicate that the categorisation of products is changing and that any business 
model should correspondingly have the capability to evolve. The current move to 
‘connectionless’ (Internet Protocol) networks suggest that the base capability of the model 
should be a data network supporting supplementary services (including voice), since 
products are increasingly independent of the network on which they are carried (Figure 
5.!%.
Data packets carried on Data network are give a Class o f Service Rating. Real time products (such as voice 
telephony) are given the best rating which endeavours to transmit them with minimum delay. Non real-time 
products (such as computer data or Facsimile) are given a best effort marking, implying they can suffer a fair 
amount o f delay with no end-user problem. In this way, the data network is able to manage its traffic more 
efficiently during periods o f high usage.
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Figure 5.8 The Financial Separation of Operators and Service Providers
In such a model no services are considered ‘Network Dependent’ and an Operator’s retail 
division operates on a similar basis to Service Providers, using the same interfaces and 
negotiating similar wholesale rates. However
‘Once you distinguish the service from the infrastructure, allowing competition on 
one but not the other, then you need complicated rules of access to the part that 
remains a monopoly so as to ensure that the monopoly does not discriminate in 
favour of its own services arm.’ (YG 1996 p7)
Hence the relationship between the Network Operator and the Operator’s retail division 
needs to be independently monitored to ensure fairness.
Over-regulation of the Network Operator/Service Provider relationship in Figure 5.8 could 
have a negative impact. For example, in the US the FCC regulations allowed Service 
Providers
‘...to buy new services at deep discounts.. .making.. .it very difficult if not 
impossible for Telcos to recoup the development costs of these services... 
Competitors can use that price difference to undercut incumbent offerings, 
hampering Telco efforts to use service prices to recover their costs.’ (Tele.Com
1997)
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As a consequence the FCC was obliged to remove the regulatory pricing controls on new 
serviees.
All the alternative business models presented in this section have a simpler structure than 
that adopted by OFTEL (Figure 5.5). The simpler structure is better able to aecommodate 
future teehnology development (since this will always occur at Network Operator level) 
and will tend to avoid inequalities at the Service Provider level. For example, if the 
business model in Figure 5.6 had been employed by OFTEL, the implementation of new 
technology and consequential independence of services from the network, would have 
allowed a non-interventionist evolution to the model in Figure 5.8. Thus the impact the 
regulated business model has upon service delivery would be minimised, despite any 
change to the underlying technology.
5.6 UK Interconnection Regulation
A major contributor to the suceess of liberalisation is the mutual provision and operation of 
serviees over competing Operators’ networks. This raises the issue of inter-working 
(Figure 5.9).
Operator A
Operator B
Figure 5.9 The Interconnection of Networks to Offer Universal Service
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OFTEL’s approach is to refer technical interconnection issues to the Network 
Interoperability Consultative Committee (NICC)^®. Such referrals fall into two categories; 
those associated with general interconnection to encourage the operation of services (i.e. 
upgrading networks to ISUP), and those services which are deemed Supplementary 
Services Business in the UK business model (e.g. BT’s Call Minder product) and hence 
capable of cross network provisioning and operation.
General network signalling upgrades result from the realisation that existing services could 
be offered more efficiently, or better services would be encouraged, by the implementation 
of a new or enhanced standard. The NICC would normally take the relevant ETSI variant 
of the ITU-T standard and discuss the benefits its adoption would bring UK 
telecommunications^ ^  This is effectively a benefit analysis that weighs the advantages and 
disadvantages of new and existing, or competing standards^^. Assuming the benefits are 
sufficient, discussion continues as to what messages will be supported and the 
action/responses needed^^. Without this mutual understanding of what a message means 
and its appropriate response, serious network problems could result. An example of what 
could happen should this agreement process fail to take place, is found where data has been 
incorrectly built on exchanges, such that it deviates from the agreed message/response 
format. In the worst case, this could cause interconnecting exchanges to go into congestion 
and eventually cease to convey any calls.
The second area of NICC discussion, is the specification of standards interconnection for 
services deemed as Supplementary Services Business (SSB). In this case (as has previously 
been discussed) the service is not considered integral to a network and thus should be able 
to be offered by any Service Provider. An example of this is a message service, allowing 
callers to leave a message when the person they are calling is unavailable. Initially this 
capability was offered by an answer-phone, a piece of Customer Premise Equipment (CPE)
The NICC is the body charged by OFTEL to consider issues o f interconnect. It takes its guidance from 
ETSI or ITU-T standards, where they exist, or else defines specifications to fulfil local needs.
Such discussions also cover the use o f the standard in the interconnect o f  UK Operators with European and 
Overseas Operators.
New standards do not necessarily offer unqualified advantages over those they replace. For instance,
TSUP’ offers a greater ‘payload’(more information in a single message) reducing the number o f  network 
messages needed for an application. However some existing services using ‘TUP NEED’, messages not 
supported by ISUP, would need to be redesigned i f  ISUP were employed.
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that plugged into a telephone socket. As CPE it was deemed network independent. BT 
developed a network-based call answering service (Call Minder), which by competing with 
answer-phone CPE was deemed to be SSB. Thus BT was obliged to provide an interface 
that allowed BT’s competitors to purchase the service and offer their customers the same 
facilities'" .^ The NICC examines the interface standards of such SSB products to ensure the 
specification is understood and that it is not specified in such a way as to disadvantage 
competitors from purchasing and reselling the service to their own customers. Often such 
interfaces (although based upon international standards) are heavily UK focussed, the 
NICC developing the interface standard without formally considering the European view. 
However participants who contribute to both NICC and ETSI standardisation discussions 
provide an unofficial link between both bodies. There is a strong case to be made that 
network inter-working should be considered at a European level to create a useful pan- 
European network, rather than the independent arrangements currently evolving as a result 
of the global communications companies (MCI WorldCom etc.) and their alliances (PNE 
1996d).
The role of the NICC is therefore to discuss and reach agreement upon the specification of 
interconnection standards. Such agreements are recommended to OFTEL for formal 
ratification. In the case of general interconnection standards they are adopted as the UK 
variant, which should be used if UK Operators adopt that standard (e.g. UK ISUP). In the 
case of the interfaces used for an SSB product, OFTEL (through powers identified in the 
1991 White Paper (DTI 1991)) could ask the telecommunications Operator proposing the 
product, to implement that interface, the alternative being that OFTEL would not sanction 
the product. The actions of OFTEL, by referring standardisation discussions to the NICC, 
have acknowledged that a Regulator is not an appropriate body to handle technical 
interconnection issues; rather it is a process requiring specialist knowledge and skills. 
However, it does highlight the value of a standardisation process in support of regulations.
For instance, the response to a congestion message may be any o f the following three options: stop sending 
a particular type o f traffic to an OLO network; stop all traffic to the OLOs network; or take the 
interconnecting route the message was received o n ‘out o f  service’,
^  Australia has a similar approach to allowing interconnection at certain interfaces. However the criteria for 
allowing interconnection is not if  a service is classified as equivalent to the UK SSB categorisation, but i f  the 
interface is declared uneconomic to duplicate. This ‘Declaration’ o f  interfaces was introduced by the 
Australian 1997 Telecommunications law and allows Service Providers to purchase and resell Operator 
network capability.
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The Service Providers in the UK usually operate by having their own equipment and if 
appropriate to the product, will tandem calls. They are typically restricted (initially by 
regulation and latterly by the Operator) to a ‘customer type interface’ (e.g. ISDN). 
Customer type interfaces have reduced capability, but are regarded as ‘safer’ by Operators 
in that inappropriate messages are not likely to cause network problems as is possible with 
C7. OFTEL has not made the availability of C7 or IN interconnection compulsory for 
Service Provider interconnection, except where they are used for SSB products and then 
only for that product’s use^ .^ Products are designed very carefully so that they use such 
interfaces minimally, since the extra cost, policing messages on the interfaces, could make 
a new product uneconomic (Shepherd 2002).
Service Providers in the USA often own their own exchanges for terminating and routeing 
calls, which allows them to develop and offer their own services. Since it is easy to route a 
call to separate equipment, act upon the information accompanying the call (e.g. dialled 
number, CLI etc.), then route the call onwards using standard network interconnection at 
the transport level (e.g. SS7), the need for open Intelligent Network interfaces was 
reduced. However, operating in such a manner was less efficient than the same service 
where no link-through was required (OFTEL 1996b sect.2.1). Thus the FCC later revised 
its position and under the US 1996 Telecommunications Act Operators were required to 
open different Intelligent Network interfaces via a Mediated Access Function (FCC 1996). 
One of the roles of the Mediated Access Function is to protect network integrity, a key 
concern discussed in Chapter 6.
A new EU ‘Access and Interconnection Directive’ passed in 2002 (to be implemented mid 
2003), formally identifies the role and scope that a regulator may play in achieving 
interconnection between two parties. It restricts the regulator from imposing 
interconnection (and hence the need to specify interfaces and functionality), to only those 
Operators deemed to have ‘Significant Market Share’, this term itself being defined in the 
‘Frameworks Directive’ approved at the same time (OFTEL 2002). This is not expected to 
significantly change the way technical interface regulation is currently approached or 
implemented.
A C7 interface has never been used for an SSB product.
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An alternative approach to the regulation of interconnect is that which is applied in 
Australia, arguably the first country to complete the transition from privatisation and 
liberalisation (using a regulator), through to a self-regulated market (using general 
competition laws). The Australian 1997 Telecommunications Act scrapped the regulatory 
authority (Austel) and added telecommunications responsibility to the remits of the 
Australian Communications Authority (ACA), responsible for technical standards, and the 
Australian Consumer and Competition Commission (ACCC), which oversees competition. 
The result was that the Operators themselves formed a body called the Australian Carrier 
Industry Forum (ACIF) in an attempt to apply internal industry controls, particularly in the 
area of interconnection standards. The ACA only get involved when the industry is unable 
to reach internal agreement. This experience questions the need for a state sponsored 
standardisation body, indicating that industry can be self-regulating in the production of 
standards.
An unusual consequence of Australia’s approach of using a general competition authority 
to oversee fair competition, was that the Australian Telecommunications Users Group 
(ATUG) industry association took a leading role in spotlighting industry issues. They 
particularly focussed attention on Service Provider issues and those of new entrants 
competing with the incumbent Operator (Telstra) (Dimasi 1998).
A third approach to the regulation of interconnection is that which is applied in New 
Zealand from when it liberalised the telecommunications service industry in 1991. Here 
there is negligible regulation of the interconnection of networks and transparent inter­
working of services across networks and is arrived at by joint agreement between the 
parties. This strategy is sometimes referred to as the minimalist approach to regulation 
(EIU 1995). The disadvantage is that any major disagreements that arise must be referred 
to the courts. ‘Getting entangled in court is one of the main brakes to liberalisation’ 
(Cockbome 1995), resulting in costly and lengthy disputes (EIU 1995, Williamson 1996). 
Thus a body with no expertise in the telecommunications area, the judiciary, shapes the 
direction of telecommunications through the judgements it makes, or as one industry 
player mused ‘In New Zealand the courts take four years to get the wrong answers’ (EIU 
1996 p40).
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Whatever the attributed shortcomings of the UK regulatory system and whatever criticism 
is levelled at OFTEL, it appears to have introduced competition into the UK service 
segments quicker and more efficiently than in New Zealand, thus helping to justify the 
need for regulators (albeit in the initial stages). This is further evidenced by the actions of 
Sweden, which introduced a regulator 10 years after the introduction of competition (EIU 
1995). However having a regulator does not automatically mean that a successful 
competitive environment will automatically follow:
‘The art of the regulator is knowing not only when to intervene in the market, but 
also when to leave it to its own devices’ (PNE 1997b).
5.7 Telecommunication Regulation from the European Union 
Perspective
Telecommunications policy and regulation is now a European issue. The Articles of the 
Treaty of Rome (1957) identified and agreed the key aims of the founding Member States 
of the European Economic Community (now known as the European Union (EU)). 
Although the Articles did not specifically identify objectives for the Telecommunications 
Sector, a number of Articles have proved applicable. For example:
• Article 86 addressed fair competition and formed the basis for allowing 
competition between Member States in the telecommunications environment.
• Article 90 applied the competition rules (article 86) to companies or 
organisations having a dominant market share or enjoying a monopoly. This 
was a key consideration in how incumbent Operators were treated in the lead- 
up to the 1998 liberalised telecommunications market.
• Article 100 allowed free trade in products and services between Member States.
Supporting the above were Articles 30 and 59, which outlined the action that could be 
taken against Member States that did not adhere to the EU legislation.
Other articles, such as Articles 128 and 130, allowed community funding for technical 
research and development, since ‘.. .technical progress makes new services possible’ 
(Ungerer 1990 pi 98). The results of such research have often provided the basis for 
developing technical specifications that encouraged European standardisation. An example 
was the Research and Development in Advanced Communications Technologies in Europe
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(RACE) programme, which developed a pan-European specification for Broadband ISDN 
(B-ISDN) and was also involved in the agreement of air firequencies used for the Universal 
Mobile Telephony System (UMTS), the third generation mobile technology.
This section discusses how the European Union Commission, based upon the remit of the 
Articles of the Treaty of Rome, has developed and implemented legislation within the 
telecommunications sector.
The Role of EU Regulation In Telecommunications
By the end of the 1970s basic telephony services in the EU Member States were nearing 
saturation and growth was reaching a plateau. Operators looking for new growth 
opportunities introduced mobile and Value Added Services. The EU for its part was 
looking to encourage growth in this area and was encouraged by the introduction of 
computer intelligence within telecommunications as a means of introducing new services, 
thereby enhancing growth opportunities for the industry (Ungerer 1990). The importance 
of the development of this sector was increased, when the 1987 Telecommunications 
Green Paper (EU 1987) suggested that, not regulating the EU telecommunications services 
market would severely damage the long term economic strength of the Community. 
Conversely, a strong comprehensive telecommunications sector would contribute 
significantly to the development of European economic activity and a more effective 
European free market (Cranston 1991). Furthermore, a comprehensive, liberalised 
telecommunications infrastructure was essential preparation for the EU’s role in 
developing future trading relationships with the rest of the world and in particular with the 
World Trade Organisation signatories. To achieve this, Europe needed to ensure it was part 
of the developing global telecommunications scene, forcing the EU to consider the impact 
of a regulated telephony environment, both in the context of achieving its aim of 
systematically removing the trade barriers between Member States and of aiding the 
economic growth of the EU with respect to the rest of the world (Ungerer 1990). The 
underlying argument was that successful free-trade required a good telecommunications 
infrastructure and that a good infrastructure encouraged regional growth (Ungerer 1990). 
However, for the telecommunication sector services to be optimally priced, so that both the 
customer and the Operator would benefit, competition was necessary; hence the drive to 
liberalise (Ungerer 1990). The larger European market might also make services viable 
that a single national market could not sustain.
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In analysing how to achieve this, the European Parliament felt:
‘.. .that the traditional system of telecom administration regulation which has 
served well in the past, lacked the flexibility to allow the development of new 
products and services necessary to keep pace with innovation in this sector’ (EU 
1984).
The EU Commission considered that re-regulation was needed, which would permit more 
rapid development of the sector, whilst still providing the necessary consumer safeguards 
(such as the maintenance of universal service etc.). They had seen how the American and 
the Pacific Rim markets were developing, following the US (1984) and Japanese (1985) 
de-regulation of telecommunication. Within Europe there was evidence from the UK, 
Finland and Sweden of how economies could benefit from a competitive market. However, 
the Commission discounted the USA model of deregulation, comprising competing long 
distance and local Operators, suggesting it could not be applied within the EU because of 
the number of Operators involved.
Thus the Commission authored the 1987 Green Paper (EU 1987), which with hindsight can 
be identified as the first significant step contributing to the 1998 liberalised 
telecommunications environment. The paper identified the key requirements for the 
development of telecommunication sectors:
36• an obligation on Operators to interconnect (applying the principles of ONP );
• ceasing cross subsidisation;
• taxing Operators rather than transferring excess budget to government;
• providing telecommunication networks to standards that create and maintain 
community-wide operability
(Ungerer 1990).
In considering how to implement these requirements for a liberalised market, the 
Commission recognised that telecommunication regulatory harmonisation in the EU 
needed to occur simultaneously for all Member States. Any alternative would result in the
ONP is the EU’s regulatory regime defining that standardised interfaces and charging should be applied on 
an equal basis to the service arm o f a monopoly provider and its competitors (YG 1995 pES7).
217
5 The Evolution o f  Regulation and Standardisation Policies in Regulation
development of a multi-stage system^^, that would create an information gap, resulting in 
economic and hence social disparity. However, most Member States still had a state owned 
dominant Operator, associated with which were a number of issues that needed to be 
addressed, before any liberalisation legislation would be effective (Ungerer 1990). These 
issues included:
• the political attitude of the Member State government;
• the degree of control exercised over the existing telecommunications Operators 
(particularly where the incumbent was government supported) (PNE 1996a);
• the pressure applied to the government for change by the telecommunications 
Operators, users and the EU/other Member States;
• the support of the trades-unions towards the changing position of government 
employed employees (as was demonstrated in Eire, France and Germany) (EIU 
1995);
• the quality of service provision by the new telecommunications Operators 
(Cranston 1991).
Recognising these issues the EU adopted the approach of applying legislation at the 
European level, thereby forcing the Member States to take appropriate action at the 
national level (ET 1994).
‘National systems are locked by rigidities which have evolved from different 
cultures, public beliefs and ideological positions bom out of a variety of historical 
influences. National politicians obviously have to answer these local pressures... 
The EU then has a clear cut responsibility to introduce new ideas to meet the wider 
goals, sometimes even imposing decisions which would not be possible in national 
circumstances’ (Bangemann 1995 pps. 6-7)
During the lead-up to liberalisation, the EU faced the fundamental problem of how to alter 
the mindset of Member States to reflect a European position in a global market, rather than 
a nationalist view in a European market (Bangemann 1995). A number of large companies 
held similar views (EIU 1995). For example:
Multi-stage in that different Member States liberalising at different points in time, would embrace 
telecommunication sector development at different times. Those developing later would always be struggling 
to catch-up and by never catching-up would minimally benefit from the economic betterment such action was 
calculated to bring.
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‘Government can and must, take a global view of regulation and standards. ..I know 
this carries the hard and unpopular message that national and regional interests 
must be subordinate to a global view. But telecommunications is not a respecter of 
national boundaries’ (Vallance 1995 p i7)
These conflicts of multi-national companies and EU commission views, versus the 
nationalist views of an EU Member State, occasionally led to open disagreement. An 
example of such a conflict in another sector occurred with a 1995 German decision not to 
allow the merger between the Lufthansa and Interflug airlines. This was overruled by the 
EU Commission on the basis that:
‘If Germany is treated as a relevant market, then the (German) decision was logical 
as Lufthansa is number one in Germany. However, if you use the global market as 
the relevant unit, which is the correct one for airlines, then you would come to 
other conclusions’ (Bangemann 1995 p9)
Another area where the EU Commission stepped in was where it passed legislation that 
made users subject to Member State Value Added Tax (VAT) on the telecommunication 
services they used, wherever they were sourced in the world. Prior to this, EU-sourced 
services were subject to VAT, whilst those sourced outside were VAT exempt, 
encouraging multi-national companies to employ non-EU telecommunication services 
(Skeldon 1997).
As EU telecommunications services liberalisation approached, Member States that had 
experienced restructuring delays owing to Trade Union action and legislative processes, 
sought to extend their 1998 liberalisation deadline^^. In some cases (e.g. Eire) the EU 
Commission withheld joint-venture approvals involving that Member State’s Operator, 
unless the liberalisation date was brought forward once again (PNE 1996e). Regional 
administrations in some Member States similarly put pressure upon their governments to 
liberalise early. The Flemish region of Belgium, Catalonia in Spain, Frankfurt in Germany 
and areas of France, all encouraged telecommunications competition in their regions, well 
before their national governments had established a suitable structure for such changes 
(EIU 1995). Subjected to internal and external pressure for change, some governments
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were compelled to retract their requests for exemptions to the 1998 liberalisation deadline 
(PNE 1996b,PNE 1996c, Maloney 1996).
Whilst managing this situation, the EU had begun to adopt an international regulatory role 
by way of seeking reciprocal agreements for the granting of telecommunication licences. 
For example, the Unisource consortium (which includes the Swiss PTT) was cleared only 
after Switzerland^^ (a non-EU member) agreed to open up their Telecommunications 
infrastructure to competition and the Member States of the other consortium members 
(Italy, Spain and the Netherlands) committed to introducing network infrastructure 
competition early"^ ® (PNE 1996i). Similar agreements were sought from Norway (re. the 
TelNor consortium), Germany (re. the Global 1 consortium), Spain (re. the UniSource 
consortium) and the USA (re. the UniWorld consortium) to open infrastructure (ET 1996, 
Communicate 1996, PNE 1996a, PNE 1996b, Cromer 1996). i.e.
‘.. .national operators joining global alliances as full partners or as distributors will 
find themselves having to think more globally’ (PNE 1996d).
The FCC in the USA took an identical approach by withholding approval of EU Operators’ 
joint ventures with US Operators, unless the appropriate Member States opened their 
network infrastructure to other (competing) US Operators'*  ^ (EIU 1995).
In this way the EU has been using commercial alliances as a mechanism for formally 
opening non-EU geographical areas to competition. One consequence of this approach is 
that negotiations between EU and non-EU countries are changing to being between the EU 
Commission and the non-EU country. For instance, it may become inappropriate for the 
UK to negotiate certain levels/types of telecommunications interconnect to the USA; rather 
such agreements become the province of the EU Commission and are applicable to all EU
Originally (November 1994), Belgium & Luxembourg were allowed to extend their liberalisation date to 
2000 and Greece, Eire, Portugal & Spain to 2003 (EIU 1995)
Some Non-EU countries (e.g. Norway, Switzerland etc.), have an agreement with the European Free Trade 
Association, covering one or more trading sectors such as telecommunications. These countries are allowed 
to trade with the EU in that sector as though they were a member, provided they adhere to that sector’s EU 
regulations and hence allow reciprocal competition from EU members. Although they are allowed to observe, 
they do not have the right to participate in EU policy discussions (Cl 1996b). It is unclear i f  the EU has a 
right to intervene in an interconnect agreement between one o f these countries and a non EU Member State.
An EIU (1995) survey reported that more than half o f  the telecommunications industry professionals 
responding felt the 1998 liberalisation date should be advanced.
220
5 The Evolution o f Regulation and Standardisation Policies in Regulation
Member States, or not at all. Examples of this approach, such as the Commission’s 
guidance to Belgium, Spain, Italy, Greece and Portugal at the 1996 WTO talks, not to 
improve their offers on opening their countries to foreign Operators, until the offers made 
by other non-EU Member States were improved, have already been observed for some 
time (APR 1996).
Liberalisation saw a new set of problems arise, especially those associated with licensing. 
Member States imposed different conditions in the awarding and operation of a 
Telecommunications Operator’s licence. In the Netherlands for instance. Operators did not 
require a licence. Interconnection similarly brought about its own set of inconsistencies.
For example, in the early days of liberalisation France, Germany, Italy and Spain supported 
their monopoly Operator’s stance of insisting that interconnection only be permitted if a 
large number of interconnect points were available, effectively preventing small companies 
from getting established (Nye 1998). Charges for interconnected calls also raised concern, 
with the European Commission investigating a number of Member State Operators who 
appeared to be making excessive charges for forwarding calls to other European 
Telecommunications Operators (PNE 1998a).
Peter Sadler of the European Commission recognised these potential problems in 1996, 
highlighting licensing and interconnection as the key areas requiring consistent 
implementation and consideration/consultation for 1998 deregulation and beyond. 
Furthermore, he argued that common implementation should consider and allow for those 
Member States who were at different stages in the liberalisation process (Stephen 1996).
As a result, DG X I11 was asked in 1998
‘.. .to explore the value-added effect of a European regulatory authority and ... to 
evaluate the effectiveness of such a proposal’ (Cockbome 1998),
The work was undertaken as part of the EC’s review of the effectiveness of 
telecommunications regulation in 1999.
A reciprocity clause in the 1996 US telecommunications law indicates that other countries should provide 
similar access to US companies as is provided to those countrys’ Operators in America (Shankar 1996,
Hellerstein 1996).
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It was this non-uniformity of liberalisation among EU Member States that resulted in some 
Operators lobbying the EU commission, to try to secure a commitment from the Member 
State governments to a pan-European regulator or arbitrator (Molony 1996a, PNE 1996, 
PNE 1996f, Warwickl996). Such a regulator was supported by both Martin Bangemann 
(then EU Commissioner for Industry) and Edith Cresson (then European commissioner 
responsible for science and research, training and competitiveness) (EIU 1995). In 
Bangemann’s case he felt an EU regulator was essential to deal with the convergence of 
communications and computing technologies (ET 1997).
However despite the need to co-ordinate the implementation of regulation across Member 
States, the remit of any European regulatory body would have had to be balanced against 
the role Member States considered subject to national sovereignty. Schier (1998), in 
highlighting that the role of an EU regulator would be similar to the FCC in the USA, also 
indicated that the Member States were opposed to such a body. Cockbome (1998) similarly 
reported that there was reluctance on the part of Member States to recognise the need for 
such an EU body and Doyle et al. (1998) believed that politics should be kept out of 
telecommunications regulation. Doyle proposed instead that regulatory enforcement should 
remain at the Member State level, but that the relationship between the National 
Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) and the European Commission’s competition (DG XIII) 
and telecommunications directorates (DG-IV), should be strengthened. The argument 
being that the key functions of an EU regulatory authority already existed in that:
a) the commission by now represented EU telecommunications interests on an 
international scale;
b) they looked for unfair trading practices between Operators, as in interconnect 
pricing investigations; and
c) the EU Court of Justice was able to apply competition law.
The EU achieved a liberalised EU telecommunications environment in 1998, by adopting 
and producing European-wide standards and policies in mutual support of legislation, 
which progressively forced the Member States to adopt those policies and standards. This 
resulted in:
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• Member State Regulators comprising a separate body to the dominant Member 
State Operator (a 1987 Green paper recommendation (EU 1987)/^;
• The sale of legacy telecommunications companies in government ownership;
• The necessity for Government owned Operators to be treated in the same way 
as independently owned competitors. Thus governments were no longer able to 
add money or take profits from them (a traditional source of income), being 
restricted to general taxation. There was therefore no advantage for the legacy 
Operator to remain in state ownership. An additional factor was that 
government responsibility for the regulator and government ownership of the 
legacy Operator could be argued not to fulfil the liberalisation obligation to 
separate the two functions"^ ;^
• The prohibition of bespoke standards unless exempted by the regulator. (In the 
UK this is achieved through the operation of the NICC, sponsored by OFTEL);
• The monitoring of value added services to ensure that income covers operation.
This was a significant achievement, given the general resistance to change by the EU 
Member States and the fact that many companies felt the EU regulations would have a 
marginal effect on their ability to make better use of telecommunications (EIU 1995).
The interpretation and implementation of European telecommunications policy however, 
rested almost entirely on individual Member State regulators. The consequence was a maze 
of national interpretation and implementations that complicated and slowed the 
liberalisation process.
EU Telecommunications Law/Policy Process
EU legislation takes the form of ‘directives’, ‘decisions’ or ‘recommendations’. A 
‘directive’ is mandatory for all Member States and the Member States typically amend 
their national legislation to align with the directive. A ‘decision’ deals with administrative
With both the telecommunications operations and regulation frequently being part o f a country’s civil 
service, this goal could only be achieved through the privatisation o f the monopoly telecommunications 
Operator.
Although the European Commission is prevented from interfering in matters o f  Member Sate ownership o f  
companies (EIU 1995 p81), its actions in the 1998 liberalisation o f the telecommunications service sector 
appears to have had a common affect o f relinquishment o f total Member State ownership o f  
telecommunications Operators.
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matters and is similarly binding on Member States. A ‘recommendation’ is a proposal that 
Member States can adopt, or not, as they see fit (Ungerer 1990).
The Processes for producing EU telecommunications legislation are illustrated in Figure 
5.10.
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Figure 5.10 The European Telecommunications Regulatory System
The legislative process is an iterative one with information passing back and forth between 
the interested groups at each stage, although the following description implies a principally 
uni-directional flow. Legislation can be passed in one of two ways.
The first is the ‘co-decision’ procedure introduced by the 1991 Maastricht Treaty.
Typically (but not always) this would be initiated and agreed in outline by the Member 
State governments at the Council of Ministers or by the European Parliament. It is then 
passed to the Commission and investigated. Evidence is drawn from Member State 
regulators and if necessary the ETSI standardisation body, allowing refinement of the 
proposed legislation. The Commission draws up the detailed legislation and submits the
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proposal to the European Parliament. The Parliament may ask for alterations, but once it 
has approved it, it is submitted to the Council for its approval, which may go through a 
similar refinement process. When both the Parliament and Council are in agreement, the 
legislation is passed. Parliament however, has a power of veto. This veto was used in July 
1994 by the Parliament to block the adoption of a proposed directive applying the rules of 
Open Network Provision to voice telephony services (EIU 1995).
The second way of introducing legislation is by the Commission and although undesirable, 
can be done without the need to consult the Council of Ministers or the European 
Parliament. An example of this in the telecommunications sector is the 1990 directive that 
introduced competition to the telecommunications services market. This was the first 
legislative step by the EU of its liberalisation programme and was adopted by the 
Commission on the basis of aligning the operation of this market with Article 90 of the 
Treaty of Rome. This unilateral decision by the Commission was legally binding on the 
Member States.
Once the legislation is passed and enshrined in EU law, it is implemented by the national 
governments, applied to the Operators, and policed/enforced by the national regulators.
A directive becoming law does not oblige Member States to enshrine it in their legislation. 
However, if Member States do not adhere to the directive, the EU Commission has 
authority in the form of the European Court (Braun 1990). Competition commissioner 
Karel van Miert made threats in the early days of EU liberalisation, to invoke Article 90, 
when Member States could not agree on a date for telecommunications liberalisation 
(eventually set as 1998) (ET 1994). Similarly the European Commission threatened fines if 
liberalisation was not enacted on time (PNE 1996h). Come November 1998 the EU were 
still threatening proceedings. In fact history has shown that prosecutions only occur many 
years after legislative enactment, such as for the EU clean water directive (Cromer 1998). 
Thus the EU Commission appears reluctant to take immediate action, particularly if a 
number of Member States are slow in adopting a directive;
‘Even within Europe, we have seen the ability of national governments to finstrate 
the intentions of the very directives to which they subscribed in Brussels. For 
instance three years into the regime defined by the Telecommunications Services 
Directive, only four countries out of twelve had implemented the prescribed
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rules.. .we do need the Commission’s Competition Directorate (DGIV), to be given 
teeth’ (Vallance 1995 pi 8).
Since Regulation of the liberalised telecommunications sector resided with Member States, 
the EU commission tried to remove bias from the regulatory process by separating the 
operational and regulatory functions of telecommunications within Member States. This 
reduced the chance of a legacy Operator (traditionally under state control) manipulating 
local telecommunication market terms and conditions, or influence EU policy via their 
government.
The EU legislative framework operates a two-stage acceptance process (the European 
Parliament and Council of Ministers) to pass legislation. A third body is the European 
Commission, arguably the least connected with individual Member States which is also 
able to pass legislation. This legislative structure can be assessed in two opposing ways. 
Firstly, the Commission is the least associated/answerable to Member States"^ "^  and thus is 
likely to be the most impartial of the three bodies when independently drawing-up 
legislation. Secondly, by being the least answerable of the three bodies, Commission 
legislation is less likely to consider the reality of its impact upon individual Member 
States. The research has identified examples of both viewpoints, although it was not 
always possible to identify which legislation was drawn-up solely by the Commission and 
that which had detailed input from the Council of Ministers and European Parliament.
5.8 A Global Perspective - The World Trade Organisation
The arguments made in favour of national (e.g. Member State) and supra-national (e.g.
EU) telecommunications liberalisation, apply equally at the global level. The World Trade 
Organisation (WTG)"^  ^had as its primary obj ective the provision of a framework and 
agreements for unimpeded trade between member nations (over a hundred countries). 
These agreements included market access (i.e. open markets), national treatment (alien and 
indigenous companies having the same legal rights) and non-discrimination (indigenous 
companies not being given preference). The WTO recognised that such free trade applied 
to, as well as required, a global telecommunications infrastructure for it to be successful.
The Council o f Ministers and European Parliament both comprise o f members voted into office by the 
electorate o f their Member States.
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Therefore its general agreements of non-discrimination of the previous decade (regarding 
import/export duties etc.) were applied to the telecommunications sector, to encourage 
competition, innovation and development.
‘Even five years ago, a typical ITU person would not have agreed there was a role 
for the WTO in telecoms.. . . . the new regime has recognised the WTO will have 
a tremendous impact on ITU members in terms of underlying competition, allowing 
foreign participation, breaking down barriers and encouraging investment’
(Isenberg 1998).
WTO discussions in 1996 centred on a ‘General Agreement on Trade in Services’, 
including in the telecommunications arena, value added services and data 
interchange/processing. Later discussions led to agreements that included basic voice 
telephony. The implications were that a nation should not favour its indigenous companies 
over those of another member nation. For example, countries with an Operator having a 
telecommunications monopoly, should not erect a barrier to prevent companies from other 
(WTO) member nations from entering the market.
A number of countries and organisations (i.e. the EU, US, Japan, Canada and the ITU) 
joined forces to push the WTO proposals forward (Stephen 1996, Molony 1998). Some of 
these (i.e. Japan and the USA) had to revise their existing legislation restricting foreign 
ownership of companies within their countries, in order to meet the WTO requirements 
they were promoting (PNE 1997a).
Such agreements have furthered the adoption of international standards"^  ^for interconnect 
and potentially the adoption of the European/U SA model of demonopolisation of the 
telecommunications industry to enhance competition. However, an EIU survey of 
commercial organisations indicated that they did not feel they would benefit from 
regulations occurring outside their immediate sphere of operation, thus the potential benefit 
of the WTO agreement was not necessarily perceived by customers (EIU 1995).
The WTO arose from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), a dominant post Second 
World War international trade regime.
Actually upgrading to international standards
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To leverage an open telecommunications environment, the WTO threatened/restricted the 
free trade of goods in other market segments, until acceptable progress was made. This 
sanction similarly applied to member nations not keeping to the word of the agreement; 
however detection of such non-agreement appears to be challenging (ET 1997).
Regulation Summary
Regulation exists at a number of levels; internationally through the WTO; at the supra­
national level through bodies such as the EU Commission passing legislation and 
negotiating on behalf of all the Member States; and at the national level through typically 
National Regulatory Authorities.
This thesis has argued that an effective liberalised telecommunications environment is best 
achieved through regulation supported by legislative guidelines and that such regulation be 
the responsibility of a regulator who can provide the flexible interpretation of guidelines 
necessary for a rapidly changing environment. However, in the EU there are many 
regulators and thus differing interpretations of the operational framework associated with 
the EU legislation. This has given rise to new legislation and a revised operational 
framework to be implemented in mid 2003, which will address a number of these Member 
State interpretative inconsistencies and normalise them throughout the EU.
A common regulatory tool is the standardisation of interfaces. Regulators at all levels, 
particularly at the supra-national and national levels, sponsor standardisation bodies to 
encourage the discussion of standards. Standardisation leads to interoperability of services 
on different networks, achieving the common regulatory goal of universality of service. 
However, the application of inappropriate, or overly restrictive, standards could inhibit 
innovation of products and services and reduce competition.
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5.9 The Role of Standardisation in the Delivery of 
Telecommunication Services?
Standardisation can be defined as ‘complying to a recognised form’ and is used in all areas 
of telecommunications technology design. The literature review in Chapter 2 identified that 
telecommunications standardisation has multiple foci. These included:
• encouraging inter-working and universality of service;
• extending the life of investment through standardisation updates;
• increasing the market available to manufacturers of standardised 
telecommunications equipment.
This research is particularly interested in the action of standardisation with respect to 
telecommunication’s technological interfaces, especially quotas, timeliness, and co­
ordination between standards bodies. This chapter therefore considers these areas, whilst 
discussing the role and operation of the ITU-T and proprietary standardisation groups and 
developing standardisation models for the EU and UK.
The definition of standardisation indicates that its role is that of a harmonising tool, 
comprising the technical process necessary to provide a universal service through the inter­
working of products firom different manufacturers. In the UK, the importance of standards 
really developed during the 19^  ^Century Industrial Revolution, particularly with the 
development of railways. Standards were used to specify the composition of steel used for 
rail tracks and later to define a common gauge to encourage an inter-connected public 
railway network.
In telecommunications, standards were similarly used to encourage a fully connected 
public telephone network. Initially, telephony used different technologies, and the bespoke 
developments needed to achieve interconnection introduced unnecessary complexity. 
Telecommunications standards were revised when the telephones division of the British 
Post Office settled on Strowger technology"^  ^as the basis of a new automated telephone 
network. Suppliers were made to pool their Strowger related patents in order to allow them 
to manufacture a common ‘switch’ (BT 1993b). A new role for standards was therefore to
The last operational Strowger Exchanges were removed in 1995, the technology having lasted some 100 
years from its invention (BT 2002b)
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give Operators purchasing power, since they no longer depended on one Supplier for a 
particular type of equipment, but had flexibility of choice. New equipment designed to 
such a standard could be purchased by competitive tender, minimising the price paid.
Non UK Operators saw the benefits of standards, and set their own standards, or adopted 
existing standards such as those established by the British Post Office Telecommunications 
Division. It was still common, up until the late 1980s, to see overseas Operators specify 
that their network equipment should have BT DASS2 interfaces or adhere to BT C7 NUP 
(Shepherd 1987/^. Historically then, it has been monopoly Operators who have set the 
pace of change and innovation, their standards becoming de facto standards for the 
industry.
Telecommunication services were provided by monopolies. There was no urgency to 
modernise or develop systems, and benefits could be gained by waiting for standards to 
mature before implementation. Suppliers saw the standardised development of their 
equipment as a benefit to help sell their products and benefit fi*om a larger market 
(Pandurangan 1993). Indeed, it became a commercial necessity for less influential 
Suppliers to ensure their equipment adhered to standards and that it could work with that of 
the market leaders.
The benefits of standardisation have encouraged the formation of special interest groups, 
typically comprising a mixture of Operators and Suppliers"^  ^and it is within these groups 
that standards are currently created,^^ either within standardisation organisations or by 
small, self-developing technological interest groups. Standards are therefore continually 
arising and developing, the more significant ones evolving to improve their content with a 
view to making the associated technology more efficient and versatile. Hawkins (1995b) 
and Tassey (1991) view this role of standards as acting to define
Such action unconsciously increased the potential for the global interconnection o f telecommunication 
networks and equipment, thus further encouraging the global adoption o f these defacto standards.
Suppliers knew that to develop standards and equipment in isolation might not gain sufficient market 
interest to be successfiil. This was demonstrated by IBM in the early 1980s where their personal computer 
architecture was available to be copied and ‘clones’ encouraged market development. In the late 1980s they 
introduced their Systems Network Architecture (SNA) which being initially closed and despite being later 
opened by EU action did not attract‘clones’ and the concept died (Ungerer 1990 pl70).
An exception is perhaps the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) group, where standards development 
can comprise an individual’s suggestions which after appropriate public critique may be accepted. This less 
regulatory regime has led to the development and formal acceptance of some ‘joke’ specifications.
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‘.. .the benchmark below which the parallel development of technology is perceived 
to be inefficient and/or technology-based competition is perceived to be redundant’ 
(Hawkins 1995a).
There are a number of key standardisation organisations that form a hierarchical structure 
embracing national, regional and global standards. At the bottom of the hierarchy sit the 
national and technological bodies such as the NICC in the UK or the Parlay Consortium, 
whose members typically contribute to supra-national regional bodies such as ETSI in the 
EU. The supra-national regional bodies in turn, contribute to the International 
Telecommunications Union - Telecommunications (ITU-T), which sits at the top of the 
hierarchy and specifies world-wide standards. Typically, subscription to the 
standardisation process is upwards fi*om the special interest groups and national bodies into 
ETSI and from ETSI into the ITU-T. Standards adoption is downward, with the ITU-T 
standards being adapted by ETSI for the EU region and hence adapted by the NICC for the 
UK.
The EU has recognised the importance of harmonised standards in providing end-to-end 
network and service connectivity. Without harmonisation a barrier exists in the provision 
of international telecommunications, limiting the growth of international trade and 
business and/or increasing the cost of operations in international markets (Pandurangan 
1993).
This importance of standards makes standardisation a potential tool for regulation. The 
following sections examine the operation, role, and interrelationship of the standardisation 
bodies with respect to the standardisation process, and as a consequence identify how the 
established framework of operation can aid or hinder the application of regulation.
The UK Standardisation Model
UK governments have consistently strived for universal telecommunications service, 
employing tools such as nationalisation and licensing to achieve it. These actions allowed 
the provision of telephony links to costly rural customers, thereby achieving one aim of 
universal service. Standardisation was seen as a way of encouraging the second aim of 
universal service, that is, the ability of any user to connect to any other user.
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The pattern of UK Telecommunications Regulation has been explained earlier in this 
chapter. UK Telecommunications standardisation follows a similar pattern, influenced by 
the regulatory environment. In 1884, licences to allow the development of national 
networks, encouraged interconnect between competing Operators and standardisation of 
that interconnect to offer an any-to-any service. Nationalisation of the trunk network in 
1892 took this a stage further. Full nationalisation in 1913 led to greater purchasing power 
and by the late 1920s the Post Office (who operated the telephony system) had made its 
Suppliers pool their patents in order to produce a common specification. Equipment could 
be procured from any of them^\ This strategy was perhaps last repeated on a large scale 
with the introduction of System X exchanges in the UK, where the three Suppliers (GEC, 
STC and Plessey) were each tasked with developing a different part of the design to 
produce a common standard, which could then could be manufactured by all of them. In 
the UK’s liberalised environment the role of standardisation has now been taken over by 
the Network Interoperability Consultative Committee (NICC), developing UK specific 
standards applicable to the UK telecommunications market.
With time the original notions of universal service (any-to-any voice communications) was 
achieved. However, deregulation of the telecommunications sector has seen the scope of 
the definition of universal service expand to include feature transparency between 
networks (e.g. ensuring a ‘call back when free’ service will operate when the two end 
points of a telephone call are on different Operators’ networks). Standardisation therefore 
continues to play a role in a deregulated market.
The UK Network Interoperability Consultative Committee (NICC)
The UK government’s 1991 White Paper (DTI 1991 Paras. 7-32) identified the need to 
establish a UK consultative forum. In this forum Operators, Suppliers, and users could 
address interconnection standards and the related technical issues needed to ensure end-to- 
end services in a competitive environment, beyond basic telephony. The resulting forum, 
the Network Interfaces Co-ordination Committee (subsequently renamed the Network 
Interoperability Consultative Committee), was created and sponsored by OFTEL’s 
Regulatory Policy Directorate, which influenced and specified the standards used in the 
UK. The NICC recognised that
Competitive supply reduced costs, making services to remote users more cost effective, thereby aiding the
232
5 The Evolution o f  Regulation and Standardisation Policies in Regulation
‘Public systems must inter-work coherently to provide network sqvwicqs,...that such 
inter-working..,rQq}xirQs the use of well defined in te r f a c e s . . . that...such. 
interfaces cannot be defined by any one party in isolation from others’ (OFTEL 
1993).
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Figure 5.11 The NICC Standardisation Process
The contributors to the NICC standardisation process (Figure 5.11) comprise Operators, 
Suppliers, representatives of interest groups, and official body liaison members (such as 
from BSI, BABT, DTI and OFTEL). Many of the NICC members are individually 
involved in standards definition work in other organisations, including the ITU-T and 
ETSI, aiding consistency between the standards of different bodies. Although OFTEL does 
not drive the output of the group, it directs and facilitates its operation, mediating between 
the different parties and aiming
‘...to reduce technical barriers to the interconnection of different networks and to 
the interoperability of services on different networks’(OFTEL 1996).
universal service objective.
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The NICC maintains a public register of generally available, established and emerging 
network interfaces. New standards (such as those needed for SSB products) or variants on 
international standards (e.g. UK ISUP) are discussed, agreed and formally accepted within 
NICC task groups. Implementation of NICC agreed standards is voluntary, but OFTEL 
will take action if a standard they feel should be implemented (such as for an SSB product) 
is ignored (interview Bowman 2003). Ungerer (1990) referred to EEC directive 83/189 
(now superseded by EU directive 98/34) addressing Technical standards and indicating 
that Members States must inform the EU Commission of the technical specifications they 
intend to introduce. This allowed the Commission the opportunity to block standards not 
considered to be in the best interests of the EU. However this only applied to
‘...technical regulations and standards called up by such regulations. NICC outputs 
are not in themselves regulations, neither are they mandated by regulations., the 
procedures set out in 98/34 therefore do not apply’^  ^(interview Bowman 2003).
This indicates a lack of formal co-ordination among the Member States for such standards. 
If each State develops its own detailed standards in isolation, this hinders the goal of inter­
operation among Operators and Service Providers in different Member States.
Of particular relevance to this research has been the work of one NICC task group, which 
since 1993 has been responsible for discussing:
‘Intelligent networking interfaces for connection of service switching, service 
control and database interrogation functions’ (OFTEL 1993 standards p5).
However, nothing of significance appears to have emerged from this task group regarding 
the development of IN standards (interview Newman 1997).
The EU Standardisation Model
National Operators have always tended to focus on their own individual needs, considering 
interoperability only if it appears in their interests. Standardisation not only encourages the 
interoperability of telecommunication services between networks, but also reduces fixed 
costs owing to the minimal level of customisation needed (Ungerer 1990).
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From an EU perspective, standardisation encourages the interoperability of intra-state 
telecommunication services. Operators in different Member States are then better able to 
interconnect their networks, potentially allowing more complex end-to-end services 
between and across the different networks. This helps the telecommunications sector play 
its part in the economic growth of the EU. The EU’s aim therefore has been to try and 
ensure that technology has an EU sanctioned standard, facilitating the development and 
adoption of those standards where it thinks appropriate. Examples of its work are GSM and 
Broadband ISDN. However, total harmonisation of networks to new standards is generally 
slow, since Operators are reluctant to upgrade networks without incentives, financial or 
otherwise (Ungerer 1990).
A related consideration recognised by the EU (EEC 1983) was that standards could be 
inflexible and stifle innovation:
‘Politicians should not seek to impose standards on technological developments. 
Instead we should aim to promote an undertaking about standards among all key 
players’ (Bangemann 1995 p8).
Standards should therefore strive for a compromise between providing sufficient structure 
to facilitate interoperability, whilst avoiding the rigidity of overly detailed technical 
implementation, that might hinder the development of an Operator’s network.
Notwithstanding these concerns, there are benefits from a standard being under the control 
of a recognised standardisation body with well-defined links to other standardisation 
bodies and stakeholders. These benefits include standards being ‘open’, internationally 
recognised, and having a structured change control mechanism. Another concern is that 
industry might not deliver the appropriate standards in a timely fashion to support the 
developing regulatory objectives. In recognising these points, the EU reviewed and revised 
the number of standardisation organisations and in 1988 created the European 
Telecommunication Standards Institute (ETSI). Prior to this date all European 
telecommunication standardisation was undertaken by the Conference Européenne des 
Administrations des Postes et des Télécommunications (CEPT) (Ungerer 1990).
Standards in the UK which would apply are those designated a ‘British Standard’; these needing to be
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The telecommunications standardisation system in Europe is therefore centred on ETSI. 
The EU Commission has attempted, through ETSI, to bring co-ordination to the activities 
of the many standardisation organisations existing at national, regional, and international 
levels, and within the telecommunications industry. It has now established a well-defined 
association (ETSI) and is hence able to interact with and influence its focus.
ETSI is funded by the EU under the Treaty of Rome Articles 128 and 130, which allows 
community funding for technical research and development. ETSI defines the common 
technical standards necessary for the free trade of telecommunications between Member 
States. In doing this, ETSI not only considers the European prospective, but considers the 
appropriateness of EU originated services internationally, so as to encourage the 
competitiveness of the EU Member State Operators in the world market. Input to ETSI 
discussions can be made directly by any individual who has an interest, the standards being 
approved by a majority vote, weighted by Member State (Pandurangan 1993)
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Figure 5.12 The European Telecommunications Standardisation System
submitted to the EU Commission for their approval.
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Figure 5.12 outlines the European Telecommunications Standardisation System. Although 
ETSI obtains its steer from the EU Commission, it is also influenced by decisions in the 
ITU-T and the industry in general (in terms of what the Operators and Suppliers are doing). 
Once topics for discussion, or development, are agreed, they are developed by the 
members of the appropriate ETSI forums. The members of the forums are drawn 
principally from European Suppliers and Operators. The resulting standards are passed to 
the EU Commission for formal ratiflcation and adoption by the standardisation bodies in 
the EU Member States. If appropriate, the EU ‘developed’ standards are fed back into the 
appropriate international standardisation organisation (typically the ITU-T), as the 
European position and considered for amendment/adoption at this higher level. An 
example of this in the area of Intelligent Networks (INs) was the definition of a minimum 
set of IN features for ITU-T Capability Set 1 (CSl).
The standards created by ETSI are taken by the Comité Européen de coordination des 
Normes (CEN)^^, which publishes them throughout Europe via European Standards 
(European Norms (EN)) and harmonisation documents, drawn up in conjunction with the 
standardisation bodies of the EU Member States (Ungerer 1990).
ETSI thus fulfils an important role as the EU develops the concept of a pan-European 
Telecommunications network, a role recognised and supported by the Commission.
‘As interconnection and interoperability rely to a certain extent on the development 
of the technology and standardisation, we are putting money into that’ (Bangemann 
1995 p8)
However, the influence of the EU Commission on the standardisation process can be 
detrimental. Hawkins (1993) reports on the imposition of quotas and resultant unwanted 
standards. This research has similarly identified an area of standards definition produced 
with little ‘market requirement analysis’ in order to meet a deadline (interview Herian 
1996). This indicates that not all standards are ‘fit for purpose’ and although their use has 
been shown to improve the deployment and inter-working of technology (e.g. GSM), the 
imposition of flawed standards could have a detrimental effect. This perhaps leads to the 
OECD (1995) view that the production of specifications is of lesser importance than the
CEN is effectively the European body covering the subject areas o f ISO.
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standardisation process itself, comprising ‘.. .information exchange between competing 
firms’.
ETSI does not limit its membership to the Operators, as was the case with its predecessor 
CEPT, but includes administrations, standardisation bodies. Suppliers and manufacturers, 
users, etc. (Ungerer 1990). Australia is another member of ETSI, a memorandum of 
understanding allowing the mutual recognition of standards between the two continents. A 
key representative is the European Computer Manufacturers Association (ECMA).
The European Computer Manufacturers Association (ECMA) have ITU and ETSI 
members acting as liaison between the organisations, feeding standards ratified elsewhere 
(typically de facto), which they feel are sufficiently important for the industry, into the 
Commission/ETSI for discussion/approval (e.g. the 3GPP specifications). The strength of 
ECMA lies in the number of members, who through their European subsidiaries are 
representing global companies and the fact that a linkage is provided between computing 
and telecommunications standards.
From a telephony service perspective, there is increased blurring of the 
telecommunications and computer sectors. Initially computers were incorporated into 
telecommunications equipment (leading to new commercially viable value added features). 
Now that trend is reversing, as telecommunications are increasingly being offered on 
computer networks, challenging the whole way telephony is offered to the public (e.g. 
Microsoft Internet telephony).
A concern for the EU is that standards for computer telephony are a mixture of competing 
international, de facto and peer (e.g. IETF) standards. If a standard does not appear to do 
what is wanted, it is changed or an alternative developed. For instance, the ITU-T H323 
VoIP standard is being superseded within the industry by SIP, a private collaborative 
standard that is considered to offer greater flexibility than H323. Thus firom an EU 
standardisation perspective, it is difficult to prescribe which standard should be used for 
VoIP telephony. The industry is deciding for itself, resulting in various network standards 
being implemented and consequential reduced inter-working.
238
5 The Evolution o f  Regulation and Standardisation Policies in Regulation
The International Telecommunications Union - Telecommunications (ITU-T)
The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) (formally CCITT) tops the 
standardisation organisation pyramid, addressing global standardisation. One part of the 
ITU is the ITU-T (the telecommunications part of the ITU). Its role is to encourage 
international co-operation in order to promote standardisation and arrive at an efficient 
international telecommunications infi*astructure. It produces functional standards, (based 
upon recommendations produced by the International Standards Organisation (ISO)) which 
provide a fi*amework for operation, typically indicating how certain (established) 
applications should be made to work and providing recommendations for others (Ungerer 
1990).
The development of ITU-T standards is undertaken by input from the three major regional 
bodies; the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) covering North America, the 
Telecommunications Technology Committee (TTC) covering the Pacific Rim and the 
European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), all feeding co-ordinated 
regional positions into the ITU process. Operators, Suppliers and other standardisation 
organisations also send representatives to contribute to the ITU-T process. These 
representatives have the opportunity to influence the international standards along the route 
best suited to their company/organisation. However, they are limited by the stance of the 
regional organisations and the ultimate sanction by their country’s government 
representative. This national representative is often one of their colleagues, historically and 
fi*equently still, drawn from the company of the monopoly Operator.
There is theoretically no direct political impact upon the organisation’s standardisation 
process, with non-technical participants having only observer status. However there has 
been major criticism of the slow speed of the ITU-T standardisation process and its 
domination by government (CWI 1998), presumably through a government 
representative’s ability to reject contributions firom other nationals.
Standardisation has also taken on a social element, with the role, implementation and 
impact of standardisation being considered within the ITU. This is the remit of the 
relatively new ITU-Development (ITU-D) group. The group offers technical and 
implementation assistance (particularly to developing countries) in the field of 
telecommunications. It aims to highlight the importance of telecommunications in
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supporting national economic and social development programmes (reinforcing the 
capabilities for human resources development) and to provide advice on possible 
telecommunications structural and policy options that will achieve this. The implications of 
this new consideration to the ITU remit may be that in future, ITU specifications could be 
written with a view to actively aiding in some way, the accelerated development of 
telecommunication services in less advanced countries.
Proprietary Standards
Although standardisation organisations fulfil an important role, they are by no means the 
only standards generators. Organisations can also get together to develop common 
standards (e.g. Parlay, SIP etc.) in order to ‘. . .ensure that the equipment to be supplied 
could work together with that of the most influential suppliers’ (Durven et al. 1992), 
gaining Operators purchasing power and Suppliers a larger market. The ultimate hope is 
that a standard’s usefulness and openness will lead to it being generally utilised (known as 
and eventually adopted by a standardisation organisation.
A similar strategy applies where individual Suppliers produce their own standards. By 
making the standards open they hope others will adopt them, resulting in greater market 
penetration of their products. An example of this is Microsoft Windows. By allowing 
software developers to develop their programs to operate with Windows, Microsoft have 
little worry of emerging competition, since the same range of applications would not exist 
for the competitors.
However, where companies have a monopoly in areas of popular, yet closed proprietary 
(de facto) standards, the EU have demonstrated they will act, as for example when they 
compelled IBM to open its Systems Network Architecture (SNA) to other manufacturers. 
(Ungerer 1990)
Standardisation Summary
The process of standardisation is a complex one, with many external pressures influencing 
the content of particular standards. With some bodies, for example the NICC and ETSI, 
individuals with proven interests (but not necessarily being commercially connected) are 
able to contribute. This all leads to unpredictable outcomes that may not be easy to change, 
but which are beyond the control of regulatory bodies. Thus implementing a regulatory
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policy that relies on standards as a means to achieve a desired outcome is a questionable 
strategy.
However, the process of standardisation has been shown to have merit. There are clear 
benefits for both Operators and Suppliers in terms of competition and market size. There 
are also benefits from the service perspective (and hence arguably the regulative 
perspective), since standardisation leads to interoperability of services on different 
networks. However, the larger the standardisation body the slower the progress made, 
indicating the need for a flexible structure that provides the ability to progressively adapt to 
regional, national and thence specific working limitations at the Operator level. Overly 
detailed standards created by the higher-level standardisation bodies are unlikely to be 
adopted.
Standards at each level in the standardisation hierarchy (for example, ITU-T, ETSI, NICC) 
therefore, need to achieve a compromise between providing sufficient structure to facilitate 
interoperability, whilst avoiding the rigidity of overly detailed descriptions that might 
hinder technological, and hence Operator product, development.
In conclusion therefore, standardisation appears a most appropriate tool for ensuring the 
delivery of services using Intelligent Networks; the imposition of standards is not.
5.10Summary - The Implications for Telecommunications
History has shown that attitudes to, and hence the regulation of, the telecommunications 
market in the UK have been cyclical as the technology developed. Both Telegraphy and 
Telephony (which originated from prior applications of theatre transmissions) have 
followed similar regulatory trajectories (Figures 5.1 & 5.4). As the technology is 
developed to offer a public service, a free market is created, which is subsequently licensed 
by the government (arguably to encourage efficiency, quality of service, and universal 
service). This in turn led to the nationalisation of the companies in support of governance, 
defence of the country, and again for universal service. In the case of telephony, a retreat 
occurred when telephony was de-nationalised and reverted to licensing in 1984. Such 
cycling of regulatory strategies reveals a restrictive set of tools with which to implement 
telecommunications regulation, these being licensing and nationalisation.
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The pattern of innovation, licensing, and nationalisation could perhaps be used to predict 
the future regulative position for the newer communications technologies. Consider the 
Internet for example, where numerous court cases in the US against Service Providers (for 
typically defamatory content) may lead to licensing (in order to improve the quality of 
service). Terrorist web sites and those inciting civil unrest may be perceived as a national 
security threat and result in regulations being taken a step further, leading to direct 
government control in the defence interests of the country.
By contrast, the USA telecommunications market, arguing a case similar to the UK for 
universal service, evolved into a regulated monopoly. The break-up of this monopoly 
occurred with the re-introduction of competition in the 1980s. Of particular interest in the 
USA model is the relationship between the FCC and State regulators, since it provides an 
insight into the possible future relationship between an EU regulator, should it be 
developed, and the regulators of the EU Member States.
The EU liberalised the telecommunications sector in 1998, profoundly changing the 
paradigm of working for Member State’s monopoly Operators. Traditional 
Supplier/Operator relationships were broken. Fearing competition. Operators formed 
themselves into alliances to strengthen their position, paradoxically hastening the 
liberalisation process against which they were reacting "^ .^ Regulation in support of 
liberalisation was implemented in a variety of ways by the different Member States, 
leading to benefits for some and disadvantages for others. Although such biases have been 
reduced since 1998, regulation in the form of new EU directives due to be implemented 
around the middle of 2003, is designed to further ease and equalise regulation by Member 
States.
It is also appropriate to consider the role of universal service in the current environment. 
Historically it was one of the principal arguments for regulation and the EU made explicit 
reference to it when drawing up its liberalisation legislation. However the scope of its 
interpretation is expanding. It no longer just aims at a fully interconnected national 
telecommunications network. It includes supra-national networks, (regions such as Europe)
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and a world-wide network (through the WTO). It is no longer concerned solely with voice 
interconnect, but with efficient service and data interworking. Regulation has therefore 
developed from the national to the regional level and is evolving at the global level.
Regulation
In theory, general (e.g. competition) legislation is applicable to the telecommunications 
sector, but the resulting litigation tends to slow the development of the sector. More 
dangerously, it allows parties who may not fully understand the technical considerations 
(like the judiciary) to determine appropriate action (Williamson 1996). The experience of 
Sweden and New Zealand, contrast with many other countries who have a specific 
telecommunications regulator. However Australia and to a lesser extent the EU (from mid 
2003), are now tending to follow a less directly regulated regime. The appropriateness of 
this will be shown in time. Although within the EU there will be an easing of specific 
regulation and a greater reliance upon general legislation, the Member State regulators will 
still have a specific role in ensuring that new directives are adhered to.
In the EU, regulation operates at both the competitive (regulatory) level and, arguably, the 
technical (standards) level, with the two being integrated through DGXIII. The regulatory 
system (Figure 5.13) links the EU commission with Member State regulators.
54The EU Commission generally withheld approval for joint ventures until the members’ countries were 
liberalised.
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Figure 5.13 The European Telecommunications Regulatory System
One problem experienced by the regulatory system is that the Commission can take 
unilateral action, independent of the Council of Ministers or European Parliament. An 
example was that the Commission set the timescale for EU wide implementation of 
geographical number portability. The UK Operators persuaded OFTEL and the DTI that 
the timescales proposed were not achievable and suitable DTI representations were made 
to the EU Commission to extend the timescale. These were turned down. The result was 
that when the deadline passed for implementation of the service, the DTI (and OFTEL) 
should have taken action against the UK Operators for a non-compliance with which they 
sympathised. By not taking action, they were themselves liable to EU penalties. In 
practice, the delay in implementation was short and no repercussions at EU or national 
level seem to have occurred.
The application of regulation can be supported by appropriate standards. The danger with 
this is that the standardisation process can be relatively slow, especially when the 
technology reaches maturity. In this latter stage the standardisation process attracts many
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more contributors, increasing the amount of discussion and slowing the decision-making 
process. Operators that are obliged to adhere to the standards through regulation, could get 
frustrated by the slow process, which limits the speed at which they can introduce new 
services.
Standardisation
The Standardisation regulatory system in Europe (Figure 5.14) is centred around ETSI. 
The EU recognised that a European integrated telecommunications infrastructure was 
necessary for economic growth. ETSI aided the regulations put in place to achieve that 
growth, by producing pan-European standards that would be used for telecommunications 
interconnect by the different Operators, enabling seamless services across Europe.
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Figure 5.14 The European Telecommunications Standardisation System
The EU Commission therefore directs ETSI to focus on the development of standards in 
areas that are envisaged as essential to encourage technological development (e.g. GSM), 
or in support of legislation (such as ONP in support of liberalisation) and for these 
standards to be produced in a timely manner.
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The research for this thesis has shown that the process of standardisation generates 
discussion among competitors. This process generally achieves a compromise for the 
standard specification, maximising usefulness, technological benefit and potential 
adoption. However it has also found that external influences (e.g. time constraints and 
quotas) can have a detrimental impact upon the content of standards. The impracticality of 
such ‘compromised’ standards are not immediately obvious, this only becoming apparent 
with time, by their lack of adoption. Similarly the usefulness of standards varies with the 
state of economic development. It is no use developing a network to the latest standard if 
the economy is such that Operators are unable to recoup their investment. Competing 
technology will also render the most excellent of standards obsolete, such as has been 
demonstrated with the IN standards beyond CS2.
Interconnect (and influencing the standards to achieve it) is also a political process and 
shapes the form of the technology policy and regulation to encourage service interworking 
and prevent interconnection barriers fi*om arising. The production of Standards requires 
people with specialist knowledge and skills. The standardisation model has shown that 
these specialists are drawn principally fi*om the telecommunications Operators and from 
the Suppliers (whose equipment the Operators will use to offer their services), with the 
Operators arguably having influence over the Suppliers in the form of purchasing power. 
Thus the standardisation process can be influenced by the very group of stakeholders (the 
Operators) to which the legislation is directed.
In summary, standards have been shown to encourage technological evolution and product 
development, but any forced application of standards, such as in the support of legislation, 
is fraught with difficulties. Standards compromised by external influences and contributor 
input, the state of the economy, or supersedence by alternative emerging technologies, 
would all make standards imposition inappropriate.
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This chapter has also addressed two of the questions arising from the Hypothesis stated in 
Chapter 1.
• ‘How can it be ensured that robust technical and architectural models exist before 
standards are ratified?’ and
• ‘Does regulation or detailed standardisation constrain technical innovation, service 
delivery, or both?’
The answer to the first question is that technical and architectural models, together with the 
standards into which they are incorporated, are a compromise; they will not be ideal for all 
stakeholders. Technical architectures will therefore never receive unanimous agreement 
and owing to rapid changes of the environment, will progressively become less ideal with 
time. This reveals the necessity to constantly revise and update standards to optimise their 
appropriateness, ensure their longevity and discourage their supersedence.
Answers to the second question revolve around the necessity of flexibility. Standards need 
to provide a framework that eases the process of interconnection and interworking, whilst 
retaining the flexibility required by the individual stakeholders to develop their networks. 
But standards are a compromise; they are not ideal for everyone. Thus there is a danger 
that either regulating standards or the enforced implementation of a standard will affect the 
framework of standards generation (necessary to facilitate regulation) and the role 
standards take in the interplay of technology. Both of these actions are likely to lead to a 
sub-optimal outcome. Regulation and detailed standardisation could therefore constrain 
technical innovation.
This chapter has looked at the evolution of regulation and standardisation policies in 
regulation. It has discussed how and why the EU encourage standardisation in order to aid 
the implementation of its regulatory polices. The surveys and interviews have gathered 
data from the viewpoints of various stakeholders, to assess the perceived impact of 
imposing Intelligent Network standards as part of interconnect regulation. The original IN 
architecture models developed for this research (discussed in Chapter 4) are addressed in 
the next chapter. Chapter 6, which analyses data obtained from the surveys and interviews.
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6 Stakeholder Attitudes and Concerns
6.1 Introduction
This chapter addresses in particular, four of the questions arising from the hypothesis 
stated in Chapter 1. It principally uses primary data gathered from the two surveys and 
interviews undertaken during the course of this research. The specific questions addressed 
are:
• ‘Does regulation or detailed standardisation constrain technical innovation, 
service delivery, or both?’
• ‘Is legislative regulation the appropriate means to shape a technology in rapid 
change?’
• ‘How can it be ensured that robust technical and architectural models exist 
before standards are ratified?’
• ‘Do the members of the standardisation bodies (often the employees of the 
incumbent monopolies) subvert the goals of the regulators?’
These questions are addressed in sections 6.4 to 6.9 of this chapter, but prior to any 
analysis it is worthwhile summarising the perceived stakeholder positions in order to 
understand some of the survey trends.
6.2 Stakeholder Viewpoints
The Participant Analysis Matrix discussed and developed in Chapter 3 as part of the 
research design, revealed a relationship between the stakeholders which has been 
considered in analysing the survey responses. This is summarised in Table 6.1, which has 
been reproduced (in part) from Chapter 3, where the relationships are explained in greater 
detail.
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Matrix EU DTI
OFTEL
Switch
Suppliers
Computer
Suppliers
Operator Service
Providers
Standards
Bodies
Consultant
DTI/OFTEL
Switch
Suppliers
- -
Computer
Suppliers
++ ++ -
Operator +- +- - ++
Service
Providers
+ + - +
Standards
Bodies
Consultant
TMA/TUA/
User
+ 4 - ++ 4- 4-
+ Complementary aim between stakeholders 
- Conflicting aim between stakeholders
Table 6.1 Participant Analysis Matrix
The table identifies perceived complementary and conflicting aims between the different 
stakeholder groups and was used in conjunction with the data analysis to confirm the 
preliminary findings or explore variances.
This section therefore considers the perceived position of the surveyed stakeholders 
(Suppliers, Operators and Service Providers), along with others not surveyed (UK & EU 
regulators and the WTO), in order to set the scene for data analysis. Three of the 
stakeholder groups in Table 6.1 (the Standards Bodies, Consultants and Users) have not 
been discussed, since their position was not directlv affected by the analysis.
Supplier Perspective
Switch Suppliers originally did not want open standards, since closed proprietary standards 
were more likely to constrain an Operator to using its own equipment (Shepherd 1999a). 
Once the equipment was purchased and operational, the 'entry threshold cost' for an 
Operator changing its Supplier was much higher (owing to evaluation and inter-working 
development). It was generally more economic for the Operator to purchase more of the 
same, than diversify to other Suppliers.
However as technology has progressed, the cost of developing new technology has become 
increasingly prohibitive, resulting in joint developments and joint standardisation evolution
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groups. The new technology, being more efficient than that previously deployed, results in 
a shrinking market (Brown 1998). Hence Suppliers have to be involved in joint ventures, 
concentrate on targeting niche markets, or run the risk of failing, as in the case of GPT in 
the UK.
An alternative Supplier strategy would be to attempt to capture global market share by 
developing products to established international standards, with a view to giving their 
product worldwide marketability.
In practice. Suppliers appear to be pursuing a variety of strategies depending upon the 
technology and maturity of their existing products.
Operator Perspective
Traditionally, Public Network Operators developed a symbiotic relationship with a small 
number of Suppliers, often encouraged by a national government. Typically, the Suppliers 
resided in the same country as the Operator and ensured that the Operator’s investment 
(sanctioned by government) was retained in that country. Such a relationship allowed an 
Operator’s precise needs to be met, but resulted in the Operator being tied to that Supplier, 
often paying a premium as a result. Liberalisation saw the removal of Operators from 
governmental control and a consequential weakening of the links between Operator and 
Supplier. Sector liberalisation encouraged standardisation to aid interconnect and hence 
promote competition. An Operator looking for a reduction in costs, welcomed 
standardisation, owing to the ease of interconnect and operation with other Suppliers’ 
equipment, giving them flexibility and purchasing power through competitive 
procurement.
However Operators were also mindful of the competitive advantage that could be achieved 
from the proprietary elements of a particular Supplier’s equipment. They found that to 
offer services differentiated fi*om their competitors, they needed to use these proprietary 
elements. If, due to competitive procurement, their network comprised a variety of 
equipment, then it was likely that services using non-standardised elements would operate 
in a slightly different way, according to each Suppliers’ equipment. This might have 
presented their customers with a slightly different 'look and feel' to the service, depending
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upon to whose equipment their telephone line was connected\ Should such a product have 
been designated as a Supplementary Service Business in the UK, the problem would be 
exacerbated. This is because an interworking interface would have had to be approved for 
the product by the NICC, in order to allow other Operators/Service Providers the option to 
adopt the service and allow inter-working between the different Operators’ networks. With 
different Suppliers’ equipment working in different ways, a common interface was difficult 
to achieve. If the product were classed as Services Business, which does not require a third 
party interface, the problem would not arise.
Operators generally do not like opening interfaces to other competitors for interconnection, 
since it could set a precedent for allowing competitors access to other services offered over 
that interface, which had not previously been available to them.
Service Provider
Service Providers (SPs) in the UK focussed upon niche markets, providing information or 
specialised services to their customers. Although they were in competition with the 
Operators, their specialism, their ability to purchase capability at the most competitive 
rates and lower overheads, should have made them competitive with Operators offering 
similar services. This was perhaps true in competition with the incumbent Operator BT, 
since BT was dominant and forced by its licence conditions to treat such business as 
Supplementary Services Business. This meant that BT retail had to purchase network 
capacity at the same rate as the Service Provider, making the competition fair. However 
other Operators not being classified as dominant, did not have the same conditions and 
were able to charge at lower rates. Some Service Providers were similarly advantaged, 
since they were historically given the same rights as Operators to interconnect rates 
(known as Licence Condition 13 rates or 013 for short^) and were able to purchase 
network capacity at wholesale rates.
The position was therefore that SPs were generally unhappy, because they did not in the 
main have access to the same tariff structure (013) as the other Operators. This meant all 
the other Operators (apart from BT) could, without adding any value, resell BT services at
* Should only one Suppliers equipment be able to offer a service, then only a subset o f the Operators 
customers would be able to use it. In the UK, the regulator OFTEL, would prevent such a service being 
launched because it could not be universally offered.
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cheaper than BT retail tariff, whilst the prices SPs were forced to pay meant they had to 
sell their services at potentially greater than retail. For this reason Service Providers felt 
they had as much right to C l3 tariffs as Operators (OFTEL 1995).
Service Providers were also pressing for a more open Operator architecture, suggesting 
that services should not be ‘bundled’ and that a toolkit approach could be employed. This 
would allow them ‘.. .to construct their own services from the service functions available 
from the Network Operator’ (Sutton 1995).
OFTEL Perspective
The UK national regulator (OFTEL) had a series of objectives, discussed in detail in 
Chapter 5. These included a single virtual UK telephony network, the protection of 
consumer interests and effective competition. Competition, leading to competitive pricing 
and minimised service charges, was used to ensure the consumer received value for 
money. Standardisation was used to expedite basic interconnect and the interconnection of 
BT’s Supplementary Services Business products, thereby seeking to ensure an ‘any to any’ 
service.
EU Perspective
The EU perspective was similar to that of a national regulator, but at the supra-national 
level. It identified that a sound economic European telecommunications infrastructure was 
important for the continued economic growth of the EU and hence positioning and 
influence of the EU in the world market. In order to develop such an infrastructure it 
adopted the approach that competition would lead to investment, which in turn would lead 
to development of the infrastructure. This approach fitted quite nicely with its ongoing 
objectives of breaking-down the trade barriers between Member States, thus 
telecommunications became another area for its market liberalisation programme.
The EU Commission’s initial (1998 liberalisation) approach was to open the Member 
States’ telecommunications markets to service competition. Latterly (2002), it has sought 
to bring the application of Members States’ regulations on a more common footing, by 
generating a number of lower level directives. These (in mid 2003) replace key judgement
 ^More recently these have become known as Condition 69 or Annex 2 rates.
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criteria of individual Member States with a common interpretation and application to 
regulation.
The EU, like OFTEL, recognised the importance of standardisation in ensuring a pan- 
European telecommunications network. The EU created the ETSI standardisation body and 
the Commission provided direction as to the areas of standardisation to be generated, both 
in support of new technology initiatives and regulatory directives^.
Global (i.e. WTO) Perspective
The World Trade Organisation had an objective, to help encourage the development of 
impoverished countries through trade with better developed countries. The WTO sees that 
a strong telecommunications infrastructure aids trade with other countries and encourages 
such economic growth. Better lines of communications allow production to be sited in 
poorer countries with reduced labour costs, whilst retaining the ability to react quickly to 
market demands and changes to the product, as demanded by the developed countries’ 
markets in which the goods are sold^
To encourage such trade, the WTO aims to reduce the barriers between countries (such as 
the taxation of imported goods or services to protect home produced items), allowing 
goods produced in other countries to be imported without hindrance.
These stakeholder positions provide a reference with which to compare and possibly 
correlate with the responses arising from the survey data analysis. Prior to the analysis, the 
next section provides details of what surveys were undertaken, their recipients and what 
they had as their objectives.
6.3 Survey Overview
The theoretical development underpinning the framing of the questions used in the 
construction of the surveys, has already been discussed in Chapters 3, 4 & 5. Survey 1 
(The Regulation of Intelligent Networks) focused on stakeholder attitudes towards the
ETSI also decide for themselves areas which should be discussed for standardisation.
Some say such an approach encourages the exploitation o f workers o f poorer countries, through the 
production o f goods by workers working long hours for low pay. These groups frequently disrupt the 
international WTO meetings. Others argue that such workers enjoy a higher rate o f pay compared to others 
living locally and that it brings income to the country.
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validity of three IN architectures (the standard ITU-T architecture model and two 
alternative IN architectures) and gathered and prioritised information related to opening IN 
interfaces. Additionally, it aimed to determine concerns that could arise with the 
development of regulation and standardisation of interconnection interfaces. Survey 2 
(Intelligent Networks ‘98’) was undertaken to assess if industry focus and concerns had 
shifted since Survey 1 and to explore the relationship of INs with new technological 
developments, such as connection-less transport and routing.
This section provides details of what surveys were undertaken, their objectives, their 
recipients and the response rate achieved.
Regulation of Intelligent Networks (Survey 1)
For the first survey (Appendix A) 250 questionnaires were distributed and 23 were 
returned (a 9.2% response rate). The majority of respondents were based in the United 
Kingdom (UK). Responses were sought fi*om named individuals of the key institutions 
within each of the stakeholder groups identified in Chapter 3. In those cases where the 
respondent failed to reply, another representative from the same organisation was 
approached^. The benefit of targeting named individuals with a known interest in, or 
responsibility for, INs is evidenced by the relatively high response rate achieved (Thomson 
1990).
The survey allowed confirmation, development and prioritisation of the findings fi*om the 
background research. It also investigated the problems and issues with interconnect within 
INs at different points in the architecture. More importantly, other IN architecture models 
could be considered just as architecturally appropriate as the standardised one, illustrating 
that standards might be more important than regulation as a means of encouraging IN 
innovation. Additionally it was hoped to identify areas that would aid or hinder the 
interconnection of Intelligent Networks, in order to determine whether the regulators or 
standardisation bodies had recognised and addressed them.
See Chapter 3 for details o f how the Stakeholders were selected.
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The survey fulfilled a number of key functions for the research:
• confirmation of the preliminary questions derived from the background 
research;
• development of these questions through an exploration of user issues related to 
the interconnection of INs;
• exploration of alternative IN architectures;
• establishment of the relative importance of the standardisation and regulation 
processes as a means of promoting innovation in INs;
• prioritisation of research activity.
Respondents were, in the main, firom Operators (9) (referred to as Public Telephone 
Operators (PTOs) in the survey^) and Suppliers (9). Service Providers (2) and Consultants 
(3) made up the remainder. The number of responses fi*om the Operators and Suppliers 
were representative, since they provided insight into the views of all the major 
Telecommunications Operators in the UK and all the main Suppliers in Europe. The data 
used to draw the conclusions is therefore dominated by the Operators and Suppliers. Where 
the other categories of respondent are significantly different, the text indicates who and 
what these are.
An attempt was made to determine whether there was a correlation between ‘job function’ 
and response patterns. A review of the job titles suggested that all the respondents could be 
grouped within five categories, namely Network Strategy (8), Design (7), Implementation 
(3), with a minority in Sales (2) and Marketing (3). There were no discernible trends in the 
answers from respondents working in the different areas, perhaps confirming that company 
strategy is stronger than any thinking that different roles within a sector may have.
The analysis of the data identified a number of weaknesses within the survey, where 
tighter wording of question options, or a larger number of options, would have produced 
more discriminating data. ‘Private Branch Exchange’ Suppliers are a case in point, as their 
responses differed significantly from the other Suppliers. The most probable cause is that 
these Suppliers were not intent on developing their products as an integral part of a public 
telephone network, but rather saw their market as the Service Provider/User end of the
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market that would not wish to integrate with the Operator’s network to which they were 
connected. Greater benefit may therefore have been gained by sub-categorising the types 
of Supplier. This and other potential improvements, are discussed further in the analysis.
Intelligent Networks ‘98’ (Survey 2)
Survey 2 (Appendix B) provided the opportunity to reaffirm the goals and concerns 
identified in Survey 1. More importantly it allowed new questions relating to emerging 
technologies, specifically the Internet.
The survey was undertaken in conjunction with the organisers of an IN conference the 
researcher was addressing (Shepherd 1998). The recipients of the survey questionnaire 
were the attendees of the conference with a known interest in INs, employed within a wide 
variety of European telecommunications related organisations.
The survey achieved a response of 29 questionnaires from a total of 132 distributed forms 
(a 22% response rate). Respondents were mainly from Operators (19, including 4 Mobile 
Operators) and Suppliers (6, including one exchange/switch Supplier) and the remainder 
from Computer Suppliers and Information Technology companies^.
The survey asked respondents for their Job Titles. Although some direct mapping firom this 
to the first survey’s categorisations can be made (Sales, Network Operations etc.), a large 
number of job titles were nondescript, e.g. ‘Business Analysis’ (INI 6), ‘Business 
Development’ (IN42), and the categorisation which best suited that individual was unclear. 
It was therefore considered inappropriate to try and identify response trends by job 
segment (rather than by stakeholder segment) owing to the inability to confidently 
categorise the respondent.
The survey format employed was that of individual questions followed by a text box. This 
approach was taken to speed completion of the form and hence promote the greatest 
number of returns. However such a format led users to employ a much wider set of terms 
within their responses, making analysis more subjective. The analysis approach adopted
 ^The term ‘Public Telephone Operator’ (PTO) was common at the time o f the survey, but now appears 
dated. This thesis therefore uses the shortened form ‘Operator’ in its discussions.
 ^Information Technology in this context is that associated with software and computer coding.
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was to equate and categorise responses through the use of key words or phrases. These 
categorisations were based upon personal experience and expertise, but have been checked 
with other experts in the field of Intelligent Networks, Network Operations etc., to ensure 
they have been correctly interpreted. Since respondents were not being forced to select 
fi*om a prescribed list, the equated responses had potentially greater significance than 
comparable questions within Survey 1.
With this background in mind, the remainder of the chapter examines the analysis of the 
survey data and interview information, with a view to addressing a number of the questions 
arising firom the thesis hypothesis given in Chapter 1.
6.4 Intelligent Network Architecture Models
Information gathered in the early 1990s, by the European Union (EU) (ETCO 1990) and 
the UK Department of Trade and Industry (DTI 1992), indicated a high probability that 
any regulation of Intelligent Networks would be based upon an implementation of the 
International Telecommunication Union - Telecommunications (ITU-T) IN architecture 
model. The implicit assumption that the ITU-T model was the most appropriate, is one of 
the major questions raised by this study, that is:
• ‘How can it be ensured that robust technical and architectural models exist 
before standards are ratified?’
Should the model used be found to be inappropriate, then the standards based upon it may 
be sub-optimal and use of the resulting standards in support of regulatory policy may be 
inappropriate.
Survey 1 investigated this issue by asking respondents to select one of three possible IN 
architecture models as the most appropriate firom the perspectives of technical features, 
regulation and product strategies for the identified stakeholder groups. The first 
architecture was the standard IN model, referred to as the ‘Centralised Processing 
Environment’ and labelled A in Figure 6.1. The researcher developed the other two models 
as an original contribution to architecture diversification. The first of these, referred to as 
the ‘Centralised Distributed Processing’ model and labelled B in Figure 6.1, borrowed the 
idea of distributed processing from the computing environment and applied it to the
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telecommunications domain. This is now an established model for Intelligent Networks 
requiring centralised intelligence and is capable of high levels of processing, enabling high 
volumes of calls to be quickly serviced. The third model, referred to as the ‘Centralised 
Distributed Processing’ model and labelled C in Figure 6.1, was wholly the resercher’s 
own development and introduced the concept of local and central Service Control Point 
(SCPs). These models have been discussed in detail in Chapter 4.
--------
SSF
CCF
Option A:
Centralised Processing 
Environment
SCF ) ( SDF SCF ) ( SDF
SSF
CCF
Option B:
Centralised Distributed 
Processing Environment
Centralised
SSF
CCF
SCF ) ( S D F  
Local
Option C:
Mixed Distributed 
Processing Environment
SCF Service Control Function
SDF Service Data Function 
SSF Service Switching Function 
CCF Cali Control Function
Figure 6.1 Network Architectures
20 respondents answered this question in Survey 1, with four Supplier respondents 
identifying more than one model as being an appropriate IN architecture. The related 
survey results are charted in Figure 6.2 and discussed in the following subsections.
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Operator
Service
Provider
Supplier
stakeholder
/  Mixed Distributed Processing 
Centralised Distributed Processing 
Centralised Processing Architecture
Consultant
Figure 6.2 Respondents’ IN Architecture Preferences 
Centralised Processing
Stakeholder
Architecture
Operator Supplier Service
Provider
Consultant Total
Centralised Processing 3 3 6
Table 6.2 Respondents preference for the Centralised Processing Architecture
Table 6.2 shows the categories of respondent preferring the Centralised Processing 
architecture model. Six of the respondents selected it, giving the reasons as lower cost, 
simplicity, or that it matched the CSl IN architecture (e.g. cbc09). In arguing this latter 
case, the respondents asserted that the system limitations which would render it 
inappropriate were unlikely to be reached, either through low growth of the services, or 
because advances in processing development, would ensure that upgrades always stayed in 
advance of service growth.
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Centralised Distributed Processing
Stakeholder
Architecture
Operator Supplier Service
Provider
Consultant Total
Centralised 
Distributed Processing
3 6 9
Table 6.3 Respondents preference for the Centralised Distributed Processing 
Architecture
Table 6.3 shows that nine out of 20 respondents (predominantly Suppliers) preferred the 
Centralised Distributed Processing model, recognising the cost benefits of centralisation 
(ebb 14) and the benefits of a distributed processing architecture to ensure adequate speed 
of response and resilience (bby44, cbb25). The model was also said to provide flexibility, 
by providing the option to migrate to the mixed distributed architecture should it be needed 
(ebb 14).
At the time of the survey, there were no internationally ratified standards for computer 
distributed processing. Such standards were generally produced by computer 
manufacturers and were specific to their equipment. The favourable reception of the model 
in the survey, perhaps indicated that further consideration should have been given to 
introducing a Centralised Distributed Processing model into the IN standardisation fora, 
allowing Operators to expand firom single to multi-processing INs, whilst remaining 
vendor independent and allowing reuse of processing hardware.
A number of respondents identified that different architectures would be better for different 
situations, depending upon the geography, traffic and services offered. For instance, one 
Supplier stated ‘Mixed distributed allows office based services. (Centralised) Distributed is 
best for GSM etc. where centralisation is key’ (bay40). Other respondents, reflecting on the 
potential geographic coverage of the model, gave opposing viewpoints. One indicated that 
Centralised Distributed Processing was appropriate for a small network (and for reuse of 
equipment) (bay05), while a second argued that it was appropriate for a large country-wide 
network (with its greater processing requirements) (cbal 8).
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Mixed Distributed Processing
Stakeholder
Architecture
Operator Supplier Service
Provider
Consultant Total
Mixed Distributed 
Processing
2 6 2 2 12
Table 6.4 Respondents preference for the Mixed Distributed Processing Architecture
The Mixed Distributed Processing Architecture was the researcher’s own development as 
an attempt to compromise between the speed of the traditional distributed processing 
architecture and that of the standardised IN. In this architecture, the service and data are 
located both centrally and locally.
As is summarised in Table 6.4,12 of the 20 respondents replying to this section in Survey 
1, selected the Mixed Distributed Processing (MDP) architecure. However, it is interesting 
to note that this includes the selections of the two Service Providers (SPs) and two 
Consultants who responded to this question in the survey. Examining the model in terms of 
its attractiveness to Suppliers and Consultants, it was selected by 8 of the 20 respondents 
(predominantly Suppliers), making it about as attractive to them as the other architectures. 
The two SPs and two Consultants preferred the model owing to its more open architecture, 
the SPs opting for the greater flexibility in the way they could interconnect to Operators 
networks compared to the other architectures. With an Operator’s network able to cope 
with multiple SCPs, the benefit of an SP owning and interconnecting an SCP to the 
Operators network increases, particularly if the SPs are regional or offer primarily regional 
services. Analysis of the responses indicated that the architecture was interpreted as 
operating in one of two ways.
The first is where applications are running both centrally and locally. Those having 
frequent data changes, would run centrally, whilst those where the data changes are 
infrequent could run locally (increasing the query/response speed). This is how it was 
originally envisaged to operate when first constructed (see Chapter 4).
The second interpretation is that unless an Operator is willing to be tied to one Supplier’s 
equipment, the design constraints of different Suppliers’ systems forces the Operator to
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accept the mixed distributed processing environment architecture (day22). A number of 
respondents adopted this second interpretation because (at the time), applications from 
different Suppliers could only run on their own SCPs. Standardisation fora therefore 
needed to concentrate on expanding their scope in the arena of Intelligent Network 
applications and the service execution environment, to truly mix and match both hardware 
and software. This would have been of greater benefit than concentrating on expanding 
feature sets.
Another respondent favoured the Mixed Distributed Processing (MDP) model because they 
felt that the services would inevitably be a ‘. . mix of ... standardised ... and those creating 
competitive advantage’ (dayl4). This respondent perhaps recognised that a market leader 
would not be constrained to offering services within the limitations of the IN standards 
prevailing at the time, or to only one Supplier’s offering. Another view, from a Consultant, 
was that ‘The multiplicity of service networks and service providers means no one can 
dictate a single uniform solution’ (day07). Here the respondent seemed to be taking the 
view that the large variation in types of services and the demand for flexibility, would 
create an ever evolving capability set and thus never be sufficiently firm for 
standardisation and hardware/software matching. In both these cases the inference is that 
an Operator has to adopt the MDP architecture if it wishes to maintain a competitive 
advantage in the services it offers.
One unfavourable response to the MDP architecture came from the respondent who didn’t 
‘.. .want multiple service agreements/accounts’ for customers (cbb25), preferring the 
centralised distributed architecture. A possible interpretation of this response could be an 
unwillingness to pay for an integrated support and billing system (see the later section on 
‘Other Interconnection Issues’). The fact the respondent was employed by a relatively new 
telecommunications company lent support to this interpretation. Such responses add 
weight to the argument that standardisation bodies should perhaps have given greater 
priority to considering and developing management interfaces (including billing) for IN 
equipment.
The Operator respondents, in not choosing this model, gave the reasons as complexity, cost 
and not conforming to the CSl model (ebb 14, cbal8, cbcl3, cbc09).
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Summary
Examining the combined responses of the Suppliers and Operators, there was little 
preference for any one of the three architecture models with four of the Suppliers 
indicating that different models would be appropriate for different situations. There was a 
slight preference for the two alternative IN architectures (Centralised Distributed 
Processing and Mixed Distributed Processing) compared to the standardised Centralised 
Processing architecture. However, considering the choices of the Service Providers and 
Consultants, with their preference for a more open architecture and perhaps lack of 
awareness of the issues associated with such an architecture, the Mixed Distributed 
Processing model becomes the favourite. The principle reasons were its operational 
flexibility and/or speed of response.
Survey 1 has demonstrated two key points. First, that the standardised IN architecture is 
not necessarily the favoured architecture and secondly that no single architecture can be 
described as being the favourite, since different circumstances will favour different 
architectures. Thus in answering the question raised in Chapter 1 :
• ‘How can it be ensured that robust technical and architectural models exist 
before standards are ratified?’;
it is unlikely that complete technical architecture models will ever exist prior to 
standardisation, owing to differing and changing circumstances that make alternative 
architectures attractive to different stakeholders at different points in time. This indicates 
that standards need to be sufficiently flexible to accommodate different architectures, 
including those not envisaged when the standards were initially ratified. It also indicates 
that using the IN standardised architecture as the basis of regulation to open IN interfaces 
and interconnect could be inappropriate, since this will not be the optimum architecture for 
some Operators.
This section has sought to test the appropriateness of the standard IN architecture.
However, since the IN architecture can be regulated through the opening of interfaces, the 
next section discusses the issues identified with the points of interconnection relating to the 
standard architecture.
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6.5 Points of Interconnect in a CS1 Environment
Inter-operation across networks owned by different Operators requires a point of 
connection, or interconnect, between the networks, the precise location of which 
determines the level of sophistication and functionality available to each of them.
As has been discussed in the previous section, actions by the DTI in 1992 indicated a high 
probability that any regulation of Intelligent Networks would be based upon the 
standardised ITU-T CSl architecture and its associated interfaces. This architecture, shown 
in Figure 6.3, was used as the baseline model by both the DTI (DTI 1992) and in this 
research.
Network Operator Service Provider
SCnF
SMF
SCF
SDF
SRF
SSF
CCF
CCAF
Service Creation Fmution 
Service Management Function 
Service Control Functum 
Service Data Function 
Service Resource Function 
Service Switching Function 
Can Cordrol Function 
Can Control Access Function SRF - ® -  CCF
Figure 6.3 Points of IN Interconnect
The operation of the architecture shown in Figure 6.3 has been explained in Chapter 4. 
Respondents were asked to identify the most suitable interfaces for the different groups of 
stakeholders and to identify the problems associated with using these interfaces (similar to 
the KPMG (1993) model). It addresses the research question:
• ‘Does regulation or detailed standardisation constrain technical innovation, 
service delivery, or both?’
The findings are summarised in Figures 6.4 and 6.5.
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Cust (End User) Stakeholder 
Mobile 
New Corr\er
Preferred Interconnect Point
Figure 6.4 Preferred Interconnect Point for Different Classes of Stakeholder
Figure 6.4 shows the totals for the choices made for each interface by each stakeholder. 
The three zero values (ringed), represent interconnect points for two classes of stakeholder 
(Mobile and New Carrier), which were identified by respondents but were not given in the 
list of prescribed response options. As such, they cannot be compared quantitatively with 
the data for the other groups of stakeholders, but are considered qualitatively.
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The two zero values represent alternative interconnects proposed by respondents.
Figure 6.5 The Problems Associated with the Interconnection of Different Classes of 
Stakeholder to an Operator’s Network
Figure 6.5 quantifies the responses relating to the perceived importance of problems 
associated with each stakeholder group interconnecting with a standardised Intelligent 
Network.
An unexpected finding from the Survey 1 question eoneeming the most appropriate 
interfaee to intereonnect to an Operator’s IN, is that six of the respondents replied with a 
multiple answer. In such cases it has not been possible to associate the specific problems 
they identified in Question 3.5 of Survey 1 with the interface point they seleeted in
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response to Question 3.4. However these respondents did not give multiple interface 
responses for every stakeholder group, thus there were a large number of cases where 
problems could be directly associated with individual interfaces and these, together with 
the remaining respondents who did not give multiple answers, allowed trends to be 
established. It was these trends that were used as the basis in deciding where the issues are 
discussed in this section.
The following subsections consider the survey data relating to points of interconnect from 
four different service aspects, the choices being summarised by applicable interface at the 
beginning of each subsection.
Service Development and Provisioning
Stakeholder Preferred Interconnect Point
(by number of respondents considering it appropriate)
Operator
Carrier
Service Provider
Cust. (End User)
Mobile
New Carrier
1
M
1
Total
Service Creation Interface (M),
Service Creation -  Service Management Interface (L)
Table 6.5 Preferred Interconnect Points for Service Development and Provisioning
Seven respondents to Survey 1 felt that the Service Creation interfaces were appropriate 
for interconnection. These responses implied that Service Providers would want to create 
their own services and use the Operator’s SCP to run them. This could be achieved either 
by the Service Provider downloading their application to the Operator’s SCP (interface L) 
or by the SP using the Operator’s own Service Creation Environment (interface M). 
Service Creation for network services was an issue for 12 out of the 29 respondents to 
Survey 2. Their main concern was that service creation was not as flexible as they desired. 
Comments relating to ‘customisation to local requirements’, (IN 12) and ‘service
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differentiation from competition’ (fr^lS), suggested that the ‘SIBs were too few to make 
real new services’ (IN3 8).
The Operators found themselves in a dilemma in that whilst welcoming standardisation to 
minimise costs (purchasing off-the-shelf with minimal bespoke development) and gaining 
themselves purchasing power (by being able to mix different Suppliers’ equipment), they 
found they were getting a similar service building capability to that of any other Operator 
with standardised equipment (Shepherd 1997). In order to create unique services. 
Operators would have to compromise the ideals of standardisation and Supplier 
competition, in order to develop a bespoke SIB set, resulting in ‘Fast service 
Creation.. .allowing the Operator to be the... leading edge’ (IN30) in the provision of 
Intelligent Network provided services.
A related problem is that applications are often created with the control of one particular 
Supplier’s SSP in mind. These applications will employ SIBs which may not interact and 
operate with another Supplier’s SSP, owing to the different ways switch actions have been 
implemented by the different Suppliers. This creates the situation whereby either duplicate 
applications are written for the same service (to service the different SSPs of different 
Suppliers), or (what often happens in practice) the call is routed to an SSP of a type which 
communicates with the SCP containing the application. Woollard (interview 2002) 
indicated that this limitation has meant the flexibility of SIBs has never been realised. 
Various intermediate Application Programming Interface (API) initiatives such as Sun 
Microsystem’s Java API for Integrated Network (JAIN) and Microsoft’s Object Request 
Broker (ORB) have been developed to help avoid this situation, but have not been 
implemented to any great degree (Blau 1998, Korzeniowski 1998).
One respondent (Survey 1) felt that the ‘SCEF (SCnF interface)... should be made open so 
as not to compromise the integrity of the network’ (day22). They considered that this 
would be an appropriate interconnect point for Service Providers, writing their own 
applications and running them on an Operator’s platform; however Bohacek et al. (1993) 
felt that international standards for this interface were unlikely to be developed.
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The respondent also recognised that the integrity of the network must be maintained in so 
far as the third-party application must not be allowed to damage the operational capability 
of the Operator’s network. A similar observation was made by Leber:
‘.. .increased activity, much of it linked with third party service providers, brings 
the potential risk of large-scale network disturbance if actions are not taken.’ (ibid 
1998)
The potential damage that could be caused would be on a par with major network outages 
arising from software upgrades. For instance, in 1991 a signalling software problem 
resulted in millions of customers in the USA losing service for several hours (Tele.com 
1998). Pandurangan (1993) suggests employing gateways to screen messages, but many of 
the hazardous messages would, under normal circumstances, be considered valid. It is the 
quantity and context in which they are used that are the issue.
Another respondent (to Survey 2) highlighted issues relating to ‘Total Service Creation’ 
(IN8), with a further three respondents regarding Service Creation as the key Intelligent 
Network challenge. These respondents were concerned with the bespoke provisioning of 
services for customers (i.e. adapting a product to a customer’s individual requirements), 
inter-working with the customer’s equipment in order to provide these services (INI6, 
IN26, IN34), (see ‘Other Interconnect Issues’ section) and provisioning in conjunction 
with existing (non IN) services.
Since IN and non IN services would not operate on the same platform, they would not be 
built using the same service creation environment, therefore integration would only be at 
the operational level. For example, suppose that an Operator sells a messaging service 
comprising the ability to implement a diversion application at the IN Level and a mailbox 
application at the exchange level; a non-integrated Service Creation environment would 
mean that the application associating the customer telephone number with a mailbox would 
need to be initiated at the exchange level and, using a totally different order entry system, a 
diversion application would be created on the IN associated with the customer’s telephone 
number. That is, the one service requires two service applications to be invoked and similar 
details entered on two different systems. An integrated service creation environment would 
allow a messaging product to be developed which would encompass both the mailbox and 
diversion applications from the same provisioning system, thereby requiring a single
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service invocation to supply the customer with the messaging product. Separate Service 
Creation is a significant problem for any Operator offering IN services in conjunction with 
existing services on its legacy systems.
All the problems identified with Service Creation could be symptomatic of such 
provisioning difficulties. Thus the restrictions of service development (e.g. the inflexibility 
of Service Independent building Blocks resulting in a limited ability to adapt to customer 
requirements), service inter-working, throughput of management systems (to implement 
applications and alter customer data), as well as providing customers with the ability to 
build, invoke and change services/service data themselves, could all be caused or 
exacerbated by a poor service creation capability.
Interconnect at the Intelligence Level
Stakeholder
Operator
Carrier
Service Provider
Cust. (End User)
Mobile
New Carrier
Total
Preferred Interconnect Point
(by number of respondents considering it appropriate)
G
15
H
10
J
1
1
K
1
* Not marked on survey questionnaire, but raised by respondent in free format field 
Key
Service Management -  Service Data Interface (J),
Service Management -  Service Control Interface (K),
Service Control to Service Data Interface (Intra-Network) (I),
Service Control to Service Data Interface (Inter-Network) (H), 
Service Control to Service Control Interface (Inter-Network) (G)
Table 6.6 Preferred Interconnect Points for the Intelligence Level
The inter-network Service Control to Service Control Interface (G), was preferred by seven 
respondents as a suitable point for Operator interconnect, by four respondents as suitable 
for Carrier interconnect and by four respondents as suitable for Service Provider 
interconnect. The principle problems identified with Operator and Carrier interconnect 
were the Interconnect Compliance Testing of this interface and Maintaining Network 
Integrity. Interestingly, given a Carrier’s technical similarity to an Operator, network
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integrity did not feature as significantly for the Operator respondents. It could be that 
Carriers typically have fewer services than Operators and thus there is less chance of 
accidentally compromising other services. Despite interface G being standardised in CS2 
(ratified after Survey 1 was returned) and there being a standardised set of IN services, the 
construction of those services on individual SCPs would almost certainly be different, so 
inter-networking is not as simple as commonly envisaged.
The next most popular interface (10 respondents) was the inter-network Service Control to 
Service Data Interface (H). This is a fairly simple interface and one that has been 
standardised in CS2. It requires SCF knowledge of the third party’s SDF’s data structure. 
As before, the key issue identified was that the ‘SCF/SDF should be made open so as not 
to compromise the integrity of the network’ (day22).
Two respondents chose the intra-network Service Control to Service Data Interface (I) as a 
suitable interconnection point. This is a bit meaningless, since for a third party to 
interconnect at this interface would effectively mean an inter-network Service Control to 
Service Data Interface (H) had been created. It is therefore perhaps more appropriate to 
sum these choices to those of interface H.
The Service Management -  Service Data Interface (J) and Service Management -  Service 
Control Interface (K), were only chosen by a few as appropriate interconnection points. 
This is unsurprising since these interfaces principally relate to the management of the 
equipment. The small number of respondents identifying these interfaces, may have been 
considering their suitability for remote monitoring the state of the network and in 
particular, third parties’ applications which may be running on the SCP.
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Interconnect at the Switch Level
Stakeholder
Operator
Carrier
Service Provider
Cust. (End User)
Mobile
New Carrier
Total
Preferred Interconnect Point
(by number of respondents considering it appropriate)
14
B
1
12
D
1
E
14 12
* Not marked on survey questionnaire, but raised by respondent in free format field 
Key
Service Switching -  Service Control Interface (Intra-Network) (F) 
Service Switching -  Service Control Interface (Inter-Network) (E) 
Service Resource -  Service Control Interface (D)
Call Control - Service Switching Interface (C)
Service Resource - Call Control Interface (B)
Call Control Access -  Call Control Interface (A)
Table 6.7 Preferred Interconnect Points for the Switch Level
There was some confusion shown in the responses in Survey 1, between the preference for 
the intra-network and inter-network Service Switching -  Service Control Interfaces (E & 
F). A third party interconnecting at this point should always choose interface F, since they 
must always have their application operating on their own platform. If they wished to have 
their application operating on the Operator’s platform, then they should choose the Service 
Management -  Service Control (K) or Service Creation -  Service Management (L) 
interfaces, in order to load their own applications on the Operator’s platform. Under such 
circumstances the inter-network Service Switching -  Service Control Interface (F), is 
wholly internal to the Operator and opening it to third parties is meaningless. For this 
reason, those responses indicating interfaces E or F for a particular question have been 
combined and regarded as meaning the same.
The Service Switching - Service Control Interface (E/F) was the most popular for 
Operator, Carrier and Service Provider interconnect. Interconnect Compliance Testing to 
ensure network integrity is maintained, was identified as a key problem. This reaffirms the 
traditional view within the industry that this interface is an appropriate interface for SP 
interconnection to Operators and acknowledges the problems of operating across this
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interface (i.e. sending potentially damaging commands to the switch, causing congestion 
etc.) and compromising the integrity of the underlying network.
Interface F is also the one Operators would ideally like to use when implementing an IN, 
potentially allowing re-use of their existing switches. Interconnection with the legacy 
network was seen as a critical challenge for seven of the respondents to Survey 2, in 
implementing their organisation’s IN network design. The specific reasons given included 
‘.. .implementing SSP functionality in all switches’ (IN46) and ‘Integration of new INs 
with existing IN components (SSP)’ (INIO). Many of the deployed switches were designed 
without considering INs (INs did not exist when the switches were being designed) and 
those switches which were able to evolve to incorporate an SCP interface, almost certainly 
implemented INs in a proprietary manor, thereby restricting the ability of the hardware to 
be upgraded to incorporate standardised functionality.
The Call Control Access - Call Control Interface (A) and Call Control - Service Switching 
Interface (C) were equally popular for Operator and Carrier interconnect, with the Call 
Control - Service Switching Interface (C) being predominantly chosen by Operators. 
Interconnect Compliance Testing was once again identified as a key problem. The 
traditional problems with the provision of these interfaces have been seen as:
• for A, the call models had proprietary elements, therefore the easiest way to 
connect via a CCAF would be to pass the call to an exchange having a SSF; 
and
• for C, the SSF/CCF interface was highly proprietary having been developed in 
an evolutionary fashion rather than planned
(Shepherd 1993).
The implementation of these interfaces therefore tended to vary between Suppliers’ 
equipment and would be costly and time consuming to standardise^, for what could 
arguably have been minimal benefit. Only recently (2001) have some Suppliers released 
the Application Programming Interface (API) for these areas and hence allowed access to 
these interfaces (interview Jenkins 2001).
i.e. Upgrade to a standard, should a standard ever be developed.
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Integration with Customer Premise Equipment
Stakeholder Preferred
(by numbe
A G
Operator 5 1
Carrier 4 4
Service Provider 4
Cust. (End User) 5
Mobile *
New Carrier *
Total 14 15
* Not marked on survey questionnaire, but raised by respondent in free format field 
Key
Service Control to Service Control Interface (Inter-Network) (G)
Call Control Access -  Call Control Interface (A)
Table 6.8 Preferred Interconnect Point to Customer Premise Equipment
The most appropriate interconnect point for a customer was thought to be the Call Control 
Access -  Call Control Interface (A) (Survey 1). This is typically a C l  Call Control 
interconnect^, as referred to by one respondent (day22) and represents the way Operators 
and Carriers currently interconnect in the UK. Service Providers and Users are currently 
not allowed to connect in this way; thus the respondents could either be inferring that such 
an interconnect be made more freely available or that the CCAF functionality could be 
made inherent in Customer Premise Equipment. Weight is given to this latter argument by 
identification of the problem of a proprietary interface.
Some respondents to Survey 2 highlighted potential problems when offering an end-to-end 
(routeing) service over networks incorporating non-integrated management systems. For 
example, ‘.. .relationship with PABX vendors’ (IN 16) and ‘.. .provision of CTI in IN’ 
(IN44). Such comments highlighted the need for interaction between IN and Computer 
Telephone Integration (CTI) applications. There are clearly benefits to be gained fi*om an 
IN application interacting with a CTI application before routeing a call, so as to ensure 
efficient call handling (Shepherd 1998, Shepherd 1999c). Although the researcher is not 
aware of any complex interactions currently taking place in a public network, there are 
simple interactions which have recently (2000) been implemented. For instance, based
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Upon information from a CTI application on the customer premises, (such as one 
monitoring queuing and call handling times at a call centre), an IN application in the public 
network can dynamically alter the routeing and hence the spread of calls across a number 
of geographically remote call centres.
Points of Interconnect Summary
In order to provide a telephony connection to customers on networks provided by different 
Operators, the networks need to be cormected. With Intelligent Networks, the point of 
interconnection can be made at several points in the network, depending upon the level of 
sophistication and functionality the Operator wants to provide. These were shown in 
Figure 6.3.
The responses to Survey 1, identifying the problems associated with the different 
interfaces, together with additional information from interviews, publications and personal 
experience, were presented at the 1997 Brussels ‘Intelligent Network’ conference 
(Shepherd 1997). This information has been summarised in Table 6.9.
CCAF-CCF 
(Standardised CS1)
SSF-SCF 
(Standardised CS1)
SCF-SCF (Remote) 
(Standardised CS2)
SCF-SDF 
(Standardised CS2)
SCF-SDF (Remote) 
(Standardised CS2)
SDF-SDF (Remote) 
(Standardised CS2)
Intereonnect
Service 
Uniqueness
Service 
Transparency
NetworkStandardisedinterface Efficiency Integrity
CAF-SSF
(Proprietary)
SMF-SCF
(Proprietary)
SMF-SDF
(Proprietary)
Key:
Table 6.9 Points of Interconnect - Ease and Value of Implementation
 ^The Call Control connection between telecommunications exchanges is at what is termed the transport level 
(ISO term). The protocol used to convey information, both signalling and voice over this link is CCITT No. 7 
Signalling System, often abbreviated to Cl.
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The columns of the table categorise the characteristics exhibited by each of the interfaces 
shown in the table rows. The colour of each cell indicates the ability of the interface to 
meet that feature requirement.
The features are:
• Ease of Interconnect - the ease by which a third party (e.g. competitor) can 
implement a suitable interface to enable interworking;
• Service Transparency - the continuity of the Took and feel’ of services offered 
across interconnected Operators’ networks;
• Service Uniqueness - the flexibility an Operator has in developing unique or 
complex services, not easily replicated by competitors;
• Service Efficiency - the level of processing required to offer and manage
.services;
• Standardisation - whether a particular interface is proprietary or to 
internationally recognised standards;
• Network Integrity - the ability of an interface to avoid being used to convey 
potentially damaging commands from a third party.
The table indicates that overall, remote database look-ups are the easiest to implement 
owing to their simplicity and standardisation in CS2. It also reveals that interconnect at the 
management interfaces is likely to be difficult, due to the proprietary nature of the 
messaging involved. Subsequent to Survey 1, open management interfaces were gradually 
addressed in the standards arena, but with the advent of competing technology slowly 
replacing INs, a standardised IN management interface will never be implemented.
To some extent, regulation in the UK has forced the opening of IN interfaces through the 
regulation of products falling within the Supplementary Services Business^^ (SSB) 
category. Such products have to have interfaces for third parties to interconnect to, in order 
that another Operator can offer the same service on their network. This was discussed in 
detail in Chapter 5.
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A number of the problems associated with stakeholder interconnection have consistently 
arisen regardless of the interface under discussion. This demonstrates them to be generally 
applicable to interconnect and not necessary attributable to a single interface. Respondents 
to Survey 1 felt ‘Interconnect Compliance Testing’ of the interfaces was the greatest 
problem, followed by the use of ‘Proprietary Interfaces’, ‘Network Integrity’ and ‘Data 
Security’. For example, ‘Regulators ... should impose that network integrity and data 
security is ensured’ (bay05). Other respondents highlighted that ‘the problem “Service 
Interaction” is unsolved.’ (cbc 13, supported by bay05 & day22).
All these problems are interrelated. The use of proprietary interfaces generally means that 
the interface specification has not been released by the Supplier and interconnection is not 
possible, except to more of the same Supplier’s equipment. If the interface is open, then 
Interconnect Compliance Testing is needed to ensure that rogue commands from one 
network to another do not compromise Network Integrity (i.e. causing it to fail in some 
way) and that customer-specific data held on the network cannot be retrieved by 
commands from a third party’s network, except on a ‘need to know’ basis. This latter point 
highlights a grey area of what information should be considered essential for the efficient 
(intelligent) routeing of a call and could be released, and what should be withheld. The 
requirements will vary from network to network and service to service, depending upon 
their implementation.
OFTEL’s view was that they
‘.. .will not necessarily accept particular arguments that secure interconnection is not 
achievable and encourages those involved in the development of standards to build 
in appropriate means of access control. OFTEL would, of course, also expect 
network Operators to design their internal network configurations to limit the extent 
of damage that might be done’ (interview Newman 1997),
placing the onus of ensuring Network Integrity on the Operator.
SSB is deemed by OFTEL to be all dominant Operator services utilising capabilities which are not 
dependent upon any particular telecommunications network e.g. Conference Calls.
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The issue of Service Interaction also implies the need for compliance testing, but at the 
application level, to ensure new applications do not have a detrimental affect on existing 
applications and possibly the network. For instance, certain sequences of key presses for 
voice mail retrieval might already be in use for transferring the charging responsibility for 
a call. Service Interaction is therefore a major problem, since through third party 
differentiation, not all services would be known in advance.
Despite any regulation or testing, a level of co-operation, openness and trust must exist 
between two inter-connecting Operators that share information for the interconnection to 
be said to be successful. The easiest method of implementing more complex services (by 
allowing connection at SCP level), also increases the potential for damaging acts. A 
practical example of a ‘liberty’ was given by Gottleib (interview 1995). An Operator, who 
having tried to deliver a call to another Operator’s network and had it fail, would attempt 
to connect the call twice more before failing it themselves and conveying that failure back 
to the originating customer (usually in the form of a tone, such as the ‘busy’ signal). The 
reason they would try twice more (which would take less than a couple of seconds), was 
that there was a chance that the cause of failure in the second Operator’s network (e.g. 
network congestion, terminating customer busy etc.) would clear during the period of the 
next two attempts. However, if the problem resulted from the second Operator’s SCP being 
in congestion, the repeat attempts would only exacerbate the problem, potentially further 
reducing the operational capability of that second Operator’s network. This indicates that 
regulatory agreements will not, and cannot, cover every eventuality and trust has to exist 
between the parties to instil confidence that a particular interface will be used in a sensible 
manner.
This section has indicated that interconnection at various points of the IN model may be 
desirable, but is not always possible owing to the proprietary nature of the interface. It has 
also identified that although standardisation helps interconnection, it tends to allow 
successfiil services to be easily replicated by competitors. Thus in addressing the question 
raised in Chapter 1 :
• ‘Does regulation or detailed standardisation constrain technical innovation, 
service delivery, or both?’;
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it is clear that although detailed standardisation will help regulation by easing the process 
of interconnection, there are a number of interconnection issues which need to be 
addressed, to ensure satisfactory operation of that interface by both parties. It is 
particularly important to ensure that each party’s network operation is not compromised by 
the other’s. Additionally this section has indicated that regulation geared to standardisation 
could inhibit innovative new services, which might make use of proprietary elements not 
yet standardised.
This section has sought to identify the implications of enshrining standards in regulations 
by investigating the issues associated with opening the interfaces of the standardised IN 
model. There are however, other interfaces outside the scope of the architecture model, 
which need to be considered when integrating Intelligent Networks. This is discussed in 
the next section.
6.6 Other Interconnect Issues
The focus of Survey 1 on the use of the standardised architecture interconnection points to 
interconnect stakeholders, omitted consideration of the interfaces used for support systems 
such as billing. This was addressed in Survey 2, as was interconnection to emerging 
network technologies such as the Internet. This section considers and discusses the data 
gathered from (principally) Survey 2, relating to non-standardised interfaces, in the context 
of the following questions raised in Chapter 1 :
• Ts legislative regulation the appropriate means to shape a technology in rapid 
change?’;
• ‘Does regulation or detailed standardisation constrain technical innovation, 
service delivery, or both?’
The interconnections considered are those to the Internet, Billing and Management 
Systems.
Interconnecting with the Internet
Seven respondents to Survey 2 identified that there was no ‘unified view’ (IN32) of 
interfacing with the Internet. Furthermore, three of these respondents identified it as their 
biggest IN challenge and through their comments, emphasised the need for interconnection
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standards. Some of these respondents indicated that interconnection to the Internet was 
potentially applicable to all telecommunication technologies, not just INs, whilst others 
were more specific, indicating Service Creation, Data Amendment, Service Operation and 
Support Services, as their reason for wanting to interconnect. The implications of these 
areas are as follows:
• Service Creation
The concept here is that the customer buying a service would be able to 
customise it from within an Operator’s ‘Service Creation Environment’ ,which 
they would typically access via the Internet. This requires secure access to the 
Operator’s domain with the ability either to re-create the Service Creation 
Environment locally (off-line) and upload the application with an acceptable 
delay, or to develop the application on-line with minimal delay of the 
implementation (IN30, IN44).
• Data Amendment
In this scenario, respondents are given greater flexibility in the way they could 
alter their personal profile^ \  by having the ability to alter their data via the 
Internet. For instance, they could change the destination of a ‘Time of Day 
Routeing’ application (IN30, IN44).
• Support Services
The goal of this option would be the provision of a customer interface to the 
Operational Support Systems (CSSs) for administration purposes (service 
ordering, fault reporting, profile changes etc.), or billing purposes (notification 
or break-back of call statistics and on-line receipt of itemised bills) (IN20, 
IN28, IN50).
• Service Operation
This scenario covers those situations where the Internet or (more appropriately) 
an extranet is used to access third party applications or data. The challenge is to
11 A customer’s personal profile contains the data relating to their service. For example for a time o f  day 
routeing service, it would contain the telephone numbers that they would want their calls routed to, together 
with the hours o f the day those routeings would be applicable.
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convey IN commands over IP networks^^ rather than C l or IEEE 802.3 (IN4,
IN8, IN52), or to carry calls over IP which requires some means to
query the SCP service for information (IN20, IN28).
Use of the Internet in both these ‘Service Operation’ cases, would normally be considered 
inappropriate owing to the Quality of Service requirement that messages are transported 
and responses returned in a timely fashion. What was probably meant by the respondents, 
and explicitly identified by seven respondents to Survey 2, is the use of ‘IP telephony’. IP 
telephony implied a new generation of control structures that offered a competing 
technology with Intelligent Networks, since IP telephony and INs were not initially 
dependent upon each other (IN38). Initial implementations were interconnected only at the 
transport and call-signalling level, therefore the respondents were most likely referring to 
some kind of integrated access. Such applications might employ an Intranet to convey 
integrated data and (IP) telephony fi'om a customer’s premises, with separation into two 
streams at the Operator’s local point of presence.
Thus the issue raised by these respondents was one of identifying an elegant way of 
passing telephony signalling information fi'om the terminal equipment (in this case a 
customer’s intranet) to an IN application so as to mimic the SSP Call Model trigger points 
(off-hook, time-out etc.)^ "^ . This would allow calls originating in an IP network to be routed 
to a traditional telephony network, without the need for an IN look-up on its ingress to the 
traditional network. However, without an elegant mapping of telephone numbers to the 
Internet system of addresses, such inter-working will be extremely limited (Korzeniowski 
1998).
By the time of Survey 2, Operators and Suppliers saw the meteoric rise of the Internet and 
viewed it as a technology with which they would have to integrate. This view was not 
shared by the Information and Communication Technology sector as a whole at the time of 
the survey. Discussions with Internet Protocol experts in BT (not formally recorded) 
indicated the view that IP could do everything that an Intelligent Network could do, thus
Sigtrans allows INAP to be carried over IP. 
H323 or SIP allows voice to be carried over IP.
Passing telephony signalling information from terminal equipment to an IN application might be possible 
using an SCP interfaced to a Radius or DNS server. Alternatively, the IN CS4 standard specifies a capability 
to interface an SCP to a Soft Switch, allowing an SCP service to be invoked in the routeing o f  an VOIP call.
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Intelligent Networks were not needed. However INs are an established technology, with an 
enormous investment; they cannot be instantly scrapped and replaced by IP. Even at the 
time of writing in 2003, IP voice networks do not possess the same level of ftinctionality 
that can be utilised for a public telephony service, as aiQ provided by INs; thus a degree of 
intelligent inter-working between IP and INs would be beneficial.
The literature in this area considers Internet access primarily as a means of providing new 
Service Management capabilities that enhance existing services, allowing the customer 
greater control over their services, adding value to the existing products and potentially 
increasing revenue as a result. This aligns with the categories of ‘Data Amendment’, 
‘Support Services’ and to a lesser extent ‘Service Creation’, in the situations given above. 
In addressing these needs, each of the different areas has its own specific requirements, so 
there is no simple solution with one interface solving all problems. All the categories apart 
from ‘Support Services’ could conceivably be brought within the IN model by creating 
suitable interface points to the SCnF and SMF.
These issues (being in response to a specific question addressing problems associated with 
IN and Internet convergence) were only weakly supported by responses to other questions 
in the survey. For instance, responses to a question on Service Management, which was 
likely to have produced corroborative data, did not emphasise interfacing to the Internet to 
the same extent, perhaps indicating that the Internet interface was an important, but 
minority need.
Integration of Billing Systems
Eight of the respondents to Survey 2 identified billing and integrated billing as a problem, 
due to the lack of a standardised interface. This aligns with past research (Shepherd 1993) 
which indicated that customers prefer integrated bills (not one for each of the services to 
which they subscribe) and similarly bulk discounting. In order to achieve integrated billing, 
a single system is required to handle all the billing information, for all the services, for all 
the different platforms. Intelligent Network services will therefore need to do the same. 
However the more platforms this central billing system integrates with, the larger the 
system becomes and the more complex, difficult and slower it is to link to and 
accommodate the products needs. The flexibility introduced by an Intelligent Network 
could be restricted by the billing system’s inability to differentially price that flexibility.
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The inability to integrate billing capability was exacerbated by a lack of standards. In 
North America a standard Call Detail Record, Automated Message Accounting (AMA), 
was developed for capturing information used in pricing a basic PSTN call. Although it 
was not universal, it was adopted by the majority of exchange Suppliers, developing a 
virtual de-facto standard. This allowed Operators to use a common billing system to handle 
call records from different exchange Suppliers; although link protocols still remained an 
issue. Concerns about protocol adaptation is evidenced by IN58 and Kidd (1998) who 
identified it as a key problem for integrating CSSs. There is no equivalent to the AMA 
standard for IN call detail records.
The very nature of IN services requires that date, time, destination and duration 
information be captured, but they must be captured for each service invoked within a call, 
with charges possibly split between caller and called party at different points in the call. 
Added to this complexity is the inter-Operator accounting information that has to be 
captured as the call progresses.
An example of the potential complexity of a call for which Operator charging information 
needs to be captured, is a customer telephoning a financial company. The initial call may 
be free, originate on network A and terminate on an interactive unit on network B. The 
customer may choose a service that provides share purchase recommendations charged at a 
premium rate. The call drops back to network A and routes to an interactive unit on 
Network C. After playing the customer the pre-recorded advice, the call drops back to 
network A and automatically re-routes to the interactive unit on network B, the charging 
reverts to freephone and the customer is able to make further choices.
Although such a mixture of services is quite advanced, the lack of a standardised billing 
record to capture charging information indicates that service complexity is growing faster 
than can be matched by the standardisation process and its implementation. Coupled with 
the need to capture charging information on a single bill necessitating an interface to an 
existing billing system, with its own inherent limitations, billing appears to be a major 
problem limiting the positioning of IN products in a competitive market through an 
inability to provide flexible pricing.
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Integration of Management Systems
Analysis of Survey 2 showed that 8 out of 29 respondents identified that management 
interfaces were a problem, particularly the integration and interaction with existing 
systems, e.g. ‘Interaction with PTTs legacy (OSS) systems’ (IN36) and ‘...merging IN 
OSS into the central n/w maintenance system’ (IN 14). This compares favourably with an 
earlier public survey where 51% of respondents identified network management as their 
biggest headache (Network Briefing 1996).
Management standards for Intelligent Networks were negligible up until 2000 (interview 
Anderson 1999) when the ratification of CS3 introduced specific management 
recommendations. The recommendations are sufficiently high level that they could be 
argued to ease the process of integration, rather than enabling it, but as yet they have not 
been implemented. Were they to be implemented, the lack of standards of the existing 
systems to which they have to interface would impede immediate benefits.
Summary
This section has shown that interconnection with the Internet would allow enhanced 
support services to be offered in conjunction with Intelligent Networks. In the main these 
would be to allow the customer to gain access to a particular facility or service, the way 
this would be offered varying from Operator to Operator. By this means, the Internet is 
being used as a simple access mechanism; the interface to it is independent of the use to 
which it is being put. The only real issue of the interface therefore, is the provision of 
secure access/firewalling for access to confidential data (IN54).
Billing has also been shown to be an issue, owing to the inflexibility of the content of the 
Call Detail Record and/or the systems used to process them. Similarly, the need to 
integrate with legacy management systems, in order to provide end-to-end management 
visibility, is problematic owing to the lack of management standards.
This section has shown that the interconnection of Intelligent Networks with existing 
support systems is essential for the offering of telecommunication services. The flexibility 
of such systems potentially limits how Intelligent Networks may be exploited. Thus in 
addressing the research questions raised in Chapter 1 :
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• ‘Is legislative regulation the appropriate means to shape a technology in rapid 
change?’; and
• ‘Does regulation or detailed standardisation constrain technical innovation, 
service delivery, or both?’;
there is a danger that regulation to a particular standard could force stakeholders to adopt 
changes which they are unable to exploit, owing to the inherent limitations of their support 
systems. This would impair Service Delivery.
6.7 Intelligent Networks as a part of a Company’s Strategy
The focus of this chapter thus far has been the physical aspects of an Intelligent Network, 
that is, its structure, interconnections and integration. However Intelligent Networks could 
be used as a tool in order to aid the strategy of a company. This section examines the 
interaction between the stakeholder groups in the offering IN services and in the process, 
addresses the Chapter 1 hypothesis questions:
• ‘Is legislative regulation the appropriate means to shape a technology in rapid 
change?’; and
• ‘Does regulation or detailed standardisation constrain technical innovation, 
service delivery, or both?’
Many of the respondents (19) to Survey 1 felt their company had taken INs into account in 
formulating their company’s strategy^The exceptions were a respondent from a Private 
Branch Exchange (PBX) manufacturer and (understandably) the consultants. Of those 
respondents whose companies were considering INs, all bar one regarded INs as either 
very (10) or fairly (8) important for their companies. One respondent (an Operator) found 
the survey to be thought provoking in that ‘...it has raised some problems and issues we 
weren’t previously aware o f (cbal 2).
Eight of the respondents to Survey 2 felt positioning IN services correctly was the key 
issue. The comments made by these respondents indicated they viewed the problem from
The role INs would play in a company’s strategy would vary depending upon their stakeholder segment. 
For a Supplier, it would be manufacturing IN components, for an Operator, it would be offering IN services.
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both a ‘market driven product’ position, for example ‘.. .understand the marketing 
requirements’ (IN26) and a ‘product driven market’ position, that is ‘. . .identifying right 
market segment’ (IN32). Five respondents identified that there was a problem meeting 
market requirements with the capabilities in hand. One respondent indicated ‘ Adaptmg off- 
the-shelf services to mkt.’ (IN8) and another ‘. . .customising to different mkt. segments’ 
(IN20); the underlying causes of these problems being discussed in section 6.8 of this 
chapter.
Six of the respondents (employed by Operators) to Survey 1 said their companies were 
negotiating with other Operators to offer IN services. Such negotiations might represent 
the seamless operation of services between networks or offering one Operator’s services to 
the customers of another. Either way, such co-operation in the EU could not be verified 
from other sources, although such co-operation occurred in the US (Shepherd 1996, Cullin 
1996).
Four of the respondents (employed by Operators) indicated their companies were talking to 
switch Suppliers and conversely, four of the respondents (employed by Suppliers) 
indicated their companies were talking to Operators about technical solutions for IN 
marketing opportunities. This is as expected, since it is normal for both stakeholder groups 
to have ongoing communication about future products and technology (which would 
include INs). What is surprising is that only 8, from a combined Operator/Supplier 
stakeholder group of 18^ ,^ respondents indicated that such discussions were taking place, 
although a small allowance might be made for those Operators not having, and not 
intending to have, an IN.
Only two respondents (an Operator and a Supplier), indicated their companies were in co­
operation with a computer manufacturer. The early implementation of INs, that is prior to 
standardisation, saw the exchange Suppliers producing their own Service Control Point 
hardware, thereby retaining total control of their product. With the introduction of 
standardised interfaces and computing becoming core to the centralised processing
PBX manufacturers not considering the impact o f  INs would not be in a position to benefit from IN/CPE 
(Customer Premise Equipment) type services such as Computer Telephony Integration (CTI) in the future 
(Shepherd 1998, Shepherd 1999c). Computer Telephony Integration is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.
Two Operator respondents did not reply to this question possibly because they considered the information 
commercially sensitive.
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capability of INs, I would have expected all the Suppliers to have been in communication 
with computer manufacturers in order to offer a joint product, rather than have the 
computer manufacturers dilute market share by offering a product directly to the 
Operators. Within two years of Survey 1, it was observed that IN Suppliers were offering 
SCPs combining computer manufacturers’ hardware and the Suppliers software (Shepherd 
1999a,b).
Four of the respondents (Operators) indicated that their companies were in co-operation 
with Service Providers in providing services, but these were probably non-IN offerings, 
since no third party IN services were identified as being launched in the years immediately 
following Survey 1.
Summary
The survey data indicated that although a significant majority of respondents viewed 
Intelligent Networks as important to their companies, it appeared that few of the 
stakeholders were actively co-operating with each other (be it Supplier, Operator, 
Computer Manufacturer or Service Provider) to offer IN services. Personal observations at 
the time of Survey 1 suggested a weak Computer Manufacturer/Supplier relationship, as 
previously identified by Mansell (1993). However, I had a different perception to that 
indicated by the respondents to Survey 1 regarding the lack of discussions between 
Operators and Supplier. In all the projects with which I have been involved and at all the 
conferences at which I have presented. Suppliers have taken the opportunity to ‘network’, 
seeking to learn how network design and capability is expected to develop and 
investigating how their products could meet future network needs.
The data in this area therefore appears inconclusive. In addressing the Chapter 1 questions:
• ‘Is legislative regulation the appropriate means to shape a technology in rapid 
change?’;
• ‘Does regulation or detailed standardisation constrain technical innovation, 
service delivery, or both?’;
there appeared to be little communication between the stakeholder groups in discussing 
interconnection and interworking needs. This might be interpreted as a need for
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standardisation to define interconnection criteria. Alternatively, it could be argued that 
legislative regulation could be used to encourage discussions about interconnection. One 
respondent employed by a small Operator identified that the questionnaire had identified 
issues of which he was previously unaware, revealing that legislation which imposes INs 
or IN interconnection upon Operators could result in unforeseen problems.
6.8 The need for Standardisation
The previous section suggested that standardisation might have a role to play in the 
interconnection of INs, given the perceived lack of activity between the stakeholders. Thus 
this section looks at the need for Intelligent Network standards and addresses the following 
questions raised fi*om the hypothesis:
• Does regulation or detailed standardisation constrain technical innovation, 
service delivery, or both?
• How can it be ensured that robust technical and architectural models exist 
before standards are ratified?
• Do the members of the standardisation bodies (often the employees of the 
incumbent monopolies) subvert the goals of the regulators?
Twenty of the respondents to Survey 1 thought open standards very or fairly important for 
interconnection, with 15 indicating there should be an EU led, agreed design for INs to 
encourage interconnect. All the Suppliers supported this viewpoint, together with three of 
the Operators. One respondent felt that ‘Standards.. .are the fundamental requirement in 
developing networks across Europe’ (cbal8). Another said that ‘Standards will lead to 
more competition and should force the cost of IN down’ (bby44). The cost aspect was 
noted by a number of respondents (cbb25, bay48, bby44, cbcl3, cbc09). One Operator 
cited the success of GSM as justification for an EU led IN design (cbal2).
Standardisation would similarly address concerns raised by respondents to Survey 2. These 
were the ‘.. .inter-working to different standards + proprietary interfaces’ (IN32) in order to 
allow inter-working with other Supplier’s equipment, both within a network (purchasing 
power) and between IN networks (to offer seamless services) (IN54).
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These survey responses perhaps demonstrate that the ETSI work of standardising 
interfaces and identifying a minimum feature-set is appropriate. It forces Operators 
implementing INs to adhere to a basic set of standard services whilst allowing them the 
freedom to innovate for their more advanced services. A problem arises when an Operator 
has its own (adequate) set operating, because then there is little incentive for it to upgrade 
to an enhanced service set.
Another respondent to Survey 1 stated that ‘.. .standards are not compatible; the holy grail 
of complete interoperability is unlikely to be achievable’ (cbb25), indicating that despite 
standardisation there was a sufficient mix of established proprietary INs such as to hinder 
complete interconnection.
There were a few further dissenters to an EU led, IN agreed design. One respondent, a 
consultant, said that standards were not needed to get customers to open interfaces (dayl4). 
Another respondent said that
Tt would be most proper to speak about requirements to be fulfilled by the 
respective interconnecting networks rather than standard interfaces' (cbc28).
This respondent also indicated that standardisation was not the way to achieve the ultimate 
aim of interconnect and that it would be more appropriate to identify what needs to be 
achieved by interconnection and let the interconnecting network Operators decide how this 
could be achieved. As has been shown with Operator C7 interconnect in the UK, 
agreement frequently cannot be reached. The standardisation of the C7 protocol means this 
inability to reach an agreement is not from a technical perspective; rather it is from an 
inability to agree the accounting rates. OFTEL is asked to adjudicate such cases. A lack of 
IN standards would therefore exacerbate the problem of IN interconnect, increasing the 
cost of interconnect and reinforce the already high chance of agreement not being reached, 
except with the involvement of a third party.
A third respondent stated:
‘Demand will increase,... freephone/local call/premium rate will be their mainstay 
for a long time with VPNs being key for private networks’ (day22).
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This respondent was arguing the point that standardisation was not needed, since the 
current services would prove adequate for a long time to come. However this argument 
appears to contradict itself, since it implies the need for at least a minimum standardised 
feature set of non-geographic and VPN capability to ensure efficient interworking.
The issue of ‘competing protocols’ (IN32), leading to the problem of ‘interoperability’ 
(IN36) was raised by several Survey 2 respondents. For instance. Asynchronous Transfer 
Mode (ATM), Global System for Mobile (GSM), Intelligent Networks and Integrated 
Services Digital Network (ISDN), were all developed in isolation fi"om each other, with no 
consideration for interworking with each o t h e r (EU 1986, EU 1989, interview Guram 
1995, interview Paterson 1994). The success of INs has meant that all these standards have 
had to develop interfaces for working with (fixed) Intelligent Networks, but not necessarily 
with each other. From this evidence, INs can be argued to be an enabling technology 
(Mansell 1993, Hawkins 1996, Shepherd 1996) and one that other technologies need to 
work with, in order to be successful (Christiansen 1997).
Although the standards groups have now developed integrating standards (e.g. ISDN and 
IN), it was too late for those Operators that had already implemented their networks, 
because the cost of upgrading to the latest standards would show negligible commercial 
benefit (interview Paterson 1994). This indicated a lack of interaction or co-operation 
between the standardisation working groups when initially developing their standards; an 
area outside the scope of this thesis, but perhaps worthy of future research.
The problems of network interfacing extends to existing non-IN networks, as evidenced by 
two of Survey 1 respondents (cbb25, cbc28) and five of Survey 2 respondents identifying 
issues interfacing with legacy technology. One Survey 1 respondent, employed by a 
Supplier, said that even the existing (CSl) standards were not defined to a sufficient level 
for true multi-vendor, multi-Operator implementation (bay05). For example, each Supplier, 
although implementing IN CSl, will have proprietary supersetsthat can cause problems 
in one of two ways. Firstly, if an Operator implements a basic service using some superset 
features, then interconnection will need to employ a strategy that identifies how these
The problem associated with ISDN and IN interworking is discussed in detail in Chapter 4.
One Supplier told the researcher that their company’s IN implementation was a ‘superset and subset’ o f  
ETSI IN CS1. i.e. at that point in time, it was mainly proprietary (Shepherd 1993)
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superset capabilities are handled at the interconnect boundary (i.e. ceased, created or 
mapped^®). Secondly, Operator interconnect services which implement primarily 
(proprietary) superset features, will need to adopt an interconnect strategy which 
determines how these capabilities are mapped onto another Operator’s IN environment, 
which is likely to use proprietary features of another Supplier’s equipment. The point to be 
made, is that standards aid and ease the interconnection process, but do not solve it.
The ability to develop services within the confines of a standardised Supplier’s product, 
that is, to produce a service differentiated fi*om the competition, was cited by many as an 
area for concern (INI2, INI4, INI 8, IN26, IN50). As discussed in Chapter 4, the problem 
is that differentiation caimot be achieved utilising standard Service Independent building 
Blocks (SIBs), since anyone with a standard IN can replicate the services. Services 
employing proprietary SIBs can help produce differentiated services, which are only 
replicable by Operators using the same Supplier, but reduce the likelihood of the service 
operating between networks. (Chapter 4 discusses the different options available in this 
area in greater detail).
Operational Support Systems (OSS) were also identified as a problem by some respondents 
of Survey 2. Management standards have always lagged network standards, hence many 
Operators have developed bespoke management systems conforming to no general 
standards, which prevent an integrated service management approach. For instance, a 
customer requiring Time of Day routeing to a voice mail system will need their data 
entered into both the IN and voice mail management systems. Failure of the voice mail 
system will be detected by the voice mail management system, but it will be unable to 
notify the appropriate IN services application to prevent calls being routed to it. With an 
integrated management system, proactive action could be possible.
Five respondents to Survey 2, indicated the need for a standardised interconnect with the 
Internet. As discussed previously, this simple statement belies a number of different types 
of interconnection for different purposes and is discussed in detail in the ‘Interconnecting 
with the Internet’ section in this chapter.
A message needs to be ceased if  it cannot be understood by the second network. A  message needs to be 
created if  it is expected by a service application, but the second network is unable to supply it. A  message
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Problem areas identified by respondents as most hindering the implementation of INs is the 
speed of development of the standards (also highlighted by Hawkins 1996) and the cost of 
implementation of standards (cbb25).
‘The delay in bringing the ETSI or ITU standards through to delivery .. .leads to 
proprietary‘leaps of faith’ by equipment manufacturers’ (bby44).
Consortia (e.g. 3GPP, Parlay Forum etc.) are often created by industry to develop relevant 
standards, particularly in new technology areas. Initially, this would speed the 
standardisation process. With time however, acceptance can lead to bureaucracy and a 
slowing of the process, as highlighted by Hawkins (interview 1997). He mentions that 
Brian Carpenter at the IGF, when head of the Internet Protocol Architecture Board, said 
that their open standards enquiry and contribution processes were getting so much input 
that they couldn’t possibly deal with it all and that they were trying to introduce levels of 
bureaucracy to filter out the contributions fi’om the ‘hackers and cranks’ and start thinking 
seriously about what was of real value.
Eighteen of the respondents to Survey 1 indicated their companies were represented on 
relevant standardisation bodies. Although all the Suppliers were on both the ITU and ETSI 
bodies, the majority of the Operators were on ETSI (rather than the ITU). This reflects the 
European nature of the investigation, since ETSI works out the details of the 
implementation of ITU standards in Europe. The responses to this question also identified 
an interesting situation with the ETSI standardisation process. Where the EU Commission 
perceives that the availability of standards would prove useful to legislation, it direct ETSI 
to develop appropriate standards. If the key players setting the standards are those who will 
be most impacted by the legislation (i.e. the Operators), then surely they will design the
21standards to best benefit themselves and possibly minimise the impact of the legislation . 
This argument helps reaffirm the OECD (1995) and McGowan et al.’s (1995) views, which
needs to be mapped (i.e. transferred or altered in form or structure) in order that it can be understood by the 
second network’s equipment.
With time, personal experience has shown that the liberalised market and competition has increased the 
level o f budgetary constraints within organisations. Telecommunications companies have consequently 
reduced their overall involvement in standards setting bodies, becoming much more selective o f  the areas in 
which they participate and focussing upon those which they feel will be o f greatest benefit to their 
organisation. Thus the overall domination by Operators may have now reduced.
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expressed concern with the domination of the European agencies by special interest 
groups.
Summary
This section has shown that the stakeholder community generally supports standardisation, 
particularly Suppliers who perceive benefits firom supporting a standardised product. It also 
invalidates the view that Suppliers prefer proprietary standards, the thinking being that 
once an Operator has committed to a proprietary product, it would mean a captive market 
and reduced competition. In answering the question
• ‘Does regulation or detailed standardisation constrain technical innovation, 
service delivery, or both?’;
there is concern that standardisation to too great a detail, such as for SIBs, would create a 
situation where there was little service differentiation. Any Operator could easily replicate 
a competitor’s service. Such action would therefore constrain innovative services, by 
restricting Operators to the standardised capability.
In answering
• ‘How can it be ensured that robust technical and architectural models exist 
before standards are ratified?’;
this section adds to the evidence that for complex technologies such as INs, this is 
extremely difficult. Technology is continuously evolving and an architecture model cannot 
be future proofed; it is only appropriate at the instant in time at which it is created. Thus 
architectures will need to evolve to accommodate interconnection with other emerging 
technologies. What has been identified is that more care should have been taken with 
evolving the initial IN model, since it omitted interfaces to a number of established 
technologies, causing subsequent interworking limitations. Whilst standards are being 
developed, proper consideration should be given to integrating with other standards being 
developed in parallel.
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Similarly, standardisation for supporting systems, such as management and billing, should 
be developed in parallel with those of the technology, to ease the process of support system 
integration.
Finally in answering
• ‘Do the members of the standardisation bodies (often the employees of the 
incumbent monopolies) subvert the goals of the regulators’;
it has been shown that the Suppliers and Operators actively participated in setting IN 
standards and have the opportunity to implement what is best for themselves. Where such 
standardisation is used in support of legislation, its impact will be weakened by the 
resulting standards. Similarly, if technology such as INs were forced on Operators, the 
Operators would have a vested interest with what happens within standardisation bodies, 
which could lead to an increase in contributions and greater bureaucracy, thus slowing 
progress and lessening the potential of the technology’s future.
This section has examined the need for standardisation and shown that adherence to 
detailed standardisation can restrict service differentiation and hence delivery. This aspect 
is researched further in the next section.
6.9 The Impact of Regulation upon Service Delivery
The large majority (19) of the respondents to Survey 1 thought priority should be given to 
regulating interconnections between Operators. Given the nature of the survey, it is 
reasonable to conclude that all considered a level of interconnect between Operators at a 
higher level in the model hierarchy was required. This section examines the perceived 
impact of regulation upon service delivery, addressing in the process the research 
questions:
• ‘Is legislative regulation the appropriate means to shape a technology in rapid 
change?’; and
• ‘Does regulation or detailed standardisation constrain technical innovation, 
service delivery, or both?’
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Ten of the respondents to Survey 1, thought priority should be given to regulating 
interconnection standards between Operators & Carriers, and Operators & Service 
Providers. Interconnect regulation between Operators & Information Providers was of a 
lower priority with only seven respondents selecting it. This aligns with the findings in the 
‘Standardisation’ section, where 15 of the respondents thought there should be an EU led, 
agreed design for INs to allow interconnect, because ‘Standards .. .are the fundamental 
requirement in developing networks across Europe’ (cbal 8) and ‘.. adherence to minimum 
agreed standards’ (cbb25), would help new entrants interconnect with existing Operators, 
encouraging‘...market stimulation and growth’ (bayOl).
The key areas identified as needing regulation were access and network standards, closely 
followed by network integrity and data security (bay05, bayl6, bay59). The use of personal 
data in telephony, within the bounds of the EU (1990) data security directive (which 
protects an individual’s personal data by restricting what it can be used for), appears 
difficult. The directive appears contradictory in that it indicates data can be used for 
routeing a telephone call, but states that data must not be disclosed outside the organisation 
without prior authorisation. Operators work on the basis that a customer purchasing a 
service accepts such use of their data. There is a further problem though, in that in routeing 
a telephone call, some of a customer’s personal data, or access to that data, may be given to 
another Operator to aid with the routeing. If for some reason that data is not used, then the 
directive is infringed. Such occurrences are very difficult to detect and police.
Some respondents thought that there should be no regulation regarding access (cbb25, 
day07, ebb 14, bay59), since ‘...if interconnection is fixed, the development is difficult’ 
(cbd03). The concern being voiced is that if a particular IN interface is deemed appropriate 
for interconnection, as intimated by the DTI (1992) survey and KPMG (1993) report, then 
future developments would be constrained within the stated bounds of the capability of that 
interface. Thus services that might make use of that interface may never be developed.
The UK, one of the earliest liberalised telecommunication environments in Europe, 
attracted the criticism that ‘Government attitude was protecting existing Operators’
(day08). A second consultant thought the regulators incompetent and proposed that
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regulation should be no more than implementation of articles 85/86^ (day 14). The danger 
here is that in order to meet the requirements of Articles 85/86, an Operator may grant 
access to a non standard interface. Small Operators however, may not be able to use such 
an interface, being unable to justify the cost of developing a non standard interconnection. 
Offsetting this, UK and EU experience has shown that although there may be a plethora of 
small Operators following de-regulation, with time, these would have consolidated to a 
smaller number of larger players^^. Longer term, access to non standard interfaces may not 
prove a barrier to interconnect, owing to the larger companies being able to justify the cost 
of developing such interfaces.
The cost theme is taken up by other respondents to Survey 2.
‘The packaging of IN capability by a switch manufacturer makes IN offerings 
prohibitive in the start-up phases of an Operator introducing IN’^ "^ (bby44, 
supported by cbb25, bay48, cbcl3, cbc09).
Although standardisation would lead to more competition and should force the cost of INs 
down, the introduction of INs is still an expensive option for small Operators. It could be 
argued that if, for regulatory purposes, an IN were forced upon an Operator it could cause 
them financial difficulties. A similar argument is that regulations compelling 
implementation of standardised INs, could financially disadvantage Operators should a 
proprietary IN being cheaper. In practice there now are no wholly proprietary INs and this 
situation is only likely to have occurred during a Supplier’s transition between proprietary 
and standardised offerings.
A few respondents to Survey 2 commented that interconnection regulation with mobiles 
should be given priority and hence categorised separately. Since the protocols used for 
cellular INs are totally different from fixed INs and interconnect between the networks 
already exist at C7 level, the respondents must be inferring interconnect at a higher level in
^ Articles 85 and 86 refer to sections in the ‘Treaty o f  Rome’ (1957), upon which the structure o f  the 
European Union is based. Article 85 guards against anti-competitive practices and article 86 guards against 
the abuse o f a dominant (market) position.
^  Examples are the consolidation o f Cable TV companies in the UK between 1996 and 2001 and in Europe 
the merging o f  telecommunications companies such as MFS, MCI and WorldCom.
Suppliers don’t necessarily allow Operators to select only the elements o f their product which the Operator 
might be able to develop into a financially viable service. Making Operators purchase unnecessary capability 
together with than needed, could make the Operator’s resulting service financially unattractive.
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the architecture. This appears a valid point, since mobiles are increasingly prevalent and 
mobile/fixed line integrated services would be desirable.
Summary
This section has identified that there is a general need to regulate interconnection standards 
between competing Operators and between Operators and Service/Information Providers. 
In addressing the question:
• Ts legislative regulation the appropriate means to shape a technology in rapid 
change?’;
it appears that legislative regulation is appropriate to encourage interconnection and hence 
competition. This however requires more than just standardisation, extending to a level 
where the interconnecting parties are confident that operation of such interfaces will not 
compromise the operation or data security of their networks. In answering the question
• ‘Does regulation or detailed standardisation constrain technical innovation, 
service delivery, or both?’;
this section has also identified that ti^ tly  defined regulation of interfaces could restrict the 
use to which those interfaces are put and thus constrain the development of new services.
6.10 Chapter Summary
This chapter has drawn on primary data sources to address several of the research 
questions posed in Chapter 1. This summary considers each of the questions in turn and 
indicates fi*om the gathered evidence, what a suitable answer might be. The questions 
addressed are:
• ‘Does regulation or detailed standardisation constrain technical innovation, 
service delivery, or both?’
• ‘Is legislative regulation the appropriate means to shape a technology in rapid 
change?’
• ‘How can it be ensured that robust technical and architectural models exist 
before standards are ratified?’
• ‘Do the members of the standardisation bodies (often the employees of the 
incumbent monopolies) subvert the goals of the regulators?’
303
6 Stakeholder Attitudes and Concerns
In preparing this chapter, it was noted that a number of issues were echoed in different 
sections and whilst perhaps not significant within each individual area, they grow in 
importance with each iteration. For this reason they have been identified in this summary.
Intelligent Network Architecture
Examining the combined responses of the Suppliers and Operators there was little 
preference for any one of the three architecture models, with four of the Suppliers 
indicating that different models would be appropriate for different situations. There was a 
slight preference for the two alternative IN architecture models (Centralised and Mixed 
Distributed Processing) compared to the standardised centralised processing model. 
However, taking into account the Service Providers and Consultants, with their preference 
for a more open architecture and possible lack of awareness of the issues associated with 
such an architecture, the Mixed Distributed Processing model gains the greatest support 
due to its flexibility and/or speed of response.
A number of respondents to Survey 1 indicated that the various models were ideal for 
different product offerings (e.g. cellular or fixed), or as a migration stage - starting small 
and evolving. Such support highlights the fact that standardisation organisations need to 
expand the scope of their activity to embrace (or enable) a variety of evolving 
architectures, perhaps by reassessing the validity of their selected Architecture as part of 
‘next release’ standard discussions. For example, the architecture required by a new 
Operator may need to be different to the architecture required by a large Operator 
introducing an IN as an overlay network, with a third architecture required by a large 
Operator employing an IN as their core network.
Survey 1 has therefore demonstrated that the standardised IN architecture is not necessarily 
the favoured model, since no one architecture can be described as being the optimum, as 
varying circumstances will favour differing models.
Although the architecture provides a high-level operating model, in order to provide a 
telephony connection across networks, the networks need to be interconnected. This 
chapter has shown that the interconnection of INs with existing support systems is essential 
in the offering of telecommunication services. With INs, the point of interconnection can
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be made at several points in the network, depending upon the level of sophistication and 
functionality the Operators want to provide. The flexibility of such interfaces governs the 
potential of INs which may be exploited.
Survey 1 identified the most appropriate interconnect points for the different stakeholders 
as follows:
• Service Provider SSF - SCF (E);
• Customer CCAF - CCF (A);
• Operator CCAF - CCF (A); SCF - SCF (G); SSF-SCF (F);
• Carrier CCAF - CCF (A); SSF-SCF (F).
The letters refer to those assigned to the interfaces in Figure 6.3
The responses to Survey 1 also identified the problems associated with the different 
interfaces. This together with additional information from interviews, publications and 
personal experience (Shepherd 1997), has been summarised in Table 6.10.
l n t e d a c e ^ ' \ ^ Interconnect Uniqueness
Service
Transparency
Service
Efficiency Standardised
Network
Integrity
CCAF-CCF 
(Standardised CS1)
, .. '
SSF-SCF 
(Standardised CS1)
SCF-SCF (Remote) 
(Standardised CS2)
SCF-SDF 
(Standardised CS2)
SCF-SDF (Remote) 
(Standardised CS2)
SDF-SDF (Remote) 
(Standardised CS2)
CAF-SSF
(Proprietary)
r.
SMF-SCF
(Proprietary) N/A N/A
SMF-SDF
(Proprietary) N/A N/A
Key:
Table 6.10 Points of Interconnect - Ease and Value of Implementation
The columns of the table categorise the characteristics exhibited by each of the interfaces 
shown in the table rows. The colour of each cell indicates the ability of the interface to 
meet that feature requirement. An explanation of the key is given in Section 6.5.
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The key problems identified with interconnecting different stakeholders were:
• Interconnect Compliance Testing - ensuring all signalling messages are 
understood and acted upon;
• Data Security - ensuring that only the specific data needed to process a 
particular service (e.g. call) is made available for that service;
• Network Integrity - ensuring messages cannot cause problems for each of the 
connecting networks;
• Highly Proprietary Interfaces, leading to integration difficulties with:
o legacy networks; 
o existing Management systems; 
o existing Billing Systems;
o other IN Suppliers equipment (e.g. GSM, billing and management 
systems); 
o the Internet.
All these ‘problems’ are interrelated. The use of proprietary interfaces generally means that 
the interface specification has not been released by the Supplier and that interconnection is 
not possible, except to more of the same Supplier’s equipment. If the interface is open, 
then Interconnect Compliance Testing is needed to ensure that rogue commands from one 
network to another do not compromise Network Integrity (i.e. causing it to fail in some 
way) and that customer specific data held on the network cannot be retrieved by commands 
from a third party’s network, except on a ‘need to know’ basis. This latter point highlights 
a grey area of what information should be considered essential for the efficient (intelligent) 
routeing of a call and could be released, and what should be withheld. The requirements 
will vary from network to network and service to service, depending upon their 
implementation. Regulatory agreements will not, and cannot, cover every eventuality and 
trust has to exist between the parties to instil confidence that a particular interface will be 
used in a sensible manner.
In answering the question:
• ‘How can it be ensured that robust technical and architectural models exist 
before standards are ratified?’;
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it is unlikely that exhaustive technical architecture models will ever exist prior to standard 
ratification, owing to differing and changing circumstances making alternative 
architectures attractive to different stakeholders at different points in time. Technology is 
continuously evolving and a model cannot be future proofed; it is only appropriate at the 
instant in time at which it is created. Thus architecture models will need to evolve to 
accommodate interconnection with other emerging technologies.
IN standards should be sufficiently flexible to accommodate differing architectures, 
including those not envisaged when the standards were initially ratified. This chapter also 
indicates that using the IN standardised model as the basis of regulation to open IN 
interfaces and interconnect could be inappropriate.
Similarly, standardisation for supporting systems, such as management and billing 
standards, should be developed in parallel with those of the technology, to ease the process 
of support system integration.
What has also been identified is that more care should have been taken with evolving the 
initial IN architecture model, since it omitted interfaces to a number of technologies 
established at the time, causing later interworking limitations. Whilst standards are being 
developed, proper consideration should be given to integrating with other standards being 
developed in parallel.
Industry Dynamics
The survey data indicated that although a significant majority viewed Intelligent Networks 
as important to their companies, few of the stakeholders were co-operating with each other 
(be it Supplier, Operator, Computer Manufacturer or Service Provider) to offer IN services. 
Personal perception at the time of Survey 1 confirmed a weak Computer 
Manufacturer/Supplier relationship. However, personal experience is that Operators are 
continually talking to their Suppliers about potential developments. The researcher is 
unable to satisfactorily explain the variance between the survey findings and personal 
experience, but it may be due to the fact that the majority of respondents come from areas 
within their organisations that do not have regular contact with their Customers/Suppliers. 
The data in this area therefore appears inconclusive.
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The surveys reveal a dilemma, in that the respondents wanted standardised INs (because it 
gives Operators purchasing power and easier interconnect) whilst retaining the ability to 
provide service differentiation. These two needs conflict. Services constructed from 
standardised Supplier offerings are easily replicated, therefore the use of highly 
standardised INs would force a change in focus in the Operators product strategy. The 
service differentiation from the customer’s viewpoint would no longer be so much the 
service capability as the peripheral capability. Customers would place greater emphasis on 
the range of products, the level of service automation and support available and indeed the 
cost, to determine who gains their custom.
There is therefore a fine balance between standardising to great detail and stifling 
innovation and market development, and pitching standards at a level where the benefits of 
standardisation are minimised. Currently the (ETSI) standards define a feature set for 
universal working, allowing Suppliers to add their own SIBs and developing a super-set^^ 
of the standardised capability for innovative services. Regulation of interfaces may limit 
the use of such supersets.
Finally, it appears that one of the key advantages of INs, that of offering customers 
bespoke services, is limited (principally) by the SIBs available. Thus INs produce products 
that seek a market, rather than the reverse, this sector being a product driven market (OU 
1985).
In answering the question:
• Ts legislative regulation the appropriate means to shape a technology in rapid 
change?’;
there appeared to be little communication between the stakeholder groups in discussing 
interconnection and interworking needs. It appears that legislative regulation is appropriate 
to encourage discussions about interconnection and hence promote competition. This is 
however more than just standardisation, extending to a level where the interconnecting
No Supplier produces equipment with a strictly standardised INAP. They all provide capability in addition 
to what has been standardised (i.e. the super-set), in order to provide different and supposedly more useful 
fimctionality than their competitors. This is in order to make their equipment more attractive to the Operators.
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parties are confident that operation of such interfaces will not compromise the operation or 
data security of their networks.
However there is a danger that too tight a regulation or too detailed a standard could force 
stakeholders to adopt changes that can’t be exploited, owing to the inherent limitations of 
their support systems, impairing the level of service able to be offered.
Standardisation
This chapter has demonstrated that the stakeholder community generally supports 
standardisation, particularly Suppliers who perceive benefits firom implementing a 
standardised product. It also invalidates the view that Suppliers prefer proprietary 
standards in order to commit an Operator to their products. The issues identified by the 
surveys that are related to standardisation are, the interworking with other technologies, 
distributed processing standards, support system standards and standards Setting. These are 
considered individually.
i. Interworking with other Technologies 
IN standards did not concentrate sufficiently on inter-working with the existing telephony 
infrastructure. Looking at the structure of the ETSI IN Working Group one year after 
Survey 1 (1997), the focus was still primarily on enhanced functionality and development 
of open interfaces (of limited benefit where the established communications network is of 
a different technology). One topic being discussed at the time, but only partially exploited, 
was CAMEL (Customised Applications for Mobile network Enhanced Logic), the 
intelligent interconnection of INs with Mobiles. CAMEL has (in the main) been used to 
develop pre-paid calling capability for mobiles. There was still an opportunity (arguably 
now missed), for using CAMEL to better integrate the fixed network and mobile network 
services.
As has been explained in Chapter 4, the development of fixed network IN standards has 
effectively ceased due to the shift in focus to other technologies. However, in the later 
versions of the standards (CS2 and CS4), interfaces to allow interworking with ISUP and 
packet networks were ratified.
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ii. Distributed Processing Standards
Many of the issues related to distributed systems could have been resolved by closer 
examination of the computing industry. In particular, the telephony industry needed to 
adopt existing computing standards, architectures and protocols, in order to allow efficient 
distributed processing within INs. Distributed processing would have allowed several 
remotely located processors to appear as a single ‘virtual’ computer, aiding a movement 
away firom the rigid IN standards model, without compromising its efficient mode of 
operation.
iii. Support System Standards
IN standardisation organisations needed to expand their scope of activity to include 
management and billing applications, in addition to the development of ‘feature’ 
specifications, in order to integrate with legacy management systems and provide end-to- 
end management visibility. Such standards should (as far as possible) have followed 
established generic standards to ease the process of integrating INs with the support 
systems of other technologies, providing an integrated service management capability.
This chapter has also shown that interconnection with the Internet would allow enhanced 
support services to be offered in conjunction with Intelligent Networks. In the main, these 
would be to allow the customer to gain access to a particular facility or service. In this 
way, the Internet is being used as a simple access mechanism, thus the interface to it is 
independent of the use to which it is being put. The only real issue of the interface is the 
provision of secure access/firewalling to protect confidential data.
iv. Standard Setting
The lengthy periods taken to ratify standards, leaves Suppliers (and Operators) with little 
option but to create proprietary solutions in order to enter the market first and capture 
market share. The associated risk is that their offerings will be so vastly different firom 
standards when they are ratified, that inter-Operator working is made difficult.
When the standards are ratified, there is the additional danger that they are not necessarily 
designed for the needs of the market, leading to products for which a market must be 
sought. A specific example of this was described by Herian (interview 1996) in relation to 
IN standards. In this particular case, elements of the functionality enshrined in the
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standards were originally created to achieve targets, rather than have any marketable 
justification.
A related issue is that of standardisation body participation. In addressing the question 
raised in Chapter 1 ;
• ‘Do the members of the standardisation bodies (often the employees of the 
incumbent monopolies) subvert the goals of the regulators?’;
it has been shown that the Suppliers and Operators are the dominant participants in the 
ETSI standardisation body working groups that set the standards. Where such 
standardisation is used in support of legislation, the Operators, a primary target of 
regulation, could potentially endeavour to reduce the effectiveness of the standards created. 
Similarly if technology such as INs were forced on Operators, then the Operators would 
have a vested interest in what happens within standards groups, and the increase in 
technical contributions and resulting bureaucracy could slow the process and hence longer 
term impact of the technology.
Regulatory Environment
This section has indicated that interconnection at various points of the IN model may be 
desirable, but is not always possible owing to the proprietary nature of the interface. 
Adherence to minimum standards would facilitate interconnection (particularly benefiting 
new Operators interconnecting with existing Operators) and the universal adoption of a set 
of standard services would foster growth, resulting in lower costs. Thus there appears to be 
a general need to regulate interconnection^^.
Opponents of such regulation highlight the slowness of the standards definition process. 
They also argue that the implementation of a common level of functionality would restrict 
service differentiation and limit Operator opportunity, allowing successful services to be 
easily replicated by competitors. Defining a narrow regulatory framework, within which to 
offer IN type services, would give an Operator negligible opportunity for competitive 
differentiation of their services. Such an argument (although perhaps not the cause cited) is
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supported by Ungarer who writes that ‘.. .technology must be allowed to adapt to user 
requirements’ (Ungarer 1990 pl94).
GSM was cited several times as an example of what could be achieved with EU led 
regulation and standardisation. Examining the GSM service in 2000 there appeared little 
uniquely innovative development (i.e. new services which could not be replicated on a 
competitor’s network) in the eight years since it was first implemented. An exception is 
‘Pre-pay’, a service provided by a standardised IN solution (Camel) added to the GSM 
architecture, which took several years to be defined. Standardisation ensured that this new 
capability would interwork with GSM and thus was made available on all Operators 
networks within a short period of each other. It could be argued that without the need to 
standardise, an Operator would have implemented a proprietary solution earlier.
In answering the question,
• ‘Does regulation or detailed standardisation constrain technical innovation, 
service delivery, or both?’;
detailed standardisation in its own right has not been shown to constrain service delivery, 
since its adoption is voluntary and it is clear that standardisation will help regulation by 
easing the process of interconnection. However, there are a number of interconnection 
issues that need to be addressed in order to ensure satisfactory operation of that interface 
by both parties. In particular, it should be ensured that each party’s network operation is 
not compromised by the other.
There is a danger that regulations that force stakeholders to implement a particular 
standardised technology could result in under-exploitation, owing to unforeseen issues or 
the inherent limitations of the existing support systems, and hence impair Service Delivery. 
There is also the concern that there appeared to be weak communications between the 
different technology groups in the standardisation forums. This resulted in INs not 
necessarily inter-operating with other technology protocols. Again, if the technology were 
forced upon an Operator, they might be limited by the level to which they could exploit it.
To some extent, regulation in the UK has forced the opening o f IN interfaces through the regulation o f  
products falling within the Supplementary Services Business (SSB) category having to have interfaces for
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If INs as a technology was not forced upon stakeholders, but the need to standardise 
existing INs was, then a different range of issues arises. There is concern that 
standardisation at too great a detail, such as for SIBs, would create a situation where there 
was little service differentiation. Any Operator could easily replicate a competitor’s 
service. Such action would therefore constrain innovative services, by restricting Operators 
to the standardised capability. Similarly, regulation that binds too tightly to standards will 
tend to inhibit innovative new services, which might make use of proprietary elements not 
yet standardised. The same applies to interfaces, the regulation of which, if too tightly 
defined, could restrict the use to which that interface is put and thus constrain the 
development of new services.
Afterword
Although the findings given in this chapter have been based on fixed network INs, they are 
applicable across a range of technologies. For instance, 3^  ^Generation (3G) mobile 
networks employ a centralised intelligence architecture. Similarly, centralised intelligence 
is being considered for offering services on packet networks, addressing the scalability 
issues which have traditionally limited the scope of their operation.
This chapter has addressed a number of the questions arising firom the hypothesis stated in 
Chapter 1. It has drawn-in primary data gathered firom surveys and interviews undertaken 
as part of this research. The next chapter summarises the findings discussed in Chapters 4,5 
and 6 to assess the validity or otherwise of the hypothesis.
third parties to interconnect to, in order that another Operator can offer the same service on their network. 
This was discussed in detail in Chapter 5.
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7 The Implications and Issues for the Regulation and 
Standardisation of Different Inteliigent Network Modeis
7.1 introduction
The focus of this research originally stemmed from an industry perception that Intelligent 
Networks in the UK would be directly regulated in some way. This and other observations, 
in the context of the emergence of Intelligent Networks, led to the development of the 
following hypothesis:
Tight architecture-based regulation is inappropriate fo r a rapidly changing 
telecommunications environment, since that environment is continually challenging 
and redefining the boundaries o f  technological change.
The hypothesis and associated arguments led to the development of a range of research 
questions:
• ‘Are INs a service in themselves or simply a means to deliver services?’
• ‘Does regulation or detailed standardisation constrain technical innovation, 
service delivery, or both?’
• ‘Is legislative regulation the appropriate means to shape a technology in rapid 
change?’
• ‘How can it be ensured that robust technical and architectural models exist 
before standards are ratified?’
• ‘Do the members of the standardisation bodies (often the employees of the 
incumbent monopolies) subvert the goals of the regulators?’
The goal of this thesis was to address these questions and contribute to their debate. It does 
this in the form of a series of observations and consequent recommendations. These 
address the micro level, such as the architecture of Intelligent Networks and specific 
standards, as well as the macro level, such as the standardisation framework.
 ^ ‘Rapidly Changing’ in this context indicates the continuous demand for new innovative telecommunication 
services overlaid with the frequent arrival o f new technology. A compromise is always being sought for the 
benefits it brings and its potential longevity, verses developing what exists to meet market needs.
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In addressing the questions a range of original research was undertaken. This included:
• an historical review of regulatory patterns for the UK telecommunications 
industry between 1837 & 2002;
• the development of original IN architectures and comparison analysis with the 
ITU-T architecture;
• the completion of a Stakeholder analysis and study of stakeholder attitudes;
• investigation of the impact of the UK telecommunications business model and 
development of alternative models;
• identification of stakeholder attitudes to IN architectures, the standardisation 
process and regulation, through surveys and interviews;
• identification of the preferred interconnection points for different stakeholder 
groups and the associated issues, through surveys and interviews;
• identification of the characteristics associated with different types of 
telecommunication traffic;
• development of UK and EU standardisation regulatory models, through literary 
research and interviews;
• development of an EU telecommunication regulatory model, through literary 
research and interviews;
• identification of the steps taken when implementing voice technology;
• development of a series of design considerations for the implementation of 
voice technology.
This chapter therefore considers the implications of the findings of the research, making 
appropriate recommendations. The research has shown itself to be centred around four key 
themes - Intelligent Network Architecture, Industry Dynamics, Standardisation and 
regulatory environment. The conclusions are presented according to these themes.
7.2 Intelligent Network Architecture
A number of IN architecture models were developed and evaluated for this research. They 
were analysed to assess their appropriateness for helping achieve a company’s 
telecommunications product strategy and their ability to carry different traffic types. The 
research results suggested a marginal preference in using the Centralised and Mixed
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Distributed Processing models compared to the standardised ITU-T model. The principle 
reasons identified were the flexibility and/or speed of response.
The optimum choice of Intelligent Network architecture was contingent upon a large 
number of variables, which differed between Operators. Furthermore, the models were 
seen as having differing benefits and hence ideal for different product offerings (e.g. 
cellular or fixed), or as a migration stage, such as starting small and evolving. This clearly 
indicates that the single model adopted by the ITU-T was not appropriate for all situations 
and that IN standards developed to this model may be inappropriate and non-optimal for 
alternative architecture models. The single model approach may even have hindered IN 
development.
The research also found that some Operators had developed non-standard architectures that 
provided optimal performance for their networks. The application of regulations developed 
assuming the standardised model, when applied to non standard models, could have 
restricted the optimum operation of those Operators’ networks employing them. The 
research also showed that it was possible to develop models, which whilst utilising 
standardised interfaces, would create a barrier to interconnection. Wide deployment of 
such models would have inhibited the success of ‘regulated interconnection’ using the 
standardised interface.
The resulting standards are therefore a compromise and the associated technical 
architecture models will never receive unanimous agreement. The pace of change of 
technology is such that a model has most validity around the time it is created. Standards 
therefore needed to exhibit greater flexibility, so as to accommodate and evolve to 
architecture models never envisaged when the standards were conceived. Furthermore, 
they require a framework which eases the process of interconnection and interworking 
whilst such changes are occurring.
Although the architecture provides a high level operating model, telephony connections 
between customers serviced by different Operators necessitates interconnection. With INs, 
the point of interconnection depends upon the level of sophistication and functionality the 
Operators want to provide. The flexibility of such interfaces governs the exploitation 
potential of INs. The research analysed and summarised the advantages/disadvantages of
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different IN interfaces for interconnect. The most appropriate ITU-T IN architecture model 
interconnect points for the different stakeholders were identified as;
• Service Provider SSF - SCF;
• Customer CCAF - CCF;
• Operator CCAF - CCF; SCF - SCF; SSF - SCF;
• Carrier CCAF - CCF; SSF - SCF.
These interfaces are all signalling interfaces. Currently, Operators do not charge for 
signalling traffic but it has been found that this method of operation is open to abuse. 
Obviously the way of curbing any abuse is for operators to start charging for signalling 
queries, but this would necessitate an expensive revision of their billing capability.
Along with the preferred points of interconnect, the research also identified the problems 
associated with interconnecting via the different interfaces. The key issues raised by 
stakeholders were:
• Interconnect Compliance Testing - ensuring all signalling messages are 
understood and acted upon;
• Data Security - ensuring that only the specific data needed to process a 
particular service (i.e. call) is released for that service. The requirements 
depend upon the service implementation and will vary between networks, 
making it difficult to police;
• Maintaining Network Integrity - ensuring rogue messages cannot create fault 
conditions for either of the connecting networks;
• Proprietary Interfaces, leading to interworking difficulties with: 
o legacy networks;
o existing network and service management systems; 
o existing Billing Systems; 
o other IN Suppliers equipment; 
o other technology standards.
The research clearly indicates that interconnection at various points of the IN model may 
be desirable, but is not always possible owing to the proprietary nature of the interfaces. 
Adherence to minimum standards would facilitate interconnection (particularly new
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• Strategy -  does the chosen architecture compromise or complement the 
company’s development strategy?;
• Market - does the target market and the network’s targeted traffic mix relate to 
the chosen architecture? Does it address each traffic type individually, or is it 
the best compromise?
• Delay - would the network be sufficiently large or geographically spread, or the 
centralised database have a large number of interactions (such as external 
database queries), where the query response time of centralised processing is 
unacceptable?;
• Reliability -  would the network be geographically spread so that the reliability 
of centralised processing is unacceptable?;
• Chum - is there is a sufficient base of stable application or data, or significantly 
low chum of customer data or application changes, that a more distributed 
architecture appears attractive?;
• Updates - the volume and frequency of updates need to be reconciled with the 
management system capability, to ensure data population occurs in an 
acceptable time;
• Interworking - how conducive the architecture is to interworking with other 
networks/technologies and offering a seamless service between them;
• Integration -  how well the architecture will integrate with existing technology, 
management and billing systems;
• Technology -  is the ideal architecture able to be implemented, or do the 
Supplier’s offerings impose a limitation?;
• Scalable -  can the network architecture upgrade and develop when carrying live 
traffic?;
• Cost -  is the architecture or size of network cost effective?
The consideration of ‘Market’ in the checklist identified the need to categorise the different 
traffic types likely to be expected by a network. The analysis of telephony network traffic 
records allowed the characteristics of different types of telephony traffic to be mapped and 
summarised. The types categorised were Basic Telephony, Televoting, Intemet Access, 
Calling Card and Freephone. These can be used in the assessment of the appropriateness of 
a particular IN architecture.
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Operators interconnecting with existing Operators) and universal adoption of a set of 
standard services would foster growth, resulting from lower costs. Regulatory agreements 
will not, and cannot, cover every eventuality, and trust needs to exist between the parties to 
instil confidence that a particular interface will be used in a sensible manner.
7.3 Industry Dynamics
The research has found that ‘intelligence’ in the network is not new and draws a parallel 
with the services originally provided by a human switchboard operator and some of those 
typically provided by an Intelligent Network. It has also found from the examination of 
different Operators’ implementations of Intelligent Networks, that Operators progressively 
implemented INs in a series of four discernible steps depending upon the maturity of the 
technology and the role the Operator wanted it to perform in their telephony network. 
These steps were:
• Proprietary;
• Standardisation;
• Overlay (high in network hierarchy); and
• Fully Integrated.
The initial steps involve operating INs in conjunction with the Operator’s existing network, 
which may include previous implementations of INs. The level of integration increases in 
complexity as the final step of ‘Fully Integrated’ is approached, at which point the whole 
Operator’s network is an Intelligent Network. However, as the last step is approached, 
experience has shown that the problem of integration begins to include that of integrating 
with newer technologies (itself typically pursuing the four step cycle), or newer protocols. 
The need for integration has also been shown by the surveys to extend to the management 
and billing systems.
The need for such considerations gave rise to the development of the following list of 
design factors, appropriate when implementing a network. The list systematically identifies 
considerations to focus the Operator on checking whether an IN is an appropriate 
technology, which architecture might be best and other technical considerations affecting 
its success:
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7.4 Standardisation
The research has shown that the action of standardisation is a generic activity shown to be 
necessary in the facilitation of regulation. It generates discussion among competitors that 
generally achieves an optimum compromise for the specification of a standard, maximising 
usefulness, technological benefit and potential adoption. However it has also found that 
external influences (e.g. time constraints and quotas) can have a detrimental impact upon 
the content of standards. The impracticality o f ‘compromised’ standards are obvious only 
after time and non-adoption. Similarly the usefulness of standards varies with the 
economy. It is no use developing a network to the latest standard if the economy is such 
that Operators are unable to recoup their investment. Competing technology will also 
render the most excellent of standards obsolete, as has been demonstrated with the IN 
standards beyond CS2.
To aid the investigation of UK telecommunications standardisation, a UK standardisation 
model was developed. It shows the standardisation process is initiated by OFTEL, either 
through an Operator submitting an application for a new Supplementary Services 
Business^ service or through a decision being made to develop a UK variant of an 
international standard. The specification of that interface is referred to the appropriate 
Network Interoperability Consultative Committee (NICC), which comprises all the 
interested parties (i.e. stakeholders likely to use that interface). The output of the 
committee is a binding UK specific specification.
Similarly the research investigated and developed a European standardisation regulatory 
system model in order to assess the interaction of standardisation and regulation. The 
model is shown to be centred around ETSI. The EU recognised that a European integrated 
telecommunications infrastructure was necessary for economic growth. ETSI aided the 
regulations put in place to achieve that growth, by producing pan-European standards 
which would be used for telecommunications interconnect by the different Operators, 
ensuring customers a seamless service across Europe.
 ^In the UK, the DTI recognised that telecommunications liberalisation which introduced competition with 
the incumbent’s (BT’s) services, would not be by competitors covering all market segments, but by many 
competitors addressing individual market segments. To avoid unfair competition from BT cross subsidising 
services, OFTEL adopted the Systems Business/Supplementary Services Business accounting model, to help 
identify areas which needed to be accounted separately.
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The EU Commission therefore directs ETSI to focus on the development of standards in 
areas which are envisaged as necessary to encourage technological development (e.g. 
GSM), or in support of legislation (such as ONP in support of liberalisation) and for these 
standards to be produced in a timely manner.
Interconnect (and influencing the standards to achieve it), also has a political agenda and 
shapes the form of the technology policy and regulation to encourage service interworking 
and prevent interconnect barriers from arising. Standards by their very nature need people 
with specialist knowledge and skills in their production. Survey 1 has shown that these 
specialists principally comprise telecommunications Operators and Suppliers, with the 
Operators arguably having influence over the Suppliers (whose equipment they will use to 
offer their services) in the form of purchasing power. Thus the model presents a situation 
where the standards which may be used in support of its legislation are influenced by the 
very group of stakeholders (the Operators) to which the legislation is directed. Thus 
although the EU/govemment may set the overall policy, the fine detail is still in the hands 
of the Operators. This would inevitably reduce the impact of any legislation which might 
rely heavily upon the support of certain standards in order to achieve its desired outcome.
IN standards do not focus sufficiently on interworking with the existing telephony 
infrastructure. It has been noticed that (prior to the Intemet), more technologies/protocols 
have developed to work with INs than with each other (e.g. ISDN allowing SCP 
triggering). This flexibility, not shown with other technologies, (perhaps) indicates a 
characteristic which would encourage its longevity. INs could therefore be viewed as an 
‘enabling’ technology, since standards-makers appear to need to make their standards work 
with INs in order to help their technology gain acceptability. Thus standards bodies should 
give greater thought to developing interfaces between existing and emerging standards to 
ensure an acceptable level of interconnect from the outset. Similarly standardisation for 
supporting systems, such as those related to management and billing, should be developed 
in parallel with those of the technology, to ease the process of integration with existing 
systems.
Thus liaison is needed between different standards bodies and between the different 
interest groups within a body to ensure that optimum standards are developed. However,
3 2 3
7 The Implications and Issues for the Regulation and Standardisation o f Different Intelligent Network Models
liaison between interest groups with their own agendas makes the whole standards process 
more complex and slows it down. Other difficulties result from the perceived need of two 
co-operating bodies each to retain/own the developing standard, or by the very different 
operational nature of the two standards organisations. For example, the bureaucratic and 
hence typical slowness of the ITU-T compared with the speed of the IETF, has hindered 
their co-operation and led to the development of competing standards (e.g. H323 & SIP).
The different IN architectures developed for the research identified the necessity of 
additional interface standards. Standards existed within the computer environment and 
needed to be ported, adapted and adopted by the telephony environment.
IN standard organisations needed to expand their scope of activity to include management 
and billing applications, in addition to the development of ‘feature’ specifications, in order 
to integrate with legacy management systems and provide end-to-end management 
visibility. The surveys have also shown that interconnection with the Intemet would allow 
enhanced support services to be offered in conjunction with Intelligent Networks.
The lengthy periods taken to ratify standards leave Suppliers (and Operators) with little 
option but to create proprietary solutions, in order to enter the market first and capture 
market share. The associated risk is that their offering, being so vastly different from 
standards when they are ratified, make inter-Operator working difficult.
Information arising from the interviews showed that ratified standards were not necessarily 
designed for the needs of the market, this leading to products for which a market is sought. 
Elements of the functionality enshrined in the standards were originally created to achieve 
targets rather than have any marketable justification.
Another view was that the demand for new features exceeded the rate at which standards 
were agreed and thus could be helped by speeding the standardisation process. Countering 
this was the view that standardisation prevented an Operator from producing unique 
services. The surveys revealed a dilemma, in that the respondents wanted standardised INs 
(because it gave Operators purchasing power and easier interconnect), and they also 
wanted the ability to provide service differentiation. These two needs conflict. Services 
constmcted from standardised Supplier offerings could be easily replicated, therefore the
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use of highly standardised INs would force a change in focus in the Operators’ product 
strategy. There is therefore a fine balance between standardising to great detail and stifling 
innovation and market development, and pitching standards at a level where the benefits of 
standardisation are minimised.
The findings therefore tend to suggest that standardisation organisations should concentrate 
on making IN standards more applicable and flexible to encourage innovation.
Additionally they should start developing management interface standards. This is unlikely 
to help interfacing with legacy systems, but should aid future technology integration with 
the IN support systems.
Opponents of such regulation highlight the slow standards definition process. They also 
argue that the implementation of a common level of functionality would restrict service 
differentiation and limit Operator opportunity, allowing successful services to be easily 
replicated by competitors. That is, defining a narrow regulatory framework within which to 
offer IN type services would give an Operator negligible opportunity for competitive 
differentiation of its services.
7.5 Regulatory Environment
Research of the history of telecommunications regulation, has shown that the attitude to, 
and hence the regulation of, the telecommunications market in the UK has been cyclical, as 
the technology developed. Both Telegraphy and Telephony have followed similar 
regulatory courses. As the new technology developed and was implemented to offer a 
public service, a fi*ee market was created, which was subsequently licensed/nationalised by 
the government. It was argued that this would encourage efficiency, quality of service and 
be in the defence interests of the country. In the case of telephony, a retreat occurred when 
telephony was de-nationalised and reverted to licensing in 1984. Such cycles reveal a 
restrictive set of tools with which to implement telecommunications regulation, these being 
licensing and nationalisation. This trend of innovation, licensing, nationalisation etc. could 
perhaps be used to predict the future regulative position of newer communications 
technology such as the Intemet.
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The current UK regulatory regime is heavily influenced by a business model dividing 
products into the three categories of Network Business, Systems Business and 
Supplementary Services Business. The research perceived anomalies within the UK 
licensing regime based around this model (since rectified), with a number of Service 
Providers being allocated Operator licences which gave them an interconnection rate 
advantage over other Service Providers. The research also discovered limitations 
associated with applying the business model to other technologies and developed 
alternative business models which were less technology orientated.
In the UK, EU telecommunications directives are generally passed into law and 
implemented and enforced by the UK regulator OFTEL. Telecommunication Service 
Providers (Operators etc.) are licensed; the type of licence indicates the scope of the 
services they can offer and the conditions under which they can offer that service.
Information from literature and interviews allowed the investigation of the EU regulatory 
process and development of the European Telecommunications Regulatory model. The 
model links with the EU standardising process model through DGXIII, indicating that 
regulation operates at both the competitive (regulatory) level and also arguably, the 
technical (standards) level. The regulatory system also links the EU commission with 
Member State regulators.
A concern identified by the regulatory model is that the Commission can take unilateral 
action, independent of the Council of Ministers or European Parliament. That is, there is no 
accountability to Member State representatives for its actions. However this has not shown 
itself to be a problem in the telecommunications environment.
The application of regulation can be supported by appropriate standards. The danger with 
this is that the standardisation process can be considered relatively slow, especially when 
the technology reaches maturity.
Across the EU there are a number of anomalies between the licensing structure and hence 
accounting model; consequentially, companies find a number of countries in which it is 
easier to gain a foothold compared to others. Although such biases have been reduced
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since 1998, regulation in the form of new EU directives due to be implemented in June 
2003, is designed to further ease and equalise regulation by Member States.
The Surveys revealed that the majority of respondents thought there should be an EU led, 
agreed design for INs. The reasons given were that adherence to minimum standards, 
would facilitate both interconnection, (particularly by new Operators with existing 
Operators), and the universal adoption of a set of standard services encouraging market 
stimulation and growth, resulting in lower costs. However, with standards being developed 
and Suppliers supporting those new standards. Operators adopting/upgrading an IN will 
purchase new kit conforming to standards. Thus if the standards are in place, they will be 
implemented by default, giving Operators buying power, reducing costs and encouraging 
new entrants through reduced costs and standardisation. Alternatively, the application of 
regulations to INs (as was hinted at by the DTI in 1992 (DTI 1992)) which force Operators 
to (potentially adopt an inappropriate IN model and then) open those IN interfaces to 
access to other Operators could reduce the efficient operation of that Operator’s 
telecommunications network.
Similarly the research has shown that it is possible to adopt an architecture model which is 
different to the standardised model, yet adheres to the standard interface specifications. 
This has demonstrated that should regulation be applied to open those standardised 
interfaces (without considering the underlying architecture model), then the regulation 
could be made ineffective.
The research also raised the question of what the outcome would be if Operators utilising 
proprietary INs were made to open interfaces for interconnect. Being proprietary the 
manufacturers would almost certainly not allow this to be done. The EU could then apply 
anti-competitive regulations to the manufacturer, if there was sufficient evidence that not 
opening the interface led directly or indirectly to a detrimental effect on the 
telecommunications service industry. Although opening such interfaces was researched, 
time has shown that proprietary interfaces were not regulated, due to the prohibitively high 
cost of adaptive engineering for other supplier equipment to work with such interfaces and 
the development of open IN standards which were adopted by the Suppliers. Thus in 
practice, it was found (certainly in the UK) that upgrading IN capability and introducing a 
new IN, involved implementing equipment which conformed to international standards.
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The functionality required by interfaces, was limited to only that required for the services 
affected and interconnect has been left to apply/negotiate by the individual country 
regulators.
It has been shown that strong standards can be put in place without regulation (e.g. GSM), 
but not necessarily without being given a formal focus (such as by the EU commission). 
However, (using the example of GSM again), it has also been shown that tight 
specifications, although aiding initial implementation, has long term stifled innovation due 
to the tight regulation of interfaces.
7.6 Conclusion
Although the focus of this research has been upon Intelligent Networks, the conclusions 
arising from it can be applied to a range of technologies and situations. For instance, the 
research has shown that the introduction of (voice) technology follows a series of four 
stages - these being Proprietary, Standardisation, Overlay and Fully Integrated. The steps 
taken by an Operator in implementing a particular technology will depend upon a series of 
factors including the appropriateness of its existing network, the level of investment 
available and the maturity of the standards of the new technology.
The research has also found that the process of standardisation is a generic activity shown 
to be necessary in the facilitation of the regulation of interconnection. Standards generation 
is organised primarily by international standardisation organisations. The standardisation 
process generates discussion among competitors, the resulting standards being a 
compromise maximising usefiilness, technological benefit and potential adoption.
However, they will not be ideal for everyone. Any technical architectures associated with 
the standards will therefore never receive unanimous agreement. Additionally, technology 
is continuously evolving and differing and changing circumstances will mean an 
architecture is only appropriate at the instant in time at which it is created. Standards 
therefore need to exhibit sufficient flexibility to accommodate and evolve to differing 
architectures perhaps never envisaged when the standards were conceived, yet create a 
framework which eases the process of interconnection and interworking whilst such 
changes are occurring.
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The literary research and interviews also found that external influences such as time 
constraints and quotas can have a detrimental impact upon the content of standards. The 
impracticality of such ‘compromised’ standards are not immediately obvious, this only 
being revealed with time by their non-adoption. Other influences similarly reduce the 
usefulness of standards. A weak or failing market economy would prevent Operators from 
adopting the latest standards, since they would most likely be unable to recoup their 
investment. Similarly, competing technology will also render the most excellent of 
standards obsolete.
Legislative regulation encourages discussions about standards and interconnection, with 
both the EU and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) having an influence on the 
standards produced by ETSI and the ITU-T respectively. The ultimate aim is to use the 
standards to help promote competition. However to maximise usefulness, such standards 
need to be more than just interconnect; the scope needs to broaden to encompass operation 
(secure operation) and management standards in order to enable integration with similar 
elements of different technologies.
It has also been shown from the surveys, that the Suppliers and Operators are the dominant 
participants in the ETSI standardisation body working groups. Where the resulting 
standardisation is used in support of legislation, the Operators, a group such legislative 
regulation is likely to target, are in a position to potentially reduce the effectiveness of the 
standards created.
The application of regulation can therefore be supported by appropriate standards. History 
has shown that regulations formulated for one situation often expand to embrace other 
situations not envisaged at the time they were conceived. It is therefore possible that if 
regulation were not carefully chosen, it would effectively restrict the types and flexibility 
of the services offered to customers.
The danger with this is that the surveys showed that the standardisation process was 
considered by some to be relatively slow, especially when the technology reaches maturity. 
Operators bound to adherence to the standards throu^ regulation, would perhaps tend to 
get frustrated by the slow process limiting the speed at which they can introduce new 
services.
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Depending upon the level of regulation and the supporting standards, a number of 
problems could arise. Implementation of inappropriate standardised technology would 
mismatch with company strategy, resulting in the danger of under-exploitation owing to 
unforeseen issues or the inherent limitations of the existing support systems. This will 
impair the level of service able to be offered. Similarly, binding regulation to over-detailed 
standards would create a situation where there was little service differentiation and a 
constraint on innovative new services which might normally make use of proprietary 
elements. Likewise with interfaces, the regulation of the use of which, if too tightly 
defined, will restrict the use to which that interface is put and thus constrain the 
development of new services. Thus any Operator could easily replicate a competitor’s 
service. Regulation should therefore take account of the level of detail of supporting 
standards and should not be applied at a level which would inhibit service development.
The research commenced with five research questions (Chapter 1):
• Are INs a service in themselves or simply a means to deliver services?
• Does regulation or detailed standardisation constrain technical innovation, 
service delivery, or both?
• Is legislative regulation the appropriate means to shape a technology in rapid 
change?
• How can it be ensured that robust technical and architectural models exist 
before standards are ratified?
• Do the members of the standardisation bodies (often the employees of the 
incumbent monopolies) subvert the goals of the regulators?
The research has demonstrated that association of rigid architectures with standards will 
inhibit Operator flexibility and hence product development. It has identified the EU and 
UK regulatory and standardisation processes and shown that in the case where 
standardisation is used to support regulation, the development of the standards is subject to 
the influence of those parties to whom the regulation will eventually apply. Regulation 
should not therefore be shaping the technology, but encouraging its implementation and 
interconnection through the development and adoption of its standardised capability.
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In essence, the research has contributed to the debate, helping to confirm that
‘Tight architecture-based regulation is inappropriate fo r a rapidly changing 
telecommunications environment, since that environment is continually challenging 
and redefining the boundaries o f  technological change/
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7.7 Future Research
Although the focus of this research has been upon Intelligent Networks, the conclusions 
and recommendations arising from it can be applied to a range of technologies and 
situations. Such new technologies including the 3^  ^Generation (3G) mobile 
telecommunication systems (UMTS), which employs an Intelligent Network architecture 
(albeit with different terms and functions to those used for the fixed line network), and 
Voice over Intemet Protocol (VOIP) which use centralised call servers. As connectionless 
networks are more widely employed and carry ever increasing traffic, many issues 
addressed in fixed line networks, are being discovered anew (e.g. point to point links 
reducing network traffic and guaranteeing an acceptable Quality of Service)^. The focus 
for future research, although arising from that based on fixed network INs, is just as 
applicable to these new technologies.
The concept of centralised intelligence can still be seen to have benefits in Intemet 
protocol (IP) networks. The functions performed by an Intelligent Network’s SCP and SDP 
will still need to exist within the new technologies'^ and thus the lessons leamt are still 
applicable. An example of a new service on an Intemet Network is a centralised 
application, accessible by Customer Premise Equipment (CPE), which determines the 
Quality of Service across the Intemet. The application could send test messages and/or 
interrogate the management network to gather information on Network Performance at that 
point in time and this could be reported back to the CPE to adjust the requirements of the 
application (such as a video conference).
Future research focussed on the Intemet could not only address architecture and 
interconnect issues, building upon the work undertaken with Intelligent Networks, but 
could also observe its regulatory development to determine if the phases traversed follow a 
similar course to that of telegraphy and telephony in the past, even though the majority of 
changes in regulation to these occurred a century or more ago.
 ^These ‘scaling’ issues have served to reduce the cost advantage o f connectionless networks over TDM the 
Atlantic and four times cheaper compared to TDM land lines in the UK (interview Topliss 1998).networks, 
from initial estimates o f ten times cheaper to less than half the cost in some cases.
For instance the routers in an IP network are analogous to a distributed intelligence structure, the capability 
o f which is easily able to be changed via a management network. The Domain Name Server (DNS) serves as 
a central translation capability converting Universal Resource Locators (URLs) to Intemet Protocol (IP) 
addresses.
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This proposition is supported by the similarity between the arguments of ‘better quality of 
service’, ‘universal service’ and ‘national interest (security)’, originally used to justify 
greater controls of telegraphy and telephony and those currently being directed at the 
Intemet. For instance, numerous court cases in the US against Intemet Content Providers 
(for typically defamatory matter) may lead to licensing (‘better quality of service’). Greater 
access for all could lead to government investment (and associated control - ‘universal 
service’). Terrorist web sites and those inciting civil unrest may be perceived as a national 
security threat and result in greater government control (‘national interest’). That is, the 
arguments used for licensing telegraphy and telephony in the 19^  ^& 20* Centuries can be 
applied with equal validity to the Intemet in the 20* & 21®^ Centuries.
However, Intelligent Networks will continue as legacy networks for many years and the 
emergence of Voice over Intemet Protocol technology identifies its integration with INs as 
cmcial to offering the technology in a public network environment. It could perhaps be 
argued that the responses to Survey 2 were an early indicator of this. Thus the Optimum 
architecture model and operation for Intelligent Network/Intemet interworking could be 
investigated.
A further area of research would be to confirm the survey findings that the lengthy time 
setting periods for standardisation or over-detailed standardisation were limiting factors in 
offering services, as claimed. Altematively it may be found that Supplier-provided super­
sets to the standardised requirements negated this.
The research additionally identified a lack of co-ordination (and possibly co-operation) 
within and between standardisation organisations when initially developing standards, 
leading to restricted operation (e.g. ISDN and CSl). Research could examine this and 
compare it with the way the Intemet Engineering Technology Fomm (IETF) operates in 
producing standards. With telephony standards and Intemet standards becoming closely 
related, it would be interesting to examine the mutual impact of the organisations, given 
their vastly different ways of working.
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Appendix A.1 Copy of Postal Questionnaire (Survey 1 )
TheOpen 
University
Open University Survey of the 
Regulation of Intelligent 
Networks
Fax Return Box
Only to be completed if you wish to receive a report of the survey. 
For the Attention of John Shepherd or Nick Heap
Fax To: 
From:
+ 44 1908-653658
Company:
Position:
Address:
1. General
1.1 Your Organisation is? (Mark the one which best applies from your viewpoint)
Public Telephone Operator*
Supplier
Regulator
Standards Body
Other (Please State)
Service Provider 
Consultant 
Government Body  
Customer (End User)
1.2 Your area of expertise is? (Mark one only)
Sales
Network Strategy 
Network Implementation 
Other (Please State)
Marketing
Network Design/Developm ent 
Network Operations
2. Technical Strategy
2.1 Has the concept of Intelligent Networks (IN) been considered in formulating your 
organisation’s  plans for Telecommunications?
Yes N o
2.2
2.3
How important is IN for your organisation? (please circle one option)
Very Important Fairly
Important
N ot Very 
Important
N ot at all 
Important
N o  Opinion
Is your organisation (directly or in co-operation with any other organisation) 
considering offerings In the provision of IN services (Free Phone, Call Distribution 
etc.)? (Mark all that apply)
Public Telephone Operator 
Switch Manufacturer/Supplier 
Computer Manufacturer/Supplier 
Service Provider 
Information Provider 
N ot Applicable 
Other (please state)
* The term ‘Public Telephone Operator’ (PTC) was common at the time o f the survey, but now appears 
dated. This thesis therefore uses the shortened form ‘Operator’ in its discussions.
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3. Architecture and Services
3.1 Which of the IN architectures/models, shown in Figure 1, do you think is most
appropriate?
w -------- (S D F ^
SSF
CCF
Option A:
Centralised Processing 
Environment
( s ^ ( s ^  ( s ^ ( s ^
SSF
CCF
Option B:
Centralised Distributed 
Processing Environment
^ S C ^  ^ S D ^  Centralised
SSF
CCF
SCF ) ( S D F  
Local
Option C:
Mixed Distributed 
Processing Environment
SCF Service Control Function 
SDF Service Data Function 
SSF Service Switching Function 
CCF Call Control Function
Figure 1 CSl-IN Architectures
Option A
Other (Please State)
Option B Option C
3.2 What Is the main reason for your choice of architecture in answering Question 3.1 ?
(Please write in)
3.3 What do you regard as the priorities that should be agreed from a regulatory
viewpoint regarding IN interconnect access by third parties and the reason why?
(Please mark in order of priority 1 =most important, 5=least important)
Interconnect by Priority Reasons for priority
PTO
Carriers
Service Providers
Information Provider
Other (Please State)
None
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The following diagram should be used to answer questions 3.4 and 3.5. If the 
terminology is unfamiliar, please mark the ‘Don’t Know’ boxes.
Network Operator Service Provide
Ag^(sCnF)-(L^<
SCnF Service Creation Function
SMF Service Management Function
SCF Service Control Function
SDF Service Data Function
SRF Service Resource Function
SSF Service Switching Function
CCF Call Control Function
CCAF Call Control Access Function SRF CCF CCAF
Figure 2 IN Interconnect Points 
3.4 What do you feel is the most appropriate interconnect point for each of the following 
operators? (Ring the appropriate letter by reference to the Figure 2.)
Operator Interconnect Point
Public Telephone Operator A B C D E F G H I J K L M
Carrier A B C D E F G H I J K L M
Service Provider A B C D E F G H I J K L M
Customer (End User) A B C D E F G H I J K L M
Other Operator (Please State) A B C D E F G H I J K L M
D on’t Know A B C D E F G H I J K L M
3.5 What are the associated problems with the interconnection points you have chosen 
for Q 3.4? (Ring the letters of the problems which apply - see Key below - and add any 
additional problems you feel are relevant.)
Operator What are the Problems
Public Telephone Operator IC IP CR DS N I SD
Carrier 1C IP CR D S N I SD
Service Provider IC IP CR DS N I SD
Customer (End User) IC IP CR DS N I SD
Other Operator (Please State) 
Don’t Know
IC IP CR DS N I SD
Key (for Q 3.5)
Interconnect Compliance Testing IC Data Security
DS
Interface highly proprietary IP Network Integrity
NI
Conflict with current Regulations CR Service Differentiation
SD
3.6 How important would you rate the use of open interconnect standards for INs? (Mark 
the one which best applies)
N o OpinionVery
Important
Fairly
Important
Not Very 
Important
Not at all 
Important
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3.7 Should there be an EU led, agreed design for INs in each EU state to allow 
interconnect (with transparency of services across networks)?
Y es N o  D on’t Know
3.8 What is the main reason for choosing the answer you have, to Q3.7
(Please write in)
3.9 What key regulations and limitations should be imposed on Licensed Operator’s  INs?
(Please write in)
3.10 What is the one major problem that would hinder the implementation of INs in your 
country, Europe and World-wide?(e.g. standards, regulations, interconnect, 
government attitude etc.) (Please write in)
3.11 Is your company involved in any (IN) standardisation or policy setting groups?
(Mark all that apply)
ETSI ITU(CCITT)
EURESCOM TINA
Bellcore RBOC (please state which)
Other (please state)
4. Other Comments
If there are any other comments you would like to add, please use the space below:
Thank you for your help and mark here if you would like a copy of the summary of the 
study
Y es N o
Please enclose a business card with your reply or 
complete the fax return box on page 1
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Appendix A.2 The Reference Code, Adopted for the 
Postal Questionnaire (Survey 1 )
An example reference code is c:\5Mrvbcxcw7w2p.c, where
XXX industry sector (see list below), e.g. bay
n l Company identifier, e.g. 09
n2 Recipient, e.g. 07
p  identifies the format of the survey used. If a major error with the survey
contents was discovered and its contents altered, the letter ip) would have 
changed. This would have allowed the version of the survey to have been 
tracked. Since the content of the survey did not need to change after the 
trial, only one letter has been used. e.g. p  
c identifies if the recipient has returned the initial (/) copy of the questionnaire
or a copy enclosed with the reminder(s) e.g. c
1. POLICY (a) 4. CONSULTANTS (d)
1.1. Europe (aa) 4.1. Europe# (day)
1.1.1.UK# (aaa) 4.2. North America (dby)
1.1.2. European Union # (aab) 4.3. Pacific Rim (dcy)
1.1.3. Rest of Europe (aac) 4.4. Rest of the World (ddy)
1.2. North America (aby)
1.3. Pacific Rim (acy) 5. USERS (e)
1.4. Rest of the World (ady) 5.1. Europe (ea)
5.1.1. UK# (eaa)
2. SUPPLIER (b) 5.1.2. European Union # (eab)
2.1. Switch# (bay) 5.1.3. Rest of Europe (eacy
2.2. Computer/Software # (bby) 5.2. North America (eby)
5.3. Pacific Rim (ecy)
3. OPERATORS (c) 5.4. Rest of the World (edy)
3.1. International # (cay)
3.2. National - Europe (cb) 6. Standards (f)
3.2.1. UK Local # (cba) 6.1. Telecommunications (fa)
3.2.2. UK National # (ebb) 6.1.1. World-wide (faa)
3.2.3. European Union # (cbc) 6.1.2. European Union (fab)
3.2.4. Rest of Europe (cbd) 6.1.3. North America (fac)
3.3. National - North America (ccy) 6.1.4. Pacific Rim (fad)
3.4. National - Pacific Rim (cdy) 6.1.5. Others (fae)
3.5. National - Rest of the World (cey) 6.2. Computer (fa)
3.6. Service Providers- Europe # (cf) 6.2.1. World-wide (faa)
3.6.1. UK (cfa) 6.2.2. European Union (fab)
3.6.2. European Union (cfb) 6.2.3. North America (fac)
3.6.3. Rest of Europe (cfc) 6.2.4. Pacific Rim (fad)
3.7. Service Providers - North America (cgy) 6.2.5. Others (fae)
3.8. Service Providers - Pacific Rim (chy)
3.9. Service Providers - Rest of the World (ciy)
An example of a questionnaire reference therefore would be c:\surv\bay0901p.i 
indicating a response fi*om person 1 in company 9 which is a switch supplier.
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Appendix B Copy of Conference Questionnaire
(Survey 2)
Dear Delegate,
I n te l l ig e n t  N e tw o r k s  ’9 9
(HR Telecoms & Technology LONDON)
I hope you have found this year’s conference useful and informative ... and fun! I am now 
in the process of planning our next IN conference for May ‘99 in London, and would like 
to get some specific feedback from you on the programme content, so that I can ensure 
your most critical questions are answered at IN’99. So, I’d be grateful if you would kindly 
take a few minutes to answer the following questions, and hand this form back to me at the 
end of the day.
Thanks in advance and enjoy the rest of the event!
Regards
Mandana____________  '_________ ______ ______ ___________________________
Your Name; ..................................................
Your Job Title; ..................................................
Your Company; .................................... .............
1) What is the biggest IN challenge facing you on a daily basis, as an individual
working in this sector, and why?
2) What are the most critical challenges currently facing your organisation in terms of;
a. IN Network Design & Implementation
b. IN Operational Support Systems
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c. IN Service Development
d. IN Services Marketing
e. IN & Internet Convergence
3) What topics were missing from this year’s event that you would like to have 
addressed at next year’s event?
4) Which operator case studies are you most interested in & why?
5) Which Vendors are you most interested in hearing from & why?
Please hand this form in at the registration desk.
Thanks again and I look forward to welcoming you to our future events.
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Appendix C UK Licence Types (correct as of 1998)
The UK Telecommunications Act (DTI 1984) with a subsequent amendment, the 1991 
White Paper (DTI 1991c), detailed the two categories of telecommunications licence 
available. These were:
• Class Licence;
• Individual Licence.
Class Licences
A Class licence authorised the operation of telecommunication systems which match a pre­
defined type. These licences applied automatically to any person or company who met the 
requirements set out in the licence and did not have to be specifically applied for, or 
granted. In this way, (together with the individual licences) the operation of essentially all 
the UK telecommunications equipment was subject to a licence. The advantage of this, was 
that OFTEL who granted and oversaw the operation of licences, could, should the need 
arise, alter licensing conditions fairly easily, without recourse to government. If no licences 
addressing these areas existed, changing conditions of operation such as new areas needing 
individual licences would require an act of parliament.
Two of the more important Class Licences, were ‘Self Provision’ and 
‘Telecommunications Service’. The Self Provision Licence (SPL) authorised the self­
provision of any telecommunication system provided that the system was not used to 
provide service to third parties for profit. Additionally, a message conveyed on the system 
must either originate or terminate with the Licensee. At the simplest level, the licence 
allows a person to use a telephone at their home. On a more complex level, the licence 
allows companies to own and operate their own internal telecommunications equipment. 
The Telecommunication Service Licence (TSL) is very similar to the SPL except that it 
allows the provision of data service to third parties for profit, i.e. the provision of 
International Simple Data Resale to specified countries and offshore systems.
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Individual Licences 
PTO Licence
If Section B of the 1984 Act was deemed to apply to a licence, then the DOT designated 
the system a ‘Public Telecommunication System’ and the associated licence was known as 
a Public Telecommunication Operator’s (PTO) licence.
Between 1984 and 1991, numerous Individual licences were granted, especially for the 
provision of Cable TV (see later), but only two Public Telecommunication Operator 
licences were granted. These were to British Telecommunications pic. (BT) (DTI 1991a) 
and Mercury Communications Limited (MCL) (now Cable & Wireless (C&W)) (DTO 
1991b) and were issued to allow the operation of a national public fixed networks for 
seven years. The aim of only granting two PTO licences^ was to give MCL a period of 
minimum competition to establish its network. In 1991, the government White Paper (DTI 
1991) reviewed this policy and ended the monopoly of these companies and allowed the 
renewal of BT’s and MCL’s licences as well as the issuing of further Public 
Telecommunication Operator licences.
Typical Licence Overview
The licence is for a 25 year period, subject to the Conditions and unless revoked. It 
authorises the running of telecommunication systems throughout the UK and provision of 
any telecommunication service except:
• International Simple Voice Resale, to a country not designated by the 
Secretary of State (SoS);
• International Simple Data Resale, without specific SoS agreement;
• the conveyance of television programmes for the use of more than one 
property, or at one place by members of the public;
• mobile telephony;
• the transmission/reception of live speech, to/ffom satellite if the speech 
originates or terminates on another country’s Public Switched Telephone 
Network (also known as breakout).
 ^Kingston Upon Hull Telecommunications was a third PTO licence which was issued, but being restricted to 
operation in a small geographical area, did not have a significant impact on the environment in which BT and 
MCL operated.
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Interestingly there were a number of Conditions, common to BT’s and C&W’s Licence, 
which were absent from the post 1991 PTO licences. These included no conditions which:
• prohibited the licensees from providing a product to a customer on condition 
they must also take another product;
• prohibited cross-subsidisation between different parts of the licensee’s 
business;
• restricted the abuse of intellectual property to gain an unfair market advantage 
(although if on a sufficiently large scale, EU competition law would apply).
Cable TV
Cable TV operators required two licences that enabled them to provide services. The first 
was granted under the Broadcasting Act 1990, which defines the area within which the 
Operator can provide television and radio services. The second was a licence issued under 
the Telecommunications Act 1984, which authorises the licensee to operate networks. The 
licence allows the provision of telecommunication services of all types including 
conveying television, radio and telephony, but not mobile telephony.
International Simple Resale Licences
International Simple Resale (ISR) was defined as the transmission of a message from the 
UK Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN), via an international private leased 
circuit, to the PSTN of another country approved by the SoS. The ISR licence was similar 
to the TSL except: the TSL only allowed International Simple Data Resale (ISDR) to 
specified countries, whereas the ISR licence allowed ISDR and International Simple Voice 
Resale (IS VR) to specified countries. ACC Long Distance UK Ltd were the first to be 
granted such a licence on the 25th September 1992.
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Appendix C References
DTI 1984: ‘Telecommunications Act 1984% HMSO, London
DTI 1991a: ‘Licence granted by The Secretary of State for Trade and Industry to British 
Telecommunications under Section 7 of the Telecommunications Act 1984% 
HMSO, London, (Revised December 1991 and amendments dated March 1993 
& October 1993)
DTI 1991b: ‘Licence granted by The Secretary of State for Trade and Industry to Mercury 
Communications Limited Telecommunications under Section 7 of the 
Telecommunications Act 1984% HMSO, London, Revised December
DTI 1991c: ‘Competition and Choice: Telecommunications Policy for the 1990s% (Cm 
1461), HMSO, London, March
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Appendix D The EU Operating Structure
The operating structure of the EU comprises four key groups, the Council of Ministers, the 
European Parliament, the Commission and Court of Justice (Horrocks 1994), which all 
work together to agree, implement and ensure adherence to EU regulations.
Council of Minister
The Council of Ministers comprises a number of sub-councils which meet periodically. 
The appropriate minister of each country attends the appropriate sub-council, allowing 
countries to voice their views. In the area of telecommunications, there is a specific sub­
council which meets every six months in Brussels, to discuss the development of EU 
policy in this area, the UK representative being the Secretary of State.
European Parliament
The European Parliament resides on two sites in Strasbourg and comprises more than five 
hundred European Members of Parliament, elected by the nationals of the EU member 
states. Similar to national parliaments, the European parliament is politically grouped. It 
oversees the operation of the EU (election of commissioners etc.) and can propose 
amendments to legislation being discussed by the Council of Ministers, but it cannot pass 
legislation; this is the role of the Council of Ministers.
Commission
The Commission is divided into groups termed Directorates General (DO), which support 
specific facets of the EU’s operation. The staff of these groups are based in Brussels and 
form the core of the centralised operation of the European Union.
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The key directorates and their commissioners which drove the reform of the 
telecommunication’s environment in the early 1990s, establishing the 1998 liberalisation 
programme and referenced throughout the thesis, were:
• 1 - External Relations - Leon Brittan (UK);
• 3 - Internal Market and Industry Affairs (including Telecommunications
Standards) - Martin Bannerman (Germany);
• 4 - Competition - Karl Van Miert (Belgium);
• 13 - Telecommunications - Martin Bannerman (Germany).
The directorates as part of their activity, drive a number of committees. Two key ones 
within DG 3 (Directorate B) were ‘Senior Officials Group on Telecommunications’ 
(SOGT) and ‘Senior Officials Group on Information Technology’ (SOGIT). These 
committees guided the EU development policy for their respective areas.
Court of Justice
The Court of Justice is located in Luxembourg and passes judgement upon member 
countries implementing EU legislation. In the case where individual companies break EU 
legislation (enshrined in national legislation), resolution is attempted at the national level, 
transgressing the national courts before reaching the European Court (typically in the form 
of an appeal). In cases where a Member State is in breech of regulations, the commission 
refers the matter to the court of justice directly. Unfavourable judgements typically result 
in fines.
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Appendix E An example of the Documentation 
produced by the EU Legisiatory Process in the 
Telecommunications Sector
This appendix provides an example from the telecommunications sector of the 
documentation produced in the process of developing recommendations and converting 
them into legislation. It uses examples from the telecommunications sector, starting with 
the Green Papers and culminating in the 1998 liberalisation process. Its purpose is to 
provide an indication of the EU legisiatory process by way of a selection of documentation 
produced by that process. It is not a comprehensive list of EU liberalisation-related 
documentation.
The commission regularly reviews a market sector, producing a report outlining the current 
position and making recommendations for the future. These reports are termed ‘Green 
Papers’, The key ones in the telecommunications sector that led up to the 1998 
Liberalisation were the ‘The Development of the Common Market for 
Telecommunications Services and Equipment’ (EU 1987) and ‘The Liberalisation of 
Telecommunications Infrastructure and Cable Television Networks’ (EU 1994a, EU 
1995a).
The first green paper led to a Commission competition Directive (EU 1990) and 
Guidelines (e.g. EU 1991). The guidelines led to Commission recommendations to the 
Council (e.g. EU 1992, EU 1993a, EU 1994c), which in turn, led to Council 
recommendations and resolutions, a number of the latter being ultimately enshrined in 
legislation (e.g. EU 1993b, EU 1994b, EU 1994d, EU 1995b).
Following the 1994/95 green paper, the process was repeated, leading to legislation which 
deregulated the EU telecommunications market in 1998.
While the opening and liberalising to the telecommunications market was being discussed 
and passed in council, there were a number of supporting topics being discussed, 
developed and adopted, such as Open Network Provision (ONP), defining ‘a universal set 
of rules for network interfaces’ (Cranston 1991 p20) (EU 1990b, EU 1994e, ETSI1995).
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For instance the 1987 Green Paper only refers to the ONP of ISDN where public Voice 
Technology is concerned, but its supportive development in the intervening years meant 
that it had developed sufficiently for it to be included in the 1994/95 Green Papers.
Similarly, to minimise the bureaucracy and speed the entry of companies into Member 
States’ markets, the EU worked on another directive (EU 1994g), which aimed to 
streamline authorisation procedures as much as possible, issuing a general authorisation 
licence for telecommunication operators, rather than licensing for individual services 
(Eckert 1996).
Other relevant legislation was the directive on the ‘Protection of personal data and privacy’ 
(EU 1994h) and Article 85 (Anti-Competitive Practices) and Article 86 (Abuse of 
Dominant Position).
The (Treaty of Rome) Article 85 -  ‘Anti-Competitive Practices’, is only applicable to Joint 
Ventures or agreements between a number of companies. The venture in the EU is 
regarded favourably if it allows the EU companies to be better positioned to compete 
outside the EU or results in a significant increase in benefit or significant reduction in cost 
to the EU consumer. It is difficult to obtain evidence from the EU, to indicate how ventures 
which have no affect upon trade between member countries within the EU, are likely to 
gain approval (EU 1994f). (Approval is obtained by the granting of an exemption under the 
act. i.e. Article 85 adopts the approach of disallowing an enterprise unless exempt.)
The (Treaty of Rome) Article 86 -  ‘Abuse of Dominant Position’, addresses the potential 
abusive use of market power by a dominant operator, which affects trade in the EU. An 
example of this could be the application of unfair terms and conditions such as the high 
pricing of a scarce product.
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Glossary
Glossary
ACA
ACCC
Accounting
Separation
ACIF
AIN
AMA
ANSI
AP
API
AT&T
ATM
ATUG
Austel
BABT
BUS
BSI
BT
C13
Cl
Australian Communications Authority
Australian Consumer and Competition Commission
The maintenance of separate accounts for different parts of the
businesses run by the same company, so that any cross
subsidisation can be clearly identified.
Australian Carrier Industry Forum 
Advanced Intelligent Network 
Automated Message Accounting
American National Standards Institute -  A consortium of the USA 
NSO (American National Standards Institute) and the 
telecommunications industry. Generates the technical standards for 
the network infi-astructure in the USA. Used by the US Regulator 
for the basis for regulation in the USA.
Adjunct Processor
Application Programming Interface
American Telephones and Telegraphs
Asynchronous Transfer Mode, a high throughput packet switching 
protocol, enabling all types of information (e.g. data, voice and 
video) to be transported by a single network infrastructure. 
Australian Telecommunications Users Group 
(Former) Australian Telecommunications Regulatory Authority 
British Approval Board for Telecommunications 
Binary Interchange of Information and Signalling 
British Standards Institute 
British Telecommunications pic.
Condition 13 - A UK telecommunications operator licence 
condition, which allows the sale/purchase of telecommunications 
capability at wholesale rates.
CCITT Signalling System no. 7 - signalling specification firom the 
ITU-T (UK variant) - it provides access to a wider range of services 
within BT's network than is available to customers.
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Call Diversion
CAMEL
CCAF
CCF
CCITT
CCITT 7
CDP
CEN
CEPT
CLI
Commission 
Communication 
Council of Ministers
CP
CS
CSl
CTI
CUSF
DBT
DG
DGT
Directive
A service that allows customers to have their incoming telephone 
calls redirected to another number.
Customised Application for Mobile network Enhanced Logic -  it 
allows a customer to invoke services whilst roaming away from 
their Home Mobile Network, via an IN platform located in the 
home network. It is based upon IN CSl.
Call Control Agent Function 
Call Control Function
Committee Consultatif International Télégraphique et 
Téléphonique -  Now ITU-T
CCITT Signalling System no. 7 - signalling specification from the 
ITU-T
Centralised Distributed Processing (architecture model)
Comité Européen de coordination des Normes
Conférence Européenne des Administrations des Postes et des
Télécommunications
Calling Line Identity, a capability that enables identification of the 
number from which a call is made.
The executive body of the EU, with the power to create legislation 
A non-binding statement of EU policy
The EU's legislative body, in which Member States are represented 
by government ministers 
Centralised Processing (architecture model)
Capability Set
Capability Set. The first phase IN standards from the ITU-T
Computer Telephony Integration. Self-contained (i.e. not public)
computer applications which add value to telephony
Call Unrelated Service Function
Deutsche Bundespost Telekom
Directorate General
Director General of Telecommunications 
Legislation which defines the outcome to be achieved whilst 
leaving it to national regulators to decide how it should be achieved
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DNS
DTI
ECMA
ECTEL
ETCO
ETNO
ETSI
EU
FCC
FE
FEA
FLU
GATT
GEC
GPRS
Green Paper
GSM
H323
ICT
IETF
IN
INAP
Interconnect
Interface
INTUG
IP
Domain Name Server
Department of Trade and Industry
European Computer Manufacturers Association
European Conference of Associations of Telecommunications and
Professional Electronic Industries
European Telecommunications Consultancy Organisation
European Telecommunications Network Operators Association
European Telecommunications Standards Institute
European Union (previously the European Economic Community
(ECC))
Federal Communications Commission (US)
Functional Entity
Functional Entity Actions
Functional Logic Unit
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
General Electric Company, United Kingdom
GSM Packet Radio Service
A consultative document prepared and issued by the Commission, 
on a particular area for which the EU has not yet produced 
legislation
Global System for Mobile (formerly Group Spéciale Mobile) -  
Pan-European digital mobile cellphone technology 
H.323 is the underlying protocol used in the majority of VoIP 
phones and facilitates VOIP interconnection with C l.
Information and Computing Technologies 
Internet Engineering Task Force 
Intelligent Network
Intelligent Network Application Protocol
The connection of separate telecommunication networks.
A set of technical characteristics describing the point of connection 
between two telecommunication networks.
International Telecommunications User Group 
Intelligent Peripheral
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IP
IPR
ISDN
ISO
ISUP
ITC
ITU
ITU-T
JAIN
LAN
MDP
Member State
MF
MMC
MOU
NA
NAP
NET
Network Business
Nice
NRA
Number Translation
Internet Protocol (IETF) is a means which enables computers to 
communicate to each other over the Internet.
Intellectual Property Rights
Integrated Services Digital Network. A network supporting a wider 
range of services than is possible over the PSTN.
International Standardisation Organisation 
ISDN User Part
Independent Television Commission
International Telecommunication Union
International Telecommunication Union - Telecommunications
Standardisation Sector. The Main Global Organisation for
telecommunications covering Standardisation
Java API for Integrated Networks
Local Area Network
Mixed Distributed Processing (architecture model)
The countries forming the European Union 
Multi-frequency
Monopolies and Mergers Commission 
Memorandum of Understanding 
North American 
Network Access Point
Normes Européennes de Télécommunication 
The running and maintenance of BT’s network and the conveyance 
of voice telephony. It supplies network services to BT Systems 
Business (at transfer charges) or to operators with Relevant 
Connectable System status (i.e. Condition 13 rates)
Network Interoperability Consultative Committee -  Formed by 
OFTEL to agree interoperability issues. Its membership comprises 
Interest Groups from the UK Telecommunications Industry. (Was 
the Network Interfaces Co-ordination Committee)
National Regulatory Authority
A facility whereby calls made to value added numbers (e.g. 
freephone - 0800), are translated and routed to PSTN number.
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OECD
OFT
OFTEL
ONP
Operator
ORB
OSS
PABX
PANS
PBX
PCM
POTS
PSTN
PTO
PTT
R & D
RACE
RBOC
SB
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
Office of Fair Trading 
Office of Telecommunications 
Open Network Provision
Telecommunications operator. A company operating a public 
telecommunications infi*astructure and offering services to the 
public.
Object Request Broker. A Microsoft Windows NT capability 
Operational Service System
Private Automatic Branch Exchange - now known as PBX 
Pretty Amazing New Stuff - Used in comparison between old and 
new technologies, e.g. POTS & PANS
Private Branch Exchange. A telecommunications switch within a 
company
Pulse Code Modulation (a method of passing signals over a 
conductor)
Plain Old Telephony Service (Voice Telephony)
Public Switched Telephone Network, comprising the 
interconnected networks of PTOs 
Public Telecommunications Operator. The operator of a 
telecommunication network which provides, telecommunications 
network services.
Post, Telegraph & Telephones 
Research and Development
Research and Development in Advanced Communications 
Technologies in Europe 
Regional Bell Operating Company
Systems Business. That part of BT’s Business which obtains 
network services from BT Network Business in order to sell basic 
retail services to customers, whether that customer is an end user, a 
service provider or BT's Supplemental Services Business. It can 
only provide services which can only realistically be provided by a 
network operator.
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SCE
SCEF
SCF
SCnF
SCP
SDF
SDP
SIB
SIDA
Sigtrans
SIP
SLEE
SLP
SMAF
SMF
SMS
SMS
SN
Soft PBX
SOGIT
SOGT
SP
SRF
SS7
Service Creation Environment
Service Creation Environment Function
Service Control Function
Service Creation Function
Service Control Point
Service Data Function
Service Data Point
Service Independent building Block
Swedish International Development Agency
Sigtrans covers a range of protocols defined by the IETF for
providing the equivalent transport characteristics of C l message
transport on an IP network.
Session Initiation Protocol -a  session set-up protocol for use in 
applications such as Internet telephony.
Service Logic Execution Environment 
Service Logic Platform 
Service Management Access Function 
Service Management Function 
Service Management System (ETSI)
Short Messaging Service (Mobile)
Service Node
PBX functionality contained in software on and operating firom a 
computer
Senior Official Group on Information Technology 
Senior Official Group on Telecommunications 
Service Provider. Those service providers who are not network 
operators and who provide a telecommunications based service to 
the public.
Specialised Resource Function
CCITT Signalling System no. 7 - signalling specification firom the 
ITU-T
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SSB
SSF
SSP
STC
STP
TAC
TAPI
TCAP
TCP
T elecommunication 
Service 
Time of Day 
Routing
TMA
TTC
TUA
TUP
TV
UK
UMTS
US
USA
VAT
VOIP
Supplementary Services Business. All BT services with a 
telecommunications component which could be provided 
independently of the PSTN, i.e by a Service Provider.
Service Switching Function 
Service switching Point 
Standard Telephones and Cables 
Signalling Transfer Point 
Telecommunication Advisory Committee 
Telephony Applications Programming Interface 
Transactions Capability Application Part
Transaction Capabilities Part, now Transaction Capabilities (TC) - 
part of CCITT No.7 signalling system
A service consisting of the transport of voice etc. by means of a 
telecommunication system.
The routing of calls to different destinations depending on the time 
of day or the day of the week, according to instructions held in the 
telephone network relating to a particular number. 
Telecommunication Managers Association. The main business 
communications user association, representing individuals who 
have responsibility for private communications systems in 
commerce, industry and the public sector in the UK. (now the 
Communications Management Association (CMA)) 
Telecommunications Technology Committee (Japan)
Telephone Users Association
Telephony User Part - A part of Signalling System No. 7 (SS7)
Television
United Kingdom
Universal Mobile Telephony Service 
United States (of America)
United States of America
Value Added Tax
Voice Over Internet Protocol
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VPN Virtual Private Network. A service for the interconnection of
Company’s PBXs over a network shared with other companies, but 
constructed such that each company appears to use the network 
independently of the others.
WTO World Trade Organisation
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